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Synopsis 
The central hypotheses of this thesis are: 
· that global formulary apportionment is the most appropriate method for the taxation of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) in lieu of the present system commonly referred to 
as the separate accounting/arm’s length method; and  
· that it is essential, in order to implement the proposed global formulary model, to 
create an international organisation which would fulfil, in the taxation field, a role 
equivalent to that of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in international trade. 
The world economy is fast integrating and is increasingly dominated by the activities of 
transnational enterprises. These activities create a dual tax problem for various revenue 
authorities seeking to tax gains derived thereon:  
· Firstly, when two or more countries entertain conflicting tax claims on the same base, 
there arises what is commonly referred to as a double taxation problem.  
· Secondly, an allocation problem arises when different jurisdictions seek to determine 
the quantum of the gains to be allocated to each jurisdiction for taxation purposes. 
The traditional regime for solving both the double taxation and the allocation problem is 
enshrined in a series of bilateral treaties signed between various nations. These are, in general, 
based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Model 
Treaty.1 It is submitted, in this thesis, that while highly successful in an environment 
characterised by the coexistence of various national taxation systems, the traditional regime 
lacks the essential attributes suitable to the emerging ‘borderless world’. 
The central theme of this thesis is the allocation problem. The OECD Model attempts to deal 
with this issue on a bilateral basis. Currently, the allocation problem is resolved through the 
application of Articles 7 and 9 of the OECD Model. In both instances the solution is based on 
the ‘separate enterprise’ standard, also known as the separate entity theory. 
                                                             
1 OECD, Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital (Paris: OECD, 1992), looseleaf, last 
updated 2000. 
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This separate accounts/arm’s length system was articulated in the 1930s when international 
trade consisted of flows of raw materials and other natural products as well as flows of 
finished manufactured goods. Such trade is highly visible and may be adequately valued both 
at the port of departure or at the port of entry in a country. It follows that within this particular 
system of international trade the application of the arm’s length principle was relatively easy 
and proved to be extremely important in resolving both the double taxation and apportionment 
problems. 
Today, however, the conditions under which international trade is conducted are substantially 
different from those that prevailed until the 1960s. 
· Firstly, apart from the significant increase in the volume of traditionally traded goods, 
trade in services now forms the bulk of international exchanges. In addition, the advent 
of the information age has dramatically increased the importance of specialised 
information whose value is notoriously difficult to ascertain for taxation purposes. 
· Secondly, the globalisation phenomenon which gathered momentum over the last two 
decades has enabled existing TNCs to extend their global operations and has favoured 
the emergence of new transnational firms. Thus, intra-firm trade conducted outside 
market conditions accounts for a substantial part of international trade. 
· Thirdly, further economic integration has been achieved following the end of the Cold 
War and the acceleration of the globalisation phenomenon. In this new world 
economic order only TNCs have the necessary resources to take advantage of 
emerging opportunities. 
The very essence of a TNC is ‘its ability to achieve higher revenues (or lower costs) from its 
different subsidiaries as a whole  compared to the results that would be achieved under 
separate management on an arm’s length basis.’2 Yet, the prevailing system for the taxation of 
TNCs overlooks this critical characteristic and is therefore incapable of fully capturing, for 
taxation purposes, the aggregate gains of TNCs. The potential revenue loss arising from the 
inability of the present system to account for and to allocate synergy gains is substantial. 
It follows that the perennial questions of international taxation can no longer be addressed 
within the constraints of the separate entity theory and a narrow definition of national 
sovereignty. Indeed, in order to mirror the developments occurring in the economic field, 
taxation needs to move from a national to an international level. 
Moreover, a profound reform of the system is imperative in order to avoid harmful tax 
competition between nations and enhance compliance from TNCs. Such a new international 
                                                             
2 R.M. Bird, ‘The Interjurisdictional Allocation of Income’, (1986) 3 Australian Tax Forum 333, at 334. 
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tax system needs to satisfy the test of simplicity, equity, efficiency, and administrative ease. To 
achieve these objectives international cooperation is essential. The hallmark of international 
cooperation has been the emergence, after World War II, of a range of international 
organisations designed to facilitate the achievement of certain goals deemed essential by 
various nations. The need for an organisation to deal specifically with taxation matters is now 
overwhelming.  
Consequently, this thesis recommends the creation of an international organisation to 
administer the proposed system. The main objective of this international organisation would be 
to initiate and coordinate the multilateral application of a formulary apportionment system 
which, it is suggested, would deal in a more realistic way with ‘the difficult problems of 
determining the tax base and allocating it appropriately between jurisdictions’.3 
The global formulary apportionment methodology is derived from the unitary entity theory. The 
unitary theory considers a TNC as a single business which, for convenience, is divided into 
‘purely formal, separately-incorporated subsidiaries’.4 Under the unitary theory the global 
income of TNCs needs to be computed, then such income is apportioned between the various 
component parts of the enterprise by way of a formula which reflects the economic 
contribution of each part to the derivation of profits. 
The question that arises is whether the world of international taxation is ready for such a 
paradigm shift. It is arguable that this shift has already occurred albeit cautiously and in very 
subtle ways. Thus, the latest of the OECD Guidelines on the transfer pricing question provides 
that ‘MNE [Multinational Enterprise] groups retain the freedom to apply methods not 
described in this Report to establish prices provided those prices satisfy the arm’s length 
principle in accordance with these Guidelines.’5 Arguably, the globalisation process has 
created ‘the specific situation’ allowed for by the OECD. This thesis, therefore, explores the 
relative obsolescence of the bilateral approach to the taxation of TNCs and then suggests that 
a multilateral system is better adapted to the emerging globalised economy.  
The fundamental building blocks of the model proposed in this thesis are the following:  
· First, the administration and coordination of the proposed system is to be achieved by 
the creation of a specialised tax organisation, called Intertax, to which member 
countries would devolve a limited part of their fiscal sovereignty.  
                                                             
3 Id., at 333. 
4 Note, ‘Multinational Corporations and Income Allocations Under Section 482 of the IRC’, (1976) 89 Harv 
L.R. 1202, at 1204. 
5 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators  (Paris: OECD, 
1995) at I-27 para. 1.68. 
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· Second, in order to enable the centralised calculation of TNC’s profits, the proposed 
system requires the formulation of harmonised methods for the measurement of the 
global profits of TNCs. Therefore, the efforts of the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) to produce international accounting standards and 
harmonised consolidation rules must be recognised and, if needs be, refined and 
ultimately implemented.  
· Third, the major function of Intertax would be to determine the commercial profits of 
TNCs on a standardised basis and to apportion the latter to relevant countries by way 
of an appropriate formula/formulas.  
Once this is achieved, each country would be free, starting from its share of commercial 
profits, to determine the taxable income in accordance with the particular tax base that it 
adopts and, ultimately, the tax payable within its jurisdiction. In the proposed system, 
therefore, a particular country would be able to independently set whatever depreciation 
schedules or investment tax credits it chooses, and adopt whatever tax accounting rules it 
deems fit relative to its policy objectives.  
Moreover, this thesis argues that the global formulary apportionment model it proposes is not 
dramatically opposed to the arm’s length principle. Indeed, it suggests that the constant 
assumption to the contrary, even with regard to the usual formulary apportionment 
methodology, is extravagant because both methodologies are based on a common endeavour, 
that is, to give a substantially correct reflex of a TNC’s true profits.  
It has often been objected that global formulary apportionment is arbitrary and ignores market 
conditions. This thesis addresses such concerns by rejecting the application of a single all-
purpose formula. Rather, it recognises that TNCs operating in different industries require 
different treatment and, therefore, suggests the adoption of different formulas to satisfy specific 
industry requirements. For example, the formula applicable to a financial institution would be 
different to that applicable to the pharmaceutical industry. Each formula needs to be based on 
the fundamental necessity to capture the functions, taking into consideration assets used, and 
risks assumed within that industry. In addition, if the need arises, each formula should be able 
to be fine-tuned to fit specific situations. Moreover, it is also pertinent to note that the OECD 
already accepts ‘the selected application of a formula developed by both tax administrations in 
cooperation with a specific taxpayer or MNE group...such as it might be used in a mutual 
agreement procedure, advance transfer pricing agreement, or other bilateral or multilateral 
determination.’6 The system proposed in this thesis can thus be easily reconciled with the 
separate accounting/arm’s length which the OECD so vehemently advocates. Both models 
                                                             
6 Id., at III-20 para. 3.60. 
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have the same preoccupations so that what is herein proposed may simply be characterised as 
an institutionalised version of the system advocated by the OECD. 
Multilateral formulary apportionment addresses both the double taxation and the allocation 
problems in international taxation. It resolves the apportionment question ‘without depending 
on an extraordinary degree of goodwill or compliance from taxpayers.’7 It is therefore 
submitted that, if applied on a multilateral basis with a minimum of central coordination, it also 
seriously addresses the double taxation problem. Indeed, it is a flexible method given that 
different formulas may be devised to suit the needs of TNCs operating in different sectors. 
Consequently, formulary apportionment understood in this sense, is a realistic alternative to the 
limitations of the present system. 
 
                                                             
7 Bird, supra note 2, at 333. 
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PART I 
SLICING A SHADOW: 
THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with the taxation of transnational corporations (referred to as TNCs). 
TNCs are not simply firms engaged in international operations. An enterprise which merely 
takes foreign orders for its products and exports the required goods is not a TNC. It only 
trades with a foreign country. Conversely, a TNC is an enterprise which establishes a foreign 
presence and thus trades within rather than with a foreign country.1 
On the international level the activities of TNCs create a dual international tax problem. Firstly, 
the country where the TNC is considered to be resident may claim a right to tax any gain 
derived from the worldwide activities of the enterprise. However, countries where those 
activities are carried out may also claim a right to tax such gains on account of their being 
sourced there. If these conflicting claims are not reconciled, then the gains of a single enterprise 
are likely to be taxed twice. Secondly, because the activities of a TNC are carried out in more 
than one country, a second problem arises in the determination of the quantum of the gains to 
be allocated to each jurisdiction for taxation purposes. 
The traditional regime for solving both the double taxation and the allocation problem is 
enshrined in a series of bilateral treaties signed between various nations and based on the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Model Treaty. 2 The 
double taxation problem is resolved by granting the source country the right to tax business 
profits arising from the activities of a permanent establishment (PE) of a TNC within its 
jurisdiction, while the residence country is required to provide the TNC with either a credit or 
an exemption for source country taxes. Moreover, the OECD Model imposes a limit on the 
source country tax by targeting exclusively business profits attributable to a PE. A residual 
right to tax such business profits is then granted to the residence country. In general, a PE is 
defined as any fixed place of business or an agency relationship which is characterised by a 
certain degree of permanence. The taxation regime of subsidiary companies, because of their 
separate legal personality, is determined by the law applicable to corporate entities in their 
respective country of residence unless they are considered to be PEs of their parent company.  
                                                             
1 See Grainger & Sons v. Gough  [1896] AC 325. See also J.D. Adams & R.J. Whalley, The International 
Taxation of Multinational Enterprises in Developed Countries (London: The Institute of Fiscal Studies, 1977). 
Adams and Whalley use the expression ‘multinational enterprises’. For the present purposes the expression 
‘transnational corporation’ rather than ‘multinational enterprise’ seems more appropriate. The latter expression 
connotes allegiance to several states when in reality such allegiance transcends national boundaries and vests 
solely with the parent. 
2 OECD, Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital (Paris: OECD, 1992), looseleaf, last 
updated 2000. 
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The second aspect of the international taxation problem arising from the operation of TNCs is 
the proper allocation of income generated by multijurisdictional operations. This problem, 
referred to as the ‘allocation problem’, forms the central theme of this thesis. The OECD 
Model deals with the allocation problem on a bilateral basis. Article 7 provides for the 
methods of apportioning profits derived by PEs operating in different jurisdictions. Article 9, 
for its part, allows the taxation authorities of a country to re-write the accounts of an 
associated enterprise of a TNC in order to show the true profits arising within that country. In 
both instances the solution is based on the ‘separate enterprise’ standard also known as the 
separate entity theory. 
This theory is based on two hypotheses: 
· First, it assumes that the components of a TNC, regardless of their legal form, act as if 
they are not related to each other. It is thus assumed that members of a TNC compete 
with each other as if they were separate and independent parties each attempting to 
maximise its own profits.  
· Second, as a result of this competition hypothesis, transactions entered into by various 
members of the group must be comparable to those which would have been 
negotiated between unrelated parties dealing at arm’s length.  
The OECD Model, therefore, requires that the price agreed upon by related parties for a 
particular good should equate that which unrelated parties would have negotiated for the same, 
or similar good, under the same conditions and circumstances. Since arm’s length prices are 
charged, or are deemed to be charged, between parties dealing with each other at arm’s 
length, then, notwithstanding their relationship, the profits that are shown in the separate books 
of the related parties must necessarily reflect the exact commercial significance of the 
operation. It is that commercial result (profit or loss), sourced in a particular country and 
adjusted if necessary to reflect an arm’s length situation, which forms the tax base upon which 
that country may assess. In certain jurisdictions, however, further adjustments are necessary to 
the commercial profits in order to satisfy tax accounting principles. 
This separate accounts/arm’s length method was articulated in the 1930s and has been highly 
successful in achieving some coherence in international taxation. However, with the advent of 
the so-called ‘new economy’ based on services and information exchanges in increasingly 
globalised markets, it is doubtful whether the present system could endure further stretching to 
accommodate these innovations. Indeed, the globalisation phenomenon of the last two 
decades has enabled existing TNCs to extend their global operations and has favoured the 
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emergence of new transnational firms.3 In addition, the end of the Cold War, the implosion of 
the former USSR and the embrace of the market economy by former East European countries 
and China have opened vast markets in which TNCs can now operate. Furthermore, the 
removal of trade barriers through multilateral trade negotiations under the General Agreement 
on Tariff and Trade (GATT), now the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the creation of 
extensive integrated economic zones, for example the European Union (EU), the North 
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation, have again opened new 
markets. In most cases only TNCs have the necessary resources to take advantage of the 
emerging opportunities. On the taxation front these conditions have irrevocably altered the 
equilibrium between the interests of the source and the residence country. Indeed, they have 
even blurred the traditional dichotomy between capital exporting and capital importing 
countries. 
The very essence of a TNC is ‘its ability to achieve higher revenues (or lower costs) from its 
different subsidiaries as a whole  compared to the results that would be achieved under 
separate management on an arm’s length basis.’4 The prevailing system for the taxation of 
TNCs ignores this critical characteristic. Consequently, the separate entity/arm’s length 
principle is relatively ineffective in capturing, for taxation purposes, the aggregate gains of 
TNCs. Since TNCs are now the major proponents of international trade, the amount of 
revenue loss arising from the inability of the present system to account for synergy gains is 
substantial. Therefore, the perennial questions of international taxation can no longer be 
addressed within the narrow constraints of the separate entity theory. Moreover, if the current 
provincialism of taxation authorities based on the principle of fiscal sovereignty remains 
unchecked, then these problems are likely to remain unresolved. A profound reform of the 
system is imperative in order to avoid tax competition between nations which could lead to 
what Thomas Menck has described as a ‘star wars between finance administrations’.5 
Cooperation in solving international problems of any magnitude is crucial. This objective can 
be achieved efficiently through various international organisations endowed with a clear 
mandate and appropriate powers. 
In the international taxation field there is no international organisation to fulfil an equivalent role 
to that of the WTO in international trade. An international organisation needs to be set up to 
initiate and to coordinate the multilateral application of alternative taxation principles in lieu of 
the actual practice by various nations. The major purpose of an eventual international 
                                                             
3 The United Nations believes that in 1995 there were 39,000 TNCs with 270,000 foreign affiliates representing a 
total investment of $2.7 trillion; see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment 
Report 1996: Overview (New York & Geneva: United Nations, 1996), at 2. 
4 R.M. Bird, ‘The Interjurisdictional Allocation of Income’, (1986) 3 Australian Tax Forum 333, at 334. 
5 T. Menck, ‘West Germany’, (August 1986) Tax Notes 583, at 585. 
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organisation in the taxation field is therefore to deal in an alternative way with ‘the difficult 
problems of determining the tax base and allocating it appropriately between jurisdictions’.6 
An alternative method for the determination and allocation of the tax base to different 
jurisdictions is the unitary entity theory. This theory considers a TNC as a single business 
which, for convenience, is divided into ‘purely formal, separately-incorporated subsidiaries’.7 
Under the unitary theory, the global income of TNCs is first determined. It is then apportioned 
between the various component parts of the enterprise by way of a formula reflecting the 
economic contribution of each part the enterprise to the derivation of the aggregated profits. 
Global formulary apportionment is not a radically new proposition. The method, or variants 
thereof, was used by various European states at the beginning of the century. It is still 
predominant in the U.S. at the State level. In addition, although the arm’s length principle was 
adopted by the League of Nations as the primary method of apportionment, the formulary 
apportionment alternative was not totally rejected. Its retention by the League of Nations is 
echoed by the OECD, which still provides that it is applicable pursuant to article 7(4) of the 
OECD Model or ‘in specific…situations where other methods give rise to serious difficulties 
and…the countries concerned are able to adopt a common approach and the necessary 
information be made available.’8 Moreover, the latest of the OECD Guidelines on the transfer 
pricing question provides that ‘MNE [Multinational Enterprises] groups retain the freedom to 
apply methods not described in this Report to establish prices provided those prices satisfy the 
arm’s length principle in accordance with these Guidelines.’9 Furthermore, as far as the 
selection of a proper method for determining transfer prices is concerned, the 1995 Guidelines 
provides that ‘generally it will be possible to select one method that is apt to provide the best 
estimation of the arm’s length price.’ 
It then goes on to recommend the use of ‘a flexible approach’ provided that: 
an attempt [is made] to reach a conclusion consistent with the arm’s length principle that is 
satisfactory from a practical viewpoint to all the parties involved, taking into account the facts and 
circumstances of the case, the mix of evidence available, and the relative reliability of the various 
methods under consideration.10 
This thesis is based on the hypothesis that the globalisation process has created ‘the specific 
situation’ allowed for by the OECD. It further suggests that formulary apportionment is not 
                                                             
6 Bird, supra note 4, at 333. 
7 Note, ‘Multinational Corporations and Income Allocations Under Section 482 of the IRC’, (1976) 89 Harv 
L.R. 1202, at 1204. 
8 OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD, 1979), at 
para. 14. 
9 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators (Paris: OECD, 
1995), at I-27 para. 1.68. 
10 Id., at I-27 para. 1.69. 
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dramatically opposed to the arm’s length principle. Indeed, the constant assumption to the 
contrary is extravagant because in many instances retail prices are often set by merely allowing 
a certain percentage mark-up of a wholesale price.  
Global formulary apportionment addresses both the double taxation and the allocation 
problems in international taxation. It resolves the apportionment question ‘without depending 
on an extraordinary degree of goodwill or compliance from taxpayers.’11 It is therefore 
submitted that, if applied on a multilateral basis with a certain form of central coordination 
through a specialised tax organisation, it seriously addresses the double taxation problem and 
is, consequently, a realistic alternative to the limitations of the present system. 
This study is devoted to the systematic application of the formulary system on a worldwide 
basis with emphasis on the global financial industry. Part I is concerned with the major 
problems of the present international tax system. Chapter 1 describes the origins of the basic 
principles of international taxation. Chapter 2 discusses the limitations of the prevailing system. 
Chapter 3 studies the proposals for reform that have been suggested to enhance the present 
system. Part II is concerned with the practical application of formulary apportionment for the 
taxation of TNCs in a global economy. Chapter 4 is an historical account of the unitary 
method. Chapter 5 argues for a multilateral approach to the problem of international taxation 
and proposes the creation of an international tax organisation. Chapter 6 is concerned with the 
administrative functions of such an organisation, for example, the institution itself, the 
promotion of international accounting standards, and the calculation of the tax base. Chapter 7 
focuses on the application of various possible formulas by the international organisation, their 
justification and their limitations. Finally, Chapter 8 applies the model that has emerged to the 
global financial industry. 
 
                                                             
11 Bird, supra note 4, at 333. 
 The Origins of the General Principles of 
International Taxation 
The difficulties of allocating income among various countries has been described as bearing 
‘some resemblance...to slicing a shadow’.1 A first attempt to address the issue on an 
international basis was carried out by the League of Nations in the 1920s.2  
Section I of this chapter reviews the search for a theoretical rationale linking the state’s power 
to tax with the concept of jurisdiction to tax. Section II analyses the efforts of the League of 
Nations to deal with the problem of international double taxation. Finally, Section III considers 
the problem relative to the proper allocation of multijurisdictional business income. 
Section I  Development of Rationales for International 
Jurisdiction to Tax 
A fundamental question relative to taxation is the determination of the relationship between a 
state’s power to tax and that of its jurisdiction to tax. 3 Early theoretical studies of this question 
conceded that mere power to collect tax does not justify the indiscriminate use of that power. 
In order to satisfy customary international fiscal law, a country must have what is called 
jurisdiction to tax.4 
                                                             
1 Per Brennan J. in Container Corp v Franchise Tax Board  (1983) 463 U.S. 159, 192. 
2 According to Picciotto, since its foundation, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) was preoccupied with the 
question of international double taxation. In 1920 it held an international financial conference, and on its 
recommendation, the League of Nations took on the task of coordinating the efforts to find a solution to the problem 
of international business taxation. See S. Picciotto, International Business Taxation (London: Weidenfeld 7 Nicholson, 
1992), at 15. A history of the ICC’s involvement with the efforts to solve the problem of double taxation is to be 
found in Ke Chin Wang, ‘International Double Taxation of Income: Relief through International Agreement 1921-
1945’, (1945) 59 Harv L.R. 73, at 97ff. 
3 The concepts of power to tax and right to tax is explored in A.L. Harding, Double Taxation of Property and Income 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), at 24ff. 
4 The question as to whether there is in fact a coherent body of international rules that may be termed customary 
international fiscal law is examined in A.H. Qureshi, The Public International Law of Taxation: Text, Cases and 
Materials (London: Graham & Trotman Limited, 1994), at 2ff. Qureshi uses the expression ‘public international law 
of taxation’ to describe that branch of public international law which provides an ‘international normative framework 
in fiscal matters’. See also A. Knechtle, Basic Problems in International Fiscal Law  (HFL Publishers Ltd, 1979); and 
R.S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Structure of International Taxation’, (1996) 74 Texas Law Review 1301, at  1305, where 
Professor Avi-Yonah argues that the international tax regime can be regarded as customary international law. 
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1 The Earlier Approach 
Attempts to reconcile the power and jurisdiction to tax date as far back as the Middle Ages.5 
However, a comprehensive doctrine dealing with the issue in relation to business income 
originated towards the end of the nineteenth century with the gradual spread of business 
taxation.6 This initial approach was based on the doctrine of political allegiance and on the so-
called equivalence or exchange theory. 
A The Doctrine of Political Allegiance  
Until the end of the last century, political allegiance, that is, nationality for physical persons and 
incorporation for legal persons, was widely considered as a reasonable connecting factor or 
nexus between a taxable subject and a taxing state.7 Nationality confers political rights and 
certain obligations to its holders. Consequently, nationality has been regarded as creating the 
necessary nexus enabling a country to tax. Thus, the United States (U.S.) taxes American 
citizens on their property and income even if derived and held abroad.8 
Political allegiance is, however, an imperfect connecting factor. Apart from the difficulties 
associated with the enforcement of any tax liability based on nationality, it often results in the 
double taxation of the citizen in the absence of adequate relief measures. Moreover, ‘the 
                                                             
5 E. Seligman, Double Taxation and International Fiscal Cooperation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), at 
1-16. 
6 According to Professor Klaus Vogel, two of the most influential authors on the question of the taxation of foreign 
income are Adolph Wagner and Georg von Schanz. Thus, Henry Simons, author of Personal Income Taxation (The 
University of Chicago Press, 1938), (Midway Reprints), honours Georg von Schanz for originally developing the 
ideas that form the basis for his definition of income. See K. Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income-A 
Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments’, (Part I) [1988/8-9] Intertax 216, at 218-19. (Part II [1988/10] Intertax 310, 
Part III [1988/11] Intertax 393.) 
7 This is the so-called nexus question. Nexus ‘describes the amount and degree of business activity that must be present 
before a state can tax an entity’s income’; see at <http://wwwaicpa.org/members/div/tax/nexus.htm>. This question 
will be explored fully in later chapters. Moreover, authors such as Hobbes, Rousseau, Bentham, Duguit, and Austin, 
to quote but a few, have explored the philosophical basis for taxation. Two schools of thought have emerged. The first 
makes a clear distinction between sovereign and subject, between ruler and ruled. It then holds that the sovereign or 
the state is supreme over all and answerable to none. In this view, the state may tax anything, any person, or any act 
within the reach of its powers. The second school presents a different notion and character of the state. It is based on 
the conception that individuals or groups of individuals form a state either from choice or from a ‘social instinct’ or 
from physical necessity. Pursuant to that theory, man establishes a state for definite purposes such as for protection 
against external aggression or internal strife or to gain for themselves advantages flowing from the creation of a ‘critical 
mass’. It follows that the state exists for the satisfaction of human wants and that the right for the state to exist is 
conditional upon it being able to satisfy these wants. To fund its mission thus stated, the state has a right to tax; see 
Harding, supra note 3, at 35ff. 
8 See Cook v Tait (1924) 265 U.S. 47. For a discussion of citizenship as a criterion of income tax liability, see P. Gann, 
‘The Concept of an Independent Treaty Foreign Tax Credit’ (1982/83) 38 Tax Law Review  58. 
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natural instinct of every country’ is to ignore the nationality of any foreigner residing within its 
territory and to tax that person’s income when derived from sources within the country.9 
B The Exchange or Equivalence Theory 
Tax jurisdiction may further be explained through the equivalence or exchange theory which is 
expressed in two forms: the cost theory and the benefit theory. The cost theory rests on the 
premise that taxes represent the cost of services performed by the government. The benefit 
theory, for its part, holds that taxes are payable in consideration for the benefits conferred by 
the government on an individual. Basically, the equivalence theory postulates that a taxpayer 
should pay taxes equivalent to either the costs that he or she causes to the government of a 
country, or the benefit that he or she derives through the use of the infrastructure of a 
country.10 
At the international level the exchange or equivalence theory has some significance in that it 
mainly supports source countries’ fiscal aspirations. Indeed, governments, in a bid to attract 
foreign investors, often engage in heavy public expenses designed to finance additions or 
enhancements to the country’s infrastructure. These facilities are then used by foreign 
businesses in the course of carrying out their activities. Arguably, a tax on these activities may 
be levied by the source country in exchange for the expenses it incurs to facilitate business 
operations.11  
As progressive as it may sound, the exchange or equivalence theory exhibits serious practical 
weaknesses, especially at the national level. These flaws were addressed by what may be 
referred to as the ‘modern’ approach to the question of jurisdiction to tax. 
                                                             
9 While retaining citizenship as the basic criterion for taxability, the U.S. makes substantial exceptions and concessions 
to economic and residential allegiance both for its own citizens and for foreigners. See A.A. Skaar, Permanent 
Establishments (Kluwer Law International, 1991), at 22. 
10  Id., at 24. 
11 Transnational companies (TNCs) are increasingly involved in infrastructure development as a result of the 
privatisation of government facilities following the failure of expropriation and nationalisation polices implemented 
after World War II. Thus, such schemes as Build -own-operate (BOO), Built-operate-transfer (BOT), or Built-
transfer-operate (BTO), or any variants thereon, may be viewed as indirectly satisfying the benefit theory. Indeed, 
infrastructure investments are risky and the involvement of TNCs shifts the risks involved from governments to those 
enterprises. The compensation paid to those enterprises in the form of profits from the operation of the facilities is 
meant to compensate for those risks. In other words, the benefit that TNCs derive is increased by a profit element 
calculated on market conditions; see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 
1996 (New York & Geneva: United Nations, 1996), at 18ff.  
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2 The Modern Approach 
The modern approach is characterised by the increasing intervention of economists and their 
analytical methods in an area which, until then, had been the precinct of lawyers.12 At the 
international level, the trend was inaugurated in the 1920s when the Academic Experts of the 
League of Nations investigated the question. 13 They concluded that the ability to pay, or the 
faculty theory, was superior to the earlier theories as a basis for the international allocation of 
tax jurisdiction.14 
A. The Principle of Ability to Pay 
The underlying idea of the ability to pay (or the faculty theory) is that the possession of ability 
is of itself a sufficient condition to justify the imposition of tax upon a taxpayer. Ability to pay 
assumes that if a person can pay, then that person should pay.15 It is also premised on the 
principle of equal sacrifice. Indeed, the payment of taxes involves the sacrifice by a taxpayer of 
the enjoyment of that part of his/her property used to effect payment. A greater sacrifice is 
required from a person that has greater ability compared to one whose ability is inferior. 
Arguably, faculty does not attach to things although many taxes known as real or impersonal 
taxes, as opposed to personal taxes, are imposed on things or objects. Ultimately, however, 
as the Academic Experts noted, all taxes are paid by persons. Taxes, therefore, shape the 
economic status of all individuals including their ability to pay. If persons are ultimately 
responsible for paying taxes, then the rights and obligations associated with personality acquire 
substantial importance in the quest for an acceptable justification for exercising tax jurisdiction. 
The question of personality is closely linked to the idea of personal political allegiance or 
nationality. However, most countries no longer favour nationality as a basis for taxation. 
Residence then emerged as an acceptable connecting factor.16 Mere temporary residence, 
however, does not create a sufficiently enduring relationship between a person and a particular 
                                                             
12 Vogel, supra note 6, at 216. 
13 A sub-committee of the Financial Committee (Doc. E. F. S. 253 fixed the terms of reference of these four experts in 
March 1922. A. 152) as disclosed in the League of Nations, Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial 
Committee by Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp (The Academic Experts) League of Nations 
Documents E. F. S. 73. F. 19, (5 April 1923) in Legislative History of United States  Tax Conventions, Volume 4: 
Model Tax Conventions  (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 4003, at 4006. 
14 See Vogel, supra  note 6, who traces the paternity of these concepts to Adolph Wagner and Georg von Schanz. 
15 G.S. Cooper, ‘The Benefit Theory of Taxation’, (1994) Australian Tax Forum  (No. 4) 397, at 417. 
16 The emergence of the concept of residence as a fundamental principle of the modern international tax regime may be 
attributed to a very large extent to Edwin Seligman who was the leading economist among the Academic Experts. A 
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jurisdiction to justify the taxation of that person on the whole of his or her wealth. A stronger 
nexus is afforded when a person is domiciled in a particular jurisdiction or has his or her 
permanent residence therein. Thus, residence came to be defined as the place where wealth or 
income is habitually or permanently consumed or utilised.17 In essence, therefore, residence 
taxation is a doctrine pursuant to which those who habitually reside in a particular place must 
be required to contribute to the expenses incurred for the upkeep of that place. 
While the residence criterion appears to be acceptable it still lacks certain attributes that would 
facilitate its universal application. Residents as well as non-residents may own property in a 
particular jurisdiction. To rely on taxes levied on residents alone in order to finance the 
protection of the whole mass of property located in a particular jurisdiction may not only be 
insufficient, but it is also clearly inequitable. Indeed, non-residents may own some of that 
property. If costs incurred to protect that property is recouped from residents exclusively, then 
non-residents would have derived a benefit without incurring any corresponding cost. Clearly, 
non-residents must have certain obligations to the place where some of their property is 
located or where their income is derived. Conversely, the revenue of some of the residents of 
a particular country may be derived from sources outside their jurisdiction of residence, for 
example, from businesses conducted abroad. If the jurisdiction of residence were to be 
exclusively allowed to tax such foreign income, then taxation would be achieved at the expense 
of the source jurisdiction, a solution unacceptable to capital-importing countries. 
In practice, tax authorities rely on both the principle of domicile (henceforth the residence 
principle), and that of location or origin (henceforth the source principle), to articulate their 
right to tax. Both the residence and source principles are the expression of a broader 
principle –that of economic interest or economic allegiance. Therefore, an individual is required 
to share between each of the competing authorities to which he or she owes economic 
allegiance the total sum which he or she is required to pay as taxes according to his or her 
ability, that is, according to the total of his or her economic resources. It is convenient to note 
that the ability to pay theory also expresses the idea of progressivity in taxation.  
Once the question of who pays is resolved, the next issue is the determination of the quantum 
payable to each competing jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
serious rivalry arose between Seligman and Thomas Sewall Adams, the U.S. representative on the Expanded Technical 
Experts Committee (see infra Section II, 1, A) who favoured source-based taxation. See M.J. Graetz & M. O’Hear, 
‘The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation’, (1997) 46 Duke L.J. 1021, at 1075 n 215. 
17 This must be contrasted with the common law concept of ‘domicile’ which includes the place where a person 
exercises his or her political rights. It therefore expresses a kind of connection related to both nationality and 
residence. 
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B. The Doctrine of Economic Allegiance 
The determination of the quantum of tax that an individual is required to pay to each competing 
jurisdiction is closely linked to ascertaining where the true economic interests of that individual 
are to be found. In the words of the Academic Experts: 
[I]t is only after an analysis of the constituent elements of this economic allegiance that we shall be 
able to determine where a person ought to be taxed or how the division ought to be made as 
between the various sovereignties that impose tax. 18 
The theory of economic allegiance provides the necessary intellectual basis for both residence 
and source taxation. What then is economic allegiance? Georg von Schanz first articulated the 
concept in 1892.19 To Schanz, a person owes what he calls economic allegiance to a state 
when that person profits from a state’s provisions of services. Economic allegiance to a state 
can be based on either consumption, or business activities, including investments. A state is 
entitled to tax a person if that person derives an economic advantage or benefit by utilising the 
services provided by that state.20 If economic allegiance is based on consumption, then Schanz 
agrees that residence constitutes a suitable criterion for tax jurisdiction. However, when 
economic allegiance arises from a business activity carried out by a non-resident, or that non-
resident derives income in a state as a result of his or her activities there, then economic 
allegiance is owed to both states. Consequently, the latter must agree to share the revenue 
arising from a tax on these activities. The criterion for achieving this is the benefit test. A non-
resident does not get the full benefit of a state’s activities. It would therefore be unfair, 
according to Schanz, if the state where the income is derived were to tax a non-resident in the 
same way as a resident who enjoys the full benefit of a state’s stock of public goods. Taxation 
of non-residents, he argued, should be commensurate with the benefits derived by the latter. 
Moreover, in Schanz’s view, the primary right to tax accrues to the state where income is 
produced. He therefore grants three-fourths of the revenue to that state. As for the residence 
state, where presumably the foreign income would be consumed, it is given the residual right to 
tax, that is, one-fourth of the revenue.21 
                                                             
18 League of Nations (1923), supra note 13, at 4024. 
19 G. Schanz, ‘Zur Frange der Steuerpflicht’, 9 II Finanzarchiv  1, 4 (1882), in Vogel, supra note 6, at 219 n 23. 
20 The most important of those benefits are security, economic stability, infrastructures and direct subsidies. Other state 
activities, such as the level of public health or education, or even the extent of public satisfaction, benefit the investor 
indirectly. See Vogel, supra note 6, at 313. 
21 Schanz argues that the benefit test does not ignore the question of progressivity in taxation. Progressivity is related to 
tax rates whereas the benefit test relates to tax basis. See Vogel, supra note 6, at 219. 
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The Academic Experts reviewed all these questions. They considered a number of issues 
including the following: 
1 Where is wealth produced? 
Wealth is produced as a result of a series of economic functions culminating to the point where 
a product is ready to be acquired for the purposes of accumulation or consumption. These 
various economic steps may be carried out in different jurisdictions. If a person carries out 
these different functions in different jurisdictions, then it may be said that he or she owes some 
economic allegiance to each of these jurisdictions. 
2 Where is wealth owned? 
The possession of wealth is that intermediary stage between its production and its disposition. 
Ownership of wealth arises from a range of functions, for example, establishing title to the 
wealth, preserving it and, if needs be, enforcing the legal rights thus created. Again, a person 
owes economic allegiance to that jurisdiction which enables him or her to enforce his or her 
property rights over the wealth in his or her possession. 
3. Where is wealth disposed of?  
The disposition of wealth occurs at that stage where it has reached its final owner who may 
use or dispose of it as he or she thinks fit. The law of the land where the final owner resides 
normally determines his or her action involving his or her wealth. For instance, if he or she 
decides to invest it, then he or she must abide by the law of where he or she resides. Again, 
therefore, he or she owes economic allegiance to this particular jurisdiction.  
The Academic Experts22 found that four factors ultimately bear some incidence on the sharing 
of the tax base, namely: 
· the principle of production or acquisition corresponding to the place of origin of the 
wealth; 
· the principle of location, that is, the situs of the wealth; 
· the principle of legal rights assimilated to the place of enforcement of the rights to the 
wealth; and 
· the principle of consumption or appropriation or disposition of wealth which is the 
place of residence or domicile of the ultimate owner. 
                                                             
22 League of Nations (1923), supra note 13, at 4027. 
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The most important of these four factors for the determination of international tax competence 
are, according to the Academic Experts, the origin of wealth and the residence or domicile of 
the owner who consumes the wealth. Therefore, an equitable sharing of tax jurisdiction 
requires the apportioning of economic allegiance between origin (source) and domicile 
(residence). This reasoning is similar to that put forward by Schanz as mentioned earlier. 
However, the solution recommended by the Academic Experts for sharing tax competence is 
the opposite of that proposed by Schanz. Instead of a proper sharing of jurisdiction to tax, the 
proposed solution required that states reciprocally exempt non-residents from income taxation 
effectively yielding such jurisdiction to the state of residence.23 
Still under the aegis of the League of Nations, a second group of experts, the Technical 
Experts, were also required to consider these questions. They were administrative 
practitioners representing various European governments, in general capital-importing 
countries. Their practical experience most obviously would have required them to recognise 
the importance that worldwide taxation of income had achieved for some of the most powerful 
capital-exporting countries. A compromise between the interests of capital exporting and 
capital importing countries was inevitable. Indeed, the Technical Experts concluded that the 
most ‘reasonable’ or ‘genuine’ connecting factors are concurrently the residence of the 
taxpayer and the source of the income. Consequently, these were considered as determinative 
of economic allegiance.  
The Technical Experts also held the view that source taxation could not be fully premised on 
the benefit theory. In their opinion, source taxation finds its justification in the economic 
connection between the source country and the income arising within its borders.24 Moreover, 
according to the Technical Experts, residence taxation is also a consequence of the economic 
allegiance theory. It arises because of the economic contacts, which occur when an individual 
lives in a particular jurisdiction. The League eventually subscribed to these principles. In 
general, therefore, until the advent of the globalisation process, which has irremediably 
changed the environment in which business is carried out, the jurisdictional basis for 
international taxation premised on residence and source has remained unchallenged. 
                                                             
23 Vogel, supra  note 6, at 220. The primacy of residence taxation in the Academic Experts’ report is ascribed to 
Seligman; see Graetz & O’Hear, supra  note 16, at 1076. As Vogel points out, starting from the same theory of 
economic allegiance as Schanz, Seligman comes to the opposite conclusion when he advises for an exclusive residence 
taxation system. 
24 It is arguable, however, that the Economic Experts retained a benefit-like component and its corollary: the cost theory. 
See League of Nations (1923), supra note 13, at 4022. 
Chapter  1 The Origins of the General Principles of Internat ional Taxation  
 14
C The Neutrality Theory 
Until recently, the system of international taxation put forward by the League of Nations’ 
system was considered as achieving an equitable sharing of the tax base between residence 
and source countries. In the 1960s, however, the issue of the proper allocation of taxing 
power resurfaced relative to the question of the influence of residence-state or source-state 
taxation upon the inter-nation allocation of economic resources.25 
Inter-nation equity is a term used by Professor Peggy Musgrave26 to describe the distribution 
of competence to tax among different countries. The term is not used relative to the amounts of 
tax paid by individual taxpayers to their respective governments but rather, relative to the 
distribution of the tax base as between competing jurisdictions. In other words, a distinction is 
made between inter-individual equity, that is, justice in the national context, and inter-nation 
equity, that is, justice in the international context.27 
The Musgraves28 view the question of inter-nation equity in terms of the equitable allocation of 
national gain and loss, that is, revenue sharing, between the country of residence and the 
country of source. In their opinion, real efficiency in capital movements in achieved in the 
presence of this equitable sharing of the tax pie. Thus defined, the question that arises is 
                                                             
25 Inter-nation equity is related to the question of capital import and capital export neutrality. Nonetheless, it is 
submitted that inter-nation equity poses the question of why countries should consent to tax in a particular way. It is 
a search for the optimum achievable system. It thus relates to the jurisdictional question, but at a higher level, given its 
emphasis on the idea of fairness. See A. Easson, ‘Taxing International Income’, in R. Krever, ed., Tax Conversations; 
A Guide to Key Issues in the Tax Reform Debate (Kluwer Law International, 1997), at 419ff. Capital import and 
capital export neutrality are raised in connection to how countries should tax within a prevailing system in order to 
achieve the most efficient allocation of resources. The concepts therefore do not relate direct ly to the jurisdiction 
question discussed in this chapter. See, however, Chapter 2, Section I, 1, B, ii, at 48ff. 
26 P. Brewer-Richman (now Musgrave), Taxation of Foreign Investment Income - An Economic Analysis (John Hopkins 
Press, 1963). 
27 R.B. Musgrave & P.G. Musgrave, ‘Inter-nation Equity’, in R.M. Bird & J.G. Head, eds, Modern Fiscal Issues: 
Essays in Honour of Carl Shoup (University of Toronto Press, 1972), at 63. According to Vogel, the term equity 
cannot be defined, although it connotes the idea of justice and is an attempt to bridge the distance between ethics and 
the law. See Vogel, supra note 6, at 393. 
28 Ibid. The value of the concept of inter-nation equity has been questioned. The principles underlying revenue sharing 
as agreed on through bilateral treaty negotiations reflect an overall balance of advantage that exists between contracting 
parties and is not based on any concept of each party obtaining its fair share of the tax pie. Indeed, it is difficult to 
measure each country’s fair share. Even if that were possible, the system wrought out to achieve apportionment of 
that fair share would need to be constantly revised in order to adjust each country’s position as its share of world 
trade changes; see M. Gammie, ‘The Taxation of Inward Direct Investment in North America Following the Free 
Trade Agreement’, (1994) 49 Tax Law Review 615, at 631 n 62. See also H.J. Ault, ‘Corporate Integration, Tax 
Treaties and the Division of the International Tax Base: Principles and Practices’, (1992) 47 Tax Law Review 565, at 
577, where Professor Ault also maintains that inter-nation equity ‘ignores the interaction between the tax system of 
two countries and their simultaneous roles as residence and source country and, if taken seriously, has obvious 
implications for the evaluation of treaty policy as it affects integration.’ 
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whether inter-nation equity is achieved under the present principles of international taxation. 
The basic thrust of the Musgraves’ argument is that if a system of benefit taxation had been in 
place, that is, one where each jurisdiction charges for the services it has rendered, then inter-
nation equity ‘would be self-implementing’.29 To the Musgraves, however, the fact is that most 
taxes are not imposed on a benefit basis. It is therefore necessary to find another allocation 
rule to deal with general non-benefit taxation. The solution proposed is to implement a benefit-
based system whereby gains would be allocated among nations commensurate to the cost of 
public services which each jurisdiction would have provided to the foreign investor. 
The Musgraves’ theory is premised on the assumption that the country of residence of the 
investor has a residual interest in all of the latter’s income. This right is based inter alia on the 
idea that the residence country ‘owns’ the capital and would have been entitled to tax any 
income it produces (or accretion thereon) had it not been invested abroad. This view is in 
contrast with that of the Academic Experts who held that the ownership of the income-
producing capital is not relevant per se given that their focus is on where that income-
producing capital is employed. If the economic allegiance theory were to be imported in the 
inter-nation equity paradigm, then the residence country’s taxation rights would be dependent 
on the extent of the taxpayer’s economic interest in the source country. Indeed, the latter often 
determines the quantum of tax he or she is required to pay in the jurisdiction where such 
interests are located. Therefore, as Vogel suggests,30 taxation by the source state always 
affects the residence state because it reduces income that the taxpayer may dispose of in the 
residence state. If the source state were to forgo its taxation rights, then the tax base of the 
residence country would be restored. However, given that the source state had provided the 
economic opportunities for the income to arise, it would be unreasonable to require it to 
accept such a sacrifice. The residence state, however, having provided nothing comparable to 
the source state for the derivation of that income, on equity grounds, it should be rewarded on 
a residual basis. In other words, the benefit theory remains the only valid legitimation even in 
the context of the principles of inter-nation equity.31 
                                                             
29 Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 27, at 71. 
30 Vogel, supra note 6 (Part III), at 398. 
31 For a further analysis of the question involving, inter alia, the rate of source country taxation, see P.A. Harris, 
Corporate Shareholder Income Taxation and Allocating Taxing Rights Between Countries  (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publication BV, 1996). 
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D The Integration Theory 
This thesis proposes a system of global formulary apportionment for the taxation of TNCs. 
The question that arises, therefore, is that of the relation of the proposed system to the above 
theories. It is crucial to understand, though, that global formulary apportionment relates only 
marginally to the concept of source as generally conceived.32 Global formulary apportionment 
allocates income to a country where the factors that contribute to the profitability of a business 
are located. It matters little whether the allocated income is sourced in that country or is 
foreign-sourced.33 A positive return on the factors of production in a particular jurisdiction 
demonstrates that a business has made a profitable use of the benefits provided by the state 
where these factors are located. Thus, pursuant to the benefit theory, tax liability which is 
dependent upon an economic relation between the business and the state where it is located34 
is fully incurred in the state where the factors are located. In general, such income will have its 
source in the jurisdiction where the factors are situated. However, global formulary 
apportionment also allocates to the country where the factors are present income that may be 
considered as foreign-sourced. As such, it may be argued that the system ignores the accepted 
jurisdictional threshold rules of a link, a nexus, or connection between the income and the 
taxing jurisdiction. 
It is submitted, however, that the required connection between that income and the taxing 
jurisdiction prevails. Only factors of production produce income as a result of certain 
economic activities, as will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis. For the 
moment, what needs to be noted is that when the total income of a TNC is allocated to 
various factors, and if in the aggregate that income turns out to be higher than what would have 
been allocated through the traditional separate accounting/arm’s length standard, then the 
excess of income thus allocated is still income produced by such factors. This additional 
income, known as synergy gains or unallocated profits,35 arises as a result of factors of 
production being efficiently integrated in a worldwide income-producing system and located at 
a specific place. Under the current system those synergy gains escape allocation and, 
                                                             
32 See R.D. Pomp, ‘Issues in the Design of Formulary Apportionment in the Context of NAFTA’, (1994) 49 Tax Law 
Review 795, at 801. There is some confusion as to what the concept of source really means. This question will be 
studied in more detail in later chapters, but see Vogel, supra note 6, at 233ff.  
33 See M.J. McIntyre, ‘The Design of Tax Rules for the North American Free Trade Alliance’, (1994) 49 Tax Law 
Review 769, at 776. 
34 See Schanz as studied in Vogel, supra  note 6, at 219. 
35 See M.J. McIntyre, The International Income Tax Rules of The United States, (Massachusetts: Butterworths, 1989), 
at 5-34 § 5/D1b. 
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therefore, taxation. In other words, formulary apportionment manages to allocate the true 
amount of income produced by factors located at a particular situs regardless as to where that 
income is sourced. 
The question of how synergy gains can be related to the factors of production located in a 
particular jurisdiction needs further analysis. In this regard, the integration theory of taxation 
expounded by Harding in the context of American states’ taxation provides the necessary 
connecting link with the taxing jurisdiction. Pursuant to the integration theory of taxation, a 
state may tax all the factors of production which have become identified with the economic 
structure of the state. Therefore: 
[A]s a matter of jurisdiction, it would seem to follow that every such place of integration may claim 
the right to tax the income which has been made possible through the economic activity within its 
borders.36 
In Harding’s mind, the state in which the property yielding the income is located ‘in the direct 
manner has jurisdiction to tax the whole of such income’.37 It follows that a state’s right to tax 
is not restricted to income that is sourced within that state but extends to any gains that may be 
imputed to the factors of production located within it regardless as to whether that income is 
sourced outside its jurisdiction. The whole of such income must necessarily comprise the 
synergy gains that are not accounted for under the traditional separate accounting/arm’s length 
standard. 
Section II The League’s First Compromise: The Allocation 
of Taxing Rights 
As early as the 1920s, international business strongly objected to double taxation which arose 
with the steady expansion of business taxation worldwide. It campaigned through the newly 
founded International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) for its elimination.38 In 1920 the ICC 
held an international financial conference which recommended that the League of Nations 
coordinate the efforts to find a solution to the problem.39 The League agreed to do so and 
                                                             
36 See Harding, supra note 3, at 42. 
37 Supra note 3, at 159. 
38 Picciotto, supra note 2, at 15. Until 1925, the ICC effectively exercised primary leadership in the movement against 
international double taxation. However, because of dissension among its members, it relinquished that role to the 
League of Nations and endorsed the League’s work without any innovative input in the debate. See Graetz & O’Hear, 
supra note 16, at 1073-74. 
39 Seligman, supra note 5, at 115.  
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entrusted that task to its Financial Committee. As already mentioned, four economists (the 
Academic Experts) were appointed to study the theoretical aspects of double taxation and to 
come up with a solution.40 In March 1923 the Academic Experts reported to the Financial 
Committee.41 
1 The Birth of Modern Double Taxation Agreements 
One of the fundamental questions in international taxation is the allocation of taxing jurisdiction 
between competing countries. A country’s right to tax is theoretically unlimited. However, this 
right is constrained by the country’s ability to enforce it. Enforcement of tax liability is 
facilitated when the potential taxpayer, or property to be taxed, is closely linked to the 
jurisdiction seeking to tax. It is generally agreed that the term ‘residence’ is used to describe a 
person’s closest economic connection with a country. The closest direct economic connection 
of income is, in normal circumstances, the country where it originates, that is, the source 
country.42 Since a person may reside in one country and derive income in another, there arises 
a conflict of interest between the residence and the source countries. Thus, the interaction of 
both countries’ right to tax may lead to double taxation. 
In order ‘to avoid or solve the problem of double taxation’,43 the Academic Experts were 
required to deal with two fundamental questions. First, there was the problem of allocating 
taxing rights between different states, and second, the apportionment of cross-border business 
income had to be satisfactorily achieved. To resolve these questions on a sound basis, the 
Academic Experts explored the theoretical rationale underlying countries’ jurisdiction to tax.  
A The Search for a Solution 
The Academic Experts were unable to propose one general principle applicable to 
international taxation. However, ‘three great principles…shaped the [Academic Experts’] 
1923 Report’: 44 
                                                             
40 League of Nations (1923), supra note 13, at 4003. 
41 Supra note 13 , at 4003-55. 
42 See V. Krishna, ‘International Income Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, (January 1999) 9 Canadian Current Tax 
(No. 4) 33, at 35. 
43 League of Nations (1923), supra note 13, at 4022. 
44 See Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 16, at 1076. 
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· The classification and assignment of specific categories of income to source or 
residence should be determined by an objective test based on ‘economic allegiance’. 
The purpose of the test is to weigh the various contributions made by different states 
to the production and enjoyment of income; 
· Existing tax practices across the globe tended to underestimate the contribution of 
residence and to reflect the misguided belief in the naturalness and rightness of source-
based taxation; and  
· Progressive taxes on global income were fundamentally different from other taxes and 
ought to be the unique province of residence-based taxation. 
The report identified four possible methods of reconciling the different conflicting approaches 
to the taxation of international income. These methods were all premised on the existence of an 
unequivocal distinction between taxes on global income and all other taxes. Thus, the state of 
residence would have the primary right to impose global taxes on the income of its residents 
while all other taxes were to be shared between the country of residence and the country of 
source. In addition, the Academic Experts held that returns on investments, such as interests 
and dividends, should be taxed in the country of residence of the recipient. 
Prior to obtaining the Academic Experts’ report, the League of Nations set up a second 
committee of experts, the Technical Experts, who reported to the Financial Committee in 
February 1925.45 The Technical Experts, concurring with the Academic Experts, found that it 
was impossible to propose a single system of international taxation that would be equitable and 
that would prevent double taxation.46 Contrary to the Academic Experts, the Technical 
Experts were not much concerned by theoretical niceties: ‘[T]he division we have 
established…has been made for purely practical purposes and no inference in regard to 
economic theory or doctrine should be drawn from this fact.’47 Instead, following the 
classification of existing taxes into impôts réel or schedular taxes, imposed on things or 
objects, and impôts personnel or general or personal taxes on income, they suggested that 
                                                             
45 See League of Nations, Report and Resolutions Submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Committee of the 
League of Nations League of Nations Document, C 115. M 55 1925 (F. 212), (7 February 1925), in Legislative 
History of United States  Tax Conventions, Volume 4: Model Tax Conventions ; see supra note 13, at 4057ff. 
46 Supra note 13 , at 4074. 
47 Supra note 13, at 4075. 
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the first category of taxes be applied by the state where the source of income is situated, while 
the state of residence be given preference to levy the second category of taxes.48  
In 1925, the Financial Committee appointed an expanded committee composed of 12 
members, and later 13, when a U.S. expert, Thomas Sewall Adams, was appointed to the 
Expanded Committee of Technical Experts with observer status, given that the U.S. was not a 
member of the League. The Expanded Committee of Technical Experts was required to 
consider the possibility of drawing up preliminary draft conventions on the basis of the 
February 1925 Resolutions adopted by the Technical Experts. 
In June 1927 the Expanded Committee of Technical Experts issued its report together with a 
draft model convention which was transmitted to all member nations for comments.49 By 
August 1928 the League had received a certain number of observations.50 A General Meeting 
of Government Experts was then convened in Geneva in October 1928 for the purposes of 
discussing the report and designing an international model. 
B. The Contents of the Earlier Models 
The General Meeting hosted by the League in October 1928 was attended by government 
experts from 27 countries. It endorsed the principles adopted by the Financial Committee 
following the report of the Technical Experts submitted in 1927. These were enshrined in three 
separate draft models:  
· Draft Ia, the original draft drawn up by the Technical Experts, was geared towards 
countries such as France, Italy and Belgium. 
· Drafts Ib and Ic sought to accommodate different tax systems in more specific ways. 
                                                             
48 In this regard it is interesting to note that the Academic Experts followed the principles found in existing double tax 
treaty practice and in particular the Czechoslovakia/Italy Double Tax Treaty of 1 March 1924. The Italian negotiation 
team was comprised of the Italian Director of Taxes who was also involved with the work of the League of Nations. 
Presumably, there would have been, in this instance, a degree of mutual influence. See Harris, supra note 31, at 299, 
302. 
49 League of Nations, Report Presented by the Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion 
League of Nations Document, C. 216. M. 85. (1927), chap. II, in Legislative History of United States  Tax 
Conventions, Volume 4: Model Tax Conventions; see supra note 13, at 4111ff. 
50 See Summary of the Observations Received by August 30th, 1928, From the Governments on the Report Presented by 
the Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Document, C. 495. M. 
147. (1928) chap. II, in S. Langbein, ‘The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length’, (17 February 1986) 30 
Tax Notes  625. 
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In general, however, the three drafts ‘were essentially similar in form and in the concepts 
employed but differed in the methods used to give double tax relief.’51 They may be 
considered as an attempt at reconciling different tax systems. Indeed, the drafts refined the 
distinction between personal and impersonal taxes.52 Personal taxes were defined as ‘taxes 
imposed on persons as such or on persons in relation to wealth.’53 Income tax was classified 
as a form of personal tax. Impersonal taxes, the earliest form of taxation, were considered to 
be the ordinary indirect taxes levied on commodities and transactions. 
The solution proposed by the Committee of Technical Experts, based on the distinction 
between personal and impersonal taxes, was not acceptable to the U.S. whose aim was to 
protect its ability to tax non-residents on U.S.-sourced income.54 The British too were not 
satisfied with the distinction, as they sought to restrict as far as possible the source country’s 
right to tax foreign-owned business. A compromise was eventually reached. It conceded to 
the source state, pursuant to the benefit theory, the right to tax business profits derived through 
a PE. The state of residence, in line with the ability to pay concept, was allowed to tax the 
returns on investments. Source, in this context, applies to income arising within the geographic 
borders of the country levying the tax, whereas residence taxation applies to the income of a 
resident of the country imposing the tax.55 
To prevent double taxation, the residence country was required to yield tax jurisdiction to the 
source country, either unilaterally by virtue of a provision in its domestic tax laws, or bilaterally 
through a tax treaty.56 
                                                             
51 See D.R. Davies, Principles of International Double Taxation Relief (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1985), at 34 para. 
3.9. For the Models, see League of Nations, Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on 
Double Taxation and Tax Evasion , (League of Nations Document C. 562. M. 178. 1928 II, (October 1928) in 
Legislative History of United States Tax Conventions, Volume 4: Model Tax Conventions , see supra note 13, at 
4155ff. 
52 Seligman, supra note 5, at 69. 
53 Supra note 5, at 59. 
54 M.B. Carroll, ‘International Tax Law. Benefit for American Investors and Enterprises Abroad’, (1965) 2 The 
International Lawyer  692. 
55 N.H. Kaufman, ‘Fairness and the Taxation of International Income’, (1998) 29 Law and Policy in International 
Business 145, at 146-47. 
56 Typically, the system that has evolved consists of the residence country exempting residents from taxation on their 
foreign source income, or at least on certain types of foreign source income–the exemption system; or it may grant 
residents a tax credit applied against domestic taxes imposed on foreign source income for the amount of foreign taxes 
paid–the credit system. See R.A. Green, ‘The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational 
Enterprises’, (1993) 79 Cornell Law Review  18, at 23. 
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With regard to business taxation, a general definition of the permanent establishment (PE) 
concept was achieved. It institutionalised the trade-off between residence and source-based 
taxation. The PE concept is founded on the dual idea that a country may tax business income if 
an enterprise trades in (or within) rather than with a country and to the extent that such 
profits are attributable to the PE. To trade in a country, an enterprise needs to be present 
therein. The PE concept, as wrought out by the League, determines the depth of this presence. 
Basically, a sufficient economic presence is required to allow a foreign enterprise to be taxable 
under a country’s domestic law. Sufficiency of presence at a specific geographical point is 
measured by the degree of stability achieved by that enterprise. If the latter trades from an 
established place with a certain degree of durability, then that enterprise has a PE within that 
country. Permanence, therefore, connotes the idea of stability, that is, one that is not 
temporary or tentative. 
The PE concept was to become the cornerstone in the compromise over jurisdiction to tax.57 
It established a separation between the taxation of business profits, which could be attributed 
to a PE considered as ‘impersonal’ income and taxed at source, and the taxation of investment 
profits, which could be treated as ‘personal’ income and taxed in the country of residence of 
the investor. The concept was further refined by the introduction of provisions defining the 
necessary threshold for the existence of a PE. It was thus agreed that a PE is constituted when 
business is transacted at a fixed place for a certain period of time, or when a foreign enterprise 
grants an agent authority to enter into business dealings on its behalf.58 
2 The Post-War Models 
In 1939, the Fiscal Committee, at its ninth session, suggested a revision of the 1928 models to 
incorporate the work done by the committee in the 1930s. However, the advent of the 
Second World War disturbed these plans. Nonetheless, its officials pursued the work of the 
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League’s Fiscal Committee during World War II from The Institute of Advanced Studies at 
Princeton University in the United States.59 
A The Final Contribution of the League and the Advent of the OECD 
Models  
During World War II, the League’s Fiscal Committee organised the Mexico Regional Tax 
Conferences. These meetings considered the League’s draft conventions as well as the existing 
bilateral treaties signed mainly by the continental European states.60 The aim was to 
consolidate all useful provisions into an acceptable model. 
i  The Mexico and London Draft Models  
The Mexico meetings culminated in the consolidation of the 1928 and 1935 conventions into a 
single draft Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of the Double Taxation of 
Income, which came to be known as the Mexico Model of 1943. Article IV(1) of the Mexico 
Model expanded the notion of the permanent establishment.61 It provides that if an enterprise 
had engaged in business activities in a foreign country and if these activities could not be 
considered as isolated or occasional transactions, then that enterprise was liable to tax on the 
profits derived from these activities. By broadening the PE definition, the Mexico Model 
explicitly favoured the primacy of the right to tax business income at source. 
After the Second World War the Fiscal Committee reconsidered the whole matter at its 
meeting in London in 1946. A new draft was published, the London Model, which included 
provisions concerning property and wealth taxation but which also amended some important 
aspects of the Mexico Model. It reasserted the principles developed in the League’s pre-war 
models, in particular the limitation of taxation at source of income produced by a PE. The 
Fiscal Committee then published both the Mexico and London Models together with a 
commentary.62 
The aim of the Fiscal Committee at the end of the war was to continue its work in the taxation 
area under the auspices of the United Nations. One of its main objectives was the 
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reconciliation of the Mexico and London Models. In 1946–47 the UN’s Economic and Social 
Council established a Financial and Fiscal Commission composed of 15 experts chosen by 
member states which was to deal inter alia with international tax matters. However, the 
presence of the Soviet bloc, dissension between continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, and the emergence of new states through decolonisation, all meant that it was 
extremely difficult to arrive at any meaningful agreement.63 In addition, by that time, the 
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
had become more prominent with regard to international financial issues. Since consensus on 
the main principles of international taxation seemed to be unattainable, the UN’s Fiscal 
Commission ceased to meet in 1954. 
i i   The OECD Models  
The political and economic situation during the Cold War prevented to a large extent any 
dialogue on a truly worldwide basis. However, the League’s Fiscal Committee’s work was 
pursued by the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), an organisation 
which had been set by the Western democracies to deal with economic matters and which 
later became the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).64 
In March 1956, the OEEC set up a Fiscal Committee with instruction to draft a convention for 
the avoidance of double imposition of taxes on income and capital. Working from the London 
Model,65 the Fiscal Committee of the OEEC published between 1958 and 1960 three interim 
reports. In the third report, submitted to the Council in 1960,66 the Fiscal Committee dealt 
with the principles of profit allocation to PEs and associated enterprises. Basically, Articles 
XV and XVI of the OEEC proposed draft convention reproduced the relevant provisions of 
the Mexico and London Models.67 
On 30 September 1961, the OECD superseded the OEEC and its Fiscal Committee pursued 
the task of drafting the model already undertaken by the OEEC. Finally, in 1963 the Fiscal 
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Committee completed a report containing a draft double taxation convention. 68 On 30 July 
1963, the Council of the OECD adopted a Recommendation concerning the avoidance of 
double taxation which urged all members to conform to that draft convention when concluding 
or revising existing bilateral conventions between them.69 
From the outset the Fiscal Committee, which had in the meantime been changed into the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, recognised the necessity of periodic revision of the draft. The first 
revision of the 1963 Draft Model was finalised in 1977. A further revision was initiated which 
led to the publication in 1992 of the Model Convention in loosele af format to facilitate future 
revisions. Thus, revisions of the Model have been carried out in 1994, 1997, 1998 and 2000, 
with further regular revisions anticipated.70 
B The United Nations Model Convention  
The bilateral tax conventions that were negotiated in the 1960s involved primarily developed 
countries. Only a relatively small number of such treaties had been concluded between 
developed countries and Less Developed Countries (LDCs). An explanation for the paucity of 
such treaties was that ‘the traditional tax conventions have not commended themselves to 
developing countries.’71 
The desire to cater for the needs of LDCs was recognised and the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations in its Resolution 1273 (XLIII) adopted on 4 August 1967 
requested that the Secretary-General of the United Nations (U.N.) to find ways for facilitating 
the conclusion of tax treaties between developed and developing countries.72 
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The U.N. Model Convention is widely considered to have achieved a compromise between 
the source and the residence principles.73 By broadening the definition of a PE the U.N. 
Model certainly gives more weight to the source principle than does the OECD Model. The 
fact is, however, that the UN Model did not adopt any new approach to tax treaties. No 
attempt was made to challenge the basic tenets of the OECD Model. There were numerous 
cases where the experts from the First and Third World failed to reach any agreement. Thus, 
although the Model is regarded as favouring taxation at source, this preference is not 
expressed in any general principle comparable to Article IV(1) of the Mexico Model.  
Section III  The League’s Second Compromise: The 
Apportionment of Business Profits 
Once the problem of allocating primary taxing rights was resolved, the League was required to 
develop an acceptable method for the proper allocation of business profits accruing to an 
enterprise operating in two or more jurisdictions.74 The Academic Experts and the Technical 
Experts, as well as the 1928 General Meeting of the League of Nations, did not specifically 
address the problem of apportionment of income and expenses of enterprises operating 
globally. It would appear, however, that the experts were inclined to favour some sort of 
formulary apportionment to achieve this apportionment objective.75  
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Thus Langbein notes that: 
the community of experts designing the models appeared to be going in the direction of adopting 
some form of formula apportionment rules for allocating business profits. Thus the reference to 
separate accounting in the original draft of the model was dropped in the final version. The pre -
existing conventions, notably that among the Central European powers, included an allocation 
provision that called for formulary apportionment, that convention had been a principal source of 
precedent for the entire effort made in the 1920s. And the commentary to the 1928 models 
suggested formulary or empirical methods were to predominate in making allocations under the 
model provisions.76 
What then caused the abandonment of the prevailing attitude regarding the apportionment of 
income derived by enterprises operating globally? It will be recalled that the original draft 
convention of the Expanded Committee of Technical Experts introduced the concept of the PE 
which, over the years, became the primary nexus triggering a country’s right to tax business 
income derived within its borders. PEs were defined as the ‘real centres of management, 
affiliated companies, branches, factories, agencies, warehouses, offices, depots.’77 The draft 
convention then provided that if an undertaking had a PE in two contracting states, each state 
would be entitled to tax the portion of income produced in its territory. In order to determine 
the profits thus produced within a territory, the authorities were to rely on the financial 
statements of the establishment. Moreover, in ‘the absence of accounts showing this income in 
proper form, the competent administrations of the two Contracting States shall come to an 
arrangement as to the rules for apportionment.’78 
The models approved by the General Meeting substantially altered the business operations that 
would have constituted a PE under the 1927 Draft Convention. Thus, ‘affiliated companies’ 
were not included in the list of operations that would constitute a PE. In addition, instead of 
referring to the use of a taxpayer’s separate accounts for the allocation of profits, the 
approved draft simply suggested that the relevant administrations should ‘come to an 
arrangement as to the basis for apportionment’.79 
These amendments left many questions unresolved. In view of the uncertainty in the area, the 
General Meeting recommended that the matter be further studied. The League’s Council then 
appointed a Fiscal Committee to which was given the task of studying inter alia the allocation 
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problem. 80 At the Fiscal Committee’s first meeting held in October 1929 it was resolved ‘that, 
in order to do any useful work, it would be essential to have a detailed knowledge of the 
practice of various countries.’81 The study of the practices regarding the allocation question 
that began in 1930 was entrusted to Mitchell B Carroll, an American lawyer who had been 
involved with the earlier works of the Expanded Committee of Technical Experts. 
1 The  Carroll Report  
If the experts of the League were more or less in favour of some form of formulary 
apportionment as a solution to the allocation of multijurisdictional income then, as Langbein 
argues, the  Carroll Report ‘represents a turning point in the development of the allocation 
rules for model conventions’.82 
A Carroll’s Methodology  
Mitchell Carroll never underestimated the difficulties relating to the allocation problem: 
[T]he subject of allocation may be described as being at the cross-roads of all sciences. It involves 
not only the fiscal sovereignty of States, and civil, commercial and sometimes penal law, but also 
commercial geography, economics, business management, and last, but not least—accounting.83 
He then proceeded to analyse on a comparative basis the apportionment question. His method 
of analysis proceeded along the lines as set out below. 
i  The Search for any Existing Legislation  
Carroll found virtually no legislation in most countries on the apportionment question. Most 
countries taxed the profits attributable to a branch operating in their jurisdiction according to 
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purely administrative practices. The only legislation on apportionment he found were the 
formulary apportionment systems in existence in Spain, Austria, Wisconsin, New York, and 
Massachusetts. 
i i  The Methods of Allocation 
Carroll found that most tax authorities were inclined to use a combination of three methods of 
allocating business profits of a multijurisdictional enterprise to its local PE.84 
a. Separate Accounting 
The most common method used for the determination of a branch’s income was the separate 
accounting method which ‘means taking the declaration of income, supported by accounts of 
the local branch, as a basis of assessment.’85 Therefore, it was important for the financial 
statements submitted to be accurate. In order to establish that these documents were indeed a 
true reflection of the business dealings, the tax authorities were required to compare them with 
those of a similar but independent enterprise. In essence, the method entailed that if the price 
charged for one transaction is comparable to that charged in a second transaction, then the 
price charged in the first transaction between two unrelated parties is to be used as a 
benchmark for the determination of the price that should be charged in the second transaction 
among related parties. This method of determining the correct transfer price between related 
enterprises came to be known as the ‘arm’s length standard’.86 
b. Empirical Methods 
When it was impossible to establish separate accounts, Carroll found that most systems would 
rely on empirical methods to determine the income of a PE. At the base of the empirical 
methods is the assumption that a local establishment would approximately make the same 
percentage profit as the other establishments of the enterprise to which it belongs, or as other 
enterprises engaged in a similar type of business.87 Empirical methods therefore involved an 
attempt by authorities ‘to estimate an income by comparing the given enterprise with similar 
enterprises, or taking into account turnover, assets or other readily ascertainable factors.’88 
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c. Fractional Apportionment  
In a certain number of countries Carroll found that fractional apportionment was either ‘the 
primary or the only basis of allocation’. Fractional apportionment is defined in the report as the 
‘determination of the income of one establishment of an enterprise by dividing total net income 
in the ratio of certain factors, for example, assets, turnover, payroll, or a fixed percentage.’89 
This system prevailed, for example, in Spain where it was claimed that separate accounting 
had to be abandoned because a certain number of branches of foreign companies operating 
there showed little or no profits. 
Several other countries used fractional apportionment as the primary method of 
apportionment. France was another country where tax on income from securities was 
computed in proportion to assets represented by the local branch. Fractional apportionment 
was also used in the U.S., more specifically, in Wisconsin, New York and Massachusetts. 
Well-developed formulary systems prevailed by statute in Switzerland, and Austria, and by 
international agreement in Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
The critical point to note is that Carroll found no widespread use of separate accounting based 
on legislative provisions to determine a branch’s taxable income. Rather, he documented the 
use of the method as an administrative practice. Yet, he concluded that a ‘predilection for the 
method of separate accounting is evinced by the great majority of countries.’90 
B The Identification of the Transfer Pricing Problem  
Mitchell Carroll’s objective was to ‘formulate a system of allocating or apportioning the 
income of business enterprises which would be fair, logical and suitable for all types of 
businesses.’91 It is indisputable that Carroll was among the first persons to clearly identify the 
problem of transfer pricing as one of the key issues of international taxation.92 Having 
acknowledged the problem, Carroll set himself to finding a solution to it. 
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2 The Articulation of the Arm’s Length Principle 
In Carroll’s mind, to deal with the apportionment problem meant to solve the ‘diversion of 
income’ problem. He believed that any corrective measures had to substitute market for 
manipulated prices. He came to firmly believe that the only plausible method for the 
apportionment of business income that would prevent manipulation between the various PEs of 
a TNC or subsidiaries in a group of companies was the ‘separate accounting’ method. 
A The Emergence of the Arm’s Length Principle 
According to Carroll, separate accounting was ‘the primary method of allocating income to the 
various countries in which an enterprise has permanent establishments [which] is preferred by 
the great majority of governments, and business enterprises represented in the International 
Chamber of Commerce, as well as other authoritative groups.’93 However, in spite of his 
preference for the separate accounting standard, it would appear that Carroll could not make 
up his mind as to the most appropriate method to apply the standard to factual situations. 
Thus, in one instance he held that it was ‘undesirable to endeavour to prescribe detailed rules 
of separate accounting’ 94 and in another he suggested that a treaty embodying the principle 
should incorporate ‘definite and precise rules for application’ 95 in order to solve the problems 
that would arise if two jurisdictions claim the right to tax the profits of one enterprise. 
Notwithstanding these hesitations, Carroll identified two distinct criteria for allocating profits to 
a branch. These were the ‘remuneration for services’ and the ‘sales between independents’ 
criterions.96 Under the remuneration for services criterion, a branch is allocated profits that are 
strictly imputable to the services that the branch has performed. The sales between 
independents criterion was construed as a three-steps process. It involved: 
· a fictional transfer of title to the goods; 
· the allotment of sufficient capital to the branch for it to carry out its operations; and  
· the apportionment of losses or risk of losses that would be carried by similar 
independent enterprises. 
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Carroll was in favour of the adoption of the remuneration for services criterion. He argued 
against the ‘sales between independents’ criterion. One of his objectio ns is that the criterion 
would involve ‘checking prices…[against] independent dealers in other countries and allowing 
for deviations due to the condition of the branch.97 He recommended the remuneration for 
services criterion because of its administrative simplicity and fairness: 
[I]f we recognize the fact that the real centre of management, especially if it is situated at the 
principal productive establishment, is the most vital part of the enterprise, the most practical 
approach to the problem is to give it the residuum of profit after allocating to each outlying 
secondary establishment compensation for the services it has rendered to the enterprise in 
accordance with what would have been paid to an independent enterprise rendering such 
services.98 
B The Arm’s Length Principle in the 1935 Allocation Convention  
At its fourth meeting in May–June 1933, the Fiscal Committee approved the Carroll Report . 
That report was then used as a basis for a draft convention on the allocation question that was 
also published in 1933.99 The Fiscal Committee further recommended that the  Carroll Report 
be used as a guide for the interpretation of that draft convention. The latter was then sent 
through the Council to all member states for comment. 
As a result of this process, the Fiscal Committee decided to rewrite the text as a model for 
bilateral treaties. The draft convention resulting from Carroll’s work was published in 1935.100 
But it was never approved by any formal inter-governmental conference nor used on its own 
as a basis for bilateral treaties.101 However, its provisions were later incorporated in bilateral 
treaties that were entered into by several countries, and eventually in the model conventions 
that succeeded the 1928 models. Although the 1935 Draft Convention never became a 
‘model’ convention, it is the only document approaching an international model, together with 
the London and Mexico Models, where the expression ‘arm’s length’ is actually used.102 
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Article III of the Draft Convention, the ancestor to the present Article 7 of the OECD Model, 
provided that where an enterprise carries on business in a number of states, each PE through 
which such business was carried out would be attributed ‘the net business income which it 
might be expected to derive if it were an independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar 
activities under the same or similar conditions.’103 Pursuant to Article III, this net income 
would, in principle, ‘be determined on the basis of separate accounts pertaining to such 
establishment.’104 The right to rewrite those accounts is present:  
The fiscal authorities of the contracting States shall, when necessary…rectify the accounts 
produced, notably to correct errors or omissions, or to re-establish the prices or remunerations 
entered in the books at the value which would have prevailed between independent persons 
dealing at arm’s length.105 
The question of affiliated enterprises is dealt with in Article VI of the ‘Carroll Convention’.106 
Although the 1935 Draft Convention advocated separate accounting as the prime method for 
the apportionment of transnational income, empirical methods and fractional apportionment 
were not completely rejected. They were retained in case the arm’s length principle could not 
be applied. However, their eventual application was constrained by an important proviso. 
They were required to be used in such a way as to yield results approaching as closely as 
possible to those which would be reflected by separate accounting. 107 
The 1935 Draft Convention marks the birth of the separate accounting/arm’s length principle. 
The principle did not suddenly gain its status as an international norm, rather, ‘the language of 
the 1935 draft supplied the basis for the text later inserted into the general international 
models.’108 In arguing for the separate accounting standard Carroll chose, however, to object 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and economic point of view. The agent’s remuneration must not be below what would be regarded as a normal 
consideration.’ See Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 16, at 1089 n 274. 
103 League of Nations (1935), supra note 100, at 4253-54. 
104 Id., at 4254. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Article VI is the direct ancestor of the present Article 9 of the OECD Model. It reads as follows: 
‘When an enterprise of one contracting State has a dominant participation in the management or capital of an 
enterprise of another contracting State, or when both enterprises are owned or controlled by the same interests, and as 
the result of such a situation there exists, in their commercial or financial relations, conditions different from those 
which would have been made between independent enterprises, any item of profit or loss which should normally have 
appeared in the accounts of one enterprise, but which has been, in this manner, diverted to the other enterprise, shall 
be entered in the accounts of such former enterprise, subject to the rights of appeal allowed under the law of the State 
of such enterprise.’ Carroll, supra  note 57, at 496. 
107 Carroll, supra  note 57, at 495. 
108 Langbein, supra note 50 , at 634. 
Chapter  1 The Origins of the General Principles of Internat ional Taxation  
 34
to fractional apportionment. Thus, it is reasonable to say that Carroll in fact did not 
convincingly commend the separate enterprise standard on its own merits. Rather, he justified 
his preference for the separate accounting standard by focusing on what he saw as the 
weaknesses of fractional apportionment.109 Notwithstanding this, the Fiscal Committee fully 
embraced the method of separate accounting as proposed by Carroll. 
C The Consolidation of the Arm’s Length Principle  
It would appear that at the time of its articulation the arm’s length principle did not cause any 
controversy in contrast to the continued disagreement between the primacy of source or 
residence taxation. Supporters of both the London and Mexico Models did not reopen the 
debate on arm’s length and fractional apportionment. The provisions for the allocation of 
income were identical in both models and merely reproduced the 1935 allocation provisions as 
a Protocol. Article VI of the Protocol to both models reproduced Article III of the 1935 Draft 
Convention relating to the allocation of income and expenses among PEs. Article VII of the 
Protocol reproduced Article VI of the 1935 Draft Convention relating to independent 
enterprises. Furthermore, just as in the 1935 Draft Convention, both the Mexico and London 
Models retained empirical methods and fractional apportionment as back-up methods for 
allocating income and expenses if separate accounting failed to achieve its purpose.  
As far as the arm’s length principle is concerned, it is obvious that officially the views of the 
members of the OECD have not changed. The original or revised versions of the draft 
conventions produced by the OECD, as well as the Organisation’s Guidelines published in 
1995,110 are all articulated on the premise that the arm’s length standard is the fundamental 
principle underlying the allocation of income and expenses both in the branch and in the 
subsidiary context. 
The emergence of the arm’s length principle as the ‘international norm’111 for the taxation of 
business profits was not achieved overnight. As mentioned, Article III(1) of the draft 
convention of 1935 provided that if an enterprise with its fiscal domicile in one contracting 
state has PEs in other Contracting States:  
                                                             
109 Carroll Report, supra note 83 , at 187-89 paras 664-70. 
110 OECD, Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administrators  (Paris: OECD, 1995), (OECD 1995 Guidelines). 
111 This ‘international norm’ status is vehemently contested by Langbein; see S. Langbein, supra note 50. In 1989 the 
German Government, in expressing its reservations to the OECD report on thin capitalisation rules noted, ‘the 
consensus regarding the actual application of the “arm’s length principle” is extremely vague and precarious’. See 
Green, supra  note 56, at 37 n 70. Obviously German reticence is obsolete as that country now fully embraces the 
OECD 1995 Guidelines. 
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there shall be attributed to each permanent establishment the net business income which it might 
be expected to derive if it were an independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities 
under the same or similar conditions.112 
In order to enable the relevant fiscal authorities to carry out this attribution, they were allowed 
to rectify the accounts produced so that these accounts reflect ‘the value which would prevail 
between independent persons dealing at arm’s length’. Article III, substantially modified, is still 
the basis for Article 7 of the OECD Model. Article 7(2) of the current OECD Model reads as 
follows: 
[S]ubject to the provisions of paragraph 3, where an enterprise of a Contracting State carries on 
business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein, there 
shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment the profits which it 
might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the same or 
similar activities under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the 
enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment.113 
Article 7 deals with the attribution of income between home enterprises in one Contracting 
State and their branches in another contracting state. This has been referred to as the ‘branch’ 
or ‘permanent establishment’ context.  
The ‘associated enterprises’ or ‘related enterprises’ context is dealt with in Article 9 of the 
OECD Model. Article 9 of the OECD Model reproduces the provisions of Article VI of the 
1935 Draft Model.114 Both provisions provide that the arm’s length standard is to be applied 
primarily in the relations between an enterprise and its subsidiaries, parents or sister entities in 
another state. The text of the 1935 Draft Model is exactly the same as the original text of 
Article 5 proposed in the 1933 League of Nations Draft Convention.115  
Article 9(1) states: 
1. Where  
(a) An enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, 
control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or 
(b) the same persons participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of 
an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of another Contra cting State, 
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial 
and financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent 
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enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have not so accrued, may be 
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. 116 
Article 7, but not Article 9, contains an explicit qualification on the commitment of the model to 
pure arm’s length principle. Article 9 does not prescribe the methods by which an arm’s length 
price is to be determined. This feature, together with the fact that Article 9(1) especially 
deviates from the original versions of the League of Nations drafts of the 1930s, has led to 
serious interpretative problems as to its scope and nature. These problems have blurred the 
legal basis for transfer pricing adjustments at the present time. In this context, two questions 
need to be addressed. What are the international obligations in the transfer pricing area and is 
there any latitude for states to use an apportionment method other than the arm’s length 
standard in the associated enterprise context?  
Article 9 is probably one of the most important articles in the OECD Model. Yet both the 
League of Nations and the OEEC/OECD have not fully explored its implications. Rather, 
emphasis was laid on Article 7 of the OEEC/OECD Model (the permanent establishment 
article) and its various ancestors originating from the League’s work. This was justified on the 
grounds, that at that time, companies that engaged in cross-border transactions did so through 
PEs rather than through subsidiaries or associated enterprises.117 Thus Commentaries to 
Article 9 of the OEEC Draft, which became Article 9 of the OECD 1963 Draft Model 
Convention, and Article 9(1) of the 1977 and 1992 models, were quite brief and were 
rounded in one paragraph of four sentences, while those relative to Article 7 consisted of 
‘especially detailed commentaries’118 covering 26 paragraphs over eight pages. It would thus 
appear that even in the 1960s, the problem of transfer pricing involving associated enterprises 
was still regarded as minor.119 Consequently, when the problem reached significant 
proportions, countries were already ‘locked into the structure of the associated enterprise 
Article’.120  
What then are the consequences of this relative neglect in the proper articulation of Article 
9(1)? To appreciate them it is necessary to compare the original texts and the current Article 
9. The two provisions seem to be very close but there are differences in their wording which 
pose a real problem of interpretation in their scope and effect. 
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These differences lie first in the absence of the word ‘loss’ and the use of ‘may’ instead of 
‘shall’ in the current Article 9(1). Consequently, one of the most pertinent questions that arises 
is whether Article 9(1) states a rule which applies to the exclusion of the domestic law of 
countries which have adopted the OECD Model for their Double Tax Agreements. Further, 
does Article 9(1) create an independent rule for adjustment, and is the provision concerned 
with profits alone to the exclusion of losses? In short, is Article 9(1) to be interpreted 
restrictively or expansively? The ultimate consequence of a restrictive interpretation is that 
Article 9(1) establishes the arm’s length standard as the exclusive method for apportioning the 
profits of a TNC, thus rejecting formulary apportionment as an alternative. 
This problem of interpretation did not arise with the original texts, for example, Article VI of 
the 1935 League of Nations Draft. This provision stated clearly that transfer pricing 
adjustments were to be made in conformity to it regardless of whether domestic rules provided 
for alternative methods. The changes to be carried out pursuant to Article VI were 
‘obligatory…[and] the provision gives a power to make adjustments independent of domestic 
law and that changes are to be made whether they turn profits into losses, profits into bigger or 
smaller profits or losses into bigger or smaller losses.’121  
Article 9(1) uses the word ‘may’ in lieu of ‘shall’ as in Article 5 of the 1933 League’s Model. 
Does this change mean that the intention is to give countries a discretion rather than an 
obligation to make any upward or downward adjustments to profits? It would appear that is 
the case. However, if an adjustment is made, then that change must necessarily be effected 
according to the arm’s length standard. In other words, countries are not forced to adjust 
transfer prices, but if they do, then they must do so according to the arm’s length principle. 
The prominent double tax agreement specialist, Professor Dr Klaus Vogel, supports the 
mandatory nature of the arm’s length principle, notwithstanding the word ‘may’ in Article 
9(1).122 In addition, the OECD report on thin capitalisation examines the nature of Article 9(1) 
and concludes too that it is restrictive by nature and sets the arm’s length standard as the only 
acceptable apportionment method. Furthermore, the same report seems to suggest that Article 
9(1) sets its own scope of application, that is, it sets the maximum to which profits can be 
adjusted: 
[T]he Committee generally agreed that, in principle, the application of rules designed to deal with 
thin capitalisation ought not normally to increase the taxable profits of the relevant domestic 
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enterprise to any amount greater the arm’s length profit, that this principle should be followed in 
applying existing tax treaties, in particular in the operation of the mutual agreement procedure under 
the equivalent of Article 25 of the Model, and that it should also be followed in the negotiation of 
bilateral treaties in the future.123 
As mentioned earlier, Article 5 of the 1933 League of Nations Model does not pose 
interpretative problems as the text is clearer. The confusion and interpretative problems that 
impair Article 9(1) arise because the latter departs from the former. Thus, while the Fiscal 
Committee of the OEEC gave the assurance that these changes were only cosmetic and not 
intended to be of any substance, the reality is quite different. 
The question then is why was it necessary to make the changes in the first place? It is 
suggested that the main reason was to align the OEEC/OECD drafts with contemporary U.S. 
practice in the area. The thrust of the U.S. practices was, it would appear, different from that 
of the OEEC/OECD drafts, and uniformity was needed. The Fiscal Committee stated: 
[A]nother consideration is that the application of common rules by Member countries of the OEEC 
may, because of their position in the world economy, be an inducement for other countries to adopt 
the same rules. The Fiscal Committee wishes to express its appreciation of the fact that 
Representatives of the United States have attended its meeting from the beginning and have taken 
part in its discussions.124 
Uniformity therefore meant that all member countries of the OEEC were required to adopt the 
rules of the dominant economic power, that is, the United States. The suggestion of using the 
U.S. system as the international benchmark in the transfer pricing debate was not new. For 
instance, in discussing the London Model, the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations said: 
the general structure of the Model Convention drafted at the present session is similar to that of 
the Mexico Model. On other points, new articles have been inserted to make use of certain 
innovations contained in conventions, such as those between the United Kingdom and the United 
States concluded since the 1943 meeting.125 
In reality, even prior to the U.K.–U.S. Convention, the U.S. had managed to impose its views 
on earlier conventions. For example, one of the earliest conventions in which a variant of the 
OEEC Articles XI and XVI are used is that concluded in 1939 between France and the 
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U.S.126 Similarly, Articles III and IV of the Double Tax Convention between Canada and the 
U.S. signed in 1942 are drafted in such terms as to make the application of the arm’s length 
principle an obligation.127 
Moreover, it is true that the U.K.–U.S. Tax Convention signed in 1945 seems to have 
crystallised the language used in this context. Thus, Articles III and IV of that Convention128 
are reproduced almost verbatim at Articles III and IV of the convention between Australia and 
the U.K. signed in 1946.129 
The question that arises, therefore, relates to the origins of these concepts which in 1960 the 
OEEC was promoting as the standard applicable between its members. The influence of the 
1963 OECD Draft Model Convention on U.S. treaties has been described in the following 
terms: ‘The new treaties are quite similar to the OECD Draft. They continue the old 
convention authorization for similar reallocations between related persons to approximate 
section 482.’130  
It is therefore clear that rather than the 1963 OECD Draft having an influence on U.S. tax 
treaties, it was well and truly the contrary. Section 482 and its regulations as reproduced in the 
treaties signed by the U.S. were being imposed on a worldwide basis through the OEEC and 
later the OECD. Thus the 1963 OECD Draft Model Convention and the 1977 OECD Model 
Convention, while rearranging the articles relative to the OEEC draft, merely reproduced the 
same concepts. 
Basically, section 482 authorises the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to allocate the gross 
income, deductions, and credits between related taxpayers to the extent necessary to prevent 
evasion of taxes or clearly reflect the income of related taxpayers.131 Section 482 does not 
specify any ‘method or theory to guide the Commissioner in making income allocations.’132 A 
study of the legisla tive history of section 482, and more especially the regulations implementing 
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it, evolved in parallel with the work of the League of Nations. The earliest predecessor of 
section 482 is section 240(d) of the U.S. Revenue Act 1921.133 This provision enabled the 
Commissioner to consolidate and redistribute income and expenses of related trades or 
businesses. In the U.S. Revenue Act of 1928, the provisions of section 240(d) of the 1921 
Revenue Act was replaced by section 45.134 This provision is the direct ancestor of the 
current section 482 which was incorporated in the Revenue Code in 1954.135 At the time 
Carroll was writing his report for the League of Nations, section 45 was already in force in the 
U.S. In fact Carroll refers to it in his report to the League.136 However, section 45, and later 
section 482, do not specify any method or theory for income allocations and ‘there is no 
mention in any of section 45’s legislative history of transfer price reviews, an arm’s length 
standard, or separate entity treatment.’137 This particular method of income allocation is 
selected in the Treasury Regulations implementing section 45. In other words, Treasury 
bureaucrats of whom Carroll was a member made the choice of this particular methodology. 
The original Regulations under section 45 were published in 1934 and they set forth ‘for the 
first time the arm’s length standard in the United States.’138 In 1935, as already mentioned, the 
League of Nations published its Model Convention, otherwise known as the Carroll Model. 
These are the only two documents where the words ‘arm’s length’ are actually used. The 
‘temporal coincidence is striking.’139 
The arm’s length principle as introduced in Treasury Regulation 86 Article 45-1 ‘established 
beyond a doubt that the arm’s length standard was the fundamental principle to be applied in 
intercompany transfer pricing.’140 Furthermore, Federal Tax Regulations in force on 1 January 
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1964 clearly stated that the ‘[t]he standard to be applied in every case is that of an 
uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.’141 Such 
language was already present in the Double Tax Convention between Canada and the United 
States signed in 1942. 
Article IV 
(b) In order to effect the inclusion of such profits in the taxable profits of the Canadian 
enterprise, the competent authority of Canada may…re-establish the prices or remuneration entered 
in the books at the values which would prevail between independent persons dealing at arm’s 
length.142 
Finally, Article 9(1) of the OECD Model really mirrors section 482 of the Internal Revenue 
Code 1986 in yet another way. It does not specify any method or theory to guide signatories 
in making income allocations. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs has published three reports 
addressing this issue.143 The 1979 Report recommended four methods for determining an 
arm’s length price: 
· the comparable uncontrolled price method; 
· the resale price method,  
· the cost-plus method, and  
· any other acceptable method.  
The 1984 Report is an elaboration of the principles that emerged in the 1979 Report as 
applicable to three specific situations. In 1992, the OECD started to work on a major revision 
of the 1979 Report. On 8 July 1995, the OECD published a major part of the revised 
Guidelines.144 In its 1995 Guidelines, the OECD endorses the view that in certain 
circumstances the traditional transaction-based methods for the determination of arm’s length 
prices could be inappropriate. It therefore suggests two new methods to be used as a matter 
of last resort for this purpose. These so-called transactional profit-based methods which will 
be examined in detail in later chapters, are:  
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· the transactional net margin method, and  
· the profit split method.  
The arm’s length principle is now regarded as the ‘international norm’ as far as the taxation of 
business profits are concerned. However, as will be examined later, there appears to be in 
recent years a subtle move away from the strict interpretation of what the arm’s length 
principle stands for. This shift or, more accurately, this perceived readiness to adopt a more 
realistic approach to the arm’s length standard, especially by the U.S., is the result of the 
frustration that arises because of its inherent problems when the principle is applied in the 
complex economic model of the 1990s. The arm’s length principle is no doubt a highly artificial 
concept. It is premised on certain theoretical weaknesses that need to be examined. 
 
 
 
The Limitations of the Present System of 
International Taxation 
The ultimate result of the work initiated by the League of Nations is the OECD Model Double 
Tax Convention on Income and Capital (the OECD Model).1 The main function of the OECD 
Model is to divide international income between the source and residence countries. The 
source country is where income is produced, and the residence country is where the investor 
deriving income from the source country resides. In the words of Professor Alvin Warren: 
‘[T]he jurisdictional basis for taxation is territorial in the first instance and personal in the 
second.’2 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in Section I the premises on which this conventional 
resolution of the basic policy issue is achieved. Section II focuses on the general limitations of 
the conventional approach.3 Finally, Section III demonstrates that the separate 
accounting/arm’s length principle, anchored as it is in a bygone era, is likely to fail in an 
increasingly globalised world economy. 
Section I  The Main Features of the Present System of 
International Taxation  
1 The Conventional Approach  
The division of the international tax base as proposed by the conventional approach is 
articulated on three assumptions:4 Firstly, source and residence countries have a concurrent 
and legitimate jurisdiction to tax; secondly, corporations and their investors are subject to 
separate taxation; and thirdly, corporations and investors are taxable on their income. 
                                                             
1 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capita l, (Paris: OECD, 1992), loose leaf, (1997 update), at C 
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3 OECD (1992), supra  note 1, at C (9)-1 para. 1(1). 
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A The Practice of the Conventional Approach 
The current consensus regarding the proper division of the income tax base rests on the 
‘method of classification and assignment of sources’.5 Pursuant to this method, the primary 
jurisdiction over corporate income is exercisable by the country where that income is sourced, 
while the residence country has primary jurisdiction over investor taxation.6 Thus, active 
business income is taxed in the country where it originates (the source country), and passive 
income is taxed in the country where the recipient of the income resides (the resident 
country).7 
Currently, the conventional approach operates through a bilateral treaty network of more than 
1500 tax treaties. These are, in general, based on the OECD Model.8 At the core of the 
OECD Model9 is the precise delineation of an active business operation carried out in a 
particular country. 10 An active business operation is carried out in a particular country if an 
enterprise has a permanent establishment (PE) therein.11 In such cases, the country where the 
PE is located, that is, the source country, has the primary right to tax the profits attributable to 
the PE.12 To avoid double taxation, the residence country, that is, the country where the 
investor resides, is required to exempt those profits from tax or grant a foreign tax credit with 
respect to tax paid to the source country on that income.13 
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Concurrently, primary jurisdiction is accorded to the residence country as far as passive 
business income is concerned. Passive income comprises investment income such as dividends 
and interests. However, the source country may first levy withholding tax on these items 
although at substantially reduced rates.14 Thus, for instance, the OECD Model Treaty provides 
for tax rates of five to 15 per cent on dividends, 10 per cent on interest, and zero per cent on 
royalties.15 To avoid double taxation, the residence country is required to give credit for any 
withholding taxes imposed by the source country. 16 It is to be noted that this neat assignment 
of income is now under threat with the advent of electronic commerce. Indeed, countries are 
increasingly worried about losing their tax base and are interpreting ‘existing laws in a manner 
that allows imposition of withholding tax on payments arising from electronic commerce 
transactions or passing new laws that provide such withholding.’17 
B The Principles Underlying the Conventional Approach  
These practices, embodied in the OECD Model Treaty, are designed to implement three 
principles underlying the conventional approach to international taxation. These principles are 
that of non-discrimination, neutrality and reciprocity. 
i  Non-Discrimination 
One of the most important concepts of international economic law is the non-discrimination 
principle.18 This principle is achieved through the so-called most favoured nation clause 
                                                             
14 For a description of the U.S. practice in this area, see U.S., Joint Committee on Taxation, Description and 
Analysis of Present-Law Rules Relating to International Taxation, Tax Analysts Document Number: Doc 1999-
22342 JCX-40-99 (28 June 1999), see at <http://taxbase.tax.org/>. 
15 This too is a compromise since it allows the source country to impose tax on some of the income derived by 
foreigners within  its territory although the international consensus is that such income is to be taxed primarily 
by the residence country. In the absence of a treaty, the source country usually imposes much higher rates on 
these items of income. 
16 The credit method is required for dividends and interest even if the exemption method is used for other income. 
See OECD Model (1992), supra note 1, Article 23A. 
17 On 28 April 1999, ‘Indian tax authorities ruled that payments received by a U.S. company from an Indian 
company for the use of computer systems located outside of India were royalties arising in India and thus 
subject to tax in India by way of withholding.’ See Pandit & Goradia, ‘Indian AAR Issues Landmark Ruling on 
E-Commerce Taxation under U.S.-India Tax Treaty, (5 July 1999) 19 Tax Notes Int’l 11 in J. VanderWolk, 
‘Direct Taxation in the Internet Age: A Fundamentalist Approach’, (April 2000) 54 Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation (No. 4) 173, at 177 n 15. 
18 The principle of non-discrimination originates from the so-called Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (FCN) and Treaties of Establishment which punctuated the expansion of commercial ventures in the 
sixteenth century. See J.G. O’Brien, ‘The Non-discrimination Article in Tax Treaties’, (1978) 10 Law and 
Policy in International Business 545, at 546. The basis of the non-discrimination principle is the ‘most favoured 
nation’ and national treatment principle contained in these FCNs. For example, the MFN provision first 
appeared in the 1642 treaty between Portugal and Great Britain; see A.J. Rädler, ‘Most Favoured Nation 
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(MFN) and the national treatment obligation.19 Both concepts are now incorporated in most 
Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs). 
Modern DTAs, following Article 24 of the OECD Model,20 contain the standard provision; 
the non-discrimination principle. It provides that treaty countries are not to discriminate against 
business activities carried out in one Contracting State by the nationals of the other Contracting 
State by taxing those activities more severely than those carrie d out by their own nationals.21 In 
fact, in three specific cases,22 it is required that the tax treatment of non-residents be equivalent 
to that of residents. Moreover, the non-discrimination provisions are confined to the tax 
treatment afforded in the source country to the exclusion of the residence country.23 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Concept in Tax Treaties’, in M. Lang, ed., Multilateral Tax Treaties: New Developments in International Tax 
Law , (Kluwer Law International, 1998) 3, at 3. It was also present in the first American commercial treaty, 
Article II-IV, Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed on 6 February 1778 between the U.S. and France. 8 Stat 
12, TS No. 83; see also Lidstone, ‘Liberal Construction of Tax Treaties - An Analysis of Congressional and 
Administrative Limitations of an Old Doctrine’, (1962) 47 Cornell LQ 529, at 537-38, in W.C. Gifford, 
‘Permanent Establishment Under the Non-discrimination Clause in Income Tax Treaties’, (1978) 11 Cornell 
International Law Journal 51, at 52 n 3. 
 As for the national treatment principle, it first appeared in the 1654 treaty between Portugal and Great Britain. 
It provided that the subjects of Great Britain ‘shall enjoy the same liberties, privileges and exceptions as the 
Portugese [sic] themselves.’ It again appeared in the treaty between Great Britain and Denmark in 1660–61, in 
the 1667 Treaty of Peace and Commerce between Great Britain and Spain, and subsequently in all early British 
Commercial treaties; see also Lidstone, ‘Liberal Construction of Tax Treaties–An Analysis of Congressional 
and Administrative Limitations of an Old Doctrine’, (1962) 47 Cornell LQ 529, at 537-38, in W.C. Gifford, 
‘Permanent Establishment Under the Non-discrimination Clause in Income Tax Treaties’, (1978) 11 Cornell 
International Law Journal 51, at 52 n 3. 
19 There is a major difference between the MFN and the national treatment obligation: The former merely secures 
for foreign nationals treatment equal to that afforded to all other foreigners in similar situations; and the latter 
requires that all foreigners receive the same treatment as domestic nationals; see Wurzel, ‘Trade Agreements and 
Tax Privileges’ (1940) 18 Taxes 484, at 486. In general, the principle of non-discrimination is construed as 
requiring the satisfaction of a certain degree of fairness, or reasonableness, or the common public interest 
standard. In other words, the principle will not be regarded as prohibiting all distinctions within the field in 
question, but only those which cannot be justified by reference to such standards; see Gifford, supra  note 18, at 
42. 
20 OECD (1992), supra  note 1, at M-43. The Commentaries are at C (24)-1. 
21 J.F. Avery -Jones et al., ‘The Non-Discrimination Article in Tax Treaties,’ [1991] BTR 359, at 360. 
22 The permanent establishment of non-resident enterprises, Article 24(4); deductible payments to non-residents 
by resident enterprises, Article 24(5); and foreign -owned resident enterprises, Article 24(6). See OECD Model 
(1992), supra  note 1. 
23 This exclusion, according to Professor Vann, could be attributed to the relationship which Article 24 has with 
the preceding provisions. Indeed, Articles 23A and 23B of the OECD Model are concerned with the methods 
by which the elimination of double taxation is sought. These are the exemption and the credit method 
respectively; see R.J. Vann, ‘The Future of International Tax Treaty or Institution? Small Step or Great Leap?’ 
(1996), unpublished paper. For a discussion of the interaction between the principle of non-discrimination and 
the permanent establishment concept, see the report of J. Weiner on the seminar held by Linklaters & Alliance 
in Brussels on 4 April 2000, in J. Weiner, ‘Consortium of EU-Based Law Firms Discusses EC Law’s Direct 
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i i  Neutrality 
The principles of non-discrimination and neutrality are closely related: Both aim at achieving 
efficiency in the worldwide allocation of capital. The concept of efficiency is based on the 
assumption that productivity will be highest when income-producing factors are distributed by 
market mechanism without public interference.24  
Another fundamental principle of tax policy is neutrality. It requires a tax system to treat 
income in a similar manner whether it is earned domestically or out of the country. In 
international taxation, neutrality is apprehended at three levels: capital import neutrality, capital 
export neutrality, and national efficiency.25 
Article 23A of the OECD Model, recommending the exemption method to relieve double 
taxation, is justified on the ground of capital-import neutrality (CIN). A tax system favours 
CIN when domestic and foreign investors receive equal after-tax yields from an identical 
investment. This means that domestic and foreign investors are placed on a level playing field 
as far as the taxation of their investment is concerned.  
CIN requires the fulfilment of two conditions:  
· First, the capital-importing country needs to tax income from foreign-owned 
investment at the same rate as domestically-owned investment.  
· Second, the capital-exporting country must exempt foreign-source income from 
taxation.  
On a practical basis, CIN is achieved by according national treatment to the foreign enterprise. 
Relief of international double taxation by way of the credit system is provided for pursuant to 
Article 23B of the OECD Model. Its application postulates the pursuit of capital export 
neutrality (CEN). The objective of CEN is to secure the equal treatment of investors, whether 
they invest at home or abroad. CEN is desirable because it avoids distortion of the locational 
decisions of TNCs. A country achieves CEN when investors in that country ‘pay the same 
amount of tax on investments with equal pre-tax yields whether the investment is domestic or 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Impact on Direct Taxation’ (10 April 2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 15) 1629, at 1632 analysing the Saint 
Gobain Case decided by the ECJ in 1999. See also R. Offermanns & C. Romano, ‘Treaty Benefits for 
Permanent Establishments: The Saint Gobain Case’, (May 2000) European Taxation  (No. 5) 180. 
24 See K. Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Part I)’, 
[1988/8-9] Intertax 216, at 218-19. (Part II [1988/10] Intertax 310, Part III [1988/11] Intertax 393.) 
25 Ibid. There seems to be some uncertainty regarding whether within the efficiency concept, a ‘national’ and an 
‘international aspect’ or ‘world aspect’ should be distinguished.  
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foreign.’26 CEN is achieved by taxing foreign-sourced income on a current basis and allowing 
a full credit for foreign tax paid on that income. 
CEN is, however, rarely reflected in the tax rules of traditional capital-exporting countries. In 
most cases, these countries defer the taxation of income accumulated in foreign companies 
until repatriation, except for specific cases as covered by the various CFC regimes.27 A long 
enough deferral period is equal to an exemption of the foreign-sourced income. 
National efficiency suggests that each nation should be concerned about maximising its own 
welfare. Thus, a residence country that abandons part of its revenue to the source country 
undermines its national efficiency. Consequently, it has been suggested that, for neutrality 
purposes, a deduction for foreign taxes paid is more appropriate than a credit for paid taxes or 
an exemption of foreign income.28  
Moreover, the concept of neutrality in an international environment requires the achievement of 
inter-nation neutrality. In other words, countries need to concern themselves with the 
combined effects of their tax laws on investors’ behaviour.29 Inter-nation neutrality, therefore, 
means that taxation should ‘not alter the (explicit or implicit) relative prices of goods, services, 
activities, production inputs, and so forth, in the private sector.’30 
Many countries combine the principles of CIN and CEN but, as will be explored in a later 
chapter, it is doubtful whether these purely economic principles have had any appreciable 
impact on international tax policy.31 
                                                             
26 M. Rigby, ‘A Critique of Double Tax Treaties as a Jurisdictional Coordination Mechanism’, (1991) 8 
Australian Tax Forum  302, at 413. 
27 J.R. Hines, Tax Policy and the Activities of Multinational Corporations , Working Paper 5589 (Cambridge, Mass: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996. 
28 See P.B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: Issues and Arguments 134 (1969), in 
Warren, supra  note 2, at 602 n 12. 
29 Norman Ture and Professor Klaus Vogel have advocated such a concept. See N. Ture, ‘Taxing Foreign Source 
Income’, in U.S. Taxation of American Business Abroad (1975), at 37, in Vogel, supra note 24, at 222 n 38. 
30 Ture, at 38, in Vogel, supra  note 24, at 313. 
31 M.J. McIntyre, ‘The Design of Tax Rules for the North American Free Trade Alliance’, (1994) 49 Tax Law 
Review 769, at 777. CEN does not apply directly to TNCs as it does to portfolio investments. First, the bulk 
of the world’s international investment is now in the form of portfolio investment. It follows that the role of 
TNCs, although growing in absolute terms, is diminishing relative to the growth of portfolio investments. 
Second, TNCs use financial manoeuvring, for example, debt financing and transfer pricing manipulation to 
achieve CEN by lowering their tax payable in high tax jurisdictions. Third, in the U.S. debate about CEN as 
applied to TNCs relates only to those enterprises whose parents are incorporated in the U.S., which is a purely 
formal distinction. For a more detailed examination of these issues, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1314-16. 
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i i i Tax Rate Reciprocity 
One of the major characteristics of the conventional system is that it tends to allocate the right 
to tax investment income almost exclusively to the residence country. Indeed, the system 
attempts to reduce or even eliminate the source country’s right to tax such income through the 
use of the withholding tax mechanism. This is achieved through the principle of tax rate 
reciprocity. Tax rate reciprocity requires the reciprocal reduction of withholding tax rates to 
relatively low rates by source countries. The rates are reciprocal in the sense that both states 
party to a DTA must apply them in their capacity as source country.32 Reciprocity of tax rates 
is premised on the idea of equal sacrifice between both the source and the resident country. 
There is equal sacrifice, in the case of dividends, if both parties have similar corporate tax 
systems and, in the case of interest income, if both are economically comparable.33 
Moreover, withholding taxes on investment income of non-residents are levied on a gross 
basis in most developed countries. This means that no deductions are allowed as with the usual 
domestic net-basis taxation. The low rate of withholding taxes on portfolio dividends is 
justified in that it approximates source country taxation of domestic shareholders who benefit 
from deductions not available to foreign shareholders. As for the even lower rate on direct 
dividends, its rationale stems from the fact that it is an additional tax levied by the source 
country on corporate income. Finally, the nil rate on interest arises because associated non-
deductible expenses are greater than for dividends. It has, however, been suggested that the 
real reason for the zero rate arises because of capital importing countries’ desire to attract 
foreign debt.34 
                                                             
32 For a historical explanation of the principle of reciprocity for investment income, see Ault, supra  note 4, at 
569-70. 
33 P.A. Harris, Corporate/Shareholder Income Taxation  (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications 1996), at 314-15. Under 
Article 10(2) the OECD Model, the maximum rates applicable to dividends paid to corporate investors owning 
more than 25 per cent of the paying corporation is limited to 5 per cent. As for interests, the maximum rate 
pursuant to Article 11(2) is 10 per cent; see OECD (1992), supra note 1. 
34 Warren, supra  note 2, at 603. If, as is the case, some countries have an integration system and others a classical 
system for the taxation of dividends, ‘the sacrifice consequent on a reduction in source taxation of dividends to 
a specific withholding tax rate is unlikely to be equal’; see Harris, supra note 33, at 314. An alternative 
approach suggested by M. Sato and R.M. Bird is that, in the case of corporate income, it is better to compare 
effective rates of tax levied; the so-called effective reciprocity rather than actual withholding tax rates; see M. 
Sato & R.M. Bird, International Aspects of the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders,  (1975) IMF Staff 
Papers 384, 426-29, in Warren, supra  note 2, at 603 n 20. 
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2 The Conventional Approach: General Problems  
The present system of international division of the international tax base is plagued by 
obsolescence. Its conceptual foundation which assumes separate corporate and investor 
taxation is inconsistent with present domestic tax rules of most developed nations. Yet, it 
remains at the very heart of the OECD Model Treaty which epitomises bilateral cooperation in 
tax matters. Arguably, the Model’s reliance on the separate accounting/arm’s length standard 
no longer fits the conditions of international commerce.35 
A Conceptual Discontinuity 
The central organising principle of the conventional system is the distinction between the 
corporation and the investor. This classical system of two-tier taxation, although eliminated in 
the domestic system of most industrialised countries other than the U.S., has been maintained 
for the taxation of international income. The two-tier system of taxation (the classical system) 
has the ‘effect of imposing a relatively higher total tax burden on foreign investors and on the 
foreign income of domestic investors.’36 This is a relic from the past. The consensus wrought 
out by the League of Nations was designed to apply in an environment when separate taxation 
of corporations and their shareholders was the norm. That environment has all but 
disappeared. Indeed, the separate taxation of corporations and their shareholders induces 
several serious economic distortions ranging from a disincentive for investment in new 
corporate capital, an incentive for corporate financing by debt or retained earnings, or the 
incentive to retain or distribute corporate earnings.37 To counter these manoeuvres, domestic 
systems have moved from the classical to an integration method whereby corporate and 
investor taxes are treated in a unified and coordinated manner. However, in the field of 
international taxation, the conventional model endures. It is therefore difficult and illogical, as 
Professor Ault argues, to continue applying the traditional rules of international tax jurisdiction 
as developed in DTAs.38 The interaction of domestic integration and classical international 
separate taxation results in international income being taxed more heavily than domestic 
income both at the source and the residence levels. For instance, foreign investment is likely to 
be subject to higher taxation than domestic investment in a source country given that 
shareholder integration credits (imputation credits) are denied to foreign investors. In the 
                                                             
35 Chang Hee Lee, ‘A Strategic approach for Capital-Importing Countries Under the Arm’s Length Constraint’, 
(1999) 10 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 7) 677. 
36 Ault, supra note 4, at 582. 
37 Warren, supra  note 2, at 604. 
38 Ault, supra note 4, at 566. 
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residence country, income from investment abroad can be taxed more heavily than income 
from investment at home because the foreign tax credit or exemption for corporate income 
earned abroad is not generally available to shareholders when that income is distributed as 
dividends.39 
B Operational Problems 
The current system is extremely formalistic due to its schedular nature. It is exceedingly 
complex.40 As such, it promotes treaty shopping. Its bilateral nature results in an ever-
increasing number of treaties which is becoming increasingly irrelevant in a globalised world 
where, for example, the sophistication of modern capital markets have made the enforcement 
of source-based taxation of portfolio income problematic.41 
Finally, and most importantly, the reliance on the separate accounting/arm’s length principle for 
the sharing of the income tax base between competing jurisdictions is unrealistic and 
unworkable.42 
i  The Schedular Nature of the Model 
The schedular nature of tax treaties based on the OECD Model has considerable significance 
on the investment decisions of TNCs. In essence, under a schedular tax system different 
categories (schedules) of income are taxed on a different basis and at different rates according 
to their respective sources. For international tax purposes, income is derived from four 
sources: business, investments, services, and employment. Each of these is taxed on a different 
basis; for example, business profits are taxed on a net-of-expense basis while investment 
income is taxed on a gross-revenue basis. In order to minimise tax, taxpayers may seek to 
manipulate the various categories in order to fall, for example, within the most favourable tax 
rate.43 The OECD Model encourages this behaviour since it disregards the concept of global 
                                                             
39 The full consequence of such tax differentials is attenuated if source countries extend shareholders credits to 
foreign investors. However, while this has been achieved as far as foreign portfolio investors are concerned, 
notably by France, extension of credits to direct corporate investors is extremely rare, for example, the 1975 
U.S.-U.K. Treaty. See Ault, supra  note 4, at 585-87. 
40 For example, IRC § 904, the U.S. provisions limiting the foreign tax credit to the U.S. rate; or IRC §§ 951-64 the 
controlled foreign corporations provisions. 
41 Thus, the U.S. has all but abandoned the taxation of U.S. source portfolio interest, see IRC §§ 871(h), 881(h). 
42 Warren, supra  note 2, at 606. 
43 For example, if a treaty between A and B contains a zero rate of taxation on royalties, while business profits 
sourced in any one of the Contracting States are taxed at the current corporate rate, then it is likely that a TNC 
resident in A doing business in B through a subsidiary, will endeavour to recharacterise business profits as 
royalties to minimise tax costs; see V. Krishna, ‘International Income Taxation of Electronic Commerce’ 
(January 1999), 9 Canadian Current Tax (No. 4) 33, at 35. 
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income and considers the various members of a transnational group as separate entities dealing 
with each other at arm’s length. Furthermore, the schedular system of the OECD Model 
seems to satisfy the argument that source countries should have a different claim on various 
categories of income. The economic justification has been questioned44 and it has been argued 
that a single flat rate of tax applied to all non-resident income is the most reasonable 
alternative.45 
The real justification in preserving the schedular nature of tax treaties lies in the administrative 
convenience that it entails. In most tax systems, collection of tax from non-residents on passive 
income is achieved by withholding at source, that is, before it leaves the country. Withholding 
tax is calculated on gross income because if a net basis had been adopted, the taxpayer would 
have been entitled to a deduction for costs incurred in deriving that income. To demand a 
substantiation of these costs on the part of the foreign taxpayer and devising a system that 
could verify their reality is considered as being virtually impossible. On the other hand, a net 
basis approach is appropriate for business income because a business has usually sufficient 
‘presence’ to justify costs and other expenses incurred in the process of creating a profit. 
Tax treaties adopt the same practice as far as revenue collection is concerned. In other words, 
Contracting States anticipate problems of collection in spite of the fact that a provision for 
assistance in collection may be included in the treaty. The severity of such problems would 
certainly be mitigated if an international body, acting as an agent of one revenue authority, 
could track down the recalcitrant taxpayer and obtain payment of taxes due. 
i i  Treaty Shopping  
Treaty shopping occurs when a person in country A, entitled to receive income from country 
B, uses an entity in country C to receive that income on his or her behalf because the B/C 
double tax treaty contains more beneficial provisions than the A/C treaty if indeed one exists.46 
This is what basically happens with the ‘Netherlands royalty route’. Most of the Netherlands 
                                                             
44 While there has been, until 1985, a move away from schedular taxation, it has recently returned in new forms 
with, for example, the introduction of anti-shelter provisions in the U.S. For further details, see K. Messere, 
‘OECD Tax Developments in the 1990s’, (July 1997) 51 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 298, 
at 300. 
45 See P. Musgrave, ‘The Taxation of International Capital Income’, in J.G. Head, ed., Taxation Issues of the 
1980s (Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1984), at 279-94. For a contrary view as to the 
appropriateness of the single flat rate of tax, see ‘Flattening might get you nowhere’, at 
<http:\\dialog.krinfo.com/cgi-bin/dwclient.cgi>, Document No. 00567653/7. 
46 R. Saunders, ‘How Much Longer Will Treaty Shopping Be Allowed?’, (January 1995) 22  Tax Planning 
International Review 1, at 20. 
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treaties have a zero tax rate on royalties. Therefore, if a TNC manages to be governed by any 
one of these treaties, it will end up receiving or paying tax-free royalties. 
The real cause of treaty shopping lies not with the OECD Model per se, but it arises because 
of the different tax rates each country applies to the same type of income. In fact, the Model 
trie s to solve the problem through Articles 10, 11 and 12, which state that the lower rates 
applicable to dividends, interest and royalties are available only if the non-resident recipient is 
the beneficial owner of the income. Therefore, the reduced rates do not apply if the non-
resident deriving the income is not the beneficial owner but is merely acting as an agent or 
nominee for a resident of a third country. However, arbitrage opportunities remain because the 
concept of beneficial owner47 is more accurately defined in some jurisdictions than in others. 
For instance, Article 37 of the Italian Unified Tax Code of Income Tax uses the ‘more precise 
legal concept of effective owner’ rather than that of ‘beneficial owner’.48  
In the treaty shopping area, TNCs often use the ‘conduit company’ method to exploit the 
different tax rates that each country applies to the same type of income. A conduit company is 
one whose constitutive powers are so narrow that it may be regarded as ‘a mere fiduciary or 
an administrator acting on account of the interested parties (most likely the shareholders of the 
conduit company).’49 When such a vehicle is interposed between the payer and the recipient, 
the Model, relying on the concept of beneficial owner, denies the concessional tax treatment 
that would have normally been available in the source country. 50 The term ‘beneficial 
ownership’ first appeared in the 1977 OECD Model Tax Convention. 51 However, no 
definition of the term was given either in the convention or in the commentaries. Therefore, tax 
practitioners around the world have struggled to understand what the expression really 
means.52  
                                                             
47 For an examination of the concept of ‘beneficial owner’, see J Sainsbury Plc v. O’Connor (Inspector of Taxes) 
Chancery Division, [1990] STC 516, more especially the judgement of Millett J., at 530ff. See also A. 
Rowland, ‘Beneficial Ownership in a Corporate Context: What is It? When is it Lost? Where does it Go?’, 
[1997] 3 BTR, at 178-87. 
48 Article 37 of the Italian Unified Tax Code of Income Tax (TUIR), in  G Palumbo, ‘Anti-Avoidance and the 1992 
OECD Model Convention’, (September 1994) 21 Tax Planning International Review  3, at 4. 
49 OECD, ‘Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies’, in OECD, International Tax 
Avoidance and Evasion, Four Related Studies  (Paris: OECD, 1987) 93, at para. 14(b). 
50 OECD (1992), supra note 1, Commentaries on Article 10, at C (10)-3 para. 12; Article 11, at C (11)-3 para. 8; 
and Article 12, at C (12)-1 para. 4. 
51  OECD, Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital (Paris: OECD, 1977). 
52  For an analysis of the term and its meaning, see J.D.B. Oliver, et al., ‘Beneficial Ownership’ (July 2000) 54 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation  (No. 7) 310. 
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Treaty shopping has certainly not been reined in by the beneficial ownership requirement. 
Leaving aside the confusion as to the meaning of the term, it is fair to say that the success of 
the concept in policing the application of tax treaties is limited because: 
· firstly, it does not apply where a conduit company engages in other activities 
concurrent to acting in a fiduciary capacity; and 
· secondly, it is extremely difficult for the source country to establish that the non-
resident conduit company is not the beneficial owner of the income.  
The truth is that treaty shopping persists because of tax rates differentials existing between 
various jurisdictions. If tax rates were relatively comparable worldwide, then, to engage in 
treaty shopping would probably be an unattractive proposition. Unfortunately, the 
standardisation of tax rates on a worldwide basis is impossible to achieve in the present 
framework. 
While treaty shopping is normally portrayed as being undesirable,53 it has however been 
argued that it serves to remove the impediments to international trade caused by the absence 
of double tax treaties between two particular countries. Furthermore, it provides ‘equal 
opportunities to maximise the return on one’s investments, thereby encouraging and facilitating 
such investments.’54  
The traditional policy response to the question of treaty shopping aims at limiting the 
attractiveness of the mechanism. This is achieved by the inclusion of the so-called ‘limitation-
on-benefit’ article in the relevant treaty as pioneered by the U.S.55 As the term suggests, the 
intention is to limit the benefit of a treaty to a resident of either of the Contracting State by 
narrowly defining the concept of residence.56 However, it appears that, as a result of the 
limitation-on-benefit provision between Canada and the U.S: 
                                                             
53 J.G. Russell, ‘The New Limitation-on-Benefits Article’, (1995) 43 Canadian Tax Journal 964, at 966. 
54 Saunders, supra note 46, at 21. 
55 See section 894 of the IRC and the temporary regulations thereunder with effect from 1 January 1998. Foreign 
persons are denied the reduced rates of withholding tax under all treaties with the U.S. on income derived 
through a fiscally transparent entity if the income is not treated as the income of the foreign person in the 
foreign country; the treaty does not address income derived through fiscally transparent entities; and the foreign 
country does not tax distributions from the entity to the foreign person. These provisions illustrate 
conspicuously the readiness of the U.S. to unilaterally override its treaty obligations. Moreover, in Australia 
the weakness of similar provisions has been demonstrated in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Lamesa 
Holdings BV 97 ATC 4752. In any event, the complexity of international tax laws is such that TNCs are now 
forcefully lobbying to simplify these rules, at least in the U.S. context; see R.J. Donmoyer, ‘Multinationals Beg 
Senate Finance Committee to Simplify Int’l Laws’ (1999) 18 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 12) 1103. 
56 For an analysis of the new limitation on benefit article applicable pursuant to the 17 March 1995 protocol to 
the Canada-U.S. Treaty, see Russell,  supra note 53, at 966. 
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many taxpayers not involved in treaty shopping may be adversely affected. For example, foreign 
controlled corporations, highly leveraged private corporations, and trusts with non-resident 
beneficiaries.57 
Nonetheless, the U.S. initiative is a novel response to the problem of treaty shopping as there 
is no similar limitation-on-benefit provision in the OECD Model Convention, although the 
problem is discussed at length in the commentary on Article 1 and countries are permitted to 
include such limitations in their conventions.58 
i i i The Irrelevancy of the Model 
The OECD Model is increasingly irrelevant because new principles of taxation are emerging in 
the field of international taxation. Tax planning activities of TNCs reduce the tax take of both 
source and residence countries. As a result, countries have introduced innovative legislation in 
order to combat elaborate forms of tax avoidance or evasion. These measures were not 
anticipated in the years when the ancestors of the present Model were being articulated. The 
question arises as to how these measures should be reconciled with the provisions of existing 
treaties. Different modifications of the Model have been suggested to accommodate these 
developments. However, the value of such an approach is debatable because of the inflexible 
nature of the Model. Consequently, more and more countries resort to treaty override in order 
to boost the chances of success of their legislation. Treaty override, an American term, means 
that ‘the rules of a double taxation agreement can be superseded by a subsequent national law, 
making the treaty rules ineffective.’59 Thus, in the U.S., the practice is that when a particular 
legislation is passed ‘that is at variance with the U.S. treaties, a transitional period is allowed 
for the treaty partners to agree to a protocol varying the treaty provisions to allow for the 
imposition of the new domestic law.’60 Unfortunately, while in the past most countries 
regarded ‘treaty override as unlawful and immoral’, some now ‘behave as if treaty override is 
a minor misdemeanour’ rather than a serious breach of the requirement that an international 
agreement should be executed in complete good faith. 61 
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Section II The Conventional Approach: Problems Specific 
to the Separate Accounting/Arm’s length Method 
The separate entity theory is based on the concept that, regardless of their juridical form, the 
various components of a TNC are to be treated, for taxation purposes, as if they are truly 
independent to each other.62 It therefore requires these entities to deal with each other at arm’s 
length. Consequently, it assumes that their transfer prices are not biased by any relationship 
that may exist between them. 63 
1 The Main Features and the Limitations of the Separate 
Accounting/Arm’s Length Method 
In theory, the separate entity/arm’s length principle enables tax administrators to demand that 
dealings between related enterprises be commensurate with conditions prevailing in an open 
market where full and free competitive conditions prevail.64 In practice, this objective is 
achieved, if at all, by means of a complex set of regulations in constant evolution and whose 
utility is debatable. 
A The Classical Expression of the Arm’s length Principle 
In its classical expression, the arm’s length principle refers to an arm’s length price for a 
particular transaction. 65 The principle is thus applied on a transaction-by-transaction basis.66 
The application of the arm’s length principle requires that a comparison be made between a 
controlled transaction and a transaction selected on the open market. A transaction is 
comparable to another if: 
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none of the differences (if any) between the situations being compared could materially affect the 
condition being examined in the methodology (e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate 
adjustments can be made to eliminate the effect of any such differences.67  
Therefore, insofar as market conditions contemporaneous with the transaction are known, the 
arm’s length price needs to be established on the basis of data which are available to the 
taxpayer when the transaction occurred.68 
To determine an acceptable transfer price in the context of a particular case, tax administrators 
are required to perform what is called a functional and comparability analysis. A functional 
analysis is an exercise which focuses on the functions of the enterprise. The functions of an 
enterprise are those economically significant activities which are ultimately responsible for the 
enterprise deriving a profit or a loss.69 In performing this functional analysis, regard must be 
had to the assets used by the enterprise and the risks it assumes. Thus, the whole objective is 
to find similar but not identical transactions and to match their prices. 
B The Arm’s Length Principle: Theoretical Problems 
i .  The Artif iciality of the Arm’s Length Principle 
The major theoretical weakness of the arm’s length principle is that it is based on the 
assumption that members of a global enterprise will treat each other as independent and 
separate entities subject to market forces in their dealings. The appropriateness of this 
assumption is open to doubt. In reality: 
affiliates of a MNC would not necessarily be expected to treat other affiliates as wholly separate 
corporations or to choose arm’s length prices for their transfers, since affiliation may give rise to a 
variety of synergistic effects which alter the costs and benefits of transacting intercompany 
business.70 
The existence of such synergistic gains was not unknown to Mitchell Carroll when he 
examined the question of allocation rules as reviewed in Chapter 1. He even conceded that the 
separate accounting/arm’s length methodology he was advocating would not capture these 
gains. 
It is obvious that the proportion of work to capital varies from business to business and that, in the 
alchemy of a successful business, the intangible, immeasurable element of brainwork is a very 
important factor, if not the most vital factor. This is impossible to measure accurately, and only 
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formal recognition is in the préciput ranging from 10 to 25 per cent of the total net profit which is 
allotted by the Swiss cantonal authorities to the seat of management.71 
Since Carroll’s time, much more is known about how TNCs operate.72 An enterprise chooses 
to operate as a TNC because this organisational structure produces synergistic efficiencies so 
that, in the aggregate, the members of a TNC earn more than the sum of what each party in 
the conglomerate would have earned had it operated individually. Therefore, the common 
acceptance of the ‘fiscal myth’ that every subsidiary or branch of a TNC is an entity separate 
from its parent or head office and is capable of dealing independently with either the parent or 
any other member of the group is at the very root of the problem relative to the allocation of 
income within the group. The ability for TNCs to act as a single mind in order to derive a 
competitive edge is the essence of the TNC. To ignore this and to reason on the assumption 
that intra-firm transactions should satisfy a hypothetical arm’s length norm ‘flies in the face of 
reality’.73 The ultimate result of such a method is that it does not produce a fair division of 
income between related parties.74 
A TNC consists of an amalgamation of branches and subsidiaries. The OECD Model Treaty 
applies the arm’s length principle to both permanent establishments and to subsidiaries.75 The 
exact relationship between Article 7, which attributes income to a permanent establishment, 
and Article 9, which adjust profits between associated enterprises, is not clear. It has been 
argued that there is a close relationship between these two articles and that they are mutually 
exclusive.76 If this is the case, then ‘this has important consequences’77 in terms of potential 
double taxation since, unlike Article 9, Article 7 does not have a corresponding adjustment 
provision.78  
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The implementation of the arm’s length principle may also lead to uncertainty and conflict 
between different taxation authorities.79 In theory, arm’s length prices should be equivalent to 
those that would be arrived at as a result of bona fide bargaining between independent 
enterprises. In practice, however, prices that are negotiated merely reflect the bargaining 
strength of the parties.80 Thus ‘[e]conomic theory and practice strongly teach that the arm’s 
standard can, at best lead to a range of reasonableness.’81 
i i  The Different Concepts of Arm’s Length. 
A divergence exists between the Anglo-Saxon and the European perception of the arm’s 
length principle.82 In its classical expression, the arm’s length principle postulates that, for 
taxation purposes, the financial and commercial relationships between the various components 
of a TNC need to be neutral. This neutrality is expressed either ‘by reference to a result, i.e. a 
price’ or ‘by reference to a method, i.e. a bargaining’.83 If the price arrived at by two 
associated enterprises is identical to that which either of them would have reached with an 
independent enterprise, it follows that the two associated enterprises have acted as if they 
were independent from each other. Conversely, if it is demonstrated that two associated 
enterprises in their financial relations behave as if they are completely independent from each 
other, then, notwithstanding their associated status, the economic result, that is, the price that 
they have agreed to, will be arm’s length. 
The second method of determining an arm’s length price, the arm’s length bargaining method, 
is not favoured by the OECD although it is admitted that TNCs ‘often bargain with each other 
as though they were independent enterprises’. However, it is also admitted that ‘evidence of 
hard bargaining alone is not sufficient to establish the dealings are at arm’s length.’84  
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Professor Le Gall believes that ‘a trend is developing towards a considerably different 
conception of the arm’s length principle.’85 This trend, as evidenced by certain provisions in 
the 1979 OECD Report,86 ignores reference to prices prevailing between independent parties. 
Instead, it purports to establish a price different from the market price and closer to what may 
be considered a normal price given the facts and circumstances. Thus, it is admitted that start 
up prices, or new market penetration prices, are acceptable although they may be different 
from strict market prices. 
In the present context, it is less important to examine the reasons for this shift from the concept 
of ‘price identity (i.e. from a quantitative, objective analysis) to price normality (i.e. to a 
qualitative, subjective analysis)’87 than to examine whether this trend is confirmed and the 
necessary consequences it may have in the transfer pricing area. 
That this trend is now well established is evidenced by the OECD’s acceptance of 
transactional profit-based methods, albeit as methods of last resort. The existence of two 
schools of thought on the subject matter, one more or less Anglo-Saxon and the other rather 
European, 88 became quite apparent at the International Fiscal Association (IFA) Conference 
held in Cancun in 1992.89 
The major difference between the two approaches is the following: 90 
· In the Anglo-Saxon model, the market dictates the behaviour of the entrepreneur. 
Consequently, the market fixes, in a mechanical and objective manner, both the 
transaction price and the profit margin.  
· Conversely, the European approach places the entrepreneur at the centre of the price 
determination exercise and only his decision is submitted to control by comparing it to 
that of another entrepreneur faced with similar conditions. 
In spite of the lobbying by European countries with the support of the International Chamber 
of Commerce,91 the OECD does not favour this approach, although it concedes that business 
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strategies must also be examined in determining comparability for transfer pricing purposes.92 
Likewise, it is reasonable to say that the OECD does not particularly favour the Anglo-Saxon 
approach, although it did introduce two transactional profit methods in its 1995 Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines. However, the selected profit methods are perceived as satisfying the arm’s 
length method93 and are recognised ‘as methods that assist in determining cases of last resort 
whether transfer pricing complies with the arm’s length principle.’94 
It is submitted that the indecision of the OECD relates to its quasi aversion of fractional 
apportionment. Being the successor of the earlier League’s models, the OECD Model actually 
proposes two methods of allocation of transnational income. The principal method is the 
separate accounting/arm’s length, while the auxiliary method, referrable only as a matter of last 
resort, is the method of fractional apportionment as per Article 7(4). The viability of this 
second method, it is true, is severely constrained by the requirements that its results satisfy the 
arm’s length principle. In fact, these two methods may then be regarded as the extreme ends 
of a continuum. The advent of the profit methodologies has, in reality, shifted the focus 
towards the fractio nal apportionment methodology. In view of this shift, it is suggested that the 
OECD’s objective is to ensure that the profit methodologies become the extreme end of the 
continuum rather than having this place occupied by the fractional apportionment 
methodologies. Thus recently, the OECD has been canvassing the possible removal of Article 
7(4) from the Model. If this is achieved, then a new continuum will emerge with the separate 
accounting/arm’s length at one end and the profit-based methodologies at the other. 
i i i The Practical Limitations of the Arm’s Length Principle 
The OECD advocates three traditional transaction-based methods and two transactional 
profit-based methods for ascertaining an arm’s length price or result.95 The two transactional 
profit-based methods, introduced in the 1995 Guidelines, are the Transactional Net Margin 
Method (TNMM), and the Profit-Split Method. 
a The Direct Method: The Comparable Uncontrolled Price 
In ascertaining an arm’s length price, the 1995 Guidelines express a clear preference for the 
Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method (CUP). The CUP Method is viewed as ‘the most 
                                                             
92 OECD 1995 Guidelines, supra  note 64, at I-13 para. 1.31. 
93 Supra note 64, at III-1 para. 3.1. 
94 Supra note 64, at III-18 para. 3.54. 
95 G.N. Carlson et al., ‘The U.S. Final Transfer Pricing Regulations: The More Things Change, the More They 
Stay the Same’, (1 August 1994) 9 Tax Notes Int'l 5 333, at 334. 
Chapter 2  The Limitat ions of the Present System of Internat ional Taxat ion 
 63
direct way to establish whether the conditions made or imposed between associated 
enterprises are arm’s length.’96 
Until the revision of the OECD 1979 Report, both business and tax administrators came to the 
view that the CUP Method had been applied too rigidly. 97 The 1995 Guidelines adopt a ‘more 
flexible approach to enable the CUP Method to be used.’98 However, there is still the need to 
make ‘reasonably accurate adjustments’99 in order to arrive at an acceptable standard of 
comparability between the controlled and uncontrolled transaction. In these circumstances, it is 
submitted that the CUP Method can no longer be regarded as an objective test since it 
requires the substitution of judgment on the part of taxing authorities. 
The limitations of the CUP Method in the current context of international trade, where the 
share of services is constantly increasing, are becoming more apparent. It is undeniable that it 
served its purpose at a time when most transactions were basically of a manufacturing nature 
involving the processing of raw materials into finished goods. In such a model, there is a 
profusion of comparable transactions capable of generating an uncontroversia l comparable 
price. This situation prevailed from the eighteenth century mercantile age up to the mid 
twentieth century. During this period, ‘international related-party trade was not only limited 
compared with today, but also consisted primarily of fungible basic commodities and was 
backed up by customs officers at every port of entry.’100 Today, specialised information, 
which by its nature is unique and invisible, is becoming rapidly the most traded commodity. 
Clearly, the CUP Method which proceeds on a transaction-by-transaction basis is unsuitable 
in the context of this type of trade. 
Moreover, Professor Le Gall briefly explores yet another serious limitation of the CUP 
Method relative to competition law.101 A free market system is based on two ideas: Firstly, 
market forces will determine the price of a given commodity without any need for external 
intervention; and secondly, economic operators will adjust their prices to suit market 
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conditions, for example, in order to penetrate or otherwise increase their share in a given 
market. The determination of prices in a free economy is, therefore, a dynamic process. This 
process inevitably produces a range of arm’s length prices reflecting the economic strengths of 
each operator. The OECD acknowledges the existence of a range of arm’s length prices. 
However, it maintains that the CUP Method, one which aligns a controlled transaction with an 
uncontrolled one, is most appropriate in determining transfer prices. Price alignment is 
condemned by competition law but: 
[i]t is quite surprising to observe how the incompatibility of the C.U.P method with the law of 
competition is totally ignored by tax lawyers, who are no doubt locked within boundaries of their 
own discipline and blinded by it.102 
b The Indirect Methods 
The OECD, however, recognises that there will be cases in which it would be unrealistic if not 
impossible, to apply the CUP Method. It therefore proposes other methods aimed at 
achieving a reasonable approximation of the arm’s length price. These alternative methods, 
also known as the indirect methods, are: the resale price method, and the cost plus method. 
In theory, the aim of the resale price method and the cost plus method is to determine an arm’s 
length price in situations where the CUP Method is inapplicable. These two methods are 
variations of the CUP Method in that both take gross margin data from uncontrolled 
‘comparables’, calculate gross margins, and apply these to a controlled transaction.103 
Basically, the resale price method entails deducting the gross margin from the selling price,104 
whereas the cost plus approach adds a gross margin, the so-called gross mark-up, to the cost 
of sales.105 Such mark-up is determined by functional analyses carried out along the lines 
advocated by the OECD.106 The use of the resale price method or the cost plus method is 
often necessary because of the unavailability of transaction-specific data. 
A number of observations need to be made relative to the resale price and the cost plus 
methods. To start with, transfer prices that are calculated under these approaches suffer from 
the same limitations as those calculated under the CUP Method. Since all three traditional 
transactional methods rely on the existence of comparable uncontrolled transactions, their 
usefulness is severely limited in the absence of information concerning these uncontrolled 
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transactions. Thus, the lack of information may result in a failure to identify the most 
appropriate benchmarks available for determining the gross margin. It also becomes extremely 
difficult to determine ‘the specific adjustments needed to compensate for the attributes of the 
companies whose result give rise to the arm’s length benchmarks and the attributes of the 
related party whose arm’s length price is being determined.’107 In addition, both the resale 
price and the cost-plus methods are one-sided solutions. The first concentrates on transactions 
from the point of view of the intercompany purchaser and thus neglects to put the 
intercompany supplier at par with an independent supplier, whereas the situation is the 
converse with the cost-plus approach. Consequently, this leads to a fundamentally different 
allocation of risks: all residual profits or loss are placed with the supplying location under the 
resale price approach and with the purchasing location under the cost plus approach.108 
Finally, in applying these methods a certain number of difficulties arise: 109 
· first, it is difficult to convincingly determine that the uncontrolled prices used to develop 
arm’s length mark-ups over costs are in fact sufficiently comparable; 
· second, the determination of the proper cost base to which the arm’s length mark-up 
should be applied is also fraught with uncertainties; 
· third, problems inevitably arise when it becomes necessary to make adjustments for 
the inescapable differences between a firm’s proposed comparables and the 
controlled tested party; and 
· fourth, with regard to the accepted concept of the arm’s length range, specific issues 
will still need to be solved. 
Undoubtedly the transactional methods used to ascertain the arm’s length price have had 
reasonable success in a world where trade was primarily conducted on a bilateral basis since 
in these circumstances it is much easier to identify specific transactions. This bilateral trading 
pattern is now on the verge of becoming totally obsolete. The nature of present-day TNCs 
requires them to engage in activities which tend to benefit the group as a whole. This strategy 
generally renders the successful application of the arm’s length principle highly improbable. 
This situation is well documented in the case of services and intangibles where numerous 
judicial decisions have exposed the weaknesses of the traditional transactional 
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methodologies.110 Such transactions consist of activities carried out for the joint benefit of 
many if not all of the companies in a TNC. This means that it is extremely hard for the tax 
administrator to identify a single transaction and then proceed to either find a CUP or an 
appropriate mark-up to satisfy the resale price or the cost plus methods. 
Moreover, a relationship might appear to involve an outright bilateral relationship. Yet, on 
analysis it may well be found that in fact such a relationship involves several transactions. The 
unbundling of such transactions thus becomes an important preliminary step before any 
decision is taken as to who benefits from what in this sort of transaction. For example, one 
transaction may consist of two or more discrete dealings. A sale of a tangible such as an active 
ingredient in a drug may be paired with a simultaneous transfer of intangibles as well as the 
rights to the patents embodied in it. Similarly, a transaction may be reciprocal in the sense that 
‘a patent licence will commonly include a grant-back clause for development patents, which 
must be dealt with by provisions for set-offs.’111 
Often it is extremely difficult to find comparable transactions suitable for the determination of 
an arm’s length price.112 In other cases, the nature of the transaction prevents the use of one of 
the three traditional transactional methods. Until the publication of its 1995 Guidelines, the 
OECD left open the possibility for a party to rely on some other method to demonstrate that 
its transfer pricing policy satisfies the arm’s length principle. The 1995 Guidelines, however, 
now only allows for the use of two transactional profit-based methods to achieve this 
objective. While these two methods are thought of as satisfying the arm’s length principle, their 
use is however restricted to cases where the traditional transactional methods are likely to be 
unsuitable. In other words, their intervention is permitted as a matter of last resort. A full 
analysis of these transactional profit-based methods is carried out in a later chapter. 
2 The Separate Accounting/Arm’s Length Principle in Practice  
The enforcement and administration of the arm’s length principle are often viewed as being 
especially difficult in an increasingly globalised economy. The saga of the American tax 
authorities, and to a lesser extent the Australian authorities, illustrate this predicament. 
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A The American Experience 
The IRS’s experience in dealing with the arm’s length concept is conveniently summarised in 
the Treasury White Paper published in 1988, and in three reports published by the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO).113 These documents examine the magnitude of the 
problem and the causes of the apparent inefficiency of section 482 of the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC). 
The 1992 GAO Report documented a major difference between the tax yield of domestic 
corporations and foreign controlled corporations (FCCs).114 The Report nevertheless 
conceded that whether FCCs had minimised tax by setting improper transfer prices was 
unproven. The 1995 GAO Report confirmed the earlier findings that a majority of FCCs as 
well as U.S. - controlled corporations paid no U.S. income taxes.115  
To remedy the situation a policing effort was suggested. The IRS launched a campaign of 
simultaneous audits with other tax authorities. However, from 1986 to 1990 the service 
conducted only 12 simultaneous audits, some of which did not involve transfer pricing. This 
low performance was ascribed to difficulties arising from differences in language and audit 
periods. The IRS also cited budget, staffing, and planning considerations as major hindrances 
to its audit effort. It is probably fair to say that the obvious reason for the non-enforcement of 
section 482 is the undue complexity of the regulations issued to implement this provision.  
i  The Difficulties With Section 482 Regulations 
In 1968 the Department of Treasury promulgated regulations embracing the exclusive use of 
the separate entity/arm’s length standard for income allocations under section 482.116 The 
Regulations required that commonly controlled entities be treated as if they were unrelated 
separate enterprises for the purpose of determining income from inter-company 
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99-39, (1999 GAO Report); see at <http://www.gao.gov>. 
116 United States, Treas. Reg. § I.482. 
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transactions.117 The method adopted by the Regulations requires the IRS to proceed through 
several steps. First, the fact of common control had to be established. Second, an examination 
of the inter-company transactions was required. The Commissioner, it was assumed, would 
then be in a position to decide whether a reallocation of income under section 482 was 
warranted.118 Notwithstanding this effort, the difficulty in applying the 1968 regulations is 
evidenced by the regular publication of numerous rulings and other regulations in the area of 
transfer pricing. 
i i  The Absence of Comparable Transactions  
At first sight, the separate entity approach seems simple and easy to apply. 119 There is no need 
to reconstruct all of the TNC’s transactions as the performance of other affiliates of the TNC 
is irrelevant for the calculation of the audited one. In addition, the facts surrounding the relevant 
transaction may be found in the affiliate’s own books.120 Therefore, it is unnecessary for the 
IRS to draw on other information ‘unless evidence of arm’s length prices cannot be culled 
from the taxpayer’s records of dealings with unrelated parties.’121 In reality, the application of 
the principle is fraught with several enforcement problems. 
In 1986 the U.S. Congress was made aware of the loss in revenue arising from inadequate 
transfer pricing laws.122 Thus, the 1986 Tax Reform was initiated; section 482 was amended; 
the arm’s length standard was reaffirmed; and its articulation strengthened.123 Concurrently, the 
U.S. Treasury conducted an in-depth study of section 482 and its regulations. Its findings and 
recommendations were published in the so-called 1988 White Paper. According to the White 
Paper, the primary administrative difficulty with the enforcement of section 482 was that 
existing regulations were silent as to what method of income allocation ought to be used when 
                                                             
117 Id., Treas. Reg .§ I.482-I (b) (I) (1968). 
118 Id., Treas. Reg .§ I.482-I (c) (1968). 
119 R.G. Clark, ‘Transfer Pricing, Section 482, and International Tax Conflict: Getting Harmonized Income 
Allocation Measures From Multinational Cacophony’, (1993) 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1155, at 1168 n 28. 
120 Musgrave, supra  note 62, at 402. 
121 See Note, supra note 70, at 1220. 
122 United States, 136 CONG. Rec. H928 (daily ed. 20 March 1990) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski pointing 
out that in 1986, foreign-controlled U.S. companies reported ‘negative tax liability of over $1 billion while also 
reporting over $500 billion in gross income’, in  R.G. Clark, supra  note 119, at 1168 n 130. This is an ongoing 
concern as evidenced by the most recent inquest of the U.S. Senate on this question; see 1999 GAO Report), 
supra note 115. 
123 United States, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.. 99-514, § 1231(e)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2562 (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 482 (1988)). 
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comparable uncontrolled prices are non-existent. As a result of the White Paper, a serious 
effort was put to empower section 482. 
i i i The Subjective Nature of the Arm’s Length Principle 
In 1990, at transfer pricing hearings held by the Sub-committee on Oversight, House 
Committee on Ways and Means, the Joint Committee on Taxation emphasised the complexity 
of the regulations. The Joint Committee found that, regardless of which method is used for the 
determination of the arm’s length price for tangible assets, controversy is most likely to arise 
between the IRS and taxpayers in establishing proper comparables.124 
In his testimony before the Joint Committee, the IRS Commissioner admitted that ‘transfer 
pricing cases were inherently factual and subjective in nature’.125 The Commissioner further 
acknowledged that these cases ‘required a great deal of cost, pricing, and market data about a 
taxpayer and its competitors and, as a result, were extremely difficult, time consuming, and 
costly to develop.’126 In short, the Commissioner admitted that because of inadequate 
resources, problems in accessing the books of the firm under examination, or inadequacy of 
documentation, section 482 and its regulations were incapable of efficiently countering 
international profit shifting. 
B The Elusive Search for Effective Regulations  
Recommendations of the Treasury White Paper and from the U.S. General Accounting 
Office, adverse results of litigation127 as well as the hostility of practitioners and TNCs have 
undoubtedly spurred the U.S. authorities to produce regulations that would permit a more 
effective application of section 482. 
In fact, as far back as 1968, regulations under section 482 had been issued.128 However, 
these were not extensively used until the 1970s when the IRS started to audit American 
companies that had taken advantage of certain provisions of Puerto Rican legislation designed 
                                                             
124 Id., at 36. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid . 
127 The IRS’ difficulties in the litigation of transfer pricing cases are notorious. The IRS admitted that in 1990 only 
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and 2 in 1985; see 1992 GAO Report, supra  note 113. 
128  For the latest review of the origin of the U.S. regulations, see L. Eden, The Arm’s Length Standard in North 
America’ Tax Analysts Document Number: Doc 2000-3645 (22 January 2000). 
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to attract mainly U.S. investors.129 A series of cases well known to practitioners in the transfer 
pricing area were litigated with limited success for the IRS.130 It was felt within the IRS that the 
U.S. was being deprived of its fair share of taxes by the actions of powerful TNCs. Moreover, 
it also came to be known that the U.S. was fast becoming a net capital importer. Congress felt 
that it was opportune to demand that TNCs pay their fair share of taxes. It was widely felt that 
such action would affect mostly FCCs rather than U.S. - owned TNCs. 
Tax reform was initiated131 through the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The so-called ‘super royalty 
provision’ in section 482132 was introduced amid claims by practitioners that the provision 
would generate more difficulties and that further guidance was required to facilitate compliance 
with the new provisions.133 
The super royalty or commensurate with income standard represents a novel approach to 
transfer pricing. It addresses more directly the transfer pricing question in two ways: First, it 
provides for a transfer pricing standard for the transfer of intangible; and secondly, it codifies 
transfer pricing methods that could be used under the so-called fourth methods.134 The debate 
is still open as to whether such an approach is consistent with the arm’s length standard.135 
To implement the commensurate with income requirement, the IRS/Treasury published the so-
called White Paper.136 The methods proposed by the White Paper for achieving these 
                                                             
129 Companies that set up operations in Puerto Rico were exempt from income tax save a ‘tollgate’ tax of 10 per 
cent on amounts repatriated. 
130 Eli Lilly & Co. v Comr, 84 TC 966 (1985); G. D. Searle & Co. v Comr, 88 TC 252 (1987); Bausch & Lomb v 
Comr, 91-1 USTC 933 F 2d 1084 (2nd Cir 1991); Sundstrand v Comr, 96 TC 226 (1991). 
131 The first measures consisted of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) which 
amended section 936(h) so that companies with manufacturing affiliates in Puerto Rico came to be treated as 
contract manufacturers (the so-called Dole Rule) unless they ‘elect out.’ Companies choosing to elect out of the 
amended provisions were given two options: they had to engage in a cost sharing agreement, or they had to 
agree to a 50/50 split. Section 367(d) which provided that transfers of intangibles to foreign corporations in 
either an exchange described under section 351, or in a reorganisation under section 361, were to be treated as a 
sale of intangibles. 
132 The additional sentence to section 482 reads as follows: ‘In case of any transfer (or license) of intangible 
property (within the meaning of Section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or license shall 
be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.’ 
133 R.L. Kaplan, ‘International Tax Enforcement and the Special Challenge of Transfer Pricing’, (1990) Illinois Law 
Review 299. See also N. Boidman, ‘Revenue Canada’s Transfer Pricing Circular: Selected Commentary’, (1988) 
36 Can. Tax J. 405. 
134 Clark, supra note 119, at 1155. 
135 Supra note 119, at 1155. 
136 King, supra note 109, at 25. See also OECD, Tax Aspects of Transfer Pricing Within Multinational Enterprises: 
The United States Proposed Regulations (Paris: OECD, 1993), at 6 para. 1.24. 
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objective, the basic arm’s length return method (BALRM) and BALRM with profit split,137 
gave rise to much controversy.138 The White Paper was therefore not a popular document.139 
Numerous practitioners from all over the world have commented on it and often argued that it 
represents a departure from the arm’s length standard.140 
Congress then directed Treasury ‘to study application and administration of Section 482.’141 
The ensuing report was published in April 1992 and a set of Proposed Regulations were 
issued in January 1992 (the 1992 Proposed Regulations ) with a request for comments from 
treaty partners and other interested parties.142 In 1993 Temporary Regulations (the 1993 
Temporary Regulations) were issued. The 1993 Temporary Regulations embraced the more 
acceptable provisions of the 1992 Proposed Regulations. They reverted, in a significant way, 
to a more accepted view of the arm’s length principle143 while significantly increasing the 
documentation that taxpayers are required to keep in order to justify their transfer pricing 
methodology. 
It is interesting to note the convergence between the U.S. Treasury 1993 Temporary 
Regulations and the OECD’s position on the transfer pricing question. The wide criticism of 
the 1992 Proposed Regulations prompted the OECD to release its views on the latter and its 
suggestions as to ways of making them more acceptable generally.144 In its 1993 Temporary 
Regulations, the U.S. Treasury took into account some of the recommendations of the OECD 
and modified the radical approach adopted in the 1992 Proposed Regulations. In a second 
report, the OECD pursued the matter and highlighted the remaining differences.145 
                                                             
137 They w ere the so-called exact and inexact comparable methods, see White Paper, supra note 113, at 485-90. 
138 C. Chandler, ‘Economic Issues in Intercompany Transfer Pricing’, (October 20, 1993) 2 Tax Management 
Transfer Pricing, Special Report (No. 8) 27. See also E. Sunley et al., ‘United States Section 482 White Paper’ 
in F. C. de Hosson, ed., Transfer Pricing for Intangibles: A Commentary on the White Paper , (Kluwer 1989). 
139 OECD, Intercompany Transfer Pricing Regulations Under Section 482 Temporary and Proposed Regulations 
(Paris: OECD, 1993). 
140 See for example, Stoffregen et al., ‘The BALRM Approach to Transfer Pricing: One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back’, (6 March 1989) 42 Tax Notes 1257. 
141 OECD (1993), supra  note 139, at 7 para. 1.25. 
142 United States, Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Report on the Application and Administration 
of Section 482  (Department of Treasury, 1992). 
143 ‘New Pricing Rules Seen Offering Flexibility, Requiring Added Documentation’, Int’l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA), 
at 1 (19 January 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. 
144 OECD (1993), supra  note 139. 
145 Supra note 139, at viii para. 8.  
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The process of implementation of the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was 
concluded on 1 July 1994 with the release of the Final Regulations under section 482. These 
provide for extensive guidance: first as to the comparability of third-party data, and second as 
to the choice of a specific method to assess whether the results of inter-company transactions 
satisfy the arm’s length standard.146 
The publication of the Final Regulations in July 1994 coincided with the release of the OECD 
Draft Guidelines on Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises.147 What is immediately 
apparent is that the reasonableness of many of the suggestions made by the OECD in its 
critique of the 1992 Proposed Regulations and the 1993 Temporary Regulations had been 
recognised. In fact, the OECD and United States officials had worked in close collaboration in 
their endeavour ‘to reach internationally acceptable solutions to the problems addressed by 
these regulations.’148 
Yet, these regulations illustrate the difference of approach towards transfer pricing between 
European countries and the U.S. During the Coopers & Lybrand’s European Tax Conference 
held in New York on 30 April 1996, Nick Raby, a director in the Coopers & Lybrand 
International Transfer Pricing practice based in Washington DC, surveyed some of these 
differences.149 He claimed that there is a fundamental divergence between the OECD 
Guidelines and the U.S. regulations. The OECD Guidelines favour a subjective test that 
focuses on behaviour, given that it concentrates on how transfer prices are set. For its part, the 
U.S. Regulations require an arm’s length result.150 This is an objective test that focuses on 
taxable income. The IRS monitors the correctness of the tax base and focuses on the objective 
test for evidentiary reasons. The IRS also believes that only an objective test is consistent with 
the arm’s length standard. The OECD, for its part, favours a more subjective approach in the 
determination of the arm’s length standard. Therefore, the interaction of these two methods 
                                                             
146 G. Carlson et al., ‘The U.S. Final Transfer Pricing Regulations: The More Things Change, the More They Stay 
the Same’, (2 August 1994) Tax Notes Int’l 333. 
147 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators; Discussion Draft 
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148 OECD (1993), supra  note 139, at 7 para. 1.28. 
149 S. Pope, ‘Recent European Tax Developments - Coopers & Lybrand European Tax Forum’, (24 June 1996) 12 
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150 For many taxpayers, avoiding transfer pricing penalties has become more important than the double taxation 
risk. Indeed, the heavy penalties imposed by IRC section 6662 have arguably incited taxpayers to report an 
arm’s length result notwithstanding that ‘section 482 contains no such mandate and historically has been 
interpreted as allowing only IRS to disregard actual transaction prices’; see H.J. Birnkrant & J.E. Crocker, Jr., 
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causes serious difficulties. The problem is compounded by the fact that in Western European 
systems the burden of proof for the arm’s length standard rests with tax administrations, 
whereas in the U.S. it rests with the taxpayer. 
To conclude, in spite of the new OECD Guidelines and the elaborate regulations in the U.S. 
and elsewhere, for example in Australia, it is doubtful whether the transfer pricing question can 
be satisfactorily solved within the parameters set by the arm’s length principle.151 In view of the 
numerous difficulties of applying the arm’s length principle, it is arguable that the U.S. Treasury 
has not closed the door to formulary apportionment. Indeed, in a press release dated 18 
October 1995, Treasury noted that ‘if in the future the arm’s length principle becomes 
unworkable, then we will work with our trading partners to develop a cooperative multilateral 
solution.’152 
C The Australian Experience 
As early as 1926 the Australian Taxation Office became aware of the problem of international 
profit shifting (IPS) in the oil industry.153 There was, however, no substantial effort to stem the 
perceived loss of tax revenue until well into the 1980s. By that time, however, the problem had 
reached such proportions that in its 1987 report the Australian Auditor-General even 
proposed to apply formulary apportionment to share TNCs profits.154 
Various provisions applicable to international transactions are scattered throughout the Income 
Tax Assessment Act  1936 (the ITAA 1936), for example, section 255 relative to persons in 
receipt or control of money from non-residents. Indeed, the general anti-avoidance provisions 
commonly referred to as Part IVA would seem to cover most transfer pricing situations.155 
Prior to 1982, section 136 of the ITAA 1936 purported to protect the Australian tax base 
from IPS. However, section 136, as it was then drafted, failed to achieve its purpose. Thus, 
since at least 1975, the Taxation Review Committee (the Asprey Committee) in its full report 
                                                             
151 Mazerov, supra note 100, at 28. 
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153 Australia, The Auditor-General, Australian Taxation Office: International Profit Shifting, Efficiency Audit 
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noted that ‘the section does not give the Commissioner adequate power’.156 Reform consisted 
in introducing, in 1982, a new set of measures, known as Division 13, to deal with IPS. 
Under Division 13, the Commissioner is required to substitute arm’s length prices in lieu of the 
prices adopted if certain conditions are met. Any adjustment to taxable income arising from 
that substitution is then taxed at the appropriate rate. Division 13 applies both to separate 
entities and to head office and/or branches located in different jurisdictions. In addition, all of 
Australia’s DTAs are premised on the arm’s length principle.  
Australia firmly believes in the adequacy of the arm’s length principle.157 Division 13 of the 
ITAA 1936 enshrines the standard in Australian law, and a series of Rulings by the ATO aim 
at giving guidance to taxpayers for its correct application in different circumstances.158 The 
ATO’s strategy at the present is to focus on compliance with the arm’s length standard 
through the application of three measures159 which are: 
· the Transfer Pricing Record Review program,  
· the APA program, and 
· section 25A disclosure statements. 
Yet, Australia is not a stranger to formulary apportionment. As already mentioned, one of the 
country’s most important administrative authorities, the Auditor-General, has called for the 
implementation of a formulary type of apportionment in lieu of the arm’s length principle. 
Moreover, since 1938, the Commissioner of Taxation has applied a formula, the so-called 
Ewing Formula, to allocate interest expenses within the banking industry.160 Finally, pursuant to 
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section 136AD(4) of the ITAA 1936, the Commissioner may in certain circumstances even 
apply some form of formulary apportionment method to counter IPS.161  
Section III   The Obsolescence of the Present 
System 
Since the Second World War, the world economic order has dramatically changed as a result 
of the process of globalisation and internationalisation of capital markets. While such changes 
have reduced ‘the effective economic distances among nations’,162 there are fears that a 
mutation of such magnitude may lead to a certain polarisation of wealth between rich and poor 
countries.163 The taxation of international income, based as it is on the conventional approach, 
is one of the areas where cooperation between the First and the Third World countries has 
been wanting.164 Indeed, proponents of global formulary apportionment look to developing 
countries as natural allies of the system since it guarantees a more balanced sharing of the 
international tax base.165 
1 A New World Economic Order 
The Carroll Report reviewed in Chapter 1 is peppered with reference to an era which is no 
more. Obviously, Carroll reasoned according to the traditional production system of his time. 
Thus, his constant reference to the model of international trade whereby manufacturing is 
carried out in one jurisdiction and sales in another.166 Today, international trade is carried out 
in an environment characterised by the increased integration of world economies, much larger 
capital flows, and the steady expansion of TNCs which, compared with the 1920s, makes up 
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a higher portion of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).167 Clearly, the economic 
foundations on which Carroll based his conclusions are no longer applicable. 
A. International Economic Integration 
At the end of the Second World War a novel economic system was inaugurated. The Bretton 
Woods System was based on three new organizations: 
· the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT),168  
· the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and  
· the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), commonly 
known as the World Bank.  
In brief, the purpose of these organisations was to respectively implement a liberal free trade 
system, alleviate balance of payments problems, and to provide investment finance.169 
The foundation of the Bretton Woods System was the convertibility of the dollar into gold. 
The system prevailed with relative success until May 1973 when the dollar became non-
convertible and was allowed to float with all other currencies in order to reach its natural 
exchange parity. The advent of floating currencies had dramatic consequences on exchange 
rates, shipping costs, and the general level of prices throughout the world. A revolution in the 
way international business is carried out was ignited. 
Concurrently, the world experienced the dual oil price shock of 1974 and 1981 which 
inaugurated a period of macro-economic instability in most Western economies. Higher levels 
of unemployment and inflation became the norm. In addition, some of the gains achieved in 
multilateral negotiations through the GATT to reduce tariff protection were undermined by the 
rise of non-tariff protectionism. The ultimate result was a general slow-down in the growth of 
world output and trade.170 
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A second significant change in the world economic map resulted from the relative decline of 
the U.S. role in the world economy.171 This loss in the U.S. share did not accrue to one nation 
in particular but to a certain number of nations in Europe and along the Pacific Rim. The 
relative decline of the U.S. was, however, counterbalanced by the gradual emergence of the 
European Union as a significant economic unit, consisting of a single market regrouping some 
of the world’s highest purchasing powers. In addition, the conversion of the Eastern European 
economies from centrally planned to market economies will no doubt further expand European 
influence in world trade.172 
On the political front, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of sovereign 
governments due to decolonisation and, more recently, to the fragmentation of the former 
Soviet Union. The ultimate result of this change is that today the repositories of political power 
are more diverse. In 1944, only 44 nations attended the conference at Bretton Woods which 
gave birth to the International Monetary Fund. As at 5 September 1999, the member 
countries of the IMF totalled 182,173 thus compounding the problem of coordinating the 
taxation system of such a vast number of countries. In addition, competition for scarce capital 
is now a pervasive feature of the international economy.174  
Most industrialised countries have rationalised their industries with the view to enhancing their 
competitive capabilities. Financial and exchange controls have been liberalised or even 
abolished, and many countries have eased restrictions on foreign ownership and the 
international movement of capital.175 A general trend in taxation reform aimed at rationalising 
both domestic and international taxation has also been initiated.176 
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Changes in technology have also been dramatic and fuelled the globalisation phenomenon.177 
New technologies, especially in the communication industries, have enabled TNCs to truly 
achieve their primary outcome, that is, the internationalisation of their business activities.178 
There is no doubt that this trend is accelerating with the explosive growth of electronic 
commerce through the Internet. These developments now require the full international 
cooperation as their effects permeate various spheres of activities as recognised by the finance 
ministers of the G-8 countries.179  
In short, on the politico-economic front, the world has moved from an aggregation of different 
national economies to interdependence and integration thereby uncovering the inherent 
weaknesses of the present taxation model which was established in the mid 1920s. 
B The Proliferation of TNCs 
TNCs have a long history. One of the earliest was the Dutch East India Company founded in 
1602. What is obvious is that the economic paradigm inaugurated in the 1950s, and refined in 
the 1980s, created the ideal conditions for their expansion. 180 From the TNCs’ viewpoint, 
globalisation primarily means ‘the increased integration of resources and capabilities which 
may then be transferred anywhere within the multinational firm’181 Consequently, rather than 
blindly following known models, it comes as no surprise that these enterprises are constantly 
exploring new ways to engage in international business such as, for example, the emergence of 
strategic alliances. These are: 
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agreements between firms in which each commits resources to achieve a common set of objectives. 
Companies may form Strategic Alliances with customers, suppliers or competitors. Through 
Strategic Alliances companies can improve competitive positioning, gain entry to new markets, 
supplement critical skills, and share the risk or cost of major development projects.182 
The introduction of new production processes has resulted in increased competition between 
producers.183 The particular advantage now sought by TNCs is speed in the exploitation of 
new inventions and innovations with the view to increasing efficiency and thus gaining an 
appreciable competitive edge. Moreover, the most significant aspect of this change is that now 
there is a fundamental dislocation in manufacturing processes. In the past, the process in the 
creation of a product (or a service), from its conception to the finished good, was usually 
located in one jurisdiction. Today, these same processes are more widely distributed so that it 
is no longer possible to identify a purely national product.184 
These changing conditions have pushed TNCs to ‘focus more on exploiting their ownership 
advantages, in part by undertaking activities abroad in conjunction with specific factors (such 
as labour and government) of foreign countries.’185 Concomitantly, some governments are 
endeavouring to protect local enterprises from intense global competition in order to enable 
these industries to become global companies and to compete with other governments for 
investment by TNCs,186 while others favour a constant phasing out of protective measures in 
order to force their industries to submit to the rules of the free market. 
In any event, the emergence of global economic models seriously hinders governments’ ability 
to impose national taxation systems based on traditional methods. In this new world order, 
familiar bearings are non-existent. What is required is a worldwide coordinated approach to 
the taxation of TNCs. 
At this stage a brief study of the TNC is necessary to understand the significance of such an 
organisation on the present system which purports to tax the gains it derives from its various 
activities. The most recent theoretical study of TNCs may be divided into three phases. The 
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first phase starts from 1960 with a doctoral thesis authored by Stephen Hymer.187 In his thesis, 
Hymer argued that the orthodox theory of international trade and capital movements did not 
explain the foreign operations of MNCs. In particular, it did not explain the two-way flows of 
FDI between countries, and still less between countries with similar factor proportions. His 
explanation of why firms move abroad and establish international production was based on a 
theory of the firm and industrialised organisation.188 Three decades of further research have led 
to the conclusion that ‘a TNC must have some advantage to offset the additional costs of 
running its operation, compared with domestic rivals.’189 Hymer believed that firms expand 
abroad because they possess firm-specific ‘ownership advantages’, for example, intangibles 
that do not show on a balance sheet and whose protection and exploitation required foreign 
expansion.190 
The second phase in the study of the TNC is characterised by the so-called internalisation 
theory advanced independently by a number of theorists.191 Internalisation theory is an 
extension of various theories, for example, the ‘transaction cost’ theory, which aimed at 
explaining the origin and nature of firms. To the first proponent of the theory, Ronald Coase,192 
firms and markets were alternative forms of economic organisations and subject to a process 
of substitution, akin to the process by which classical microtheory conceives of producers 
selecting among substitutable factors of production, or consumers among products or services. 
According to Coase, the basis for substitution is transaction cost. Markets organise activities if 
the transaction costs of the market are less than those of the firm. In the converse situation the 
firm is able to cut back on transaction costs. From these principles, an attempt is made, not at 
explaining why firms expand overseas, but rather why, when firms do expand overseas, they 
tend to do so through integrated enterprises in lieu of, for example, licensing agreements or 
plain exports. According to the internalisation theory, multinational integration occurs to 
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obviate certain hazards.193 Thus, for example, forward integration into distribution occurs to 
reduce the uncertainty inherent in the exploitation of valuable intangible property. First, 
internalisation reduces the risk of appropriation of the intangible property by competitors; and 
secondly, internalisation eliminates the hazard of reputation debasement, that is, an unrelated 
distributor might have an incentive to ‘free ride’ by lowering quality or reducing after-market 
service to control its own cost, thus damaging the reputation of the firm. Moreover, even if the 
firm does not possess valuable intangible property, it may still suffer if there is a certain 
debasement of what is termed its ‘assets specificity’ by unrelated firms. In other words, what 
is feared is that unrelated producers intervening at one of the production stage could, by 
holding up a vital stage in the production process, debase the value of the specific assets of the 
producer, thus holding to ransom large assets specific to the whole production process. 
Finally, there is a quality debasement hazard obviated by integration since the latter facilitates 
standardised quality control. 
A third stage in the theory of the TNC is an attempt to synthesise these various theories. 
Dunning carried this out with his eclectic theory.194 Other researchers, rather than focusing on 
economic factors, have studied the internal issues of firms’ operations.195 Towards the end of 
the 1980s the search concentrated on management issues.196 In short, these studies suggest 
that the primary success of the TNC may be explained by the fact that they are able to 
internalise the transfer of technology and of management skills across national boundaries in a 
kind of ‘coordinated federations’ or ‘centralized hubs’ where the overall result of the firm 
remains the key outcome.197 
The present phase in the evolution of TNC may be described as one based on strategic 
alliances between enterprises that are not under common control. For example, the emergence 
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of joint ventures aimed at maximising profits as well as reducing costs. Thus, in the banking 
sector, operators are increasingly combining their back-office functions in order to achieve 
economies of scale and synergies. In certain circumstances, these strategies may be 
considered as a backdoor device to circumvent regulations preventing the creation of mega-
banks. In short, while TNCs are jealous of their firm-specific ‘ownership advantages’, there is 
an increasing tendency to streamline operations which are remotely connected to their core 
strengths in order to either gain specific economic advantages or to circumvent national 
regulations. 
What all these theories postulate is that TNCs aim at maximising global profits rather than 
maximising the profits of each of its individual units. The major tax policy implication of these 
findings is that a system designed to determine transnational profits on a separate 
accounting/arm’s length standard is difficult if not impossible to apply and should be jettisoned 
in favour of some consistent formula applied on a worldwide basis. Thus, tax policy would 
match TNCs’ own strategies. 
2 The Separate Accounting/Arm’s Length Standard and the 
TNC 
In the increasingly integrated world economy it is likely that transactions between related 
entities will intensify. Such complex transactions involving intermediate goods and high-
technology product will continue to undermine the theoretical rationale upon which the arm’s 
length principle is constructed. In the words of Richard Cave: 
[T]he transactional model of the MNE holds that international firms arise in order to evade failures 
of certain arm’s length markets, especially those for intangible assets. Premier among those assets 
is the knowledge that represents new products, processes, proprietary technology, and the like. 
Thus theory implies and empirical evidence confirms that MNEs appear prominently in industries 
marked by high expenditures on R&D [Research and Development] and rapid rates of new product 
introduction and productivity advance...MNEs arise because of shortcomings of the arm’s length 
markets for intangible assets and statistical evidence establishes the prominence of MNEs in high 
R&D industries.198 
After all, organisational theory holds that the profitability of a TNC is largely attributable to the 
organisational form itself. Indeed, because of its organisation, a TNC is able to reduce 
transaction costs, achieve integration economies and exploit intangible assets which often 
cannot be localised.199 One of such costs is taxation. Since the very survival of TNCs is based 
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on their ability to reduce costs, and that taxation is one of such costs, it follows that whatever 
the response of governments to transfer pricing, TNCs will always seek to minimise taxation. 
A The Response of TNCs: Financial Manoeuvring  
In response to taxation authorities’ focus on traditional transfer pricing issues, TNCs often 
respond by engaging in elaborate financial manoeuvring in order to minimise their global tax 
bill.200 Financial manoeuvring involves the use of inter-corporate financing techniques to 
achieve an optimum allocation of resources within a group of companies. If driven by tax 
considerations, financial manoeuvring aims at shifting taxable income from high tax to low tax 
countries.201 It consists primarily of achieving a desired level of inter-company lending and/or 
the allocation of third party debt among affiliates.202 
i   Thin Capitalisation  
Inter-company lending is a prime example of financial manoeuvring.203 It involves the 
manipulation of the debt-to-equity ratio of a TNC’s subsidiaries as well as adjusting the rate of 
interest charged for inter-company loans. Thin capitalisation is a term describing companies 
with a high ratio of debt-to-equity or shareholder’s funds.204 It occurs when subsidiaries are 
deliberately capitalised with a high debt ratio to strip out profits by interest deductions.205 
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When a TNC manipulates the costs of inter-company funds it increases the risk of being 
targeted for a transfer pricing audit. However, the risk is bearable if it were to adjust the 
amount of equity it invests in its subsidiaries and optimise, on commercial grounds, its 
intercompany lending. Moreover, to minimise the risk of attack on the part of tax 
administrations, a TNC may interpose an arm’s length third party between itself and its 
subsidiaries and utilise this intermediary in back-to-back loans bearing different tax rates.206 
i i  Innovative Financial Techniques  
a. Foreign Exchange Issues 
Foreign exchange questions arise in the context of gains and losses arising with the repayment 
of loans as well as in currency conversion necessary for the calculation of income and tax 
liability. The OECD as well as the accounting profession have sought to devise uniform 
practices acceptable in the international field for the treatment of foreign exchange gains and 
losses.207 However, the OECD considers the question outside the ambit of its double taxation 
model. In the absence of a coherent international practice for the taxation of exchange gains 
and losses on loans and the conversion of foreign currencies for the purpose of calculating tax 
liabilities, a potential for double taxation exists and must therefore be addressed.208 
The problem of foreign exchange has ramifications beyond a mere revenue question. The 
globalisation of capital markets has resulted in a situation of extreme volatility. There is little 
doubt that major countries will develop closer consultation on macroeconomic policy leading 
to convergence as with Eurofed, that is, the European Central Bank.209 The same phenomenon 
is occurring in North America with the introduction of a mutual currency support mechanism 
with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The point is that foreign exchange 
problems cannot be regulated on a national basis.210 Similarly, the taxation of cross-border 
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income flows will necessarily be entrusted to an international organisation as they too cannot 
be resolved on a national basis as experience shows. 
b Finance Leases 
Leasing is an increasingly popular way of obtaining capital equipment. Both operating and 
finance leases have been strong growth areas. These techniques have also been used for 
purposes other that those intended originally. There are many instances where TNCs have 
entered into certain leases for the primary purpose of moving profits from one country to 
another. 
Finance leases are the greatest source of concern for countries endeavouring to protect their 
tax base. Contrary to accounting practice, in many countries finance leases are not, for 
taxation purposes, regarded as loans. As a result, finance leases have been at the base of 
many tax avoidance schemes and the shifting of profits and losses in the international field. 
The OECD has not comprehensively dealt with the tax problems arising from finance leases. 
Although it acknowledges the problem, its treatment of the matter is confined to operating 
leases and examines the question as to whether lease rentals should be characterised as 
royalties or business profits.211 There is therefore at the moment not even an embryonic 
proposition as to how this problem should be considered in the international field. 
c. Treaty Abuse 
Treaty abuse is achieved mainly through the use of conduit companies and base companies 
incorporated in low-taxation countries. A conduit company is one which exploits the fiscal 
advantages obtained in the country of the source of the income through treaty shopping as 
already defined. It has a brokerage function and channels income derived from a third country 
to the low-tax jurisdiction where it is incorporated. As for a base company, its function is to 
protect the global income of its group. It is also located in a low-tax country so as to reduce 
tax due in the country of residence.212 
The Commentaries on the OECD Model Tax Convention contain suggested anti-abuse 
provisions which aim at solving the problem of conduit companies. The transparency rule 
permits Contracting States to withhold the benefit of a convention to a company that is not 
owned directly or indirectly by residents of the jurisdiction in which the company is itself 
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resident.213 The exclusion rule for its part operates to exclude certain companies from the 
benefits provided in a convention.214 An example of such an anti-abuse mechanism is the 
incorporation in the Model of the theory of abuse of law.215 Under this doctrine, if the sole or 
prevalent purpose of a transaction is to avoid tax, the form of the transaction may be ignored 
or disregarded on the grounds that the taxpayer has abused its rights by deliberately casting its 
transaction in a particular form.216 In the context of treaty shopping, the consequence of the 
application of the theory of abuse of law results in the non-recognition, or the disregard of the 
form of certain payments, for example, interest, dividends, or royalties, flowing to and from 
companies involved in the arrangement. However, most treaties based on the OECD Model 
do not contain anti-abuse provisions.217 In addition, there is no internationally accepted 
standard in the application of the disregard doctrine. Moreover, the 1992 OECD Model 
Convention does not even mention the need for internationally accepted provisions regarding 
the disregard doctrine, not even in the various indicative solutions contained in paragraphs 11 
to 26 of the Commentary on Article 1.218 
Furthermore, the inadequacy of the OECD’s proposed solutions is again apparent with the so-
called stepping-stone strategy. In this situation, income from a country with favourable taxation 
rules is transferred first to a high-tax country before arriving at its final destination in such a 
way that tax authorities are forced to disregard the actual source of the income.219 This 
strategy is used where direct transfer to the recipient is likely to attract a higher rate of tax 
under the Model Convention. 220 An attempt to deal with the problem is the inclusion in some 
bilateral treaties, for example the double tax treaty between Switzerland and the United States, 
of a provision called a ‘transit formula’, which denies the exemptions and reliefs conferred by 
the treaty in cases where a conduit is being used.221 
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B The Application of the Arm’s Length Principle to Financial Manoeuvring  
In this particular area, the arm’s length principle behaves quite poorly. For example, tax 
authorities may always attempt an adjustment of inter-corporate interest rates. However, their 
chances of success is limited given that financial manoeuvring does not depend on non-arm’s 
length charges. An adjustment of interest rates based on the arm’s length standard is fraught 
with uncertainties. In order to deny an interest deduction on inter-company debt, tax 
authorities must recharacterise the loan as a contribution to equity on the argument that 
borrowings under such conditions do not occur as between unrelated parties. The difficulty is 
compounded if there is a third party interposed between the related parties, for example, an 
international bank. Thus, a TNC can lend to a branch of that bank and require another branch 
to lend to its affiliate in seemingly unrelated transactions.  
Moreover, such arrangements would no doubt fall under protective legislation relative to bank 
secrecy and it is doubtful whether the OECD’s efforts to curb abuses of bank secrecy laws in 
order to enable tax administrations to access bank information would be successful in this 
instance.222 Indeed, the tax administrator must demonstrate that the lender would not have lent 
to an independent party on those conditions conceded to the affiliate. Evidence available in the 
context of closely held corporations shows that the rate of success is minimal. 223 The reason 
for this is that, to date, financial theory has not conclusively established that an optimum debt-
to-equity ratio exists. Even if that optimum ratio did exist, empirical studies have shown that 
the value of the firm is likely to remain constant over a wide range of debt-to-equity ratio.224 
Moreover, since an extremely wide range of ratios is observed, the search for an arm’s length 
debt-to-equity ratio may well remain a vain pursuit.225 
In these circumstances, one may ask about the utility of the thin capitalisation rules that most 
developed nations are relying upon to deny a deduction for interest paid on excessive debt by 
non-resident related parties.226 Such provisions involve arbitrary line drawing particularly if the 
assets are valued at their adjusted basis.227 The arm’s-length standard applied to the issue of 
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thin capitalisation requires that the debt-to-equity ratio of a controlled corporation be 
comparable to that of an uncontrolled party. However, uncontrolled parties typically exhibit a 
wide range of debt-to-equity ratios. For instance, the Conference Committee Report on 
section 163(j)228 found that ratios far exceeding 1.5-1 were quite common. The Committee 
then rejected the contention that the arm’s length would have been satisfied if related parties 
were to show the same thinness of capitalisation. Instead, it argued that thin capitalisation rules 
based on averages among firms and typical patterns satisfy the arm’s length standard. 
The OECD holds a contrary view. While conceding that there are some difficulties in applying 
the arm’s length principle to thin capitalisation problems, it nevertheless holds that thin 
capitalisation rules are consistent with the arm’s length principle when they are based on a 
facts-and-circumstances approach with reference to transactions between independent 
parties.229 This is hardly a workable standard but, as argued before, the OECD remains 
hostage to the traditional interpretation of the arm’s length standard. As a result of such 
indetermination, TNCs are always a step ahead of tax authorities.230 
The core of the problem is that, in a fully integrated TNC, an optimum debt-to-equity ratio 
makes no sense.231 Indeed, in a world of increasing consumer power, a corporate parent, for 
the sake of preserving its reputational capital, will almost certainly indemnify its subsidiaries’ 
lenders even if it has no legal obligation to do so.232 Therefore, in setting up the interest rate to 
be charged to an affiliate, a lender is more likely to consider a TNC’s consolidated debt-to-
equity ratio rather than focus, as tax administrations do, on the separate debt-to-equity ratio of 
the affiliate. 
Until the enactment of Controlled Foreign Corporations legislation (CFC rules)233 taxpayers, 
availing themselves of the separate entity principle, had been able to defer taxation on foreign 
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sourced income.234 CFC legislation disregards one of the fundamental principles of 
international taxation whereby income accumulated in a foreign company is not taxed to the 
resident shareholder until it is distributed. This concept is based on the principle that the foreign 
company is a legal entity separate from its resident shareholders. The CFC rules enable the 
shareholders of controlled foreign companies to be taxed on their pro rata share of certain 
categories of the companies’ income. 
CFC rules emerged because the attribution principles of double tax treaties have not fully 
achieved their purpose. The practice prevailing, when there is a tax treaty between Country A 
and Country B, is that business profits derived by an enterprise resident in A may only be 
taxed in B to the extent that they are attributable to a permanent establishment situated in B. If 
Country A introduces legislation of the CFC type, a resident of A may be required to pay his 
or her proportionate share of Country B’s company’s income. In other words, CFC legislation 
operates as a consolidation of TNCs tax accounts in line with modern accounting treatment 
but against the principles of tax treaties.235 CFC legislation is by no means the only instance 
when ‘the basic assumptions and primary objects of tax treaties are being subverted by major 
members of the OECD’236. 
What is certain is that these often convoluted, solitary, and uncoordinated attempts by 
governments to protect an ever-shrinking tax base are doomed to failure. Evidence has shown 
that at the present the revenue loss resulting from the incapacity of the present system to work 
is staggering.237 TNCs consider tax as a cost which should be minimised as any other cost in 
                                                             
234 ‘Domestic source income can be transferred to a foreign company free of domestic tax, for example, where it 
constitutes a deductible expense paid by a domestic company to a foreign company for services rendered by the 
foreign company, and where the service fee is technically not domestic source income. Domestic source income 
may also be transferred to a foreign company at a lower rate of domestic tax where it is extracted from the 
source country as interest or a royalty, and only bears source country tax at the reduced withholding tax rate 
that applies to this income when derived by non-residents.’ See Rigby, supra  note 26, at 312.  
235 For an analysis of the compatibility of CFC rules and tax treaties, see D.Sandler, Pushing the Boundaries: The 
Interaction Between Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation  (London: The Institute of 
Taxation, 1994). For judicial pronouncements in the British context, see Bricom Holdings LTD v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [1997] STC 1179; and in the French context, P. Douvier & D. Bouzoraa, 
‘Compatibility of CFC Rules With Tax Treaties: Lower Courts Reach Conflicting Conclusions’, (March 1997) 
European Taxation 103. 
236 Vann, supra note 208, at 108. 
237 For example, according to the U.S.’s government figures, in 1991 the use of Netherlands companies enabled the 
latter to receive from the U.S. Dfl 10,000 million in interest, Dfl 2,000 million of dividends and Dfl 15,000 
million of royalties. U.S. withholding tax on such payments should have been Dfl 13,500 million, rather than 
the Dfl 150 million collected pursuant to the 1948 Netherlands-United States double tax treaty; see Saunders, 
supra note 46, at 21. The new treaty signed in 1993 between the Netherlands and the U.S. tries to limit treaty 
shopping manoeuvres by the inclusion of a 50 per cent-or-more stock-ownership test, and a less-than-50 
percent base-erosion test. Other derivative tests seeking to extend the treaty to other residents of the EU are: a 
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calculating their profits. Sophisticated minimisation and/or avoidance techniques prevent the 
present OECD Model to fulfil one of its major objectives: the prevention of tax avoidance. As 
a result, many countries simply ignore their treaty obligations. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. 
has regularly introduced legislation that overrides the provisions of treaties which they have 
signed and ratified.238 New Zealand has also circumvented its treaty obligations when its new 
rules for dividend withholding payment were introduced.239 The same can be said of Australia 
with regard to its thin capitalisation legislation. More recently, Germany added section 50d in 
its tax code. This provision requires payments subject to German withholding tax to be made 
without regard to any treaty or provisions implementing the European Union (EU) parent-
subsidiary directive.240 In the U.K. the question of treaty override has not been settled in view 
of the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament.241 A well-publicised threat of treaty override 
by the British Government occurred in its dispute with California over the latter’s use of 
worldwide unitary combination. Although the matter appears to have been settled, the British 
Government may still reactivate the threat to override the U.S. - U.K. tax treaty in relation to 
certain California-based TNCs by invoking the so-called Grylls Clause inserted in the 1985 
Finance Act, as the U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer warned in an interview after the 
Barclays decision242. In this particular example, though, it may well be that in order to justify an 
eventual decision along these lines, the U.K. Government would maintain that its action cannot 
be assimilated to treaty override, but rather, arises following material breach by the U.S. In the 
end, the blunt question is whether the very concept of tax treaties still remains an adequate 
method of dealing with contemporary international tax problems. 
In the emerging global economy the arm’s length principle is an act of faith rather than a 
scientifically orientated method for the allocation of the income and expenses of TNCs. It 
requires tax administrators to form an opinion on what an arm’s length price ought to be on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
publicly -quoted test, a bona fide business-purposes test, and a headquarters-company test, see P. Lier & T.P. 
North, ‘The New U.S.-Netherlands Treaty’, (February 1993) Tax Planning International Review 3, at 21. See 
also Anonymous, ‘U.S.-Netherlands Tax Treaty Takes Effect’, (January 1994) Tax Planning International 
Review, at  3-16. 
238 For a critique of various congressional tax enactments that have expressly overridden tax-treaty obligations of 
the U.S., see D. Sachs, ‘Is the 19th Century Doctrine of Treaty Override Good Law for Modern Day Tax 
Treaties?’, (Summer 1994) 47 Tax Lawyer , at 867-83. 
239 Vann, supra note 208, at 119. 
240 H.M. Pott, ‘Germany: Treaty Override’, (January 1996) 21 World Tax Report, at 7-8. 
241 See P. Baker, Double Tax Conventions and International Tax Law, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1994), 
at 52-54. 
242 G. Graham & A. Jack, ‘U.S. Judges Dismiss Barclay’s Challenge on Unitary Tax Law’, Fin Times (London), 21 
November 1994, at 1. 
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basis of figures supplied by the TNC itself. In the words of Professor Bird, the arm’s length 
principle which expects ‘tax administrators to construct such a mythical world out of the 
figures for which they must depend entirely on the firms they are trying to tax is to expect too 
much.’243 This ‘act of faith’ is so inappropriate in the present context that a wider meaning is 
surreptitiously being ascribed to the system.  
Jill Pagan’s sums up the situation when she wrote ‘[N]o arm’s length comparable? Then try 
the cost-plus or resale method, or even a more complex functional analysis of due reward for 
economic contribution and commercial risk’.244 
However, in reality, as will be shown in later chapters, all these techniques are no more than 
covert forms of formulary apportionment. 
 
                                                             
243 Bird, supra note 73, at 294. 
244 J.C. Pagan, ‘An Open Letter to Jeffrey Owens, Fiscal Affairs Division, OECD, From Jill C. Pagan’ (17 January 
1994) Tax Notes Int’l 161, at 164. 
 The Reform of the Present System of 
International Taxation 
This chapter is concerned with tax reform. 1 Several scenarios may be envisaged when tax 
reform is contemplated.2 Broadly, though, reform may be undertaken through: 
· the maintenance of the existing system based on the separate accounting/arm’s length 
standard coupled with innovative solutions such as the harmonisation of the dominant 
systems; and 
· radical reform through either an abandonment of the prevailing income tax systems for 
a consumption-based one3, or the adoption of some form of unitary method in lieu of 
the separate accounting/arm’s length standard. 
Some of these variants are studied in the following sections. Section I examines the avenues 
for the harmonisation of the dominant taxation systems. Section II explores the emergence of 
profit-based methodologies. Finally, Section III argues that the ultimate result of the evolution 
process that characterises international taxation could well be an indirect reshaping of the 
conventional principles on which the whole system is premised. 
                                                             
1 Australia is now in the grips of a major tax reform process including international taxation as a result of the 
publication of the Ralph Report. See Review of Business Taxation, A Tax System Redesigned,  (Canberra: AGPS, 
1999), more especially Sections 20-23, ‘Responding to Globalisation’, at 623-688. For an outline of the 
proposal for reform, see R. Vann & G. Cooper, Report of Australia’s Business Tax Review and the 
Government’s Response, Tax Analysts Document Number: Doc 1999-31999, (9 September 1999). See also A. 
McCleary, ‘An Overview of the Review of Business Tax’, (August 2000) 35 Taxation in Australia  (No. 2) 76. 
2 A.J. Easson, ‘A New International Tax Order - Responding to the Challenge’ (October 1991) 45 Bull Int’l 
Fiscal Documentation 10, at 465. 
3 C.E. McLure, Jr., et al., The Taxation of Income from Business and Capital In Columbia  (1990) chap. 4. The 
proponents of a direct consumption-based tax believe that it has a definite superiority over income-based 
taxation. This superiority is seen in the field of economic efficiency and simplicity. The consumption tax 
alternative has always been considered as a domestic tax issue. In the international context, consideration has 
only been given to the external constraints that a country wishing to adopt such a system would have to face. 
The consumption-tax alternative has been studied in J.E. Meade, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation , 
Report of a committee of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978).  
 More radical proposals for reform have been made, for example, the Hufbauer-van Rooij business cash flow tax. 
See G.C. Hufbauer & J. M. Van Rooij, ‘Reforming Business Taxes’, in A.C. Warren, Jr., & R.J. Shapiro, eds, 
Enterprise Economics and Tax Reform: Promoting U.S. Growth in the Global Economy, at 
<http://www.dlcppi.org/text/economics/eecon1.TXT>. See also R Krever, ed., Tax Conversations; A Guide to 
Key Issues in the Tax Reform Debate  (Kluwer Law International, 1997). One of the core proposals of the Ralph 
Report (supra  note 1) is the so-called cash flow/tax value method for determining taxable income in Australia. 
For an analysis of this proposal, see D. Boccabella, ‘Australia’s Tax Reform Rejects or Modifies Fundamental 
Principles’, (June 2000) Australian Tax Review (No. 29) 81. 
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Section I  Improving The Existing Rules 
The coexistence of different tax systems and their interaction often creates uncertainty for both 
taxpayers and tax administrators. This encourages costly disputes in the transfer pricing area 
that are counterproductive to both tax administrators and transnational corporations (TNCs). 
One method of solving these potential conflicts is to harmonise the various dominant systems 
of international business taxation in order to better mesh the various national systems, thus 
closing off any potential arbitrage opportunities. 
1 The Process of Harmonisation in the European Union 
Tax harmonisation is generally defined as the process of planning how to approximate the tax 
systems of various nations in order to better achieve certain objectives.4 This is the focus of tax 
harmonisation in the European Union (EU) given that a lack of harmonisation results in ‘loss of 
government revenue, distortion to real economic behaviour, and increased administrative and 
compliance costs.’5 
A The Initial Strategy of Harmonisation in the European Commission  
In the EU the ‘tax harmonisation exercise is generally defined as the process of planning how 
to approximate the tax systems of the 15 Member States in order to better achieve the 
objectives of the European Community.’6 The ultimate aim of the Treaty of Rome which gave 
birth to the European Economic Community (EEC), now the European Union, is to create a 
single market comprising all Member States. Ideally, a single market requires a coherent 
system of taxation in order to prevent the perpetuation of inefficiencies that could threaten its 
viability. The need to harmonise both indirect and direct taxes in the EU is of critical 
importance if Member States are to fully benefit from the advantages created by the single 
market. One of the essential objectives of harmonisation is to achieve tax neutrality. Neutrality 
is achieved when taxes do not impede the free movement of goods and services, persons or 
                                                             
4 R.J. Vann, ‘Improving Tax Law Improvement: An International Perspective’, (1995) 12 Australian Tax Forum  
(No. 2) 193, at 206. For an explanation as to the meaning of ‘tax harmonisation’, ‘tax convergence’ and’ tax 
approximation’, see K. Messere, ‘20th Century Taxes and their Future’, (January 2000) 54 Bulletin For 
International Fiscal Documentation (No. 3) 2, at 21. 
5  See comments of Lucy Chennells, senior research economist at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, as 
reported by J. Weiner, ‘News Analysis: Institute for Fiscal Studies Reports on EU Corporate Tax 
Harmonization’, Tax Analysts Document Number: Doc 2000-14053 (15 May 2000). 
6 L. Hinnekens, ‘The Monti Report: The Uphill Task of Harmonizing Direct Tax systems of EC Member 
States’, (1997) 6 EC Tax Review (No. 1) 31, at 33. See also S. James, ‘Can We Harmonise Our Views on 
European Tax Harmonisation?’, (June 2000) 54 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (No. 6) 263. 
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capital within a common internal market. Nor should tax operate as trade barriers. When these 
conditions are satisfied one may speak of a meaningful regime of free competition.7 
The European Commission has sought to initiate the harmonisation process in three different 
areas:  
· First, efforts were made to harmonise import duties;8  
· Second, the harmonisation attempt was pursued with the general consumption tax, the 
Value Added Tax (VAT) with a fully harmonised taxable base;9 and 
· Third, the Commission has sought to harmonise certain direct taxes, for example, the 
rates of corporate taxes.  
In the first two instances the success of the harmonisation effort cannot be denied. However, 
the history of the harmonisation of direct taxes in Europe remains fraught with hesitations, 
volte-faces, and sudden successes. When it comes to harmonisation, there seems to be a 
constant bickering between the various organs of the EU. For example, facing strong 
opposition from the European Parliament,10 the European Commission has unsuccessfully 
attempted to harmonise the structure and rates of corporate taxes in the EU.11 Until recently, in 
spite of certain efforts in this direction, little was accomplished in the field of direct tax 
harmonisation.12  
Finally, in 1990 the European Commission announced that it had, for the immediate future, 
abandoned the idea of a comprehensive corporate tax harmonisation. However, it is fair to say 
that while tax harmonisation is not explicitly on the Commission’s agenda, it is ‘perennially an 
issue among Member States governments, EU multinationals, and small and medium-sized 
                                                             
7 See S. Cnossen, preface to K. Vogel, Taxation of Cross-Border Income, Harmoniztion, and Tax Neutrality 
Under European Community Law: an Institutional Approach (Kluwer: 1994), at 7. For a thorough examination 
of the issues relevant to the harmonisation of company tax systems in the EU, see S Cnossen, ‘Reform and 
Harmonisation of Company Tax Systems in the European Union’, in R. Krever, ed., Tax Conversations; A 
Guide to Key Issues in the Tax Reform Debate (Kluwer Law International, 1997), at 365ff.  
8 J. Westerburgen, ‘Tax Harmonisation in the EC -- Where are We and What are the Prospects?’, (1990) 10 
Intertax 483. 
9 Ibid . 
10 Report from the Commission to the Council, Scope for Convergence of Tax Systems in the Community (27 
March 1980, Doc. Com (80) 139 final). 
11 Proposal for a Directive on the Harmonisation of Systems of Company Taxation and of Withholding Taxes on 
Dividends (1 August 1975, OJ 1975 C 253/2) in A. Easson, ‘Harmonisation of Direct Taxation in the EEC’, 
(1992) 40 Canadian Tax Journal 3, at 606. 
12 See Hinnekens, supra note 6, at 34, where the author notes that ‘the strategy for the Commissioner in charge of 
direct taxes, when it comes to dealing and playing the cards of direct tax harmonization inevitably becomes that 
of Cervantes: Patience, and shuffle the cards!’ 
Chapter 3  The Reform of the Present System of Internat ional Taxat ion 
 96
enterprises’.13 Instead, the Commission directed its attention to the seemingly less daunting 
task of harmonising specific elements of the various company tax systems of the EU. It was felt 
that the interaction of those disparate elements were the main cause of double taxation and 
constituted, therefore, an obstacle to cross-border expansion of companies within the EU. The 
European Commission further published a list of priorities at the top of which was a package 
of three measures which it regarded as essential to achieving a certain level of tax coherence 
within the EU. These were as follows: 
· The Parent-Subsidiary Directive, which applies to the ‘distribution of profits’ paid by a 
subsidiary in one Member State to its parent in another Member State. The aim of the 
parent-subsidiary directive is to eliminate double taxation and to facilitate the operation 
of a foreign subsidiary or affiliate. 
· The Merger Directive, which eliminates fiscal obstacles to cross-border mergers. This 
second element of the package aimed at achieving a coherent fiscal treatment of cross-
border mergers within the EU. Its objective was to eliminate any fiscal obstacles to 
cross-border mergers by postponing the realisation of capital gains on assets or shares 
involved in a merger until their actual disposal by the newly merged company. 
· The Arbitration Convention, which introduced an arbitration procedure in case 
Member States fail to agree on adjustments in transfer pricing cases. 
The process of harmonisation, along with new policy lines defined by the European 
Commission, continued with the publication in November 1990 of two additional proposed 
directives. The first is the Proposed Directive on Interest and Royalties, which may be 
regarded as an extension of the parent-subsidiary directive exempting from withholding tax 
dividends paid by a subsidiary to its parent in another state. It exempts payments of interest 
and royalties from a subsidiary to its parent. However, and this is the innovative feature of this 
proposed directive, an exemption is likewise proposed in case of interest or royalty payments 
made by the parent to a subsidiary.  
The Proposed Directive on Intra-group Losses was the second proposal submitted to the 
Council on the 28 November 1990. If adopted, enterprises would be allowed to take into 
account losses incurred by all their permanent establishments or subsidiaries operating in 
various Member States provided these permanent establishments or subsidiaries have been 
subject to such corporate income taxes as listed in the directive. As for permanent 
establishments, relief would be granted by either the ‘credit method’ or the ‘deduction method 
                                                             
13  Weiner, supra  note 5. 
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with reincorporation of subsequent profits’, while subsidiaries would be required to use the 
latter method only.14 
The goal of harmonisation was pursued by the publication in April 1990 of the European 
Commission’s Guidelines on Company Taxation.15 This document defined what the 
European Commission thought was necessary for the completion of the internal market by the 
end of 1992. However, the most important aspect of the document is that it developed a new 
strategy for the harmonisation of direct taxation.  
i  The Ruding Report  
The Commission then entrusted a further study to a committee of eight experts headed by Dr 
Onno Ruding, the former finance minister of the Netherlands. The committee was directed to 
study three different questions relative to the tax systems prevailing in the Community, namely, 
their interaction, the prospects of harmonising these systems, and the actions required to 
achieve that outcome. The committee of experts, (henceforth the Ruding Committee), 
submitted its report16 to the Commission in February 1992. 
The Ruding Report does not mark a significant change in direction from the policy of the 
previous 30 years.17 In general, the European Commission had already considered most of its 
main proposals. Nevertheless, the Ruding Report  does contain recommendations which, had 
they been adopted, would have tested the Community’s real desire for harmonisation.  
i i  The Ruding Report and the Arm’s Length Principle 
The main objective of the Ruding Committee was to investigate the question of harmonising 
direct taxation in the EU. The Committee did not therefore fully examine the question of the 
equitable allocation of revenue raised from corporate tax among the Member States.18 
However, the Committee did express its attitude to the arm’s length principle. The Ruding 
Committee unquestionably adhered to the doctrine of the primacy and adequacy of the arm’s 
length principle without even questioning its basic tenets. The Report remained indisputably in 
favour of the status quo. It fully supported the use of the separate accounting/ arm’s length 
principle to divide the income of TNCs. 
                                                             
14 Easson, supra  note 11, at 623. 
15 European Community, Guidelines on Company Taxation Commission Communication to Parliament and the 
Council (20 April 1990, Doc COM (90) 601 final). 
16 The European Communities, Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992), at 19 (Ruding Report). 
17 Easson, supra  note 11, at 632. 
18 Ruding Report, supra note 16, at 129-130. 
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However, the recommendations of the Ruding Report have been largely ignored.19 Undaunted 
by this attitude, Dr Onno Ruding, in a speech at a meeting of the Bankers’ Taxation Circle in 
London, still held the view that ‘the committee’s conclusions and recommendations are as up-
to-date today as they were when they were first published in 1992, since the Member States 
have failed to coordinate their corporate tax policies systematically.’20 
B The Latest Initiative  
Subsequent to the Ruding Report , the Commission announced in its July 1992 
Communication that it intended to launch a comprehensive process of consultation of the tax 
authorities and other interested parties before formulating proposals for Community legislation 
in the second half of 1992. Nothing substantial occurred until the 20 March 1996 when 
Commissioner Monti made certain propositions in a Discussion Paper to the Informal Meeting 
of the European Council of Economic Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) to be held in Verona on 
13 April 1996.21 This communication, the Verona Memorandum became the Commission 
Report on Taxation in the European Union, or the Monti Report .22 The ECOFIN Ministers 
did not endorse the Commission’s views on the harmonisation process. Discussions that 
followed were carried out through a High Level Group appointed by the finance ministers. All 
this showed that both the Commission and Member States were still not ready for an open 
debate on the question of harmonisation of the company taxation throughout the EU.23 
i  The Principle of Subsidiarity 
A new approach based on the principle of subsidiarity is now being explored with the view to 
achieving some degree of harmonisation of direct taxes in the EU. The principle of subsidiarity, 
as defined in the Maastricht Treaty, takes a decentralisation approach to EU issues. It 
empowers the European Commission to intervene only in specific rather than in every field of 
economic life, and as ‘for the rest, market forces play’.24 In the taxation field, the principle of 
                                                             
19 European Union, Communication SEC (92) 118 of 27 July 1992 in Hinnekens, supra note 6, at 34. 
20 J. Blumenberg, ‘Ruding Comments on the Future of Corporate Taxation in the European Union’, (22 July 
1996) 13 Tax Notes Int’l 245. 
21 Hinnekens, supra  note 6, at 34. 
22 European Commission, Report on the Development of Tax Systems, Taxation in the European Union 
(Brussels, 22 October 1996), Com (96) 546 final, in Hinnekens, supra note 6, at 34. 
23 Hinnekens, supra  note 6, at 39. 
24 C. Scrivener, ‘Corporate Taxation in Europe and the Single Market’, (1990) 4 Intertax 207. In regard to the 
principle of subsidiarity, it is interesting to note how the ‘sovereign pretensions of the individual states receive 
strong reinforcement from the conviction of mainstream economics today that markets can be counted on to 
provide appropriate incentives as long as monetary stability is assured.’ See M.J. Frankman, ‘Global Taxation: 
A Search for Generalizable Precedents’, (June 1997) 31 Journal of Economic Issues 641. 
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subsidiarity is taken to mean that each Member State must retain its tax sovereignty in so far as 
it does not interfere with the EU’s broad tax objectives.25 
It is difficult to see how this new strategy is going to promote the idea of harmonisation given 
that neutrality and subsidiarity are quite difficult to reconcile under the corporation tax.26 
Progress in the field of harmonisation has been achieved only when Member States have felt 
that the proposed changes did not impact negatively on their competitive positions especially in 
terms of their ability to attract foreign direct investments.27 The European Commission has 
never been able to achieve its objectives by convincing Member States to adopt measures that 
they considered are contrary to their national interests. Therefore, the Commission’s new 
strategy may reasonably be construed as the recognition that it cannot achieve its 
harmonisation objectives. These have consistently been viewed as being ‘overambitious’ and 
have thus been rejected by Member States. 
i i  The European Court of Just ice 
While on the political level progress towards the internal market is being made laboriously, the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are achieving an equivalent result, in a less 
spectacular way. For instance, the articulation of the doctrine of non-discrimination by the ECJ 
is quietly achieving fiscal neutrality throughout Europe.28 Again, in the area of tax accounting, 
the ECJ has had to consider, for example, two German cases submitted by two German 
courts acting independently. 29 Both cases related to the question of compliance with the 
Directive’s mandate by the German implementation law for the Fourth Company Law 
Directive and involved a tax accounting problem. 30 Basically, the Court was called upon to 
decide indirectly on a question of tax accounting, an eminently political issue. In seizing 
                                                             
25 The real meaning of the subsidiarity principle when applied to taxation is not clear. In general, the term relates 
to the idea of decentralisation of government functions and thus is linked to the theory of fiscal federalism. It 
connotes therefore the idea of fiscal decentralisation, that is, tax diversity, with coordination and cooperation to 
achieve the EU’s overall objective. See J. Brands, ‘Comments: Trade-Off Between Subsidiarity and Neutrality’, 
in K. Vogel, Taxation of Cross-Border Income, Harmonization, and Tax Neutrality Under Community Law  
(Kluwer, 1994) 35, at 39. 
26 Cnossen, supra note 7, at 8. 
27  Research by the European Central Bank shows that ‘EU tax harmonization would affect primarily three 
countries: Germany, Italy and Ireland. Germany and Italy would experience a significant improvement in their 
net FDI position and gain revenue, while Ireland would experience the opposite.; See R Gropp & K. Kostial, 
‘The Disappearing Tax Base: Is Foreign Direct Investment Eroding Corporate Income Taxes?’, (September 
2000) European Central Bank Working Papers Series, WP No. 31, at 8. This paper is available at 
<http://www.ecb.int/>.  
28 P. Nias, ‘Harmonization by the Backdoor?’, (October 1995) International Tax Review 29. 
29 See O. Thömmes, ‘EC Tax Scene’, [1996] 5 Intertax, 218-9, at 218. 
30 European Community, Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978, [1978] O.J. L222/11. 
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competence in such matters, the ECJ is likely to ‘become a key player not only in tax but also 
in accounting matters’31 in so far as it addresses the thorny question of compliance between 
tax and commercial accounting. As will be studied in Chapter 6, the conformity problem has a 
direct consequence on the fiscal sovereignty of Member States. 
Currently, therefore, it is fair to say that a certain restriction of the sovereign powers of 
Member States is being achieved by the judiciary rather than by the legislative structures of the 
EU.32 It may well be that this method of achieving harmonisation is actually favoured by the 
politicians in so far as it deflects attention from their role in this process. 
On another front, changes in the way business is carried out are also influencing the tax debate 
within the Union. Business integration arising from competitive pressures, the single market 
and, since the beginning of 1999, a single currency in 11 Member States are also important 
elements which are contributing to render obsolete the traditional methods of profit allocation 
between different states. In such an environment, proposals for reform abound. Thus, recently 
a strong case has been put forward for the acceleration of the creation of the European 
Company (Societas Europaea) which would act within Europe as if the internal market was a 
real single market with one legal system.33 Other possible solutions range from the adoption of 
a branch basis for taxation to a European income tax. 34 
One of the major institutional impediments to tax harmonisation in the EU is the requirement 
for unanimous agreement for any proposals for corporate tax reform. To remedy the problem, 
at least partially, the European Commission’s President, Romano Prodi, and Commissioner 
Michel Barnier, have authored a report proposing greater use of qualified majority voting 
                                                             
31 Thömmes, supra  note 29, at 219. See also Finanzamt Köln -Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker (14 February 1995 
C-279/93). For an analysis of the case see A.J. Rädler, ‘An Analysis of the European Court of Justice’s 
Schumacker Decision’, (15 May 1995) 10 Tax Notes Int’l, 1683. For a critique of the Schumacker  decision, see 
P.J. Wattel, ‘Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-EC Allocation of Personal Tax allowances: Why 
Schumacker , Asscher, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice’, (June 2000) European Taxation (No. 6) 210.. See 
also D.M. Weber, ‘The First Steps of the ECJ Concerning an Abuse Doctrine in the Field of Harmonized Direct 
Taxes’, (1997) 6 EC Tax Review (No. 1) 22 for an analysis of the more recent case of Denkavit-VITIC-
Voormeer (17 October 1996) where the ECJ has interpreted for the first time certain clauses of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, (90/435/EEC), 23 July 1990, OJ, L 225 of 20 August 1990, and D. Schelpe, ‘The 
Denkavit-Vitic-Voormeer case’, (1997) 6 EC Tax Review (No. 2) 17. 
32  Dr A.J. Radler, one of the eight independent experts on the Ruding Committee ‘is a strong believer in using the 
ECJ to achieve results that may not be available from other governing bodies, see J. Weiner ‘Consortium of EU -
Based Law Firms Discusses EC Law’s Direct Impact on Direct Taxation’ (10 April 2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l 
(No. 15) 1629. 
33 Sven-Olof Lodin & M. Gammie, ‘The Taxation of the European Company’, (1999) 39 European Taxation (No. 
8) 286. 
34 Id., at 287. It is interesting to note that if the Ruding proposals had been implemented, then income tax systems 
would have converged to a point which, according to Professor Sven-Olof Lodin and Malcolm Gammie, would 
have created the environment for the emergence of a European corporate income tax. 
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(QMV) as a mechanism to increase the efficiency of EU institutions. The report recommends 
‘that QMV be extended to allow for coordination of national tax and social security laws.’35 
However, in a speech in Hoevelaken, the Netherlands, the current EU commissioner for fiscal 
policy, Frits Bolkestein, while commenting on these proposed changes emphasised that QMV 
would not apply to laws harmonising corporate taxes.36 In other words, one should not expect 
spectacular developments in the area of corporate harmonisation in the short term. Yet, with 
the adoption of the single European monetary unit (the Euro) by 11 EU Member States in 
1999, which meant that a serious nontax barrier to cross-border activity within the EU has 
been effectively dismantled, tax obstacles such as the disparate national tax systems still have 
to be addressed.37  
2 A New Approach to Tax Administration 
Harmonisation, as demonstrated in the EU, takes a long time to achieve. In the short term, it is 
important to explore other avenues for reform with the view to solving some of the most 
critical problems with the present system of international taxation. 
A Improving Exchange of Information Procedures 
One of the major problems with the administration of the separate accounting standard is the 
difficulty of determining the parameters of a comparable transaction because of the absence of 
relevant information.38 TNCs operate in a certain number of jurisdictions and it is often difficult 
for tax authorities to obtain information on specific operations carried out by a particular entity 
of the group. Such information is often held offshore and its strategic significance may even be 
unknown to the TNC’s local managers. Obtaining information from foreign jurisdictions is 
often fraught with uncertainties especially if held by third parties such as financial institutions 
benefiting from the protection of bank secrecy laws. 
The OECD is well aware of the problems that tax authorities face in gaining access to all 
necessary information for assessment purposes. Indeed, financial information is often subject 
to bank secrecy laws and abuse of such legislation is well documented through its 1985 report 
on the question. 39 The report, however, had limited success.40 Recently, the OECD has issued 
                                                             
35  Anonymous, ‘EU Report Recommends Qualified-Majority Voting for More Tax, Social Securities Areas’, (3 
April 2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l  (No. 14), at 1529. 
36  N. Tutt, ‘EU Commissioner Discusses Ways to Promote EU Tax Harmonisation’, (3 April 2000) 20 Tax Notes 
Int’l (No. 14), at 1528. 
37  Weiner, supra note 5. 
38 S. Picciotto, International Business Taxation  (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1992), at 280. 
39  See OECD, Taxation and Abuse of Bank Secrecy (Paris: OECD, 1985).  
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a new report on the question, 41 and it is now confident that ‘this new report will be more 
successful because all 29 member countries–including Switzerland–approved it.’42 
i  Exchange of Information 
One method of achieving cooperation between different tax administrators is through the 
exchange of information between relevant tax authorities. This involves an exchange of 
information already held by tax administrations as opposed to information held by third parties 
that have first to be accessed before being exchanged. In engaging in an information exchange 
procedure, each participant state surrenders part of its sovereignty since it is agreeing to do 
something, which under international law, it is not required to do. The gain to participants is 
that access to information held offshore enhances their ability to enforce compliance with their 
tax laws. Improving the exchange of information procedures is regarded as one of the most 
appropriate methods of reforming to a certain extent the present system of international 
taxation without going through any radical change.  
There are broadly three methods of obtaining information for taxation purposes:43  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
40  C. Gnaedinger, ‘OECD Announces New Measures for Easing Tax Authorities’ Access to Bank Information’ 
(17 April 2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 16) 1725. 
41  See OECD, Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes , (Paris: OECD, 2000). 
42  See C. Gnaedinger, ‘OECD Announces New Measures for Easing Tax Authorities’ Access to Bank 
Information’ (17 April 2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 16) 1725. 
43 There are other instruments or mechanisms for exchanging information for tax purposes outside the tax treaty 
network. Thus, for example, Member States of the EU, pursuant to three Directives, (77/799/EEC, 
79/1070/EEC and 92/12/EEC (Article 30)), are able to exchange information within the Union on direct and 
indirect tax matters. Many OECD members have also ratified the European Convention on M utual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959. This convention extends assistance in tax matters through an Additional 
Protocol. In addition, the EC Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for 
the purpose of money laundering also provides Member States with the possibility of using information thus 
obtained for taxation purposes. In spite of all these mechanisms, there is a definite link between money 
laundering and tax evasion as suggested by a recent report of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and 
Crime Prevention. See United Nations, Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering, (8 June 
1998) in OECD, Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes , (Paris: OECD, 2000), para. 48, at 25 
n 14. Indeed, the problem of access to financial information, identified in the recent OECD report, Harmful Tax 
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue  (Paris: OECD, 1998) is so crucial for the purposes of a fair and neutral 
tax system that it has been the main subject of discussion at a round table discussion between business and 
government officials held in Rome on 6-8 September 1999. What transpires from all these initiatives is the 
relative impotence of national governments acting on a unilateral basis or on uncoordinated and unpoliced 
multilateral instruments. However, a first step has been taken to enhance cooperation in this area, more 
especially between the G-7, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) a group made up of 24 OECD Member 
countries, Hong Kong, Singapore, the European Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council, and the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD. Thus, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs will ‘initially review 
progress in this area at the end of 2002 and thereafter periodically.’ See OECD (2000), supra note 41, at 15 
para. 21. 
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· first, and on a bilateral basis, most double tax treaties provide for an exchange of 
information procedure. Since there are in excess of 1500 treaties concluded on a 
bilateral basis, the potential for enhanced information flows is formidable;44  
· second, on a multilateral basis, the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters sponsored by the OECD and the Council of Europe contains a 
procedure for information exchanges; and  
· finally, the U.S. has pioneered the concept of stand-alone tax information exchange 
agreements and has signed a number of these, mainly with countries of the Caribbean 
Basin. 
According to the OECD, the exchange of information is an essential tool for combating 
sophisticated ‘methods of tax avoidance and evasion’.45 Exchanges of information are 
provided for in Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention.46 This provision, according to the 
Commentary, is to be construed ‘to the widest possible extent’.47 Article 26 of the OECD 
Model permits the exchange of information which is necessary for carrying out the provisions 
of a double tax agreement (DTA).48 The application of these provisions by different countries 
has been widely documented.49 It is now agreed that, following the 1977 revision of the 1963 
Draft Model Convention, much of the ambiguity that originally plagued Article 26 has been 
removed. However, some difficulties remain, for example, the prescription that the information 
to be exchanged must relate to a tax which is covered by the DTA, as is the rule that ‘the 
application thereunder is not contrary to the Convention.’50 Therefore, since the Model 
Convention applies to taxes on income and capital exclusively, exchange of information are 
limited to such taxes, and do not apply, for example, to sale taxes. 
There are two basic principles underlying the information exchange obligations in most DTAs. 
First, no information can be disclosed unless this type of information is specifically treated as 
capable of disclosure in the DTA. The reason for this limitation is that, in most instances, the 
                                                             
44 R.J. Vann, ‘A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region?’, (1991) 45 Bull Int’l Fiscal Documentation 99. 
45 OECD, Report by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Tax Information Exchange Between OECD Member 
Countries: A Survey of Current Practice (Paris: OECD, 1994), at 11 & 17. 
46 OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (Paris: OECD 1992), 
looseleaf (1997 update), at M-49. (Note: A 2000 update is now available.) 
47 Id., at Commentaries on Article 26, Preliminary Remarks, at C-(26)-1 para. 2. 
48 Id., at M -49 para. 1.  
49 See, for example, V. Morgan, ‘Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters’, (1988) 36 Can. Tax. J. 974; 
C Brodersen, ‘Limits on the International exchange of Tax Information’, (1987) 27 Eur. Tax’n 171; and P. 
Dekker, ‘Cross Border Information Under Tax Law: A Dutch Perspective’, (1987) 27 Eur. Tax’n  107. 
50 OECD (1992), supra  note 46, at M -49 para. 1.  
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secrecy provisions of a country’s domestic tax law require that legislative authority sanctions 
any disclosure of information to third parties. Second, although an agreement may exist 
enabling the disclosure of information, signatories to a DTA will invariably interpret strictly their 
obligation to disclose. This restraint may be traced to the sovereignty principle which in a sense 
is given away each time a country furnishes information to another. 
Yet another limiting factor in the present system of information exchange arises from the 
principle that an information exchange must apply to such information that is ‘necessary’ for 
the purposes of the DTA. This provision is construed to mean information essential for: 
· the carrying out of the provisions of the DTA,  
· the prevention of fraud, or  
· the administration of statutory provisions concerning taxes covered by the DTA. 
If any improvement of the exchange of information provisions is to be achieved, then the term 
‘necessary’ needs to be construed widely. For the  moment, the construction of the word 
‘necessary’ is left to the individual appreciation of the revenue authorities concerned. The logic 
of this rule is difficult to defend. One would have thought that if information has been 
specifically requested, that information is necessary for the authority in order to enable it to 
properly assess. The restrictive character of the information exchange provisions of DTAs is a 
serious limiting factor to their effectiveness and requires revision. If this reform is achieved, 
then it is arguable that information flows between different tax administrations would be 
enhanced. Indeed, the potential for meaningful exchanges is formidable if revenue authorities 
were to make better use of the developments in information technology. Computerised 
databases are, at the moment, being created in major countries.51 The administration of 
taxation laws worldwide would be greatly facilitated if information contained in these 
databases were to become accessible between countries. 
i i  Tax Info rmation Exchange Agreements 
The concept of tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) was pioneered by the U.S. in 
the 1980s. In an attempt to gain the cooperation of countries with which it does not have a 
comprehensive bilateral or multilateral tax treaty, the U.S. is prepared to enter into TIEAs with 
those countries. Pursuant to section 274(h)(6)(C)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code, the 
Treasury Department is authorised to negotiate and conclude TIEAs with Caribbean Basin 
countries, although such agreements may also be entered into with other non-Caribbean 
                                                             
51 See R. Avi-Yonah ‘The Structure of International Taxation’, (1996) 74 Texas Law Review 1301, at 1337. 
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countries also.52 The U.S. generally considers countries in that region as tax havens.53 In order 
to entice these countries into entering into TIEAs, the U.S. is prepared to concede to them 
certain advantages listed in the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act which is the 
legislative implementation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative unveiled by President Ronald 
Reagan at the Organisation of American States (OAS) meeting in February 1982.54 Subject to 
sectio n 423 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the main advantage is the duty-free treatment of 
agricultural and manufacturing products if ‘that article is imported directly from a beneficiary 
country into the customs territory of the United States’.55 While this method may give positive 
results in the short run, it is submitted that the notion that countries may be induced to provide 
information on tax matters in exchange for economic aid may not be the most appropriate 
method to promote tax cooperation. 
i i i The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters  
The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAATM),56 a 
multilateral convention promoted by the OECD and the Council of Europe, came into force on 
1 April 1995.57 The concept of MAATM is borrowed from certain regional agreements of this 
kind58 and is a tool that would ‘allow the tax administrators of signatory states to “organise” 
their enforcement activities in the same way as multi-nationals organise their tax affairs.’59 
The purpose of the MAATM is twofold. It provides for: 
· the multilateral exchange of information; and  
                                                             
52 E.R. Larkins, ‘U.S. International Agreements: Understanding the Process’, (1 July 1996) 13 Tax Notes Int’l 59, 
at 64. 
53 For a draft of these agreements, see ‘United States and Caribbean Basin Initiative’, in W.H. Diamond & D.B. 
Diamond, eds, International Tax Treaties of All Nations (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1985) Vol. 17 
series B, at 381-409. 
54 R. Gordon et al, ‘An Analysis of Tax Information Exchange Agreements Concluded by the U.S.’, (10 May 
1991) 20 Tax Management International Journal 187, at 189. 
55 United States, The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act , at <shelden@www.law.cornell.edu>. 
56 For a reprint of the Convention, see W.H. Diamond & D.B. Diamond, eds., International Tax Treaties of All 
Nations, (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1988) Vol. 20 series B, at 393-410. 
57 OECD (1992), supra note 46, Commentaries on Article 26, ‘Preliminary Remarks’ at p C-(26)-1 para 3. The 
MAATM has been ratified by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the 
United States, see OECD (1994), supra note 45, at 27 para. 83. 
58 The Nordic Mutual Assistance Treaty that was originally signed in 1972 inspired the multilateral convention. A 
new Nordic Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters signed in 1989 and in force since 7 December 
1991 is in harmony with the MAATM. See OECD (1994), supra note 45, at 12-13 para. 11. 
59 L. Burns & R. Woellner, ‘Bilateral and Multilateral Exchanges of Information’, (May 1989) 23 Taxation in 
Australia 656, at 656. 
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· the mutual administrative assistance in recovering tax claims in participating countries.60  
In MAATM, the scope of the exchange of information provisions may be considered as being 
slightly broader than the requirements in the current bilateral DTAs. This is because of the 
adoption of a different gateway test to determine what kind of information is to be shared. 
MAATM provides that information is to be shared if it is ‘foreseeably relevant’ to the 
assessment collection or recovery of taxes. While an important development in the field of tax 
information exchanges, the concept of what is foreseeably relevant is relatively flexible and 
may perhaps open the gate to different interpretations which may, in the end, thwart the very 
purpose of the Convention. 61 
B Improving Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
There are three peaceful mechanisms to resolve international conflicts: 
· negotiation between the countries concerned, 
· decision by an international court, and 
· international arbitration.62  
At the present time, although there have been several calls for a World Tax Court63, 
adjudication of tax matters by an international court is unavailable except to a limited extent 
within the EU.64 The only two available dispute resolution mechanisms are, therefore, 
negotiation and arbitration.  
In recent years a novel method for dealing with such disputes has evolved. The Advance 
Pricing Agreement (APA) is an attempt to prevent transfer pricing disputes in lieu of the 
traditional method of trying to solve such disputes after they have arisen.  
                                                             
60 These two functions of the MAATM as well as its multilateral character has caused ‘some schizophrenia as to 
whether MAAT’s importance [in this thesis the acronym MAATM is used] is in its multilateral nature or in 
its provisions for administrative assistance. In four years the Committee [Committee on Fiscal Affairs] went 
from talking about a multilateral information exchange treaty to a model convention on administrative 
assistance. The final product is a combination of both, a point that is often missed. The provisions for 
reservation in the treaty (Article 30) allow for the severance of the administrative assistance aspects.’ See A. 
Fletcher, ‘International Agreements-The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance on Tax Matters’, 
(1989) 30 Harv Int’l LJ, at 514-23. 
61 Burns & Woellner, supra note 59, at 656. 
62 L. Hinnekens, ‘The European Tax Arbitration Convention and its Legal Framework-I’ [1996] BTR 132, at 138. 
63 J. Azzi, ‘Tackling Tax Treaty Tensions: Time to Think About an International Tax Court’, (August/September 
1998) 52 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (No. 8/9), at 344. 
64 The 1978 Conference of World Peace Through Law Centre commissioned a paper,  A Study on the Feasibility of 
a World Tax Court, and a paper by the ICC entitled Resolution of International Conflicts  dated 16 June 1984, 
both concluded that ‘in the long run, it should be possible to set up an International Tax Court.’ See also 
Hinnekens, supra  note 62, at 139; and G. Lindencrona & N. Matterson, Arbitration in Taxation (Kluwer, 1981). 
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i  The Mutual Agreement Procedure 
Under the OECD Model, the mutual agreement procedure (MAP) is the primary mechanism 
available to resolve a bilateral tax dispute. It is essentially an administrative procedure whereby 
the Contracting States authorise their revenue authorities to negotiate the settlement of disputes 
arising from the application of a common double tax convention without going through 
diplomatic channels.65 Article 25 of the OECD Model Convention provides that the 
competent authorities of Contracting States shall endeavour, by mutual agreement, to resolve 
double taxation issues when there is a risk of double taxation, or whenever disputes arise from 
conflicting interpretations of the provisions of a treaty.  
The MAP and its executive instrument, the competent authority (CA), have, at times, been 
considered an ‘ineffective mechanism(s) to resolve international tax disputes’.66 The enduring 
problems of the MAP are its time limits, the length of the procedure, inadequate taxpayer 
participation, uncertainty about the details of the procedure, and the collection of tax and 
payment of interest pending the resolution of the issue. All these problems have now been 
addressed and recommendations to Member States have been made.67 It would appear that 
at this time certain tax administrations believe that the MAP, if modified along these lines, 
could adequately serve its intended purpose.68 The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
acknowledges the growing number of cases involving the MAP69 while the German 
government holds the view that the process ‘works well’ and ‘to a large extent protects 
taxpayers’ against double taxation. 70 In addition, if in the past there were some constraints on 
the proper exercise of the MAP because of the budgetary limits on the travelling of CAs, this 
is likely to change given that technological solutions are being experimented with in order to 
                                                             
65 See OECD (1992), supra note 46, Commentary on Article 25, at C-(25)-14 para. 39. 
66 S.A. Reece, ‘Arbitration in Income Tax Treaties: To Be or Not To Be’, (Summer 1992) 7 Florida Journal of 
International Law  277, at 283. See also Picciotto supra note 38, at 289-90 for an example of the failure to 
resolve a double taxation issue through the use of the MAP with the dispute ending in Court. The case (Boulez 
v. Commissioner  (1984) 83 T.C. 584) relates to the orchestra conductor Pierre Boulez, a German resident 
whose fees for conducting orchestral performances in the U.S. for recording purposes were characterised as 
royalties and taxed both in Germany and in the U.S. without any relief for the conductor through the MAP. 
67 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators (Paris: OECD, 
1995), (1995 OECD Guidelines), at IV-13-IV-21, paras. 4.40-66. 
68 J. Killaly, ‘International Tax Into the Future: An ATO Perspective’, Paper delivered at the Taxation Institute of 
Australia, International Tax Intensive Retreat (14-15 June 1996, Mount Eliza Business School) 5.  
69 On 12 December 1995 the IRS issued Revenue Procedure 96-13 revising the procedural rules to be followed by 
taxpayers seeking assistance of the U.S. Competent Authority under the mutual agreement article of U.S. tax 
treaties. For an analysis of the new rules, see J.R. Mogle, ‘New Competent Authority Procedures Examined’, 
(14 February 1996) 4 Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report 677. 
70 A. Fernandez et al., ‘Federal Bar Association Hones In on International Tax Issues’, (18 March 1996) 12 Tax 
Notes Int’l  875, at 876. 
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enable video conferencing of treaty partners’ competent authorities.71 The MAP operating 
through the CA is an important procedure to solve double taxation as acknowledged by the 
former U.S. CA, John Lyons, in a recent interview.72 However, this success, according to 
Lyons, may be short-lived and could lead to a worldwide meltdown of the system. The basis 
for this conclusion is the following: 
· First, there is a belief among ‘people in the government in position of authority’ that the 
U.S. CA must strictly adhere to section 482 regulations when negotiating transfer 
pricing cases. Lyons believes that this tends to entertain the perception that ‘the U.S. 
legislative and regulatory system for determining transfer prices is infallible.’73  
· Second, the MAP is meant primarily, to eliminate double taxation. To do so it relies on 
the application of the arm’s length standard. However, the promotion of the arm’s 
length standard as perceived by the U.S. Treasury is gaining ascendance over the 
primary object of the MAP. This may, according to Lyons, antagonise U.S. treaty 
partners. 
· Third, there is a flurry of requests for CA materials, Field Service Advices, Pacific 
Area Tax Administrative materials, Group-of-Four materials as well as other treaty-
related material going back as far as 1990 pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA). This ‘raises significant issues of sovereignty and extraterritorial reach of U.S. 
law.’74 This assault on confidentiality of information may ‘have a chilling effect on the 
U.S. CA’s ability to conduct its traditional treaty business [and would translate] into a 
mark drop in the flow of information which could have the impact of paralyzing the 
entire mutual agreement process.’75 
                                                             
71 Anonymous, ‘ACI Researching Competent Authority Use of Teleconferencing, Lyons Says’, (31 January 
1996) 4 Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report 571. 
72 Thus, the procedure has been responsible for resolving double taxation completely in almost 90 per cent of 
cases while granting partial relief in the remaining 10 per cent. See Anonymous, ‘U.S. Competent Authority 
Into the New Millennium: A Look Back and Ahead’, (17 July 2000) 21 Tax Notes Int’l 184. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. It is to be noted that that while Congress declared that APA material as falling outside an FOIA discovery, it 
did not do so in relation to treaty material. 
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i i  Advance Pricing Arrangements76 
Advance Pricing Arrangements (APAs) may have, in the short term, the potential to solve the 
problem of income allocation between the various components of TNCs. The first country to 
adopt a unilateral APA procedure was Japan through its 1987 Pre-Confirmation System 
(PCS).77 Under the PCS, the National Tax Administration of Japan must accept a taxpayer’s 
transfer pricing methodology once it has been ‘confirmed’.78 The U.S. readily endorsed the 
concept and has, through Revenue Procedure 91-22, initiated a substantial APA program. 
An APA is simply an effort to eliminate the uncertainties and controversies in the taxation of 
cross-border transactions. It is not a procedure designed to determine specific prices for the 
transfer of goods and services between the various components of a TNC. Rather, an APA is 
an agreement between the revenue authorities and the taxpayer as to acceptable transfer 
pricing methodologies (TPMs). 
In general APAs have been welcomed by TNCs79 and by small business alike.80 An APA may 
be appropriate in many circumstances, for example, where a TNC is not involved in any 
deliberate transfer pricing manipulation, an APA is desirable if only to avoid costly disputes 
with tax authorities where units of the TNC operate. An APA is particularly desirable if it is 
impossible to find evidence of comparable third party arrangements in order to test the inter-
company transfer price. Indeed, an APA is regarded as a positive innovation if the risk of 
                                                             
76 The OECD and Australia use the term Advance Pricing Arrangement while the U.S. uses the term Advance 
Pricing Agreement. The APA procedure is not restricted to the international income tax area. There is evidence 
of the increasing encroachment of international trade concerns on purely national income taxation matters. The 
IRS, for example, ‘has concluded at least one APA where Customs reviewed the proposed APA terms and 
signed off on the imported merchandise valuation.’ (1995) 4 Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report 356. The 
conclusion of such an APA was made necessary because of the conflict that taxpayers could be faced with in 
trying to satisfy transfer pricing requirements concurrently with custom regulations as is the case, for example, 
in the U.S. pursuant to section 1959A of the Internal Revenue Code. 
77 K. Okawara, ‘Japan’s National Tax Administration Plans to Issue New PCS (APA) Procedures’ (24 May 
1999) 18 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 21) 2097. 
78 A. Miyamoto, D. Yoost & G. Noble, ‘Japanese APAs hit their stride, (April 1999) 10 International Tax 
Review 9 (No. 4) 39. 
79 Ernst & Young, ‘Transfer Pricing: Risk Reduction and Advance Pricing Agreements’, (31 July 1995) Tax Notes 
International 293, at 295. In reality, it would appear that TNCs are using the APA process ‘to deal with a few 
strategic problems and are leaving their serious business for Appeals.’ Indeed, TNCs have now two a choice: 
they either ‘cut a deal at 30 cents on the dollar or get an APA.’ See Anonymous, ‘McIntyre on APA Report 
and More’, (17 April 2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 16) 1775, at 1776. 
80 In order to extend the APA process to more taxpayers, ‘the IRS has implemented an expedited small business 
taxpayer program and an early referral program.’ See A.M. Fernandez & K.A. Bell, ‘U.S. APA Program 
Drawing Foreign Tax Administrators’ Attention’ (8 June 1998) 16 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 23) 1786. 
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dispute between the taxpayer and the tax authority over subjective ‘guesstimating’ is 
important.81 
In spite of its acceptance by several countries, some major industrial nations, such as France, 
have expressed ‘serious reservations about the compatibility of the APA process with the 
arm’s length principle.’82 In April 1996 new regulations on transfer pricing rules were 
introduced in France.83 These recognise the benefits of APAs, although at that time it would 
appear that the practice was not popular given the absence of any tradition of dialogue 
between taxpayers and French tax authorities.84 However, it would appear that such 
reluctance has been put aside and APAs, at least bilateral, APAs, are now available to French 
taxpayers. 85In fact, it would appear that the French authorities ‘are negotiating the first 
multilateral agreement.’86 
The British attitude to APAs, after an initial reticence, is such that Steven Harris, one of the 
IRS’s APA chiefs, has described it as akin to ‘jump[ing] into the pool 100 per cent’.87 A new 
statutory procedure for APAs was introduced in the Finance Act 199988 and in September 
1999 the ‘U.K. Inland Revenue issued advance pricing procedures, revising a 1998 draft 
                                                             
81 Id., at 295. 
82 B. Arnold & T. McDonnell, ‘The Allocation of Income And Expenses Among Countries: Report on the 
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85  For an analysis of the French APA procedures, see B. Gouthière, ‘Advance Pricing Agreements Introduced’ 
(March 2000) 40 European Taxation (No. 3) 118. 
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a formal APA program. See comments by Stephane Pellet in Anonymous, ‘Lawyer Says Telecoms Face 
Problems Due to Changing Industry, Few Comparable’, (19 May 1999) 8 Transfer Pricing Report (No. 2) 54, 
at 55. On 17 September 1999, the French tax authorities issued procedures in the form of a new tax circular for 
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bilateral (not unilateral) APAs more accessible to French taxpayers. See Tax Analysts Document Number: Doc 
1999-31945 (29 September 1999). 
87 Fernandez & Bell, supra  note 80, at 1786. 
88  See F. Baylis, ‘Advance Pricing Agreements-What will They Offer?’ (March 2000) 40 European Taxation (No. 
6) 229. 
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document to allow more time for applying for an APA and to place less emphasis on requiring 
that APAs be bilateral.’89 
The success of APAs is such that, as least in the U.S., many companies have joined in the race 
to conclude APAs.90 It seems that there is a growing concern among companies that if one of 
their competitors obtains an APA from the IRS this could result in that company obtaining a 
competitive edge in the market.91 In addition, given the headway that the U.S. has in the 
transfer pricing area92 as a result of the relative popularity of its APA program, several 
countries are responding in the belief that the U.S. policies ‘are causing income transfers from 
their jurisdictions to the United States and reducing tax revenue.’93  
The question that arises is whether the APA process could be generalised so as to eventually 
reach a multilateral level. In October 1994, at a meeting of the Pacific Association of Tax 
Administrators (PATA), agreement was reached between the U.S., Canada, Australia and 
Japan for common procedures for bilateral advance pricing arrangements.94 At a meeting of 
the International Fiscal Association (IFA), U.S. Branch, held on 1 December 1994, Michael 
Durst, Director of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service’s APA program, expressed the opinion 
that ‘the next generation of APAs will meet the needs of multinationals operations and go 
beyond the current trend of bilateral cooperation to the multilateral level’.95 In any event, ‘the 
IRS’s tour de force, the advance pricing agreement program, continues to flourish…’96 By 
1997, the IRS had completed more than 170 APAs,97 with the process seen as continuously 
improving.98 Since the program started in 1991 and up to the second quarter of 1999, the IRS 
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has finalised 190 APAs99 with 196 pending at various stages of development.100 As of 31 
December 1999, 231 APAs had been concluded with another 187 pending.101 
At one stage, however, the growth of the APA program had been momentarily slowed down 
following a lawsuit filed by the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (BNA) for the release of 
information pertaining to APAs.102 Initially, the IRS argued that these were protected ‘return 
information’ documents falling within the secrecy provisions of the income tax legislation given 
that these documents contain confidential commercial or financial information, attorney–client 
privileged materials, or are documents protected by the deliberative process privilege granted 
to government agencies.103 However, faced with the prospect of disclosure by order of the 
Court, the IRS stated in January 1999 its intention to disclose APA information under section 
6110 of the U.S. IRC. Nevertheless, to preempt any loss in confidence in the confidentiality of 
the process, Public Law 106-170 amended section 6103 to provide that advance pricing 
agreements and related background information are confidential return information. Moreover, 
the law provides that ‘APAs and related background information are not “written 
determinations” as that term is defined in section 6110. Therefore, the public inspection 
requirements of section 6110 do not apply to APAs and related background information.’104 
Another incidental advantage arising from the success of the APA program proceeds from the 
growing experience of tax administration with the CA process. Bilateral APAs are taking less 
time to negotiate as tax authorities now make use of technology and bypass the normal 
channels to negotiate the arrangement.105 Progress is also being achieved towards the 
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conclusion of multilateral APAs. For example, a representative of Revenue Canada revealed in 
an interview that his country is in the process of negotiating an APA involving up to five 
nations.106 The success of APAs is likely to continue in the short and medium term now that 
the confidentiality question has been resolved at least in the U.S. As for the OECD, after 
having looked into ‘whether it should establish some type of international APA standards’ in 
order to promote consistency in practice among nations that use this method has, in October 
1999, published its guidelines for conducting Mutual Agreement APAs.107 
i i i Arbitration in Tax Disputes 
Arbitration as a means of resolving international commercial disputes has long been considered 
as an alternative to judicial adjudication in international commerce.108 In recent years, the issue 
of arbitration to resolve international tax disputes, especially in the area of transfer pricing, has 
been at the forefront of the debate.109 This is by no means a new idea. As early as 1895 in 
Germany, L von Bar and, in 1899 in Italy, A Garelli were advocating arbitration in taxation 
matters.110 One of the first double tax conventions to include an arbitration provision was 
signed on 14 April 1926 between the U.K. and Ireland.111 The Institute of Fiscal Association 
explored arbitration at its Congresses held in Zurich in 1951 and later in Florence in 1993. 
Business is also quite favourable to the idea as evidenced by the BIAC 1971 Position Paper 
on the proposed amendment to Article 25 of the 1963 OECD Draft Model Convention and 
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the 1984 ICC’s Resolution of International Conflicts.112 While the idea of arbitration seems to 
be popular in various quarters, there is some difficulty in putting this option into practice.  
There have been numerous calls for the establishment of ‘an independent arbitral institute to 
address international tax matters.’113 Within the EU, the Ruding Committee, like the Neumark 
Committee in 1962, recognised the need to resolve double taxation arising from transfer 
pricing disputes in order for the single internal market to operate efficiently.114 On 23 July 
1990, the 12 original EU Member States signed the Convention on the Elimination of Double 
Taxation in connection with Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises (90/326/EEC) in 
Brussels. It became effective for an initial period of five years as from 1 January 1995.115  
The OECD is well aware of the need for a proper arbitration process in its model treaties to 
complement the mutual agreement procedure. In this regard, it is significant that its 1995 
Report contains a short section on arbitration.116 The Report concedes that relief is not 
guaranteed under the MAP if tax administrations cannot reach an agreement. The OECD 
agrees that in such circumstances a certain form of arbitration could prove to be an adequate 
tiebreaker. Consequently, the Report will be supplemented with the conclusions of a study of 
the question to be undertaken as a matter of urgency by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs. 
Interest in arbitration as a method of resolving international tax disputes originated with certain 
dissatisfaction with the MAP. With the renewed interest in the MAP, as already discussed, 
perhaps what is needed is simply the availability of an arbitration procedure rather than 
arbitration itself. In other words, if the parties have at their disposal the possibility of arbitration 
outside the usual tax administrative machinery, then it is arguable that tax administrators may 
be keener to resolve the dispute on their own terms rather than submit to an external body. 
Furthermore, the availability of arbitration may act as an incentive for the parties involved to 
resolve the dispute. Indeed, any party refusing to submit to arbitration, if available, may be 
viewed as bearing the responsibility for the failure to reach a satisfactory conclusion. In any 
event: 
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[I]f one of the contracting states expresses a willingness to go to arbitration when a mutual 
agreement procedure is unresolved there is a feeling amongst tax administrations that this will place 
heavy pressure on the o ther party to agree..117 
Under the current MAP, as provided for in the OECD Model, it is impossible to establish who 
is accountable if there is no resolution of the conflict. Clearly, the non-resolution of tax conflicts 
has the potential to hamper the expansion of cross-border business. It is urgent, therefore, to 
find an acceptable form of arbitration procedure in taxation matters to ease the pressures that 
are being brought to bear on the tax treaty system as a result of the constant expansion in 
international trade. Arbitration has been a feature of international commerce for decades and it 
has worked well. There is no reason why this success could not be duplicated in the taxation 
area. Thus, the constant osmosis between international trade and international taxation is again 
confirmed, as is the relentless evolution in international tax rules. 
Section II The Evolution of Existing Rules  
The latest illustration of the evolution of international tax rules is the emergence of profit-based 
methodologies for the apportionment of cross-border income. These have appeared as a 
result of the weaknesses of the traditional transaction-based methodologies as already studied. 
A transactional profit-based methodology is described by the OECD as one which ‘examines 
the profits that arise from particular controlled transactions’.118 It may well be that these 
methodologies are the precursors of some form of global formulary apportionment 
notwithstanding the OECD’s aversion of the latter. 
1 The Emergence of Profit -Based Methodologies 
The U.S. pioneered the use of profit-based methodologies after the relative failure of the 
traditional methods to achieve their objective.119 Profit-based methodologies: 
no longer attempt to derive an arm’s length price from comparable individual transactions, but an 
arm’s length return by focussing on returns on investment in comparable firms or dividing between 
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them the combined profits in two interrelated members of the same MNE [Multinational 
Enterprises].120 
Thus the introduction of the comparable profit method and the profit split method. The 
emergence of these methods has caused some concern for the OECD.121 However, the U.S. 
Treasury and the OECD have managed to shape a compromise which will be further 
examined below.122 
A The Comparable Profit Method 
One of the first profit-based methodologies is the comparable profit method (CPM) which 
appeared in the U.S. 1993 Temporary Regulations. It is a revised version of the 1992 
Comparable Profit Interval Method.123 The CPM determines the arm’s length consideration124 
for a controlled transfer of property by referring to objective measures of profitability called 
‘profit level indicators’ derived from uncontrolled taxpayers engaged in comparable business 
activities with other uncontrolled taxpayers in similar circumstances.125 Profit indicators are 
‘ratios that measure the relationships between the profits and costs incurred or resources 
employed,’126 for example, the location, size and line of business. In determining such profit 
level indicators, any differences between the companies being compared need to be taken into 
account when applying the CPM. While several profit level indicators may be used, those 
most likely to be favoured would be the rate of return on assets and financial ratios, such as 
operating profits to  sales, or gross profit to operating expenses.127 The profit level of the tested 
party is then compared to those of an uncontrolled party with adjustments made if there are 
important differences between them. Significantly, the tested party does not have to be the 
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taxpayer, but may instead be another member of the controlled taxpayer’s group, for example, 
its parent corporation. 
If taxpayers in the same business and subjected to the same circumstances tend to earn similar 
returns over a reasonable period of time, then in order to determine an adequate return for a 
particular enterprise it makes sense to examine the level of profits earned by another enterprise 
of roughly the same size, engaged in a similar business, and operating under similar conditions. 
This exercise should demonstrate that profits earned by the controlled enterprise and that 
earned by the uncontrolled one are comparable.128 In broad terms this is what the CPM 
intends to achieve.129 However, in doing so, it ‘deviates from the historical approach for 
transfer pricing methodologies, since it does not look at prices and attempt to adjust those 
prices to a value similar to a price which would be determined by the free play of market 
forces.’130 
B The Transactional Net Margin Method 
The 1995 OECD Guidelines state that the ‘Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) 
examines the net profit margin relative to an appropriate base (e.g., costs, sales, assets) that a 
taxpayer realizes from a controlled transaction.’131 
The TNMM is applicable as a method of last resort in situations where: 
· it is not possible to identify gross margins or mark-ups, but net margins are available; 
· differences in functions make the use of gross margins unreliable; or 
· differences in expense structures have a material effect on gross margins and prevent 
reliable adjustments. 
The theoretical justification of the TNMM is that returns earned by firms in a particular 
industry tend to be the same over a reasonably long period of time if they operate under similar 
conditions.132 It follows that the profits earned by a taxpayer in a controlled transaction may be 
compared to those earned by an uncontrolled party in order to determine an arm’s length 
profitability result. The TNMM seeks to make such a comparison. Net profit margins are 
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compared rather than gross profit margins as in the resale and cost-plus methods.133 This 
means that the TNMM is designed to operate in a manner similar to the cost plus and resale 
price methods, except that it relies more on indirect data. It is perhaps because of this 
indirectness of the data used that the OECD maintains the TNMM be applied only as a matter 
of last resort. With the TNMM net profit is ‘expressed relative to sales, costs, or assets; the 
most commonly employed measures are return on sales and return on assets.’134 
Finally, it is convenient to note that the language used to describe the TNMM is very similar to 
that used in relation to the U.S. CPM. This tends to strengthen the view that TNMM and 
CPM are broadly similar, as will be examined later. Moreover, after comparing the CPM with 
the Australian Profit Comparison Method (PCM), a method tentatively explored in Australia’s 
Draft Ruling TR95/D22, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) concluded that the latter is 
equivalent to the TNMM.135 
C Profit-Split Methods  
The profit-split method is normally employed in situations where transactions are so 
interrelated that it is impossible to evaluate them on a separate basis.136 The 1995 OECD 
Guidelines define profit split as a method which: 
seeks to eliminate the effect on profits of special conditions made or imposed in a controlled 
transaction… by determining the division of profits that independent enterprises would have 
expected to realise from engaging in the transaction or transactions.137 
In the first place this method identifies the profit (or losses) to be split between the associated 
enterprises by examining the transactions in which the associated enterprises are engaged while 
seeking ‘to achieve the division of profit that independent enterprises would have realised’.138 
It then divides the total profit earned between the two related parties using a formula, for 
example, the ratio between earned profit to capital employed, or any other ‘economically 
valid’ method. The profit-split method may be applied to the whole of the profit (or losses) 
generated by the transactions 139 or to a residue of the latter that cannot be allocated to the 
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parties because they arise from the use of high-value and unique intangibles.140 Finally, in order 
to determine their relative contributions, a functional analysis of each of the participating 
enterprises needs to be carried out. 
One crucial issue is whether the OECD’s profit-based methodologies and those of the U.S. 
1994 Final Regulations are compatible. In case of incompatibility, the risk of double  taxation 
arises if the U.S. applies its own version of the profit-based methodologies while the other 
OECD Member countries apply the OECD’s recommendations, or worse opt for their own 
methodologies in a free-for-all stampede. Nonetheless, in spite of the seemingly opposing 
views, and in an effort to reach comparable solutions, there has been much cooperation 
between the U.S. and the OECD regarding this question of compatibility.141 The comments 
regarding the convergence of the U.S. and the OECD position are favourable.142 Indeed, 
these indicate that there is a real convergence between the two profit -based methodologies.143 
Nevertheless, there are two major differences between the two sets of measures which, if not 
addressed, are likely to cause double taxation. The first of these differences relates to the use 
of ranges.144 The second important difference is in the use of the inter-quartile range by the 
U.S. Regulations.145 This entails the exclusion of the top and bottom 25 per cent of the range. 
While the IRS permits taxpayers to use comparable data without adjustments for differences in 
functions and risks, a limit for the determination and evaluation of transfer prices by the CPM 
is nevertheless imposed by the prescription relative to the inter-quartile range. Therefore, the 
most serious problem that this may likely cause is a dispute between one jurisdiction applying 
the OECD Guidelines and finding that the appropriate transfer price is precisely within either 
the lower or the upper 25 per cent of the range, while  the IRS would be forced to find that the 
appropriate transfer price is within the inter-quartile range. Such a variance would then need to 
be solved through the MAP if double taxation is to be avoided. As for the Australian Taxation 
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Office, its view on this particular point is that ‘the excision of the upper and lower quartiles 
from the sample used to calculate the comparable profit tends to produce average 
outcomes.’146 
The emergence of profit -based methodologies is the latest answer to the limitations of 
transaction-based methodologies to arrive at acceptable transfer prices in the context of TNC 
operations. Notwithstanding this, 1995 OECD Guidelines maintain the superiority of 
transaction-based methodologies over profit-based ones. Pursuant to the Guidelines, the latter 
should be used only in the last resort. On the other hand, while it proclaims the same policy, 
the general conviction is that the IRS is likely to favour profit-based methodologies as a 
method of first rather than last resort.147 This is because the use of transaction-based 
methodologies is premised on the availability of ‘sufficient good quality data’. The 
determination of ‘sufficient good quality data’ is a highly subjective exercise. The IRS, 
pursuant to the 1994 Final Regulations, is required to follow ‘the most reliable’ method in 
order to determine appropriate transfer prices. This means that if data is unavailable, then the 
IRS will have to fall back on the CPM in order to achieve its outcome. In addition, while 
pledging its preference for transaction-based methodologies, the U.S. regulations have at the 
same time expanded the circumstances in which profit-based methodologies should be 
applied, notably to the transfer of valuable intangible property. 148 
In any event, over the years there has been an evolution of the arm’s length principle and the 
official recognition of that evolution is acknowledged in the 1995 OECD Guidelines.149 The 
1995 OECD Guidelines reaffirmed the organisation’s commitment to the arm’s length principle 
as the most appropriate method for the taxation of TNCs. Nevertheless, it is submitted that 
there has been a subtle shift in OECD Member countries’ perception of what the arm’s length 
principle stands for. 
A significant illustration of this is found in the language used, for example, by the Australian 
authorities in their interpretation of Division 13, the anti-profit-shifting provisions of the 
Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. While these provisions use the expression 
‘arm’s length price’ the Commissioner of Taxation refers more readily to an ‘arm’s length 
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consideration’, an ‘arm’s length outcome’ or an ‘arm’s length range.’150 Clearly, the ATO, like 
many other revenue authorities around the world, is coming to the conclusion that the 
traditional approach in the application of the arm’s length principle is unsatisfactory and is 
exploring new approaches for its application. 
In addition, it is reasonable to conclude that although both the OECD and the U.S. regulations 
claims to the contrary, the reality is that both the TNMM and the CPM purport to set a 
benchmark as to the level of profitability that is expected for an enterprise in a given industry. 
Indeed, profit-based methodologies seek ‘to determine the nature of the audited business and 
its functions for the purposes of comparing and, if necessary, adjusting its overall profitability 
with that of comparable uncontrolled businesses.’151 Therefore, through a backdoor device, 
tax authorities are given the opportunity to ‘dictate to taxpayers in what business they shall 
engage or how to run their businesses profitably or economically.’152 
Profit-based methodologies may thus be viewed as a transition from the well-known 
transactional methodologies to the lesser-known world of profit apportionment methodologies. 
Profit-based pricing methodologies have certain definite practical advantages over the 
traditional methods. There is thus a serious possibility that they ‘will become the preferred 
methodologies of tax auditors’ in certain jurisdictions.153 If this is to be the case, then it is 
important that a certain uniformity be achieved in their application. Uniformity, or at least a 
certain concerted effort towards uniform application, has been achieved in the case of 
transactional methodologies through a rather strict adherence to OECD recommendations. 
The same result must be replicated in respect of profit-based pricing methodologies. 
2 A Refined Application of the Existing Rules  
In 1991 Professor Vann published a paper criticising tax treaties in general and the OECD 
Model in particular.154 In 1996, in a series of unpublished papers, he reviewed that critique 
and tentatively identified the major evolutionary trends in international taxation.155 An 
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examination of these ideas discloses two main themes that are likely to dominate international 
taxation in the short and medium term, that is, a refined application of existing ideas and the 
emergence of institutional models. 
A An Innovative Application of Existing Treaty Rules 
One of the most salient characteristics of the emerging global economy is the growing 
importance of trade in high-value services. Goods now incorporate such high value services, 
for example, computer hardware where value is not in the hardware per se but rather in the 
patent and know-how on which the machine is built. 
Double Tax Agreements (DTAs) do not deal effectively with the concept of high-value 
services. The construction of old concepts such as the permanent establishment (PE), 
royalties, or the provision of dependent or independent services have been stretched to 
accommodate these new developments. Thus, for example, following the 2000 update of the 
OECD Model Convention, Article 14 governing the taxation of income from independent 
services has been removed. This is justified: 
on the assumption that there were no intended differences between the concepts of “permanent 
establishment” and “fixed base” and, moreover, between the computation of profits under Arts. 7 
and 14. 156 
i  The Treatment of High -Value Services 
Traditionally, firms engaged in international commerce carry out their activities either through 
branches or subsidiaries. The PE of a TNC still constitutes the minimum nexus that allows a 
particular jurisdiction to tax profits derived in its territory. The question that arises is whether 
the PE concept fits the model used by TNCs to provide high value services. In addition, with 
high value services, the immediate issue is whether the traditional views pertaining to revenue 
characterisation are still workable.157 
Most of the value of such services rests in their intellectual property and copyright components 
rather than with their physical attributes as, for example, with an on-line tax advice service. A 
purely orthodox application of the concept is likely to cause serious problems for source 
countries attempting to tax the activities of TNCs engaged in the provision of such services.  
Services may be associated with highly expensive equipment which is often very mobile, 
unattended, or even located beyond the jurisdiction of any state, for example, 
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telecommunication facilities in space, or a Web site in a tax haven. 158 With electronic 
commerce, therefore, the traditional conditions for the existence of a PE may not be satisfied. 
159 Even if a PE is found to exist, the problem of calculating and collecting the resulting tax 
liabilities from enterprises operating under these novel conditions remains unsolved. Clearly, 
electronic commerce raises a certain number of tax issues that need to be addressed in a 
comprehensive way. 160 For example:  
· Does an enterprise of country A, which engages in electronic commerce in country B, 
have a sufficient presence in B (the PE concept) to justify the revenue authorities of B 
exercising its taxing authority?161 
· How is income generated by electronic commerce to be characterised?  
· Is it sales income, royalties, rental income, or income from services?  
· What should be considered as appropriate tests to determine where such income has 
been derived?  
· How should income and deductions be allocated among various parts of a TNC 
engaged in electronic commerce?  
To deal with such questions a novel approach to tax administration is required. 
i i  The Necessary Evolution in Tax Administration  
If national tax administration is to adapt to the significant changes in the way business is being 
conducted, cooperation between national tax administrations is absolutely critical.162 
Therefore, a fresh approach seeking to manage the system as a whole needs to be pursued as 
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is proposed in this thesis. Tax administration in an increasingly internationalised environment 
will probably rest on three major instruments and these are: 
· the exchange of information and the mutual agreement procedures,  
· advance pricing arrangements, and  
· arbitration.  
These instruments as well as the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters (MAATM) have already been analysed. What is also clear is that tax administration is 
moving from the national to the international level. Thus, the OECD has instituted a monitoring 
procedure to examine whether Member countries’ legislation, regulatio ns, and administrative 
practices are consistent with its 1995 Guidelines. This monitoring is carried out through a peer 
review, which may be construed as an innovative tax administration method. 
This evolution in tax administration is apparent when one considers the recent proposal of the 
European Commission in the field of tax administration. In international law one state will not 
assist in the enforcement of a tax debt due to another state. This practice is known in the U.K. 
as the Government of India principle as recognised in Government of India v Taylor.163 
This principle is followed by other members of the EU and is indeed upheld throughout the 
world. However, breaking away with tradition, the European Council Directive 76/308/EEC 
of 15 March 1976 restricted the application of the principle and instead provided that certain 
debts for unpaid taxes and duties pertaining to agricultural levies and custom duties and owed 
to a Member State could be recovered within the EU. In 1979, the Directive was extended to 
VAT and excise duties on tobacco, alcohol, and mineral oils. The new proposal from the 
European Commission would extend the provision for mutual assistance in the recovery of 
unpaid taxes to ‘taxes on income and capital’, for example, income tax, corporation tax and 
capital gains tax. If this proposal is adopted, then the principle of non-assistance in the direct 
enforcement of foreign tax debts will disappear within the EU. Therefore, those governments 
within the EU that have not signed the OECD-Council of Europe multilateral agreement for 
mutual assistance in tax matters may find themselves in a position as if they had done so.164 
B Beyond Existing Tax Treaties  
There are two main factors which are progressively remodelling the principles of international 
business taxation. On a general level, the influence of international economic law is growing in 
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this area, while the interaction between two specific principles of economic law and 
international taxation is increasingly being felt as international trade expands. 
The effect of the ongoing internationalisation of world economies is a steady expansion of 
international trade in both the traditional goods sector and in the services sector.165 In the latter 
case, growth has been such that a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has had 
to be conceived in order to facilitate exchanges. The GATS aims at achieving benefits similar 
to those of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).166 
The continuing expansion of international trade requires the concurrent promotion of certain 
broad principles of international economic law which, if applied on a worldwide basis, would 
create the conditions of stability and security in which trade flourishes resulting in a sustainable 
growth in world welfare.167 
Taxation is an important element of international economic principles. It is viewed by TNCs as 
a cost and its relative control through optimum transfer pricing strategies enhances their 
returns. Since TNCs consider taxation as a cost of engaging in trade, it must necessarily affect 
to a certain degree the qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of international trade. 
Moreover, the higher the trade volume of one country, the higher is that country’s expected 
revenue. Therefore, to maximise international trade is a direct way of maximising revenue, 
provided correct taxation methods are in place. 
A certain evolution towards the economic, rather than a narrow legal view, is now permeating 
the development of international tax law. TNCs require a standardisation of broad economic 
principles in order to operate efficiently. They also require comparable tax administration 
systems if not an international tax organisation that would guarantee equality of treatment to 
allow truly global competition. There is, however, a fundamental cleavage between the 
principles of international taxation and the world of international economics. The first is 
premised on bilateralism whereas the second operates more on a multilateral basis. Will these 
international trade law principles keep their multilateral character upon incorporation in the 
present international taxation model? Bilateralism will need to give way to multilateralism even 
                                                             
165 OECD, Open Markets Matter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalisation, (Paris: OECD, 1998) 
C/MIN(98)15. 
166 M.G. Eckert, ‘The GATS: A ‘Glimmer of Hope’ for a Multilateral Liberalization of Financial Services 
Markets’, (Spring 1997) Accounting and Tax Database Dialog File 485 Document 00603194. Moreover, 
pursuant to the provisions of Article XIX of the GATS, WTO Members have committed themselves to resume 
negotiations no later than 5 years from the date of entry of the GATS agreement. Therefore, GATS 2000 
negotiations are now about to be launched. 
167 On the theory of welfare and free trade see J. Bhagwati, ‘Challenges to the Doctrine of Free Trade’, (1993) 25 
NYU J. Int’l L. & Pol. 219. 
Chapter 3  The Reform of the Present System of Internat ional Taxat ion 
 126
in the field of international business taxation. International trade and international business 
taxation have a symbiotic character in so far as each one depends on the other. What is crucial 
is that wealth created by international trade be taxed in a rational way. In an increasingly 
globalised world such a rational taxation system could be achieved if there were to be a 
gradual surrender of national tax jurisdiction to an international tax organisation. This is not 
only desirable but is, arguably, inevitable as it would no doubt facilitate further growth in the 
world economy. 
Section III The Reshaping of Inte rnational Taxation 
The study of the principles that are reshaping the international taxation scene may be restricted 
to examining the measures that are being imported into the area. It may also focus on a bigger 
picture, that is, it may look beyond the relatively uncontroversial aspect of change and examine 
new ways of dealing with the whole problem. In any event, the impact on trade liberalisation 
measures is likely to continue influencing tax policy.168  
1 The Importation of the Non-discrimination Principle in the 
Taxation Area 
One of the most important concepts of international economic law is the non-discrimination 
principle. In the taxation field non-discrimination is achieved when the most favoured nation 
(MFN) provision and the national treatment concepts are incorporated in DTAs. 
A The Non-discrimination Principle  
The origins and the differences between the principle of non-discrimination and its adjunct, the 
‘most favoured nation’, as well as the principle of national treatment have already been 
examined. What remains to be achieved is the enhancement of these principles so that they 
become an integral part of the international taxation environment. 
The concept of non-discrimination permeates several spheres of human activity ranging from 
the social to the economic, including human rights. It was developed in order to facilitate the 
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operation of market economies.169 Today, it is mainly concerned with the creation of 
conditions conducive to the expansion of business activities as carried out by corporations. 
The principle of non-discrimination is closely related to the concept of economic efficiency 
whereby welfare is increased if markets are allowed to operate across borders without undue 
constraints and without discrimination based on nationality or place of operation.170 In general, 
therefore, the principle of non-discrimination is construed as requiring a degree of fairness and 
reasonableness such as to satisfy the common public interest standard. In other words, the 
principle will not be regarded as prohibiting all distinctions within the field in question, but only 
those that cannot be justified by reference to such standards.171 
Most modern DTAs contain the standard non-discrimination provision which provides that 
each treaty country agrees not to discriminate against nationals of the other country resident in 
its territory by taxing them more severely than its own nationals. Arguably, the attractiveness of 
tax treaties would be significantly enhanced if the non-discrimination principle were to be 
refined and made to apply in a uniform fashion in all bilateral tax treaties. In a multilateral 
setting as proposed in this thesis, the non-discrimination principle must, for equity purposes, be 
accorded special attention.  
B Non-discrimination in Tax Treaties 
Article 24 is the current non-discrimination article in the OECD Model.172 Article 24(1) 
focuses on the term ‘national’, which refers to individuals as well as all legal persons including 
partnerships and associations. The Commentary on Article 24 mentions the ‘nationals’ rather 
than the ‘residents’ of treaty partners as provided for in the League of Nations and the Mexico 
and London Drafts.173 A nationality non-discrimination provision first appeared in the OEEC 
Model Tax Treaty of 1958.174 As for the operation of the non-discrimination principle, Article 
24 of the OECD Model proscribes tax discrimination based on nationality rather than on 
residence. One explanation for this is that the Model proceeds on the basis of different 
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treatment of residents and non-residents. A general provision prohibiting discrimination against 
residents of a treaty partner would have been too wide.175 Further, in three specific cases, the 
permanent establishment of non-resident enterprises (Article 24(4)), deductible payments to 
non-residents by resident enterprises (Article 24(5)), and foreign-owned resident enterprises 
(Article 24(6)), it is required that the tax treatment of non-residents be equivalent to that of 
residents. 
Quite apart from these innovative trends within the traditional framework of international 
taxation, unitary taxation has for some years been regarded as a plausible alternative to the 
current system of international taxation. 
2 The Unitary Tax Question 
The difficulties inherent in applying the arm’s length principle to TNCs operating in global 
markets have, in the 1980s, prompted the examination of the so-called worldwide unitary tax 
method (WUT) as an alternative to the arm’s length principle. Most governments and TNCs 
have not welcomed the prospect of WUT with its formulary apportionment methodology as a 
possible solution to the problem of allocating the tax base of TNCs. The latter have 
peremptorily decreed that WUT, or more specifically the formula therein used to allocate to 
various jurisdictions the profits of a TNC, is intrinsically arbitrary and unworkable. 
A The Growing Debate On Unitary Taxation  
Interest in unitary taxation as a credible alternative to the separate accounting method is gaining 
momentum. Recently, the President of the U.K. Institute of Taxation said: 
[T]here is no guiding principle that tells us how to divide the profits earned by increasingly 
integrated companies in a world economy. The use of formula apportionment within the U.S. 
demonstrates this point. The adoption of advance pricing agreements is merely a variation on the 
formula apportionment theme which takes the arm’s length principle as its starting point. 176 
Various organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, as well as individuals, 
politicians, and academics, have called for the application of worldwide unitary combination on 
the basis of its superiority when compared to the arm’s length standard.  
The Ruding Committee examined the suggestion that a scaled-down version of WUT applied 
along the water’s-edge principle177 should be used in the EU if the arm’s length principle failed 
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to fulfil its objective. Its conclusion on the question is deceptively simple. In the Committee’s 
view, ‘there is no case for introducing a system of formula allocation within the community in 
the foreseeable future.’178 The Committee believed that an arm’s length price is unavailable 
only in rare cases. Similarly it held the view, contrary to the finding of several studies that, in 
general, a comparable price can be arrived at by traditional methods. Moreover, the 
Committee admitted that in the case of intangibles and global trading arrangements, a 
formulary apportionment method could be justified.179  
B Specific Actions to Promote Unitary Taxation  
The possible adoption of a certain form of unitary taxation to replace the arm’s length standard 
at the U.S. federal level was contemplated by the American Congress as far back as 1962 
when legislation to adopt a formula for income apportionment was introduced. However, 
during the Congressional debates leading to the Revenue Act of 1962, the formulary 
alternative was rejected.180 In 1971 Congress enacted a limited formulary apportionment 
method in the form of profit splits for the so-called Domestic International Sales Corporations 
(DISCs) and their successors, the Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs), and ‘section 936’ 
corporations.181 
In the 1980s California’s use of the so-called worldwide unitary combination reopened the 
debate on formula apportionment. In spite of the controversy of the Californian practice, in 
1995 the General Accounting Office issued a report exploring the use of a formulary system at 
the federal level.182 A staunch advocate of the use of formulary apportionment at the federal 
level is Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND). Senator Dorgan’s position is at odds with that of the 
U.S. Treasury whom the senator criticised for its interpretation of Article 9 of the U.S. DTAs 
in the following words: 
[T]reasury Department officials interpret one article in each of these treaties as preventing the 
United States from scrapping its outdated arm’s length enforcement approach on corporate income 
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tax and replace it with the simple and time-proven formula method, which is now the norm between 
the states. In my judgment, this interpretation by the Treasury Department is wrong-headed and is 
ill advised. 183 
Senator Dorgan, a former North Dakota tax commissioner, believes that foreign multinationals 
based in the U.S. are not paying their fair share of taxes as evidenced by the General 
Accounting Office study that he instigated. His position in the Senate is such that in 1995 he 
managed to slow the process of ratification of six double tax treaties.184 He even advocated a 
cut in U.S. funding for the OECD ‘in retribution for the Treasury Department’s refusal to 
release OECD work papers related to its adoption of the arm’s length standard for transfer 
pricing and its rejection of formulary apportionment.’185 As a result of these activities the 
Treasury Department announced on 18 October 1995 that it was launching a study destined 
to identify the issues that would arise if the U.S. used formulary apportionment in lieu of the 
arm’s length standard.186 The U.S. Treasury was, however, quick to reaffirm that its decision 
to conduct the study should not be interpreted as indicating any weakening of [the agency’s] 
support for the arm’s length principle.’187 
Currently, in spite of the reaffirmation of the primacy of the arm’s length principle by the 
OECD in its 1995 report on transfer pricing, it is arguable that there is a slow movement 
towards the adoption of some sort of formulary apportionment methodology which would, for 
an interim period, be compliant with the arm’s length principle. Transfer pricing is a vitally 
important tax issue for TNCs throughout the world.188 These enterprises are in general 
dissatisfied with the methods now in place to resolve transfer pricing disputes.189 The APA 
alternative may provide momentary satisfaction to both TNCs and revenue authorities. 
However, it is suggested that a new international tax order more suited to the conditions 
prevailing in an integrated world must be found in order to encourage broader investment and 
a more equitable sharing of the tax pie. In fact, as Senator Dorgan claims, the APA is only a 
secret method of applying formulary apportionment on a business-by-business basis.190 
Therefore, it is proper to examine the whole question of formulary apportionment and propose 
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a model for the application of an acceptable version of the method on a worldwide basis. This 
is the purpose of the second part of this thesis. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
PART II 
A NEW INTERNATIONAL TAX ORDER 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Formulary apportionment is a method by which an income base ‘is apportioned between 
various jurisdictions by means of an allocation formula consisting of various factors which are 
thought to be relevant in the production of (such) income.’1 It may be applied to both a single 
entity or to a multiple entity viewed on a consolidated basis. 
Unitary taxation, Worldwide Combined Reporting (WWCR), or formulary taxation of the 
unitary enterprise (FTUE)2 are ‘based on different economic premises, [have] different 
economic effects and [present] different technical issues, although the problems of applying the 
arm’s length method to a given unitary enterprise are not among them.’3 In essence, unitary 
taxation refers to the process of combining the operatio nal results of a group of corporations 
engaged in a unitary business prior to allocating a fair share of this combined result to the 
various components of the business.4 The unitary method involves, therefore, the calculation of 
an enterprise’s total income base (the total income of the entire business minus deductions), 
and apportioning to the various constituents part of the enterprise the remaining net income by 
way of a formula.5 
Unitary taxation may be regarded as the alternative to the separate accounting method. 
Whereas the separate accounting method is based on the assumption that each member of a 
group acts independently, the unitary method considers a group of enterprises as a single 
business which, for purely formal reasons, is divided into separately incorporated subsidiaries.6 
Consequently, for taxation purposes, the operational performance of each of the members of 
the group cannot be viewed in isolation. This theoretical construction fits well with the way 
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TNCs operate. In general, within TNCs, operational control is exercised from the centre, that 
is, the head office or parent, towards the periphery, which comprises the members of the 
group. The whole dynamic of control is, undoubtedly, to ensure that the aggregate result of the 
group is optimised.  
One of the main objectives of a TNC is to achieve maximum efficiency in the conduct of its 
global operations. To measure its overall performance, a TNC must be capable of measuring 
the performance of each and every member of the group against the group’s overall plan. In 
order to determine the contribution of each of its constituents parts, a TNC has two 
alternatives:7 
· First, it may require that the worldwide consolidated profits be distributed in such a 
way that each of group’s operating units’ performance is capable of being assessed 
independently. 
· Second, it may directly apportion to each subsidiary or branch the consolidated result 
of the group according to an index that would reflect the real economic contribution of 
each to that aggregate result.  
In simple terms, the unitary system replicates this second approach for taxation purposes. It 
assumes that operative interdependence is axiomatic to the very existence of any TNC. 
Unitary taxation starts with the determination of the overall result of a unitary business. The 
individual contribution of each component of the business to that overall result is then resolved 
by means of an allocation formula which attributes to specific firms in the group its share of that 
overall result. The formula used is designed to reflect the economic weight of each firm in the 
unitary business operation as well as the economic conditions in which they operate. 
The hypothesis in this thesis is that global formulary apportionment is a plausible alternative to 
the separate accounting/arm’s length method. In fact, it is argued that the present international 
tax system of the dominant economic power, which is the U.S., already contains significant 
formulary components.8 For instance, a U.S. corporation must use a formulary method to 
apportion interest expenses between its U.S. source income and its foreign source income in 
order to determine the level of its allowable foreign tax credits.9 Moreover, pursuant to Notice 
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8 McDaniel, supra  note 2, at 703. The Australian system also contains a significant number of apportionment 
formulas, as with the so-called interest paid adjustments noted earlier.  
9 IRC 864(e); Temp. Reg 1.861-9T to 13T. 
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94-40,10 the U.S. tax authorities have routinely used a formulary apportionment methodology 
to determine the income of enterprises engaged in the global trading of financial instruments. In 
addition, other countries, for example, Canada and Switzerland, also have domestic systems 
based on the formulary apportionment method. These are working perfectly well and, 
arguably, they may be regarded as having the potential to replace those countries’ international 
system.  
In essence, what this thesis demonstrates is that, in evolutionary terms, formulary 
apportionment is likely to supplant the arm’s length standard. It therefore proposes a certain 
refinement of the system in order for it to be suitably applied on a worldwide basis. In 
addition, it argues for a multilateral adoption of the formulary method rather than wait for the 
system to be applied by stealth by major economies. 
 
                                                             
10 1994-1 C.B. 351. 
 A Historical Account of the Alternative 
Method 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the historical origins of the formulary apportionment 
methodology. Its diverse European variants are considered in Section I and its characteristics 
as applied in the North American context are reviewed in Section II. Finally, Section III 
analyses its theoretical rationale in order to determine its strengths and weaknesses as an 
alternative method for the taxation of transnational corporations (TNCs). 
Section  I  The Alternative Method In Europe 
The formulary apportionment methodology, or fractional apportionment to use Mitchell 
Carroll’s terminology, evolved in Central Europe as a means of allocating the taxable income 
of a group of companies operating in several jurisdictions. In the 1920s the system was 
adopted by the Swiss Confederation and by Spain. 1 
1 The Central European Experience  
A The Historical Context  
Fractional apportionment first came to be used to apportion the income of enterprises whose 
activities straddled two or more sovereign states born out of the disintegration of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.2 According to Mitchell Carroll, fractional apportionment refers to ‘the 
determination of the income of one establishment of an enterprise by dividing total net income 
in the ratio of certain factors–for example, assets, turnover, pay-roll, or a fixed percentage.’3 
In other words, fractional apportionment is a method of determining an entity’s local taxable 
net income as a percentage of its entire net income. 
Fractional apportionment emerged in countries where businesses were required to pay a 
patente tax, that is, a type of franchise tax for the privilege of doing business in that particular 
jurisdiction. Significantly, instead of relying on traditional accounting principles, the patente tax 
was calculated on an empirical or forfaitaire basis, that is, by reference to outward indicia, 
                                                             
1 M.B. Carroll, Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises, Volume IV - Methods of Allocating Taxable Income 
League of Nations Document No. C. 425. (b) M. 217. (b) 1933. II. A. (30 September 1933), at 70 (Carroll 
Report). 
2 Id., at 67-70. 
3 Id., at 46. 
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which were regarded as adequate for the evaluation of business income.4 This tradition of 
calculating the tax potential of a business probably predisposed the tax administrations in those 
countries to adopt fractional apportionment as an alternative to separate accounting. 
Mitchell Carroll’s Report to the League of Nations states that fractional apportionment was 
used mainly although not exclusively, in two circumstances: It became prominent as a method 
for the proper allocation of an enterprise’s profits across national frontiers, as with the 
successors of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or across cantonal borders as in Switzerland; and 
secondly, it was adopted by Spain as a convenient anti-avoidance method.5 
B Fractional Apportionment By International Agreement 
The earliest systematic use of fractional apportionment as a method for the apportionment of 
business income occurred between Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. 6 Austria had in fact 
two regimes for the apportionment of income. The first regime based on domestic law 
provided that ‘a certain fraction of the profits derived from the joint activities of establishments 
within and without Austria be taxable in Austria.’7 The second regime arose from treaties 
Austria had signed with Czechoslovakia and Hungary.  
The breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I meant that Austria, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary emerged as sovereign states. Notwithstanding this new political 
environment, a certain number of enterprises found the various components that comprised 
their operations were now scattered in three taxing jurisdictions. Therefore, each entity forming 
part of such highly integrated enterprises was nevertheless required to source a portion of the 
enterprise’s total income in the different jurisdictions where they were operating. The 
complications which arose from this situation were such that the three countries resorted to the 
mechanism of tax treaties to share the available revenue. Fractional apportionment was found 
to be the most practical solution to the allocation problem. The treaties provided that the 
profits of the targeted enterprise, mostly manufacturing and selling concerns as well as banking 
and insurance corporations, were to be first determined by each administration in accordance 
with its own fiscal regulations. Then, these profits were to be aggregated and apportioned to 
each of the establishments in each country according to specified ratios.8 
                                                             
4 Id., at 46-47. 
5 Id., at 61. 
6 Id., at 67-70. 
7 Id., at 73. 
8 Id., at 75. 
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2 The Western European Practice 
A Fractional Apportionment through Judicial Adjudication  
Switzerland offers an example of fractional apportionment achieved through decisional law. In 
the 1920s the Swiss Federation consisted of 25 sovereign cantons and ‘demi-cantons’ bound 
under a federal constitution.9 Although Article 46(II) of the Constitution prohibited double 
taxation between the cantons, it did not prescribe any rule as to how this prohibition was to be 
achieved. 10 It merely provided that in case of perceived double taxation taxpayers would have 
the right to refer the matter to the Swiss Supreme Court competent for resolving problems of 
intercantonal taxation.11 The tax laws of the cantons contained little guidance on the 
apportionment of income derived by multicantonal or multinational enterprises. Certain general 
principles were clearly advocated, for example, the principle that foreign enterprises were to 
be taxed on the profits attributable to their establishments within the canton. In this 
environment, a formula apportionment methodology slowly evolved with the decisions of the 
Swiss Supreme Court for the prevention of double taxation and the settlement of inevitable 
disputes achieving prominence. Consequently,  as far as the taxation of multi-cantonal or 
multinational enterprises was concerned, a uniform practice came to be applied by the various 
cantons. 
The Swiss Supreme Court was not too concerned with the profits or loss incurred by a 
particular unit of an enterprise. Instead, it adopted a global approach and directed that the 
total profits of an enterprise be apportioned between those cantons with a legitimate claim to 
tax such profits. The principle that evolved was that a canton was allowed to tax that part of 
an enterprise income that ‘corresponds to the proportion between the productive factors in the 
canton and all the productive factors of the enterprise.’12 In this model, apportionment is 
effected on the basis of such criteria as the ratio of the manufacturing costs, the turnover, or 
other elements that are suitable in each particular case. Thus, for industrial enterprises, the 
suitable factors were considered to be assets and labour. For the purpose of the Swiss 
system, assets comprised, inter alia, land and buildings, machinery, tools, furniture, trading 
stocks, cash, bills of exchange, and accounts receivable. Labour was represented by salaries 
and wages capitalised at the rate of 10 per cent and attributed to the establishment which paid 
                                                             
9  S. Langbein, ‘The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length’, (1986) 30 Tax Notes 625, at 630. 
10 I. Houriet, ‘Law of Taxation’, in F. Dessemontet & T. Ansay, eds, Introduction to Swiss Law  (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1995) 189, at 201. 
11 X. Oberson & H.R. Hull, Switzerland in International Tax Law, (IBFD Publications, 1996), at 85 n 2. 
12 Carroll Report, supra note 1, at 68. 
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them. Factors that could be allocated without controversy were readily attributed with residual 
profits apportioned proportionately on the basis of an economic rather than juridical rationale. 
In other words, the Swiss system was based on practical economic realities. It did not seek to 
satisfy legal theories based on assumed behaviour or theoretical models. In the apportionment 
formula, the numerator consisted of the sum of productive factors attributed to a particular 
canton while the denominator represented the sum of all productive factors of the enterprise. 
This operation yielded a fraction of the income of the enterprise which the canton could tax.  
In general, the Swiss system, as documented by Carroll, applied in a widely diverse context. 
There were at that time, and indeed there still is, wide differences between the 26 Swiss 
cantons consisting of about 3000 communes each with a certain degree of fiscal sovereignty as 
delegated by the canton to which it is attached.13. They share four major languages, two 
different religions, as well as other substantial differences in economic development or cultural 
vision. Yet, in spite of this diversity, fractional apportionment as a method of apportioning the 
income of firms operating in Switzerland is not questioned. Basically, under the control of the 
Swiss Supreme Court, the present system operates along the following lines:14 
· A firm operating in a number of cantons is required to file a tax form in each canton of 
activity. It must report its total worldwide income. Thus, because of a difference in 
cantonal tax rules, a firm’s taxable income may not be identical in all the cantons 
concerned. 
· The tax rate in each canton is determined with regard to the worldwide income of the 
firm. Pursuant to this principle, and in order to satisfy those cantons which apply 
progressive tax rates to corporate income, two firms showing the same total profit pay 
the same tax whether they operate in one canton alone or in several others or even in 
different countries. 
· Each canton is allowed to tax a share of the firm’s total taxable income as defined by 
the canton’s law. 
· The calculation of the shares is made on the principle that the firm is taxed in the 
canton where it maintains its seat, while its ‘permanent establishments’ are taxed in the 
canton where they are located.  
                                                             
13 For an overview of the fragmentation of the Swiss fiscal system, see R. Duss & R. Bird, ‘Switzerland’s “Tax 
Jungle”’, (January-February 1979) 27  Canadian Tax Journal 46. 
14 P. Thalmann, ‘Tax Coordination and Competition in Switzerland, European Communities -Commission’, in 
Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation (Luxembourg: European Communities -
Commission, 1992) 397, at 402. (Ruding Report). 
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The criteria for apportioning the income of other firms depend on the nature of the activities of 
these firms. For commercial enterprises, the criterion for apportionment is turnover; for 
insurance companies it is premiums earned and capitalised assets; and payroll for industrial 
enterprises. In order to compensate for cases where the selected criterion gives too little 
weight to the activities of the headquarters, an initial share of profits of 10 to 20 per cent may 
be attributed to the canton of situs. This measure which Carroll identified as a préciput or 
praecipuum was already in place in the 1920s.15 A notable exception, however, required 
banks to use the separate accounting method. This rule arises because, pursuant to federal 
legislation, banks are required to keep separate accounts for their branches.16 
The Swiss system, with different formulas, thus refutes the argument that formulary 
apportionment consists simply of ‘a formula that is predetermined for all taxpayers’,17 and 
applied mechanistically across the whole spectrum of taxpayer regardless of their particular 
situation. It still survives to this day as confirmed by Thalmann in a submission to the Ruding 
Committee.18 
B Fractional Apportionment By Legislation 
Until the 1920s Spain taxed the branches of foreign enterprises on the basis of the income 
shown in the branches’ books. However, the levels of profit derived by these branches as 
shown by their accounts were, in the view of the Spanish Government, grossly inadequate. 
Therefore, the Spanish authorities did not attach much importance to branch accounts. They 
argued that if these branch accounts existed, and this was not always the case, they could not 
be relied upon to determine the branch’s profits. They held the view that, for taxation 
purposes, one needed to refer to the profits of the enterprise as a whole in order to determine 
the share of the profits that could realistically be attributed to the branch operating on Spanish 
territory. Basically, Spain considered that reliance on a notional profit as evidenced by the 
accounts of the branch was inherently arbitrary since these carried no real economic 
significance. 
The Spanish authorities, therefore, abandoned assessment on the basis that separate 
accounting facilitated income shifting by TNCs. Spain then embraced fractional apportionment 
                                                             
15 Carroll Report, supra note 1, at 70. 
16 Oberson & Hull, supra note 11, at 88. 
17 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators (Paris: OECD, 1995) 
(OECD 1995 Guidelines), at III-20 para. 3.60. 
18 Thalmann, supra  note 14. See also Oberson & Hull, supra note 11, at 83ff for an example illustrating the Swiss 
system for the allocation of taxable profits.  
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in order to determine the income derived by foreign branches operating within its borders. To 
Mitchell Carroll, inquiring about the rationale for their practices, the Spanish authorities argued 
that fractional apportionment was the only method that was fair and practical because it 
guaranteed that no enterprise was taxed at more than 100 per cent of its profits. 
The Spanish authorities employed the following steps for apportioning business income of 
foreign enterprises. First, the real profit of the enterprise on a worldwide basis was 
ascertained. That figure was then apportioned according to principles which reflected the 
economic significance of the branch relative to the whole enterprise. 
The Spanish system also dealt with foreign subsidiaries operating in Spain. The rule was that 
the tax administration could override the juridical independence of subsidiaries and declare that 
the subsidiary was in fact ‘only a branch of another company or enterprise’.19 Indeed the 
conditions imposed for casting aside the juridical concept of the independence of group 
companies is an expression of the unitary concept which was contemporaneously being 
articulated by the American courts.20 
The Spanish system did not contain any concrete rule for the apportionment of the profits of an 
enterprise. A committee of experts called the jurado de utilidades carried out this exercise. 
This jury was required to determine the quantum of profits to be attributed to Spain on the 
basis of the importance of the Spanish operations relative to the enterprise as a whole. The 
composition of the jury also reflected the desire of the Spanish legislators to abide by the rules 
of equity. Apart from high-ranking fiscal officials, it also included two representatives of 
banking institutions, as well as ‘an expert of recognised authority’. 
The methods used by the jury were far from being arbitrary. The jury agreed on a formula 
which was then put to the taxpayer who had the right to refuse to abide by it. If the taxpayer 
rejected the formula, discussions would follow and eventually modifications to the formula 
would be made. If no agreement was reached, the matter was put to independent experts for 
an opinion. Care was taken in order to safeguard sensitive information concerning the 
enterprise in question. If there appeared to be difficulties in the valuation of the contribution of 
the company’s business operations, the jury resorted to ‘mathematical statistics’ or, in 
contemporary language, a sampling method was used. 
In general, therefore, both the Swiss and the Spanish methods of fractional apportionment 
were a reasoned attempt to reach a method of apportionment that would satisfy all the 
                                                             
19 Carroll Report, supra note 1, at 62. 
20 Supra note 1, at 70. 
Chapter 4  A Histor ical Account of the Alternat ive Method  
 142
interested parties. These methods proceeded on a cooperative basis and had inbuilt flexibility 
which, at least in the Swiss case, has stood the test of time. 
Section II   The North American Experience 
The process of sharing fiscal jurisdiction within the two major federal states of North America, 
the U.S.A. and Canada, reflects to a large extent the problems associated with what Professor 
Richard Musgrave has described as ‘the vagaries of geography and the historical forces of 
nation making, wars, territorial rivalry, colonialism, and regional disputes’.21  
Canada’s achievements in this area, based on a formulary apportionment methodology, are 
remarkable. The Canadian system ‘manifests one of the highest degrees of horizontal tax 
harmonization’ among any federal state.22 In the U.S.A., formulary apportionment evolved as 
a practical solution to the need for a workable and inexpensive method of apportioning the 
income of a multistate enterprise.23 
This section examines the Canadian and U.S. systems. Canada’s task seems to have been less 
daunting. It involved coordinating the tax systems of only 10 provinces, an outcome achieved 
earlier than in the U.S. The fact that the Canadian system may be considered as a fully 
harmonised system with only minor operational problems justifies its examination ahead of that 
prevailing in the U.S. Indeed, the American states’ taxation system is still in evolution. It 
involves 50 states with all the attendant difficulty of reconciling the political and economic 
interests of such a large number of fiscally sovereign entities. Consequently, it may be regarded 
as open-ended and capable of generating further complications as states jostled for an 
increase share in tax revenue. 
1 Source-Based Corporate Taxation in Canada 
The distribution of fiscal powers between the federal and the provincial governments is 
enshrined in the Canadian Constitution.24 Pursuant to section 92(2) of the British North 
                                                             
21 R.A. Musgrave, ‘Who should Tax, Where, and What?’ in C.E. McLure, Jr., ed., Tax Assignment in Federal 
Countries, (Canberra: ANU Press, 1983), at 2. 
22 M. Daly, ‘Tax Coordination and Competition in Canada: Some Lessons for the European Community’, in  the 
Ruding Report, supra note 14, at 383. 
23 J. Hellerstein, ‘The Unitary Business Principle and Multicorporate Enterprises: An Examinatio n of the Major 
Controversies’, (July 1975) 27 Tax Executive 314. 
24 See G.V. La Forest, Canadian Tax Paper No. 65, The Allocation of Taxing Power Under the Canadian 
Constitution, 2nd ed. (Canadian Tax Foundation, 1981), at 8. 
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America Act 1867 (now the Canada Act), Canadian provinces may levy and collect direct 
taxes to fund their activities. Federal government, for its part, finds in section 91(3) of the Act 
the power to engage in ‘the raising of money by any mode or system of taxation.’25 Thus, 
Federal Government is granted the right to levy both direct and indirect taxes as well as the 
power to regulate interprovincial trade and commerce. In Canada, therefore, there is 
devolution of direct taxing power between two layers of government. The whole history of the 
Canadian federal/provincial tax relation is based on the search for a suitable arrangement to 
accommodate these two sovereign-taxing powers. 
A The Evolution of the System 
Both the provinces and Federal Government over a period starting from 1894 to 1941 
introduced corporation income tax and personal income tax. 26 In the absence of any 
coordinating mechanism between the federal and provincial practices, the system became 
‘complex beyond belief’ and produced a ‘competitive scramble for revenue’ more especially 
in the depression period of the 1930s. To find a suitable solution to the problem a Royal 
Commission on Dominion–Provincial Relations (the Rowell-Sirois Commission) was formed. 
In its report presented in 1940,27 the Commission described the Canadian system as 
‘inequitable, inefficient, uncoordinated, incredibly complex and, in a word chaotic.’28 The 
Commission recommended that, in return for compensatory grants from the Federal 
Government, provincial governments were to surrender to the federal government their 
jurisdiction to tax personal and corporate income. The latter would then be required to impose 
uniform bases and tax structures throughout Canada. 
The provinces rejected the recommendations of the Royal Commission. Nevertheless, many of 
its propositions were eventually implemented, albeit in an indirect way. Indeed, as a 
consequence of the Second World War, and in order to facilitate the financing of the war 
effort, the provincial governments surrendered their right to levy corporate and personal 
income tax in return for federal grants described as tax rentals calculated pursuant to certain 
formulas. After the war, seven provinces remained committed to the arrangement, which 
                                                             
25 W.R. Thirsk, ‘Tax Assignment and Revenue Sharing in Canada’, in C.E. McLure, Jr., ed., Tax Assignment in 
Federal Countries , (Canberra: ANU Press, 1983), at 236. 
26 Daly, supra note 22 in the Ruding Report, supra note 14, at 384. Two provinces chose not to introduce 
personal income tax.  
27 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, (Rowell-Sirois Commission) 
(Ottawa: Kings’s Printer, 1940) Book I 36-46 in GV La Forest, supra note 24. 
28 E.H. Smith, ‘Allocating to Provinces the Taxable Income of Corporations: How the Federal-Provincial 
Allocation Rules Evolved’, (1976) 24 Canadian Tax. J. 545, at 547 
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provided for a compulsory five per cent provincial corporation income tax together with rules 
for allocating taxable income to provinces. A residual role was provided for a two-factor 
apportionment formula (sales and wages) if the separate accounting method could not be 
readily applied, or if the taxpayer agreed. In 1952, a reversal of roles occurred with formula 
apportionment being granted the first rank in the apportionment methodology and separate 
accounting being relegated to a residual role. In 1962, the residual right to allocate profits on 
the basis of a company’s separate accounts was withdrawn, given that only a few companies 
used it as it proved to be difficult to administer.29 
The tax rental system was abandoned in 1962 in favour of a new approach in tax sharing 
called tax abatement together with a series of tax collection agreements. Under this system, the 
Federal Government returned to the province of origin ten per cent of federal personal income 
collections, nine per cent of corporate income tax yield and half of the federal estate tax 
collections.30 The tax collection agreements created an obligation for the federal government to 
collect income taxes for any province or territory provided the income tax legislation of the 
province met certain conditions regarding the definition of the tax base, the allocation rules, 
and, in the case of the personal income tax, the rate structure.31 Furthermore, originally 
provincial income tax legislation had to strictly adhere to federal directions. However, since 
1972 the provinces have had more leeway in altering their tax system provided they adhere to 
the federal definition of the tax base. Thus, the provinces have been able to pursue their own 
social and economic objectives at their level of government, while evolving within an overall 
tax system that is both highly decentralised and harmonised. 
B An Analysis of the Canadian System 
All Canadian provinces and territories levy tax on corporate income. To compensate 
corporations for provincial taxes paid, a provincial tax credit is provided. Pursuant to section 
124(1) of the Canadian Tax Code, corporations are allowed to deduct from their federal 
taxable income an amount equal to ten per cent of the corporation’s ‘taxable income earned in 
the year in a province’. This deduction is available to corporations independently of any taxes 
actually payable by it to the province.32 
Regulations under Part IV of Canada’s Income Tax Act: Regulations and Rulings define the 
corporation’s ‘taxable income earned in the year in a province’ and prescribe methods for 
                                                             
29 Id., at 560. 
30 Thirsk, supra  note 25, at 238. 
31 Daly, supra note 22 in the Ruding Report, supra note 14, at 385. 
32 CCH Canadian Limited,  Canadian Master Tax Guide, 53rd ed., (New York, 1998), at ¶ 8630. 
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determining the quantum of taxable income that is earned in a province.33 Corporations are 
therein classified as being in the category of ordinary companies or in the category of special 
companies, such as insurance corporations, chartered banks, or grain elevator operators. For 
ordinary corporations, Regulation 402 provides that a corporation’s taxable income earned in 
a particular province is the taxable income attributable to a permanent establishment (PE) in 
the province. 
The primary nexus for the attribution of taxable profits is thus the PE. Regulation 400(2) 
defines the PE concept. Interpretation Bulletin IT-177R2 34 shows that Regulation 400 enlarges 
the standard definition of a PE as contemplated, for example, by Article 5 of the OECD 
Model. First, the requirement for a fixed place of business is not critical to the existence of a 
PE. Regulation 400(2)(a) allows for the substitution of the principal place in which the 
corporation’s business is conducted in lieu of the habitual fixed place of business criterion. In 
addition, timberlands are considered as PEs as is the use by a corporation of substantial 
machinery or equipment in a particular place at any time in a taxation year. 
Often a corporation will have several PEs both within and outside of the province, or even 
outside Canada. In that case, pursuant to Regulation 403(3), taxable income is apportioned 
between the provinces and between Canada and the foreign country by a two-factor formula 
based on gross revenue and salaries and wages. 
Leaving aside the mathematical operation for the determination of the gross revenue that is 
reasonably attributable to each of a corporation’s PEs, it is convenient to consider the policy 
decisions at the base of these regulations. The Canadian system is based on the premise that 
each participating province should be treated fairly. In this context what is often looked for is 
‘not the exactitude by which income is allocated but the achievement of an equitable result.’35 
If a corporation has several PEs in different provinces the gross revenue that is reasonably 
attributable to each of the PEs must be computed. Gross revenue may be attributed to the 
place of production (the origin rule), or to the place where the good is consumed, that is, the 
place where the sale was negotiated which, normally, would be the province of residence of 
the buyer (the destination rule). Regulation 402(4) adopts the following rule: If the destination 
of a shipment is in a particular province, the gross revenue derived from the sale of the 
shipment is attributable to the PE of the supplier in that province. However, if the supplier 
                                                             
33 CCH Canadian Limited, Canada Income Tax Guide-Income Tax Act Regulations and Rulings, Vol. 4, at 
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34 Id., Vol. 2, at 9-95. 
35 G.G. Richardson, Report of the Eleventh Annual Tax Conference , (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1957), at 
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making a shipment to a province does not have a PE in that province, then the gross revenue 
from the sale of the goods is to be allocated to the PE to which the person negotiating the sale 
might reasonably be regarded as being attached. Moreover, if the destination of a shipment is 
another country in which the supplier does not have a PE, then the gross revenue derived from 
the sale of the shipment is attributable to the province of manufacture. In other words, for 
export purposes the rule reverts back to the principle of origin. The effect of these measures is 
to divide a TNC’s income into foreign-source income and Canadian-source income. The latter 
is then again divided into smaller portions of provincial income. Since only the Canadian-
source income is subject to provincial tax, and since provinces use the same allocation 
formula, double taxation of foreign-source income at provincial level is eliminated. 
Apart from delineating precise attribution rules, the Canadian system establishes a full 
harmonisation of the tax base. As mentioned, the federal government agreed to collect 
corporate (and personal) income taxes on behalf of the provinces or territories party to a tax 
collection agreement on the condition that their tax base and the allocation rules are in 
conformity with the federal tax base.36 It is true that the convergence sought between the 
federal and provincial tax bases has been achieved and been facilitated by the existence of 
common accounting practices. As a result, double taxation does not arise in Canada. 
The prospect of double taxation not occurring in this system is further assured with the use of a 
two-factor formula to apportion a common tax base among jurisdictions. As a result, each 
participating province taxes a fraction of the nationwide income of the corporation equal to the 
average of the fractions of sales and wages arising in a province compared with the total for 
the country as a whole.37 The choice of the factors, more especially the inclusion of sales 
therein, has been the subject of debate. The rationale for maintaining sales in the 
apportionment factor will be explored in Chapter 7. However, it is important to realise that the 
guiding principle in the choice of factors has been the desire to achieve consistency between 
provinces. Finally, the adoption of a common apportionment formula reduces the opportunities 
for tax arbitrage and therefore goes a long way to satisfying the neutrality principle. 
It is evident that the Canadian system, which requires that provincial tax credit be administered 
centrally, contributes to reduce the costs incurred to administer the system and inhibits tax 
avoidance. In addition, it frees provincial resources. For example, provinces may use their 
corporation tax to pursue whatever social and economic policies they deem fit for their 
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constituents while disputes over allocation of the corporate tax base are determined in federal 
courts. 
Finally, an interesting aspect of the Canadian system is that in order to enable each provincial 
government to supply an average standard of service throughout Canada, grants are 
transferred from the federal government to the provincial governments through a tax 
equalisation system. It would be utopian to consider the duplication of such a system on a 
worldwide basis although one needs to admit that, as applicable in Canada, it goes a long way 
to achieving an equitable allocation of the country’s tax yield among its citizens. 
Many aspects of the Canadian system and, to a lesser extent, the Swiss system have inspired 
the construction of the proposed model in this thesis. This model is based on the creation of an 
international tax organisation to administer a system of global formulary apportionment. 
Basically, therefore, the proposed system would replicate some of characteristics of the 
Canadian system. Thus, the international tax organisation would ensure that the calculation of 
the commercial profits of the TNCs is carried out in a uniform fashion, a function carried out 
by the federal tax authorities in Canada. Furthermore, as in the Canadian system, the power to 
modify the allocation formula is not vested with the participating jurisdictions. Such a measure 
prevents the manipulation of the factors within the formula for short-term gains and is, 
therefore, inherently more equitable. 
2 The American States’ Approach 
An examination of the American states’ approach to the taxation of corporate income is a 
complex exercise. This section attempts to segregate the historical evolution of the states’ 
apportionment method, the so-called unit rule, from its legal tests and constitutional 
justifications. However, since the development of unitary taxation occurred as a result of 
several judicial decisions determining concurrently the constitutionality of the method and 
defining its conditions of application, there is bound to be a certain overlap in the following 
discussion.38 
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A The Domestic Application of the Unit Rule  
i  The Initial Application of the Unit Rule 
In the U.S., when doing business within a state’s jurisdiction, a corporation is subject to either 
an annual franchise tax or a privilege tax. The present system of state corporate franchise 
taxation has its roots in an earlier general property tax. Indeed, it has been said that the current 
method for the taxation of business income is merely ‘the latest arrival in the family of 
corporate tax measures.’39 Allocation fractions have always been used in connection with 
capital stock taxes, receipt taxes, or as a method of valuing movable or unit property.40 
Whether the tax involves property, receipts or income, one of the fundamental questions of 
U.S. state taxation hinges on the problem of apportioning such bases among different states 
which may claim a right to tax.41 The preferred method of achieving this objective is 
apportionment by formula.42 The ‘theory of apportionment by formula is that certain factors or 
elements of a business will fairly reflect the portion of the measure of the tax allocable to a 
State.’43 This requirement ‘prevents a state from fixing its tax talons on extra-territorial 
values.’44 The justification of formulary apportionment arises from ‘the impossibility of precise 
location of the source of income’ arising from certain corporate activities.45  
When an enterprise operates in several states, not through separate entities but, rather, as an 
integral operation with each part relying on the other to derive income, a further complication 
arises in the apportionment of the results of such operations. In fact, it is the proliferation of 
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such integrated enterprises which, in the U.S. states’ environment, finally destroyed any 
confidence among tax officials that the separate accounting/arm’s length method could 
efficiently determine a particular state’s share of an enterprise’s income.46 The problem of 
apportioning the income of integrated businesses is comparable to those which arose with the 
earlier capital stock taxes. Not surprisingly the solution to the problem mirrored that which had 
emerged in the earlier capital stock cases. Thus, the importation of the unitary method in the 
realm of states’ business taxation. The driving force for the adoption of the unit rule was the 
perception that it was the most equitable method, given the circumstances. In Pullman Palace 
Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, which has been called ‘the foundation of the unit rule’,47 the U.S. 
Supreme Court said: 
[T]his was an equitable and just method of assessment, and if it were adopted by all states the 
company would be assessed upon the whole value of its capital stock and no more.48 
It is therefore remarkable that, in a period of less than a century, a method which was qualified 
by the U.S. Supreme Court as ‘equitable and just’ is now being described by the U.S. 
Treasury as arbitrary. The more so when one finds that the premise on which the U.S. 
Supreme Court relied to sanction the method, that is the integrated nature of the enterprise, 
has become within that same period of time the predominant method of operation of modern 
transnational corporations. 
The unitary business principle was articulated in the late nineteenth century as an offshoot of 
the ‘unit rule’ developed for apportioning property values of railroad, telegraph, and express 
companies to state or local taxing jurisdiction.49 The State Railroad Tax cases reproducing the 
early railroad property cases reveal the judicial construction of the unit rule:  
[T]he theory of the system is ma nifestly to treat the railroad track, its rolling stock, its franchise, its 
capital, as a unit for taxation, and to distribute the assessed value of this unit according to the 
length of the road in each county, city, and town bears to the whole length of the road. 50 
In other words, in order to determine the value of a company’s property that was properly 
attributable to the taxing jurisdiction, the value of the whole operating system was first 
ascertained. Then, a portion of that value was attributed to the  taxing state or locality based on 
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a formula representing the ratio of the amount of some identifiable factor within the state or 
locality to the total amount of the factor in the entire system. In Adams Express Co. v. Ohio 
State Auditor the Supreme Court said: 
[A]s to railroad, telegraph, and sleeping-car companies, engaged in interstate commerce, it has 
often been held by this court that their property in several of the states through which their lines or 
business extended, might be valued as a unit for t he purposes of taxation, taking into consideration 
the uses to which it was put and all the elements making up aggregate value, and that a proportion 
of the whole fairly and properly ascertained might be taxed by the particular state, without violating 
any Federal restrictions....The valuation was, thus, not confined to the wires, poles, and the 
instruments of the telegraph company; or the roadbed, ties, rails, and spikes of the railroad 
company; or the cars of the sleeping-car company; but included the proportionate part of the value 
resulting from the combination of the means by which the business was carried on, a value existing 
to an appreciable extent throughout the entire domain of operation. 51 
In a string of cases following Adams Express, the Supreme Court refined the unitary concept 
and proceeded to agree to its application in cases involving taxpayers other than multistate 
businesses.  
Concurrently with the process of articulating the unitary concept, the Court was required to 
determine the attributes of the formula used by the states for the apportionment of the tax base 
as determined by that method. 
One important factor in these earlier cases was that there was a continuous physical unity in 
the systems that businesses subjected to the unit rule were exploiting. In later cases mere 
physical unity was superseded by operational unity which then became one of the indicia of a 
unitary business.  
The use of the unit rule was not confined to the taxation of utility companies. A second phase 
in the application of the unitary concept occurred with the introduction of state capital stock 
taxes. The same problem of apportionment between states occurred, and formulary 
apportionment was again found to be the most appropriate mechanism to determining the 
proportion of the value of a corporation’s capital stock attributable to the states in which the 
taxpayer carried out its business. 
Further developments in the use of the unit rule were achieved with the introduction in 1911 of 
a corporation tax by Wisconsin. At first, the states, which had followed Wisconsin’s example 
and introduced a corporation tax, allowed the corporations to use separate accounting to 
determine the net income attributable to a particular state operation. The only condition for the 
use of the separate accounting method was that relevant accounting entries had to be 
sufficiently detailed to allow the accurate determination of income attributable to the operation. 
However, the difficulty of complying with what was perceived as an impracticable method led 
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to formulary apportionment based on the unitary concept becoming the standard for the 
division of income multistate businesses.52 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Underwood Typewriter Co. v Chamberlain formally sanctioned 
the use of formulary apportionment in a unitary environment.53 The Court concluded that when 
corporate income is largely earned by a series of transactions beginning with manufacture in 
one state and ending with sale in other states, the separate accounting methodology for income 
attribution was inappropriate. Instead, the Court decided that formulary apportionment was a 
realistic method for assigning the taxpayer’s income to each of the various states. Furthermore, 
the Court placed the burden of proof upon the taxpayer to show that a given formula is 
unreasonable. 
In a second major case, Bass Ratcliff & Gretton Ltd v State Tax Commission,54 the U.S. 
Supreme Court again examined the division of income of a taxpayer by formula. In this case, 
the enterprise operating a distribution office in New York had actually sustained a loss in that 
jurisdiction. The facts were as follows: Bass Ale was brewed in England and shipped to New 
York from where it was sold in the U.S. The New York tax administration considered the 
total profits of the company, treated a portion thereof as being realised in New York, and 
imposed tax on that portion. That methodology was approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
spite of the fact that the company had sustained a loss from its activities within the U.S. which 
the Court found to be irrelevant to its decision.55 
The Court’s decision enabling a jurisdiction to levy tax in a case where there is a loss reported 
in that jurisdiction may well appear to be surprising.56 First, Bass Ratcliff seems to question 
the principle whereby a state’s income tax base should be limited to such income that is fairly 
apportioned to the corporation’s activities within the state. The Court, however, found that the 
operations in the taxing state had to be considered as part of the entire unitary multistate 
enterprise. As such, New York was entitled to a portion of the entire income of the unitary 
operation. The second issue raised by Bass Ratcliff relates to the issue of the fairness of an 
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apportionment formula. One of the first theoretical requirements of an apportionment formula 
is that it should not be ‘inherently or intrinsically arbitrary’57 in its effects. In Hans Rees Sons, 
Inc. v. North Carolina58 the Supreme Court attempted, with limited success, to determine 
what constitutes an ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unreasonable’ formula.59 Indeed, the Court did not endorse 
a general description of such labels. Rather, it held that each case had to be decided upon its 
merits. In general, however, pursuant to Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is generally admitted 
that a formula must possess ‘internal consistency’, that is, the formula must be such that, if 
applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business income 
being taxed.60 It also agreed that ‘factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must 
actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.’61 In Bass Ratcliff, therefore, 
the principle that an apportionment formula should be fair was carried to its logical conclusion. 
If a formula apportions income to a local business in a way that is not unreasonable or 
arbitrary, then that local business which forms part of a globally integrated enterprise cannot be 
denied a share of the global profit derived by that enterprise just because its own localised 
results show a loss. 
A further development occurred when the unitary method was used to apportion income of 
groups of companies conducting multistate unitary businesses. It was reasoned that state 
taxation could not be affected by the juridical organisation of a business into subsidiaries rather 
than branches. In International Harvester Co. v. Evatt62 the right of the states to devise 
appropriate apportionment formulas for the apportionment of the income derived by 
enterprises carrying on a unitary business interstate was formally recognised. As a result, many 
formulas were used by different states depending on their fiscal objectives. Apportionment 
formulas varied not only with respect to the basic factors used, but also with respect to the 
definition of each of the factors used in the formula.63 The Supreme Court, from the start, had 
consistently refused to harmonise such diverse practices. In fact, the Court invariably upheld 
any apportionment formula provided the latter did not breach the established judicial tests. 
Obviously, the wide discretion enjoyed by the states in adopting different formulas created a 
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serious risk of double or even multiple taxation. The need for a common policy on these 
matters was urgently felt. 
i i  The Harmonisation Process  
As early as 1916, the National Tax Association (NTA) began work on a uniform model for 
state income tax law.64 In order to promote equality at the state level, uniformity had to be 
reached in at least three major areas:65 
· the definition of an acceptable jural connection between the taxing jurisdiction and the 
tax subject - the nexus question; 
· a uniform definition of the tax base and uniform administrative practices; and 
· the adoption of a proper method for dividing the tax base between those states entitled 
to tax. 
Achieving a comprehensive tax system acceptable to all U.S. states level has proved to be an 
elusive goal because of political rather than technical imperatives. However, in July 1957, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the final draft of the 
proposed legislation and a semblance of uniformity was achieved with the emergence of the 
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) whose main objective of the 
UDITPA is ‘to provide a state-level solution to a uniform approach to the division of a 
multistate enterprise’s income.’66 By 1982, over 23 states had adopted the UDITPA either 
verbatim or with certain modifications to suit their particular situations.67 
One important feature of the UDITPA is that it does not deal with the nexus question since it 
assumes a state’s jurisdiction to tax. Nexus describes the amount and degree of business 
activity that must be present before a state can tax an entity’s income. The UDITPA also 
assumes that the constitutionality requirements are satisfied. Likewise, it neither deals with the 
problem of what constitutes income, nor does it provide for the taxation of income derived 
from a multistate business. In brief, the definition and computation of the tax base and other 
related rules are determined by State legislation. The UDITPA deals predominantly with the 
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issue of apportioning and allocating income of a multistate enterprise to individual states. It 
achieves this objective through, inter alia, the use of the Massachusetts formula consisting of 
three equally weighted factors: payroll, property and sales. The three-factor formula as 
proposed by the UDITPA actually aims at providing a reasonable allocation of the tax base as 
between the states. Indeed, the effect of the three factors is to determine the percentage of 
income to be apportioned to each state. The basic scheme adopted by the UDITPA requires 
a classification of all income as either ‘business income’ or ‘non-business income’. There are 
four types of non-business income: 
· rents and royalties from real and tangible personal property; 
· capital gains and losses from sales of real and personal property; 
· interest and dividends; and  
· patents and copyright royalties.  
Such non-business income is allocated to a particular taxing jurisdiction according to the situs 
of the property or activity that produces the income or to the commercial domicile of the 
taxpayer. Business income is defined as: 
[I]ncome arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or 
business and includes income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management 
and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s trade or business 
operations. 68 
Once business income has been isolated, an intermediary step requires the determination of 
which activities generating business income may appropriately be classified as arising from 
unitary operations. In other words, a business may carry out certain activities that are clearly 
unitary in character and others which are not. Unfortunately, the UDITPA does not provide 
any rule for conducting this crucial exercise. Consequently, the tests elaborated by the courts 
are applicable to achieve that objective. After business income derived by an enterprise 
engaged in a unitary operation has been determined, the UDITPA apportions such income by 
using the three-factor formula. 
Whilst it is undeniable that the UDITPA has to a certain extent been successful in its 
harmonisation effort, it is also evident that the success of the system has been somewhat 
mitigated by the attitude of the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, in spite of the advantages of 
harmonised rules, the Supreme Court, in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,69 refused to 
pressure the states into adopting it. In this case, the Court sanctioned the use of a one-factor 
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formula, although in a strong dissenting judgement, Powell J. made it clear that a one-factor 
formula based on sales acted as a tariff on goods imported from the manufacturing states and 
was consequently inappropriate. 
In the U.S., the harmonisation of state taxation practices has been attempted by a second 
method, the Multistate Tax Compact. Powerful lobby groups considered that the only way of 
reversing adverse court decisions in the field of formulary apportionment could only be 
achieved through the introduction of federal legislation banning such practices. In order to pre-
empt federal legislation instituting such a ban, the State Tax Administrators Association issued 
on 20 December 1966 a model of a State Tax Statute. That model came to be known as the 
Multistate Tax Compact (MTC). Article IV of the Multistate Tax Compact actually adopts in 
toto the provisions of the UDITPA. The MTC, which became effective on 4 August 1967 
when the seventh state adopted it, had four objectives: 
· To facilitate the proper determination of state and local tax liability of multistate 
taxpayers including the equitable apportionment of tax bases and settlement of 
disputes; 
· To promote uniformity or compatibility in significant components of tax systems; 
· To facilitate taxpayer convenience and compliance in the filing of tax returns and in 
other phases of tax administration; and 
· To avoid duplicate taxation. 
As a result of the MTC, the Multistate Tax Commission was created. It is a body composed 
of a representative of each member state. One of the main purposes of the Multistate Tax 
Commission is to conduct, either on its own initiative, or if requested by member states, ‘a 
consolidated audit of the records of a multistate enterprise.’70 In addition, the Commission is 
required to monitor the application of the UDITPA by the states where it is applicable.  
The MTC is the first comprehensive attempt at state level to reach uniformity in state taxation. 
It survived a constitutional challenge71 and has the potential to become a multilateral state 
agreement. Yet, this potential has never been fully realised. Several reasons as summarised 
below have been suggested for the relative failure of the MTC. 
· First, states are not required to adopt the UDITPA in toto. Indeed, they are allowed 
to select whatever part of the scheme they deem fit, relative to their policy objectives. 
Often states have adopted a modified version of the UDITPA provisions. This 
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prevents the emergence of a uniform interpretative jurisprudence. Had these provisions 
been adopted verbatim, their interpretation would have been greatly facilitated.  
· Second, the MTC regulations are only advisory in character. Thus, states may adopt, 
amend, or reject any regulation put forward by the Commission.  
· Third, the critical reason for the relative failure of the UDITPA and the MTC stems 
from the absence of a supervisory body to which it should have been entrusted the 
duty of policing the uniform interpretation and application of the rules and regulations 
thereon.  
There have been calls for the creation of such an agency. As Professor Hellerstein has argued, 
the administration of a coherent state taxation system: 
arising out of the tax laws of fifty States and large numbers of local governments, is simply not 
viable unless an administrative agency is utilized to implement its terms, its purposes and its 
objectives.72 
However: 
many people recoil from this suggestion because, at first blush, it [.] would mean more federal 
control of states revenues, distribution according to population or some other imagined ‘needs’ 
basis, and other federal bureaucracy.’73 
B The Application of the Unit Rule to International Operations  
The application of the unit rule to international operations is commonly known as worldwide 
combined reporting (WWCR) or global formulary apportionment. In general, under WWCR, 
the business income of individual companies in a unitary business is aggregated regardless of 
whether individual companies are domestic or foreign. As in the domestic context, the unitary 
concept applied to international transactions requires that the level of business activity in that 
state determine the share of the combined income attributable to a particular state. That share 
is likewise measured by means of a formula. 
i   Worldwide Combined Reporting  
In the 1970s California pioneered the use of global formulary apportionment for the allocation 
of income of unitary businesses with international operations. The Californian State Authorities 
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did not advocate WWCR as a matter of deliberate policy choice.74 Rather, acceptance of the 
method was gradually secured as a result of the whole culture surrounding the taxation of 
interstate business. That a business with both domestic and foreign operations could be treated 
as unitary had already been sanctioned by in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,75 
and in Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton Ltd v State Tax Commission.76 In both cases, the Court 
found no reason to prevent the application of the unitary method to apportion income derived 
through international rather than domestic operations.  
For several decades, the initiative for the application of the unitary method rested with the 
Californian tax authorities. However, in the 1960s, in order to improve their tax position in 
California, two transnational oil companies operating in poor profitability conditions argued 
that they were carrying a worldwide unitary business. The Franchise Tax Board objected and 
the matter was taken to the Californian Supreme Court. In the Superior Oil v. Franchise Tax 
Board77 and Honolulu Oil v. Franchise Tax Board cases,78 the Court found against the 
Franchise Tax Board. It rejected the Board’s contention that unity of operations existed only 
when such operations were ‘necessary and essential’ to each other. The Court ruled that unity 
existed when the operations contributed to or were dependent on each other regardless as to 
whether they were necessary and essential for the business. Although these decisions were in 
favour of the taxpayers, they paved the way for the routine application of WWCR in California 
to both foreign subsidiaries of American corporations, and to the Californian subsidiaries of 
foreign corporations. 
i i  Foreign Subsidiaries  
In Appeals of the Anaconda Co., et al.79 the company, whilst agreeing that it carried a 
unitary business on the domestic front, challenged the determination of the Franchise Tax 
Board that its subsidiaries operating in Chile and Mexico were part of that unitary business. 
The appeal was rejected and the Board’s finding that Anaconda carried on a unitary business 
with its foreign subsidiaries was upheld. The Court also found that, although in Chase Brass 
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and Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Board80 the Californian Court of Appeal had refused to 
treat foreign operations as part of the unitary business of the appellant, it had never by the 
same token enunciated a general rule that foreign subsidiaries or affiliates were to be excluded 
in determining the scope of a unitary business.81  
The scope of the unitary business concept was again extended by the decision of the 
Californian State Board of Equalization in Appeal of Grolier Society, Inc.82 The only link to 
California of Grolier’s foreign subsidiaries was through its parent corporation headquartered in 
New York, which also operated a subsidiary in California whilst indirectly controlling its 
foreign subsidiaries through a wholly-owned subsidiary. Finally, in 1983, as will be examined 
further below, in Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board83 the 
Supreme Court, while addressing the issue as to whether WWCR was constitutional, fully 
confirmed that states could extend the Bass principle to tax the worldwide combined income 
of a unitary business having a U.S. parent corporation and foreign subsidiaries. 
i i i Foreign-owned and Controlled Parents 
The most extreme extension of the unitary doctrine to foreign businesses occurred with the 
decision of the Californian State Board of Equalization in Appeal of Beecham Inc.84 In that 
case, it was held that the income of a foreign parent resident and operating in the U.K. could 
be included in the combined report of the parent’s subsidiaries. The Board decided that there 
was strictly no difference between foreign-source income and other income when it came to 
determining, by formulary apportionment, the appropriate share of the income of a unitary 
business taxable by a particular state.85 As noted by E.G. Rudolph whose opinion was quoted 
by the Board in the Appeal of Beecham , the fact that no distinction was made between 
foreign-source income and other income of unitary business stems from logic. The extension of 
global formulary apportionment to encompass the worldwide income of a unitary enterprise 
does not mean that a state is allowed to tax the foreign-source income of that enterprise, just 
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as the extension of that methodology to multistate businesses does not mean that a state is 
allowed to tax extra-territorial income. Income allocated to a particular state in such instances 
is merely income which arose as a result of the existence of a unitary business, that is, one 
where, inter alia, the local operation is dependent on the foreign operations of the enterprise.86 
In Rudolph’s words: 
[I]n both situations the total income of the unitary business simply provides the starting point for 
computing the in -state income taxable by the particular state. This proposition, so far as foreign 
source income is concerned, was recognized in the early Supreme Court case of Bass, Ratcliff & 
Gretton v. State Tax Commission. While the Bass case involved a single corporation, the rationale is 
just as applicable where a unitary business is being conducted by an affiliated group of 
corporations, even though some of the corporations are beyond the jurisdiction of the taxing state. 
This was in substance the holding in Edison Stores. 87 
This reasoning was again applied in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes88 where the 
Supreme Court declared that a taxing state could attribute the business income of a foreign 
corporation to a domestic corporation only if the two comprised a unitary business. 
Notwithstanding all these decisions, litigation aimed at restricting the use of formulary 
apportionment continued well into the 1990s. In general, in spite of their relative failure, 
taxpayers sought to restrict the states’ recourse to the unitary method by requiring the courts 
to adjudicate on the constitutionality of the method. The latest in this long series of cases 
argued in the Supreme Court is that of Barclays Bank plc v. Franchise Tax Board & 
Colgate–Palmolive Company v. Franchise Tax Board.89 The immediate effect of the 
publicity generated by these cases was to force California to revise its commitment to 
WWCR. Thus, even prior to the Supreme Court hearing the case, California, reacting to the 
threat of retaliatory measures from the U.K. Government and Federal legislation, opted to limit 
the application of its taxation policy to the so-called water’s-edge concept.90  
In truth, worldwide unitary taxation has raised more political than technical problems. The 
method is portrayed as a crude tax-grabbing exercise, a reputation that is sustained by the 
often opportunistic behaviour of several U.S. states. It has also been portrayed as one 
designed to favour U.S. multinational groups at the expense of foreign business conglomerates. 
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Given the hostility towards global formulary apportionment, one may speculate about the real 
reasons underlying this attitude. It may well be that international business does not want to see 
a worldwide expansion of this method. The reason for this antagonism can no doubt be traced 
to the fact that worldwide unitary taxation truly brings within the taxing net all, rather than part, 
of TNCs’ profits. The attitude of present-day TNCs should be contrasted with that expressed 
by the owner of one of the most powerful conglomerates that existed at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Indeed, Sir William Vestey, the beef baron, testifying before the British 
Royal Commission of 1919-20 as to the nature of his operations said: 
[I]n a business of this nature you cannot say how much is made in one country and how much is 
made in another. You kill an animal and the product of that animal is sold in 50 different countries. 
You cannot say how much is made in England and how much is made abroad. That is why I 
suggest you should pay a turnover tax on what is brought into this country ... 91 
It may well be that Sir William Vestey’s position, expressed in the following words, is not 
totally shared by some of the present-day TNC directors:  
[I]t is not my object to escape payment of tax. My object is to get equality of taxation with the 
foreigner, and nothing else. 92 
C The Waters’-Edge Concept 
The 1983 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Container Corp. brought a frenzy of protest from 
foreign TNCs as well as foreign governments. It was even suggested that the U.S. government 
should, as a conciliatory measure, support a petition requiring the rehearing of the Container 
case.93 While such a course of action was not followed, President Reagan set up a working 
group under Treasury Secretary Regan. The Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group 
was also directed to study the states’ use of worldwide unitary taxation and recommend any 
measures that would safeguard the interests of both the states concerned and those of U.S. 
trading partners. The working group itself formed a task force and after a number of meetings 
these two bodies were unable to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the problem. However, 
agreement was reached on three principles: 
· a water’s-edge combination for both U.S. and foreign-based TNCs; 
· increased federal assistance and cooperation with the states to promote compliance by 
taxpayers; and 
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· a renewed effort to achieve a competitive balance between U.S. and foreign TNCs and 
purely domestic businesses. 
As far as the first principle was concerned, the Regan Report advocated the introduction by 
the states of an optional ‘water’s-edge’ unitary combination. Basically, under the water’s-edge 
principle, unitary combination is limited to U.S. business of both domestic and foreign firms. In 
other words, ‘a state taxes its apportioned share of the taxpayer’s domestic net business 
income, and apportionment is based on the ratio that the taxpayer’s local property, payroll, 
and sales bear to its domestic property, payroll, and sales.’94 
Moreover, the Regan Report provided that worldwide unitary taxation could be used when 
the use of separate accounting for the allocation of income between the U.S. and foreign 
component of a TNC, whether American or foreign, resulted in tax evasion, or was clearly 
inappropriate to reflect income, or failed to comply with disclosure requirements. In order to 
enable the states to monitor the application of the water’s-edge principle, federal assistance 
was to be given to them. It was thus agreed that the states would share the information 
obtainable from treaty partners. It was also agreed that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
would share any information that would be acquired as a result of a vigorous audit program 
targeting international businesses that the Service intended to carry out. As for the application 
of the third principle, no method could be found for reconciling the water’s-edge principle and 
equality of competition between domestic, foreign and purely local businesses. 
The Regan Report was cautiously welcomed by international business. Pressure was 
maintained on recalcitrant states like California to adopt the water’s-edge concept by threats 
of massive disinvestment. Retaliatory legislation had already been introduced by the British 
Parliament in its Finance Act of 1985 and there were renewed threats for activating these 
measures. Britain thus contemplated the withdrawal of the Advanced Corporation Tax refunds 
on dividend payments from the British subsidiaries of U.S. parent corporations located in 
unitary tax states.95 
Finally, in 1986, under the threat of federal legislation, California enacted legislation offering 
taxpayers a water’s-edge alternative. Senate Bill (‘S.B.’) 85 was signed by Governor 
Deukmejian in 1986 to establish an election by corporations doing business in California to 
compute California income by excluding from combined unitary income subject to 
apportionment income earned outside the U.S. by certain non-U.S.-incorporated affiliates.96 
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In fact the legislation contained three major elements, a water’s-edge election, a foreign 
dividends exclusion, and domestic disclosure requirements.97 The election, known as the 
water’s-edge election, became effective for income years beginning on or after 1 January 
1988. The conditions of this election were further modified in 1993, effective for income years 
beginning on or after 1 January 1994. The original measures enacted in 1986 contained 
provisions relating to the contractual nature of the election as made between the taxpayer and 
its group of companies on the one hand and the Franchise Tax Board on the other hand. 
Those taxpayers that were eligible to make the water’s-edge election were referred to as 
‘qualified taxpayers’. In addition, there were provisions regarding the composition of the 
water’s-edge group. Some corporations, for example, those with less than twenty per cent of 
the average of their property, payroll, and sales factors in the U.S., as well as foreign banks, 
were treated as ‘excluded entities’ except to the extent of their U.S.-derived income. The 
election term was for a 60-month period and there were provisions for its termination by either 
the taxpayer or the Franchise Tax Board. Finally, an election fee was payable to the Franchise 
Tax Board, which equalled 0.03 per cent of the sum of the taxpayer’s property and payroll 
factors for the income year of 1986, plus California sales in the current year.98 
As mentioned earlier, amendments to these provisions became effective for income years 
beginning on or after 1 January 1994. The annual election fee was removed, certain 
administrative burdens eased, and the period of election extended from five to seven years. 
Furthermore, instead of the Franchise Tax Board having power to disregard the election, 
certain monetary penalties were imposed in case of non-compliance.99 
Although the conditions for the application of the water’s-edge election were strict, they were 
welcomed by most foreign TNCs as well as by the British Government which suspended its 
threat of taking retaliatory measures against California. However, American TNCs were not 
satisfied and argued that the third condition agreed upon by the Regan Working Group, that is, 
the assurance of competitive equality between domestic and foreign TNCs, was not met. 
Notwithstanding this sour note, so much was thought of California’s enactment of its water’s-
edge election that when the Barclays case100 came to be heard before the Supreme Court, the 
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Solicitor-General of both California and the United States moved to have the case struck out 
on the grounds that the water’s-edge election made the case moot.101 
Section III   The Unitary Theory: Tests and 
Operation 
The adoption of WWCR by some of the most commercially significant U.S. states in the 
1970s ignited an often-heated debate as to the desirability of this method. In the U.S. 
opponents of the method reacted by aligning their attack on its constitutionality, a litigation 
strategy that can be traced to the earlier general property taxes. WWCR, it was alleged, 
breaches both the Due Process and the Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. It was 
also argued that when state taxing authorities target instrumentalities of foreign commerce, the 
risk of double taxation is increased, and the Federal Government is deprived of its ability to 
speak ‘with one voice when regulating commercial relationships with foreign governments.’102 
In other words, it was claimed that worldwide unitary taxation impaired the Federal 
Government’s exclusive powers to deal with foreign affairs and to regulate international trade. 
This constitutionality issue is obviously restricted to the U.S. environment. It should, therefore, 
have no relevance in determining the adequacy of the system on an international level. Still, it is 
necessary to review the judicial decisions relative to these questions, given that they relate to 
such crucial issues such as the jurisdictional threshold to tax, or the articulation of the concept 
of a unitary business.  
1 The Jurisdictional Threshold Question 
Liability to tax arises in the presence of certain connecting factors between the tax subject and 
a particular jurisdiction. This is the so-called nexus question which is defined as the amount 
and degree of business activity that must be present before a state can tax an entity’s income. 
Since the inception of the League of Nations Model Treaties the minimum connecting factor 
has been, in the case of a single entity enterprise, the permanent establishment, whereas for a 
subsidiary the place of incorporation or management is a prime factor for the determination of 
the enterprise’s economic allegiance and, thus, its tax-paying obligations. 
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In the U.S., Public Law 86-272, enacted in 1959, provides for ‘a minimum activity test’ to 
determine a state’s jurisdiction to impose net income tax on a multistate business.103 This 
legislation prohibits the imposition of a net income tax by any state on income derived within its 
borders by a person engaged in interstate commerce if the only business activity which that 
person carries out within the state is, inter alia, the solicitation of orders in that state for the sale 
of tangible personal property. 104 This minimum activity test is far from achieving the certainty of 
the well-known PE threshold test as used in international taxation or in the Canadian provincial 
tax scene. Indeed, the rejection of the permanent establishment as establishing the necessary 
nexus for the purposes of state taxation has often been criticised.105 
Notwithstanding the existence of Public Law 86-272, the establishment of the jurisdictional 
threshold question remains to a large extent the privilege of the Courts in the U.S. state tax 
scene. Basically, the issue revolves around the interpretation of two clauses in the U.S. 
Constitution by the Supreme Court on state tax sovereignty. 106 The Court’s jurisprudence 
imposes two conditions on a state’s jurisdiction to impose income tax: 
· First, a connection must exist between that state and the corporation’s activities which 
produce that income.  
· Second, the state may only tax the portion of the corporation’s income that is fairly 
attributable to the corporation’s income-producing activities in that particular state. 
A The Sufficient Nexus Requirement 
The two principles involved in this context are: 
· A state must have a significant nexus or a rational relationship with a particular 
corporation before it may seek to tax the corporate earnings of the latter; and 
· the taxing state must offer certain benefits for which it can reasonably expect 
something in return. 
The sufficient nexus requirement is closely connected with the U.S. constitutional requirement 
that ‘no state may deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
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law’.107 A state’s jurisdiction to tax extends to persons and subjects with some degree of 
connection with the state. The question that arises, therefore, is the extent of such a 
connection. In other words, how much connection with a state is required to meet the 
constitutional requirement. This question is of concern to both state residents and non-
residents alike. 
As far as the state residents are concerned, the U.S. Supreme Court held, earlier on, that 
states have plenary power to tax residents and domestic corporations on income derived both 
in and outside the state108 so long as the tax is not ‘palpably arbitrary or unreasonable’.109 The 
state’s taxing jurisdiction is grounded on the idea that, in respect of its residents, a state 
provides protection and privileges, including the right to receive and enjoy income. 
Understandably, the states may reap some revenue in return for the benefits they have 
conferred upon all businesses operating within their borders whether they are local, interstate, 
or international operations. A further extension of the state’s taxing power was achieved when 
the Supreme Court held that the State of New York could tax a resident on income derived 
exclusively from sources outside the state.110 In its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
the fact of domicile itself affords a basis for tax jurisdiction, and the enjoyment of privileges of 
residency and protection of state laws require residents to share the costs of government. 
Taxes, the Court went on to say, ‘are what we pay for civilized society.’111 
As the League of Nations tax experts had established, non-residents deriving income or having 
property in a foreign country are also required to contribute to the upkeep of the host 
government by paying taxes. However, there arises with non-residents a problem relating to 
the demarcation of a state’s taxing power since a non-resident does not enjoy the state’s stock 
of public goods as extensively as a resident. Upon considering this question, the Supreme 
Court held that constitutional jurisdictional nexus is based on the quality of the relationship 
existing between the non-resident and the state.112 A state’s power to tax depends on the 
state’s granting of opportunities, protections, and benefits to the non-resident. The Court 
reasoned that the Due Process standard, as applicable in this particular context, requires the 
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determination of ‘whether the state has given anything for which it can seek return’.113 This test 
was further refined a few years later when the Court held that the Due Process standard 
required that ‘some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, 
property or transaction it seeks to tax.’114 It is this rational relationship between the in-state 
activities of a taxpayer and the state’s territory that enables state authorities to tax income 
generated by these activities. 
B The Substantial Nexus Requirement 
Whereas the sufficient nexus requirement is aimed at securing a minimum connection between 
the taxpayer and the taxing state, the substantial nexus requirement requires for its part an 
assessment of the extent of the corporate activity within the state. In general, the states include 
within their taxing power every corporation resident within their boundaries and every foreign 
corporation ‘doing business’ therein.115 However, the vagueness of the ‘doing business’ 
concept is such that the Supreme Court has had to intervene very early in order to prevent the 
creation of internal barriers to commerce between the states through the latter using 
unprincipled taxation methods to raise revenue. Thus, the Supreme Court has linked the nexus 
question to the so-called Commerce Clause restriction. This grants Congress explicit power to 
enact federal legislation to govern commerce among states and with foreign countries.116 It is 
also interpreted to prohibit states from enacting legislation that violates federal policy in areas 
where federal uniformity is essential.117 
The constitutional attack on the states’ power to impose unitary taxation based on the 
Commerce Clause gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to articulate its doctrine relative to 
the substantial nexus requirement. In other words, the Supreme Court examined the extent of 
the corporate activity within the state that would justify that state’s jurisdiction to tax. In doing 
so, the Court ignored the principles applicable at the international level whereby a country’s 
right to tax is triggered only in the presence of a permanent establishment. 
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In Complete Auto Transit, Inc v Brady,118 the Supreme Court articulated a four-part 
negative Commerce Clause test which maintained that a state’s taxing jurisdiction is premised 
on the existence of a substantial nexus with the corporate activity; the tax should be fairly 
apportioned and be non-discriminatory; and, finally, it should be fairly related to the services 
provided by a state. Two other tests were later articulated in the Japan Line case.119 A state 
taxation system may not increase the risk of multiple taxation and it should not impair federal 
uniformity in the regulation of foreign commerce. 
Obviously, the fair apportionment test of Complete Auto as an offshoot of the negative 
Commerce Clause overlaps with territorial due process. This is because if the taxing state has 
not justly determined the income earned within the state by fair apportionment, then the state 
violates territorial due process by taxing income not connected with the taxing state.120 The fair 
apportionment test requires that the income earned within a state be determined by an 
acceptable accounting method. Traditionally the states opted for the formula apportionment 
methodology. However, although the states have exercised great flexibility in applying this 
methodology, the Supreme Court has attempted to control this flexibility by limiting the 
application of the formula to unitary businesses. What constitutes a unitary business will be 
examined further below. At this stage the issue that needs to be explored is the relationship 
between a unitary business and the states’ jurisdiction to tax. 
This question has been resolved in the Mobil Oil case121 where the Court decided that a taxing 
state could attribute the business income of a foreign corporation to a domestic corporation 
only if the two comprise a unitary business. In other words, the decision of the Court provides 
that the rational relationship between the taxing state and the income, or added value, that the 
state seeks to tax as provided for by the Due Process clause is satisfied if the corporation in 
question forms parts of a unitary business. Thus, the Court stated that ‘the linchpin of 
apportionability in the field of state taxation is the unitary business principle.’122 The Court’s 
analysis in dicta of the relationship between apportionability and the concept of unitary 
business is interesting. It shows that when a business is granted the privilege of conducting 
business in a state, it exposes itself to income taxation. However, such taxation would fail the 
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substantial nexus test if that business were not part of a unitary business having a nexus with 
that state. 
To sum up, both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause require that an enterprise 
be engaged in a unitary business before a taxing jurisdiction can apply a formulary 
apportionment methodology and tax an amount of profits allocable to that state.123 
C The Relationship between Nexus and Attribution Rules 
The legal rules for dividing income among the various states has a common objective and as 
the Willis Committee Report puts it, they are designed ‘to assign to the taxing state that 
portion of a corporation’s total net income which is fairly attributable to the State’.124 
In general, it is assumed that a fair attribution of income is achieved by conceding jurisdiction 
to tax income where it is earned. Traditionally, it was assumed that this would be 
accomplished if the geographical source of income could be determined. However, the 
impossibility of precisely locating the source of business income led to the adoption of 
formulary apportionment for the sharing the profits of corporations operating in several states. 
Yet, special rules for the attribution of specific items of non-business income derived by a 
corporation, which could lend themselves to precise geographic location, have been 
maintained. These rules are based on either the residence of the recipient of the income or its 
source. However, prior to the harmonisation process sought by the UDITPA, the states 
experimented with a plethora of source rules which produced an extraordinarily complex 
system, especially as it interfaced with formulary apportionment applicable to business income. 
For instance, it is assumed that the source of non-business income derived from property such 
as investment income coincides with the location of that property.125 The source of income 
from tangible property is usually taken to be at the situs of such property. However, serious 
difficulties arise in the case of intangible property. Pursuant to the mobilia sequuntur 
personam doctrine,126 the location of intangibles may be assumed to follow the taxpayer. In 
other words, the intangible property is located at the domicile of the taxpayer.127 Moreover, 
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intangible property may also be located at the ‘business situs’ of the taxpayer, or it may be 
assumed to be at the location of the entity which makes payments to the taxpayer.128 
The interaction of such specific allocation methods with formulary apportionment creates 
numerous problems ranging from overly complex rules, which undermines compliance to 
problems in the division of deductions, which are so complicated ‘as to perplex even the most 
sophisticated tax specialist’.129 What is of more immediate relevance in the context of this 
thesis is that ‘the separate treatment of the questions of location of a corporation for 
jurisdictional purposes and the location of its net income has led to a lack of congruence 
between nexus rules and attribution rules.’130 The result is that if a corporation is deemed not 
to satisfy the nexus requirement as studied earlier, then the income derived by that corporation 
from sources within that state escapes taxation. One device for recapturing income attributable 
to a state where it might not be taxed is the so-called throwback/throwout rules.131 These rules 
effectively reassign to a state with tax jurisdiction income which would normally be attributed 
to a state where such income could escape taxation. The relationship between the nexus and 
attribution rules must also be analysed relative to what may be considered as an appropriate 
apportionment formula. This study will be carried out in Chapter 5.132 For now, the conclusion 
that may be drawn is that the interaction of the nexus and attribution rules causes such serious 
difficulties that any attempt to tax income at its source have had to be abandoned.133 Instead, 
the U.S. states have embraced the concept of unity in business operations as the theoretical 
justification for their right to tax business income. 
2 The Concept of Unity in Business Operations  
A unitary business may be defined as one which carries business partly within and partly 
without a taxing jurisdiction in an integrated fashion.134 It is generally admitted that a 
corporation carries on a unitary business when some or all of its operations are so integrated 
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that that income segregation to a specific source is impracticable.135 In other words, the unitary 
business test is satisfied if the activities carried out within and without the state are such that 
they constitute inseparable parts of a single business. A unitary business implies the existence 
of common elements, which either bind the various activities together or are responsible for the 
viability of these activities in their present form. The Supreme Court whilst adjudicating on the 
constitutionality of unitary taxation has articulated the indicia of a unitary business. 
A What is a Unitary Business? 
In the U.S., the courts have relied on several tests to determine when a parent company and 
its branches and subsidiaries constitute a unitary business. In a string of cases the Supreme 
Court has indicated that such elements as management controls, functional integration and 
economies of scale are, depending on their degree, indicative of a unitary business.136 
In Butler Bros v McColgan,137 the Supreme Court enunciated ‘the three unities test’, which 
became the most used test for the determination of a unitary business. Pursuant to that 
doctrine, a unitary business exists if a parent and a subsidiary share, common ownership, 
common management, and common operations.  
The first crucial element of the test is the existence of common ownership between the 
businesses concerned. The ownership test is satisfied if a company directly or indirectly owns 
fifty per cent of another company’s shares, or if the first company exercises a strong 
controlling position on the second. The degree of ownership can thus be determined 
objectively and subjectively. The subjective analysis, presumably carried out by the taxing 
authority, is bound to create disputes between those concerned. 
As for the common management criterion, the general belief is that it is met in the presence of 
interlocking boards of directors, or where there is an exchange of key personnel between the 
companies concerned. Finally, the third criterion, that is, common financing, trademarks, 
research and development ,or other significant activities is, in conjunction with the first two, 
indicative of a unitary operation. The Supreme Court has also relied on the dependency test to 
determine whether a group of companies is operating on a unitary basis. When this test is 
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used, the critical factor is whether the operations carried out by a corporation in one state 
depend or contribute to the operations of another corporation located in a different state. 
The existence of a number of different tests does not add certainty to the quest of what 
constitutes a unitary business. The Supreme Court in the U.S. has provided general guidance 
for delineating the scope of a unitary business without committing itself to any particular 
approach.138 Business needs certainty in its tax environment. Therefore, in order to be 
considered as a viable alternative to separate accounting, it is essential that this open-ended 
attitude prevailing in the American states’ version of the unitary method be resolved and a 
definite set of criteria be agreed upon in order to determine the scope of a unitary business. 
Unfortunately, there seems to be no agreement as to what criteria are acceptable as indicative 
of a unitary business in the U.S. for the time being. Therefore, as will be explored in a later 
chapter, it may well be that the unitary concept as articulated in the U.S. will need to be 
abandoned if the model proposed in this thesis is to stand the test of certainty, simplicity and 
administrative ease. 
The three unities test has been widely criticised.139 What is apparent is that, even among the 
proponents of the unitary tax system, there is a serious divergence of views as to the 
acceptable criteria of a unitary business. Such disagreement is well illustrated in a spirited 
exchange between Charles E. McLure, Jr and Jerome Hellerstein in a series of articles which 
appeared in Tax Notes in 1983. In the first of these articles, Professor McLure140 disputes the 
contention of the attorney for Container Corp., a corporation litigating before the Supreme 
Court, that the Court should establish a bright line test of the reality of a unitary business based 
on the existence of a substantial flow of goods between affiliate firms.141 In this regard, counsel 
for Container Corp. was drawing on an argument made earlier by Professor Jerome 
Hellerstein in an article which appeared in Tax Notes on 25 January 1982.142 
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In Container Corp.143 the U.S. Supreme Court found that ‘the prerequisite to a 
constitutionally acceptable finding of unitary business is a flow of value.’144 Thus, this flow of 
value test (rather than a flow of goods test) supplements the traditional tests for determining the 
existence of a unitary business.145 To the Court, therefore, if a flow of value occurs between 
the elements of an enterprise within a taxing state, then the minimum constitutional linkage that 
justifies unitary taxation on the basis that the system is theoretically sound is satisfied.146 
Professor McLure rejected the argument that a substantial flow of goods should constitute the 
bright line test of a unitary business. He maintained that although:  
under most circumstances a substantial flow of goods should be sufficient to establish a 
presumption that separate accounting may fail and a finding of unitariness is in order...it is clearly 
not necessary that transactions occur for two or more firms to be engaged in a unitary business. 147 
Professor McLure proposed a three-tier test of unitariness involving the following inquiry: 
· Is there common ownership and management? If not, there can be no unitary business. 
· If there is common ownership and management, which expenses are shared, what 
other economies of scale and scope or intra-group transactions or other forms of 
economic interdependence are there? 
· If there is economic interdependence, is it ‘so substantial that separate accounting 
would fail to produce a satisfactory division of profits between the members of the 
group?’ 
What Professor McLure suggests is that in spite of the absence of substantial operational 
interdependence, a business should be classified as unitary if the centralised management has 
the power to manipulate the group’s operations in order to achieve whatever optimal tax 
position it perceives. 
In his reply Professor Hellerstein explored the indicia of operational interdependence.148 He 
then deplored the advocacy of ‘broad vague tests of unitariness, employing such loose 
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yardsticks as whether a branch or subsidiary ‘contributed to’ or is ‘dependent upon’ the rest 
of the enterprise.’ He stressed that such tests are burdensome, time consuming, expensive to 
comply with, and are difficult to administer. Furthermore, he argued that such tests would 
cause severe distortion and misattribution of income. Professor Hellerstein went on to suggest 
that, in the apportionment area, what was required was not a method akin to a scientific 
analysis. Such a test would often be flawed if any one of the assumptions on which it is based 
turned out to be inaccurate. Instead, he advocated a rough approximation in the attribution of 
income as would be achieved by the use of the interdependence requirement which, contrary 
to the ‘contribution’ or ‘dependency’ tests, is an objective one. 
In October 1983, Professor McLure responded to Professor Hellerstein’s critique.149 He 
noted first that the U.S. Supreme Court in  Container150 had refused to adopt the substantial 
flow of products between affiliated firms as a bright line test of a unitary business. He then 
proceeded to argue that at the heart of the unitary debate is the fact of economic 
interdependence that makes the isolation of profits in an integrated group a virtual impossibility. 
Economic interdependence is not solely apparent in transactions in goods and services. As 
pointed out by the Supreme Court in Container: ‘Substantial mutual interdependence can 
arise in any number of ways; a substantial flow of goods is clearly one but just as clearly not 
the only one.’151 
Professor McLure stressed that if the term basic operational interdependence is synonymous 
with a flow of goods or services between affiliated firms, then the test is objective, but it 
remains insufficient for the determination of unitariness. However, if the test encompasses more 
than a flow of goods and services, it remains appropriate as a test of unitariness, but it can no 
longer be considered as objective. This result is achieved, according to Professor McLure 
because: 
· First, the quantification and aggregation of various aspects of interdependence is akin 
to measuring various aspects of satisfaction and adding them up; and  
· Second, interdependence needs to be identified even if it cannot be measured.  
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However, even this identification process cannot be made on an objective basis because of the 
shifting distinction in Professor Hellerstein’s definition of basic and non-basic activities. 
It appears that Professor McLure’s proposition is more realistic, although in Professor 
Hellerstein’s opinion this is a ‘sweeping view of the scope of the unitary business’.152 Indeed it 
is difficult to agree that a business is unitary only if the management of the affiliate corporations 
act in a concerted way. It seems realistic to hold that individual companies in a group are 
engaged in a unitary business if they operate within a structure where centralised management 
can manipulate the tax position of the individual members of the group whether or not it 
actually engages in such manoeuvres. Consequently, the first two tiers of Professor McLure’s 
test appear to be adequate. 
Otherwise, the third tier seems to be immaterial. Indeed, it is not essential to define a unitary 
business relative to the separate accounting theory. Once common ownership and 
management is established and the fact that each member of the group, because of such 
membership, is able to achieve substantial economies of scale, share expenses and engage in 
intra-group transactions, then prima facie the fact of unity is established. When the first two 
tiers of the test are satisfied, it is difficult to see the purpose of the third tier, that is, whether 
separate accounting fails to produce an acceptable division of income between the members of 
the group. 
Separate accounting is a method of allocating profits to various entities. If the degree of 
economic and operational interdependence is high, then, whether separate accounting can or 
cannot achieve a proper allocation of income, it does not alter the fact that basically those 
enterprises are unitary. Indeed, if unity of management and ownership is demonstrated, and 
there are frequent instances of concerted action between the various members of the group so 
that a unitary business is deemed to exist, then, because of the fully integrated nature of the 
enterprise, separate accounting is highly unlikely to produce a satisfactory apportionment of 
income. 
Thus, for the present purpose only the first two tiers of Professor McLure’s test seem to be 
adequate. However, even this construction had been held to be too conservative long before 
the present rationalisation in the operations and structures of TNCs. 
B The Main Objections to Worldwide Combined Reporting  
It will be apparent from the above that the objections to formulary apportionment have often 
been, in the U.S. context, linked to constitutionality issues. Other objections have also been 
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voiced, the more serious being its inherent theoretical imperfection. The main objections to 
worldwide formulary apportionment are summarised in the 1995 OECD Report.153 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has already dismissed most of these objections. Thus, for example, the OECD 
claims that ‘the most significant concern with global formulary apportionment is the difficulty of 
implementing the system in a manner that both protects against double taxation and ensures 
single taxation.’154 Yet, as far back as 1983 the U.S. Supreme Court had, in Container 
Corp., dealt with this problem and there is no reason to believe that its reasoning is not be 
applicable in an international context. The Court held that, in the case of a domestic group, 
double taxation was not an ‘inevitable result’ of worldwide unitary taxation and could occur 
even if the arm’s length principle was used to determine the income of such corporations. The 
Court extended this conclusion to cases involving foreign-based multinationals and maintained 
that the foreign residence of a taxpayer or the taxpayer’s parent was a factor whose weight 
was insufficient to warrant special treatment. The Court went on to say that the fact that the 
arm’s length principle was an internationally accepted norm was not sufficient ‘to dictate this 
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence.’155 In other words, the Court made it clear that the 
international acceptance of the separate accounting/arm’s length principle does not preclude 
any attempt to find an alternative solution that would be more equitable. 
Moreover, the Californian WWCR produces lower burdens in at least two situations:  
· First, if a corporation operates at a loss, worldwide unitary combination allows it to 
include loss corporations that have no nexus with California in the combined report of 
its unitary business. Since such losses will necessarily offset income from other 
corporations in the group, less income will be returned in the pre-apportionment 
combined report. 
· Second, with WWCR, the apportionment percentage of the California taxpayer 
reflects the property, payroll, and sales of all members of the unitary business. The 
apportionment percentage of a unitary business that includes foreign corporations is 
likely to be lower than under a water’s-edge approach but only if U.S. corporations 
are included in the combined report. The lower percentage may more than offset the 
increase in the pre-apportionment tax base which results from including therein the 
results of profitable foreign corporations.  
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Accordingly, there is no systematic bias in WWCR one way or the other.156 
Double taxation under a global formulary system will occur if it is applied unilaterally by one or 
two countries in isolation while the rest remain committed to the separate accounting/arm’s 
length principle. This is the reason why suggestions have been made as to its implementation 
within trade blocs like the EU, NAFTA or APEC with a proper interface being devised to 
regulate inter-bloc trade.157. Even in this instance the OECD foresees serious political and 
administrative problems during the transition period. In any event, any serious attempt to 
minimise such risks requires the cooperation of the major trading nations on a multilateral basis 
as proposed in this thesis. 
Moreover, it has often been argued that global formulary apportionment is unfair or arbitrary. 
It has extraterritorial effects, given that it seeks to apportion to a particular jurisdiction value 
which presumably is not sourced within that jurisdiction. This argument reveals the extent to 
which the debate is hostage to the residence/source dichotomy. The basic principle of formula 
apportionment is that it seeks to apportion to a particular jurisdiction the real quantum of 
income derived through the use of facilities located within its borders, or made possible by the 
protection offered by that jurisdiction. As Mr Justice Holmes puts it: 
[T]he only reason for allowing a State to look beyond its borders when it taxes the property of 
foreign corporations is that it may get the true value of things within it, when they are part of an 
organic system of wide extent, that gives them a value above what they otherwise would possess. 
The purpose is not to expose the heel of the system to a mortal dart - not, in other words, to open to 
taxation what is not within the State.158 
To achieve this end a formula must be fair. Fairness is achieved ‘when the formula actually 
accomplishes the allocation to a state of only that value which may reasonably be considered 
as within the state and subject to tax and not outside the state where it may also be subject to 
tax by another state.’159 
Moreover, a closer analysis of the objections to global formulary apportionment reveals that a 
certain number of them relate to purely administrative problems, which, it is submitted, are 
manageable. Multilateral cooperation in taxation matters is still in its infancy. However, it is no 
longer just a remote possibility. There is a move towards using multilateral instruments in 
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international taxation matters in order to mirror the conditions prevailing in international trade. 
Taxation is merely an adjunct of international trade. Its existence, and indeed its incidence, 
depends on the efficiency of trading as a whole. If, multilateral cooperation is being achieved 
albeit slowly in such a general area as trade, then it is arguable that it is likewise achievable in 
the particular area of international taxation which owes it very existence to international trade. 
New ways of reconciling specific instances of fiscal sovereignty with the general requirements 
of efficiency in trade relations need to be developed. As will be shown later, there is already, 
in the transfer pricing area, a modest impetus towards the partial surrender of fiscal sovereignty 
to the OECD in order to enhance the application of uniform guidelines in this area. Thus, the 
creation of an international organisation whose primary objective would be to coordinate the 
implementation of a global formulary apportionment system may not, after all, be such a radical 
proposition. 
The question of the composition of the group of enterprises subject to global formulary 
apportionment is also a major concern. If the soundness of the argument that ‘all income from 
commonly owned business activities should be combined and apportioned by a single formula 
whether or not such activities are unitary’160 is proven, then the ideal solution to the problem 
on hand is to abandon the concept of the unitary business and to consider the income of a 
TNC in its entirety rather than on business lines. This solution is simple, can be uniformly 
applied, and is easily administered. 
The OECD voices concerns about the difficulties of determining the factors that would be 
included in an eventual formula, the ‘intolerable compliance costs’, such as the problem of 
exchange rate fluctuations, differences in accounting rules, valuation of property and sales, 
separate company efficiencies, the relevance of withholding taxes, and the artificial shifting of 
production factors to low tax countries. The U.S. Supreme Court has also rejected the reality 
of the ‘intolerable compliance costs’ argument. On 1 November 1993, the Supreme Court 
agreed to hear two appeals in worldwide unitary taxation cases: Barclays Bank plc v. 
Franchise Tax Board and Colgate-Palmolive Company v. Franchise Tax Board. The 
cases were heard on 28 March 1994, and decided on 20 June 1994.161 The cases were heard 
together and, in both instances, the Court found for California. It rejected Barclays’ argument 
that the administrative and financial costs of complying with the Californian law requiring 
combined reporting were prohibitive thereby enabling U.S.-owned companies to enjoy a 
competitive edge over their foreign competitors in breach of the Commerce Clause. The Court 
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found that there was an alternative open to Barclays in the use of approximations of costs 
which Californian law permitted and which Barclays had not pursued. 
Most of these objections stem from the assumption that global formulary apportionment is 
implemented on a country-by-country basis. There is some justification to the fear that a 
unilateral approach would create major interfacing problems. However, it is also certain that 
many ‘red herrings’ are pulled out of the barrel in the case of formulary apportionment.162 For 
example, as far as the exchange risks are concerned ‘it should be clear that it is far simpler to 
translate into dollars the annual net income of an entire subsidiary than it is to determine which 
two parties in a cross-border transaction is actually bearing foreign exchange risks and then 
value this for pricing purposes.’163 
This thesis proposes a model whereby the system would be implemented on a multilateral 
basis by most of the significant trading nations of the world. If that multilateral route is not 
feasible, the network of bilateral treaties that exists already may be used instead. That system 
would be administered by an international organisation that would be required to apply 
international accounting standards to measure the worldwide profits of all TNCs that fall within 
its competence. Members of that organisation would be required to furnish to it information 
pertaining to the operation of any TNC operating within their jurisdictions. With this 
information available for control purposes, TNCs would be required to file consolidated 
accounts drawn according to international accounting standards with the proposed 
international organisation. In many jurisdictions, TNCs are already required to furnish 
consolidated accounts to the authorities. For example, the unitary nature of certain operations 
is recognised with the consolidation of subsidiary losses.164 Therefore, the high-compliance 
costs argument, for example, relative to the production of consolidated accounts is not sound, 
as the U.S. Supreme Court found in Barclays.165 Once a critical mass of countries 
participating in the system is achieved, the apportionment formula could be set so as to 
attribute no business income to states that do not participate in the system. 166 This measure 
would deal with attempts to use tax havens to defeat the system. 
                                                             
162 D.R. Bucks & M. Mazerov, ‘The State Solution to the Federal Government’s International Transfer Pricing 
Problem’, (1993) 46 National Tax Journal 385, at 389. 
163 Ibid. 
164 R.M. Bird & D.J.S. Bream, ‘The Interjurisdictional Allocation of Income and the Unitary Tax Debate’, 
(November/December 1986) 34 Canadian Tax Journal 1377, at 1389. 
165 Id., at 1409. 
166 M.J. McIntyre, ‘Guidelines for Taxing International Capital Flows: The Legal Perspective’, (1993) 46 National 
Tax Journal 315, at 319. 
Chapter 4  A Histor ical Account of the Alternat ive Method  
 179
The primary purpose of international cooperation in tax matters is to achieve a fair division of 
the international corporate income tax base among various competing nations. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court found in Container Corp.,167 the unitary method is a ‘proper and fair method 
of taxation’. The major guideline is that, from a theoretical point of view, the apportionment 
formula must not be ‘inherently or intrinsically arbitrary’.168 In other words, as already argued, 
a formula must possess ‘internal consistency’, that is, the formula must be such that if applied 
by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business income being 
taxed.169  
In reality, there are only two major objections to global formulary apportionment. First, 
although not penned in such obvious terms, it is evident that the first objection of the OECD to 
worldwide unitary taxation stems from that fact that the latter is perceived as the antithesis of 
separate accounting. Separate accounting is at the very heart of the whole of the OECD’s 
philosophy. If the OECD were to reject separate accounting in favour of worldwide unitary 
taxation, then it would likewise have to reject the whole network of bilateral treaties based on 
its own Model treaty. This may be viewed by the OECD as a self-scuttling exercise. 
However, the question is not whether it is too painful to wipe the slate clean, but rather 
whether international cooperation in the field of taxation of international flows of income is 
achieving its stated objective which is to allocate to each relevant country a fair share of cross-
border income. In other words, international cooperation is aimed at apportioning to each 
relevant country a fair share of the corporate income tax base so as to enable it to obtain a fair 
share of revenue. If, to carry out this objective, undue reliance is put on a system which does 
not promote that fair division, then what is effectively being promoted is a particular system 
rather than the primary aim of international cooperation, that is, an equitable division of the 
international corporate tax base. In other words, it may well be that the means have overtaken 
the end in importance. As Professor Vann suggests, ‘the debate is hostage of the bilateral 
treaty network.’170 It is arguable that the genesis of the OECD’s objections to formulary 
apportionment stems from the risk of it having to relinquish its grip on international taxation 
questions if the system were to be adopted worldwide. Such a blanket opposition is unwise. 
Indeed, as will be shown in the following chapter, after some structural modifications, the 
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OECD may well be the most appropriate organisation to administer the system as proposed in 
this thesis. 
The second objection to formulary apportionment arises out of ‘the perceived inability of the 
international community to agree to the various components necessary for WWCR’.171 These 
various components being the very definition of a unitary business, the arbitrariness of the 
formula or formulas to be applied, and a clear definition of the international tax base. Such 
major concerns as voiced in the OECD 1995 Report as well as the question of exchange rate 
movements, the necessity to renegotiate double tax treaties with the view to adjusting, for 
example, withholding taxes to the global formulary environment,172 will be addressed in the 
following chapters. 
C The Application of the System by the U.S. at the Federal Level: A Brief 
Overview of the Issues  
There have been calls over several years for the implementation of formulary apportionment at 
the federal level in the U.S.173 Among the most vocal advocates of this shift is U.S. Senator 
Byron L. Dorgan who believes that the separate entity/arm’s length method allows massive 
artificial price manipulation and, therefore, profit shifting by TNCs.  
In a recent study Joann Weiner examines the issues that would need to be addressed if senator 
Dorgan’s campaign were to be successful.174 First, should the U.S. replace its detailed 
income-sourcing rules and its expenses allocation rules with a formula for apportioning taxable 
income? Second, should the U.S. separately apply an apportionment formula to the taxable 
income of each member of a group of companies? Third, should the income of the group be 
consolidated for the purposes of applying the formula? This thesis favours the last option and 
in this sense suggests the formulary apportionment method as an alternative to the arm’s length 
principle.175 
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The unilateral implementation of formulary apportionment at the federal level within the U.S. 
would certainly be highly inefficient.176 Although the separate accounting/arm’s length 
methodology is far from being the best system the world can achieve, its major strength is that 
it is based on consensus. This has enabled industrialised nations to minimise the most blatant 
incidence of double taxation or undertaxation. In any case, it promotes international trade and 
contributes to a certain degree to the efficient allocation of capital resources.177 Even if the 
U.S. were to unilaterally switch to formula apportionment with the hope that this would 
encourage other countries to do so, it is doubtful whether the U.S., in spite of its economic 
clout, could enforce the standard so as not to disadvantage U.S. TNCs. To police any 
international taxation system a country requires information which, relative TNCs operating 
globally, is scattered over many jurisdictions. Without international cooperation it would be 
precarious for the U.S. to attempt enforcing such controversial rules. Other countries would 
certainly construe this action as an attempt by the U.S. to grab more than its fair share of 
taxes. This perception could well lead to what has been termed ‘tax-based trade retaliation’ as 
illustrated by the U.K.’s threats following California’s dispute with Barclays Bank PLC, a 
British multinational bank.178 Moreover, the implementation of global formulary apportionment 
unilaterally by the U.S. would mean that it would have to either renegotiate all of its double tax 
agreements or effectively override these agreements. Different treaty partners would have to 
agree to such issues as the definition and calculation of the tax base, the apportionment 
formula, and the delineation of a unitary business. The methods for solving of any disputes that 
would eventually arise would also need to be agreed upon.  
To conclude, this overview of the American states’ tax scene and its seemingly intractable 
problems foretells the difficulties that would arise if global formulary apportionment is to be 
adopted on a worldwide basis. However, this experience should not be regarded as absolute. 
Problems which in the U.S. seem to be insoluble have been successfully resolved in other 
jurisdictions. The strength of the Canadian system, for example, arises as a result of a few 
fundamental principles being agreed upon. Thus, in the U.S., contrary to the situation in 
Canada, there is no common agreement to use the federal concept of the tax base; nexus rules 
are loosely articulated; states are free to adopt whatever formula they think fit provided these 
formulas adhere to some basic constitutional prescriptions. Finally, there is no central 
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collection or coordination mechanism to ensure uniform interpretation and application of basic 
uniform rules. Yet, a clear indication of the vitality and inherent strengths of the system is that, 
in spite of all these shortcomings, it has survived in the U.S. and Canadian domestic contexts. 
In an international framework, its implementation would require a genuine cooperation 
between fiscal authorities. However, even with the present system of separate 
accounting/arm’s length standard, such cooperation is sluggish, to say the least.179 
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 The Worldwide Implementation of Formulary 
Apportionment: Preliminary Steps 
This chapter examines the preliminary conditions for the worldwide implementation of a global 
formulary apportionment methodology. Section I considers the theoretical justifications as well 
as the perceived advantages of the methodology. Section II surveys the existing international 
organisations concerned with taxation with the view to determining whether these organisations 
could, under certain conditions, evolve into one to deal specifically with international taxation. 
Finally, Section III discusses the rationale for the creation of an international tax organisation 
designed to supervise the interjurisdictional allocation of the corporate tax base. 
Section I  The Theory of Global Formulary Apportionment 
In his opening speech to the Treasury conference on formula apportionment held on 12 
December 1996, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Lawrence Summers, observed that 
the central objective of any international tax system is to create a tax environment that 
promotes competitiveness and prevents tax avoidance.1 It is the contention of this thesis that 
these objectives may be achieved, as far as the taxation of transnational corporations (TNCs) 
are concerned, by means of a global formulary apportionment methodology. To demystify 
formulary apportionment, and to demonstrate that it is a conceptually more correct approach 
to the problem of international taxation, it is essential to examine its basic premises. 
1 A Brief Technical Analysis  
Many papers arguing for or against global formulary apportionment do not offer a clear picture 
of the issues raised by this methodology. Indeed, the hesitations that characterise the traditional 
study of the principles of international taxation have permeated the analysis of global formulary 
apportionment. In this regard, Professor MJ McIntyre admits that he has found little 
enlightenment from the principles that the tax specialists have traditionally proposed for 
structuring their international tax discussions. He describes these principles as 
‘metaphors...[which] have achieved their modest level of acceptance from their imprecision 
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and lack of bite.’2 He then proceeds to examine these principles. In doing so, he exposes their 
flaws and inconsistencies, and uncovers the real nature of global formulary apportionment. 
A The Source Principle, Capital Import Neutrality and Formulary 
Apportionment 
Revenue authorities worldwide have always sought to tax income sourced within their 
jurisdictions whether that income accrues to residents or non-residents. However, there is no 
universally admitted definition of source.3 It is generally agreed that the concept is broad 
enough to comprise income ‘arising in’ or ‘having its origin in’ or ‘having a domestic source’.4 
In broad terms, therefore, the term ‘source’ is used to describe ‘the geographical situs of the 
economic activity or legal protections giving rise to various classes of income.’5 In other 
words, ‘source’ is used in two senses: 
(a) to describe the geographical place from which income is derived; and 
(b) to describe the class of income to which an amount belongs, for example, dividends, 
interest, rents, royalties, business, and personal services. 6 
Moreover, the ‘why’ of source-based taxation is not absolutely clear.7 Taxing domestic -
sourced income of residents may be justified on several grounds. First, as examined 
extensively in Chapter 1, the derivation of income within a geographical area is made possible, 
or is facilitated, as a result of the source country providing the necessary infrastructure for that 
purpose. Second, since tax is payable according to one’s ability to pay, the availability of 
income as it arises at one specific location is a potent sign of this ability. Third, it is harder to 
avoid than residence-based taxation. 
The theoretical justification for the taxation of income derived in a particular jurisdiction by 
non-residents is somewhat more elaborate although it is arguable that it does have the down-
to-earth appeal of a tax on foreigners. Non-residents are not part of the country’s community; 
they do not use the existing infrastructure to the same extent as residents. Therefore, on equity 
                                                             
2 M.J. McIntyre, ‘The Design of Tax Rules for the North American Free Trade Alliance’, (1994) 49 Tax Law 
Review 769, at 771. 
3 J.F. Avery -Jones et al., ‘Tax Treaty Problems Relating to Source’, (1998) 38 European Taxation 78, at 79. 
4 R.J. Patrick, (General Reporter) ‘Rules for Determining Income and Expenses as Domestic or Foreign’, (1980) 
65b Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International 15, at 16. 
5 J.L. Andrus, ‘Determining the Source of Income in a Changing World’, (1997) 75 Taxes  839, at 840. 
6 R.L. Hamilton & R. Deutsch, Guidebook to Australian International Taxation  5th Student Edition, (Sydney: 
Legal Books, 1998), at 2-25. 
7 D.M. Ring, ‘Commentary: Exploring the Challenges of Electronic Commerce Taxation Through the Experience 
of Financial Instruments’, (1996) 51 Tax Law Review 663, at 665. 
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grounds, the full cost of government ought not be allocated to them through the tax system. 
Yet, non-residents are effectively taxed on their income sourced within the taxing jurisdiction. 
According to Professor McLure,8 the rationale for taxing non-residents is based on the 
entitlement principle which enables a state to tax the value added within its borders by foreign 
factors of production. In practice, source countries often tax income both as it arises and 
through withholding taxes. As for business income derived by non-residents, the source 
principle sanctions the taxation of such income if derived through a permanent establishment 
(PE) in the taxing jurisdiction. In the end, whatever the theoretical justifications of source-
based taxation, on a practical level, it achieves a certain sharing of taxing power between two 
competing tax powers.9 
This conventional construction of the source principle is closely associated with the concept of 
capital import neutrality (CIN) which itself is a proxy for the efficient allocation of capital 
resources worldwide.10 The weaknesses of the CIN paradigm are the following.  
· First, it is doubtful whether a country focusing on achieving CIN would derive the level 
of economic benefit which its proponents claim is achievable. Indeed, in order for CIN 
to operate, the capital-exporting country must exempt foreign-source income from 
taxation. As a result, both national and international tax revenue are reduced.  
· Second, this exemption undermines residence taxation which is a necessary 
component of a fair tax system.  
· Third, to achieve CIN, not only must residence taxation be abandoned, but also, in an 
era of emerging trading blocs, preferential trade and tax policies must likewise be 
forsaken. 
The undermining of residence taxation in favour of an exclusively source-based taxation system 
has, according to Professor McIntyre, deleterious effects on a country’s tax system. The 
source principle is based on a vague concept. It postulates that the source of income is the 
geographical place where it arises.11 Whilst most authors, it would seem, ‘take “source” to be 
a natural, self-defining concept’,12 in reality, the source of income is often determined by 
                                                             
8 C.E. McLure, Jr., Economic Perspectives on State Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporatio ns (Arlington, 
Virginia: Tax Analysts, 1986), at 164. 
9 Ring, supra note 7, at 665. 
10 See M. Gammie, ‘The Taxation of Inward Direct Investment in North America Following the Free Trade 
Agreement’, (1994) 49 Tax Law Review 615, at 632. 
11 In an economic sense source has been defined as the place of the income generating activity; see P. Musgrave, 
‘International Tax Base Division and the Multinational Corporation’, 27 Public Finance (1972) 394, at 397. 
12 See K. Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income-A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Part I)’, 
[1988/8-9] Intertax 216, at 223. (Part II [1988/10] Intertax 310, Part III [1988/11] Intertax 393.) 
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reference to the residence of the person deriving it.13 Such is the case, for instance, regarding 
the determination of international shipping income,14 or the gain on the sale of shares.15 As 
previously stated, interest income derived from a cross-border loan is assigned to the place of 
residence of the debtor,16 although cross-border interest income has a nexus with both the 
country of the lender and that of the borrower. The source of income, it is frequently argued, is 
the place where economic value is added to the activity generating the income.17 This is also a 
debatable claim given that the relationship between income and value added, or the linkage 
between the place where income arises and the place where value is added, are quite 
insubstantial.18  
The difficulties arising with the source concept are, according to Professor Klaus Vogel, 
traceable to the fact that it is often impossible to clearly define the type of connection that 
establishes the source of the income at a specific geographic location.19 In practice, the 
application of a pure source-based taxation system is unrealistic. If a country were to rely on a 
system of pure source taxation, that country would be incapable of operating an effective tax 
system. Furthermore, source taxation and CIN inevitably lead to tax competition. A country 
with a system based exclusively on taxation at source is precluded from extending its 
jurisdiction to tax beyond its national boundaries. This induces capital flight as residents of that 
country endeavour to move their capital to a country with a lesser rate of taxation. As a result, 
that country is required to impose taxes that cannot be shifted easily. Thus, broad-based 
income taxes and wealth taxes have to be abandoned in favour of commodity taxes or wage 
taxes on immobile workers. The inevitable consequence of an exclusive source basis taxation 
system is, therefore, a regressive tax structure.20 
                                                             
13 See Andrus, supra note 5 for a critique of ‘residence-based source rules’ as promulgated by the U.S. Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. 
14 Article 8 of the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital (Paris: OECD, 1992) loose 
leaf (1997 update), at M-17. (Note: A 2000 update is now available.) 
15 Id., Article 13(4), at M-26 and commentary, at C (13)-9 para. 30. 
16 Id., Article 11, at M-22 & M-23. 
17 On the other hand the only positive statement that can be made is that ‘source’ refers to a state that in some 
way or other is connected to the production  of the income in question, or to the state where value is  added to a 
good. See Vogel, supra note 12, at 223. 
18 McIntyre, supra note 2, at 775 n 16. 
19 Vogel, supra note 12, at 223. 
20 McIntyre, supra  note 2, at 774.Professor McIntyre notes that proponents of the source principle are also 
proponents of consumption taxes.  
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It is often assumed, following an article written by Professor Charles McLure in 1981, that a 
formulary apportionment system is basically a source-based system. 21 However, if, as 
Professor Vogel points out, the concept of ‘source’ itself is part of the problem22 as evidenced 
by the variety of approaches recorded at the 34th Congress of the International Fiscal 
Association in Paris in 1980,23 then to rely on the concept in a global formulary environment is 
bound to cause serious problems. 
It would appear that Professor McLure’s position was aimed primarily at distinguishing 
taxation based on the status of the person subject to taxation (residence taxation) from that 
based on the status of the income subject to taxation (source taxation). This position does not 
capture the essence of formulary apportionment. As Professor McIntyre argues: 
[T]he uncontested fact is that a formulary apportionment system does not use source rules. It is not 
source-based, therefore, unless the term ‘source’ is given a rather special meaning. 24 
The fact that ‘the federal concept of source is irrelevant in a formulary 
apportionment/combined reporting system’ 25 is clearly illustrated by the mechanics of global 
formulary apportionment. Global formulary apportionment is concerned with the total, or 
combined, taxable income of a unitary business. In the U.S., this total taxable income, or pre-
apportionment income as it is often called, is then divided between the states with a legitimate 
claim to it by means of an apportionment formula.26 This formula is not founded on the source 
principle. Indeed, it does not attempt to exclude from the system any foreign-source income. 
Thus, for example most states in the U.S. include portfolio dividends received from a foreign 
corporation in the pre-apportionment tax base. Moreover, notwithstanding the recent adoption 
of the water’s edge concept by California, formulary apportionment as applied through 
                                                             
21 C.E. McLure, Jr., ‘Towards Uniformity in Interstate Taxation: A Further Analysis’, (13 July 1981) 13 Tax 
Notes  51. This confusion has been cleared in CE McLure, Jr., & J.M. Weiner, ‘Deciding Whether the European 
Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of Company Taxation’, a paper prepared for presentation to the 
International Seminar in Public Economics/Research Center for Economic Policy Conference on Reform and 
Harmonization of Company Taxes in the European Union, The Hague, April 3-5, 1997. P rofessor CE McLure, 
Jr., graciously furnished the unpublished version of this paper for use in this thesis.  
22 Vogel, supra note 12, at 229. 
23 Patrick, supra note 4, at 15. 
24 McIntyre, supra note 2, at 776. 
25 Id., at n 23. See also R.D. Pomp, ‘Issues in the Design of Formulary Apportionment in the Context of 
NAFTA’, (1994) 49 Tax Law Review 795, at 801. Professor Pomp makes the following statement: ‘I would 
prefer that discussions about formulary apportionment avoid use of the word “source” entirely because of the 
federal baggage that accompanies it. If source is to be used at all, I would limit it to describing the amount of 
income assigned to a taxing jurisdiction after the application of formulary apportionment.’  
26 Uniform Division of Income for Taxation Purposes Act, Art 9, 7A Uniform Laws Annotated, at 348 (1985). 
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WWCR, deliberately includes foreign-source income in the pre-apportionment income of a 
TNCs computed on a global basis. 
To conclude, a formulary apportionment system is designed in such a way that both source 
rules and the legal form of doing business are ignored for corporate tax purposes.27 Income 
derived by an entity of a unitary business is included in the group’s pre-apportionment income 
whether or not the income has a foreign-source. 
B The Residence Principle, Capital Export Neutrality and Formulary 
Apportionment 
A class of persons often derive certain benefits as a result of its allegiance to a particular state. 
Taxing norms were expanded to permit the taxation of such persons on their worldwide 
income. In order to identify this particular class of persons, most states adopt residence as the 
definitional basis. The residence principle (with citizenship) has thus emerged as the second 
rule in international tax.28 
Residence basis taxation is closely related to the concept of capital export neutrality, (CEN). 
The object of CEN is to secure the equal treatment of investors whether they invest at home 
or abroad. CEN is thought to be desirable because it avoids distortion of the locational 
decisions of TNCs. A country achieves CEN when investors in that country ‘pay the same 
amount of tax on investments with equal pre-tax yields whether the investment is domestic or 
foreign.’29 
CEN is, however, rarely reflected in the tax rules of traditional capital-exporting countries. 
Even where a foreign tax credit is used countries defer the taxation of income accumulated in 
foreign companies until repatriation except for specific cases such as those covered by various 
controlled foreign corporations (CFC) legislation. A long enough deferral period is equal to an 
exemption of the foreign-source income. 
Again Professor McIntyre questions the validity of the CEN premises. He claims that in spite 
of all its theoretical justifications, the fact remains that no single government prefers foreign to 
domestic investments. This is because revenue generated by local investment stays in the 
coffers of that government whereas if that investment is made abroad, it is the source country 
                                                             
27 M.J. McIntyre, ‘Design of a National Formulary Apportionment Tax System’, (1991) 84th Conf. on Tax’n, 
Nat’l Tax Ass’n 118, at 119. 
28 U. Kohl, ‘The Horror-Scope for the Taxation Office: The Internet and its Impact of Residence’, at 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/unswlj/thematic/1998vol21no2/kohl.html>. 
29 M. Rigby, ‘A Critique of Double Tax Treaties As a Jurisdictional Coordination Mechanism’, (1991) 8 
Australian Tax Forum, 302, at 413. 
Chapter 5   The Worldwide Implementat ion of Formulary Apport ionment:  Prel iminary Steps 
 190
which would derive immediate tax revenue. Therefore, any government is more likely to favour 
home-based TNCs capable of achieving a high degree of competitiveness in world markets.30 
CEN is achieved and capital is allocated efficiently throughout the world if: 
· all taxes on foreign-source income are fully creditable; 
· all foreign-source income is taxed and credits allowed on a current basis by the 
residence jurisdiction; and 
· the structure of corporate taxation among countries does not differ in essential 
respects. 
In the real world, countries cannot simultaneously embrace these three attributes. Indeed, 
these may be contemplated only within a trading bloc such as the European Union (EU) or 
North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). 
If the source/residence dichotomy is to be maintained as a basis for analysing the proposed 
system, then the global formulary apportionment system using worldwide combined reporting 
may be regarded as a ‘pure’ residence-based system given that it is ‘a system that taxes 
exclusively according to residence and eschews source taxation.’31  
According to Professor McIntyre: 
[A] formulary apportionment system imposes tax on that portion of the income of an enterprise that 
is attributed to the taxing state under the apportionment formula. The ‘enterprise’ subject to 
formulary apportionment may be defined as the worldwide activities of some group of related 
corporations (and other related legal entities). The factors used in the apportionment formula serve 
as rough proxies for the portion of the activities of the enterprise that are conducted in the taxing 
state. Those activities in the taxing state may be described as a ‘branch’ of the enterprise. Thus, the 
tax imposed by the state in a formulary apportionment system is a tax on a ‘branch.’ The ‘branch’ is 
taxable on its worldwide income without reference to the source of the income and without 
adjustment for any taxes that might have been imposed on that income by other taxing jurisdictions. 
Such worldwide taxation without adjustment for the source of the income is the hallmark of a pure 
residence system.  32 
It is important to note the sense of the word ‘enterprise’ in the context of global formulary 
apportionment. In this context, ‘enterprise’ means an aggregation of the worldwide activities of 
a group of entities forming part of the TNC. Such a global view of the activities carried out by 
the TNC is at the core of global formulary apportionment as opposed to the separate 
accounting theory which considers the activities of the numerous separate entities forming part 
of the conglomerate in total isolation. In reality, state in a formulary apportionment system, 
                                                             
30 McIntyre, supra note 2, at 778. 
31 Supra note 2, at 780. 
32 Supra note 2, at 780. 
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those activities that are carried out in a particular may be described as being carried out 
through a ‘branch’ of the enterprise.33 
Conventionally, a branch tax has often been considered as a tax on local activities. As such, a 
branch tax is viewed as a source-based tax. This view is not strictly in accord with the concept 
of the PE as found in double tax treaties where the taxation of branches is contemplated on a 
‘quasi-residence basis’. Thus, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the OECD Model34, a country may 
tax the profits of a foreign enterprise if that enterprise carries on business within its jurisdiction 
through a PE. However, the profits that may be taxed are those that are ‘attributable’ to the 
PE. These may have two sources. First, these may accrue to the PE as a result of its activities 
within that country, an obvious illustration of the conventional source principle. Second, profits 
having a source outside the country where the PE is located, that is foreign-sourced profits, 
may still be attributed to it if such profits arise as a result of its business activities. In this 
second case, therefore, the tax on the PE is simply a residence-based tax. 
To sum up, a formulary apportionment system taxes income derived from local activities 
exclusively. However, such a system cannot be characterised as source-based. Indeed, 
activities whether local or foreign, are not subject to tax. What is subject to tax is income 
associated with local activities regardless of whether such income has a local or a foreign-
source.35 
2 The Mechanics of Global Formulary Apportionment 
Having determined what global formulary apportionment is, it is now necessary to discuss the 
preliminary steps that need to be taken for its worldwide implementation. The first question 
relates to the threshold for taxing business income under the system. Closely related to this is 
the issue of the tax unit. 
                                                             
33 Professor McIntyre quotes, in support of this argument, IRC § 989(a); Reg. § 1. 989(a)-1(b)(2)(ii) defining a 
qualified business unit as a collection of activities with respect to which books of accounts are kept. See 
McIntyre, supra  note 2, at 780 n 29. Moreover, consolidation accounting in fact results in separate companies 
being treated as de facto branches of the holding company. Thus, at its inception consolidation was labelled ‘the 
branching of profits and losses’. Walker states that: ‘Early texts described consolidated statements as depicting 
the affairs of a holding company and its subsidiaries as if they were a simple organization or as if the 
subsidiaries were merely branches of the parent.’ See R.G. Walker, Consolidated Statements: A History and 
Analysis  (New York: Arno Press, 1976). 
34 OECD (1992), supra  note 14. 
35 McIntyre, supra note 2, at 780 n 30. 
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A The Threshold for Taxing Business Income and the Taxable Unit 
Conventionally, jurisdiction to tax arises if an enterprise has a substantial presence in a country. 
An enterprise has such a substantial presence when it carries on business in a particular 
country through a permanent establishment. The question that arises is whether this 
internationally agreed jurisdictional threshold is adequate and should therefore be reproduced 
in the proposed system.  
As already noted, the Canadian provinces and the Swiss cantons have broadly maintained the 
permanent establishment as the minimum jurisdictional nexus. As such, the Canadian and 
Swiss systems adhere to the international conventional rule for the allocation of taxing rights 
even though the concept is broadened to suit certain specific local conditions. With regard to 
the American states’ approach, it will be recalled that the taxation of business is characterised 
by the presence of the unitary business concept which has, therefore, replaced the PE principle 
as the primary jurisdictional threshold rule.36  
At the outset it must be said that the utility of the concept of the permanent establishment in its 
current form is under investigation as a result of the structural changes in international 
business.37 Thus, in an age of digitised information, the question arises as to whether the PE is 
an appropriate indication of the economic allegiance of an enterprise to a given jurisdiction.  38 
One of the fundamental issues in international taxation is the proper allocation of taxing rights 
between various countries. This allocation problem was resolved by the League of Nations 
relying on a method which, to an appreciable extent, satisfied both theoretical and 
administrative considerations. Taxation rights arise when a taxpayer has a nexus or connecting 
factors with a particular jurisdiction. Connecting factors, as examined earlier,39 may be the 
residence of the taxpayer or the source of its income. Non-residents are usually liable to tax on 
income earned from doing business in a particular jurisdiction through a PE. The primary 
function of the PE concept has already been studied.40 In addition, it is also worth mentioning 
that the concept is an attempt to prevent governments overreaching their taxing power based 
                                                             
36 State jurisdiction has also been constrained by federal statute. Thus, a minimum standard for the imposition of 
state net income tax is provided for at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1994) (Public Law 86-272). See Chapter 4, Section III, 
1, at 164. 
37 See, for example, A.A. Skaar, Permanent Establishments, (Deventer: Kluwer Law International, 1991), at 557ff. 
See also L. Peschcke-Koedt, ‘A Practical Approach to Permanent Establishment Issues in a Multinational 
Enterprises’ (18 May 1998) Tax Notes Int'l 1143. 
38 OECD, Application of the Permanent Establishment Definition in the Context of Electronic Commerce (Paris: 
OECD, 1999) DAFFE/CFA/WP1(99)4. 
39 See Chapter 1, Section II, at 18ff.  
40  See Chapter 1, Section II, 1, B, at 21. 
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on insignificant presences within their jurisdictions. Thus, for example, it is arguable that the PE 
notion has helped to streamline the domestic threshold rules applicable in the United Kingdom. 
U.K. domestic legislation distinguishes between the concepts of ‘trading with’ and ‘trading 
within’ the U.K.41 A non-resident enterprise is assessable in respect of profits or gains arising 
from any trade it carries within, as opposed to with, the U.K.42 Trade is defined as ‘every 
trade, manufacture, adventure or concern in the nature of trade.’43 The British position is that 
profits arise from trade and trade is concluded through contracts. Since contracts are ‘the very 
foundation of trade’,44 then the source of the profits is the place where the contract of sale is 
concluded. This principle was refined in the Maclaine & Co v Eccott45 and Firestone Tyre 
and Rubber Co v Lewellin cases.46 The opinions of Lord Cave and Lord Radcliffe in these 
two cases respectively, when read together, indicate that the place of the contract remains the 
most important, and indeed a crucial question in determining the source of the profits. 
However, other factors, such as the place where the payment is to be made for the goods sold 
and the place where the goods are to be delivered, may combine to outweigh the importance 
of the place where the contract of sale is made.47 To determine the source of income, the 
formulation generally preferred is the rhetorical question of Lord Atkin LJ. ‘Where do the 
operations take place from which the profits in substance arise?’48 
Arguably, the British domestic jurisdictional rule rests on the concept of the business 
establishment rather than on that of the permanent establishment.49 The business establishment 
                                                             
41 See the opinion of Lord Herschell in Grainger & Son v Gough [1896] AC 325, at 335. 
42 Butterworths U.K. Tax Guide 1995-1996, at 1686. According to English jurisprudence, the words ‘trade’ and 
‘business’ are indistinguishable. See Lord Morris dicta in Grainger & Son v. Gough (1896) A.C 325. See also 
London Australia Investment Co. Ltd v. F C of T  (1977) 77 ATC 4398. 
43 See U.K. Taxation Act section 527. 
44 Per Esher MR, Werle &Co v Colquhoun 2 TC 402 at 410. See also Rowlatt J. who, in F. L. Smidth & Co v 
Greenwood (1920) 8 TC 193, at 199, said ‘until the sale is effected the trade is incomplete’. 
45 [1926] AC 424. 
46 [1957] 1 All ER 561. 
47 Canada uses the place of the contract if these are habitually concluded in the country. See G. Gagné, National 
Reports: Canada, ‘Rules for Determining Income and Expenses as Domestic or Foreign’, 65b Cahiers de Droit 
Fiscal International (1980) 291, at 292. 
48 F. L. Smidth & Co v Greenwood [1921] 3 KB 583, at 593. It is submitted that the modern version of Lord 
Atkin’s question is the functional analysis which may well show that several jurisdictions have contributed to 
the generation of profits from a single business activity. However, in the jurisdictional threshold context, the 
question is not where the income arises. Rather, it revolves on the strength of the economic link between the 
income and the place where the activities giving ris e to it are located. 
49 ‘The characterization of business and investment income for income tax purposes is a mixed question of fact of 
law. Broadly speaking, income from an investment derives from holding property through a passive process. 
Investments income is a yield on the property. In contrast, business income derives form the use of property, a 
process that generally combines labour and capital...Although there is a refutable presumption that corporate 
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concept, grounded as it is in the law of contract, has a far wider application in the sense that it 
may be regarded as favouring the force of attraction principle.50 Thus, it tends to impose tax 
on all income with a source in a particular jurisdiction.51 However, it also provides that a non-
resident cannot be taxed on the profits of a trade carried on by him or her elsewhere than in 
the U.K.52  
Is a business establishment, as conceived in the domestic tax rules of the U.K., applicable in a 
global formulary environment? The British threshold rule is very wide. It even captures an 
adventure or concern in the nature of trade. As such, even an isolated transaction can be 
regarded as a business and governments may seek to tax on such insignificant grounds.53 
Consequently, it is submitted that to rely on the business establishment concept is 
inappropriate in as much as it may hinder business expansion. In addition, given that, contrary 
to the traditional PE which combines both a source and a resident element, the business 
establishment concept focuses solely on a geographic source of business income. 
If the business establishment concept is an unacceptable jurisdictional threshold in a global 
formulary environment, the question then arises as to the adequacy of the traditional PE 
concept to fill that role. The traditional PE rule of Article 5 of the OECD Model54 is well 
known and is currently subject to revision within the OECD. Therefore, at a time when a 
reformulation of the concept is widely debated,55 it may be worthwhile to examine the variants 
of the concept as proposed in fora other than the OECD. However, Jacques Sasseville of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
income is business income, the distinction is essentially a question of fact’; see V Krishna, ‘International 
Income Taxation of Electronic Commerce’ (January 1999), 9 Canadian Current Tax (No. 4) 33, at 37. (footnote 
omitted). See also Californian Copper Syndicate v Harris (1904) 5 T C 159, Blockey v FC of T (1923) 31 CLR 
503, and Ericksen v Last (1881) 8 Q.B 414. 
50 OECD (1992), supra  note 14, at C (7)-3 para. 5. 
51 M.B. Carroll, ‘International Tax Law: Benefits for American Investors and Enterprises Abroad, Through 
International Agreement’, 2 Int’l Law 692 at 700 in D.M. Hudson & D.C. Turner, ‘International and Interstate 
Approaches to Taxing Business Income’, (1984) 6 Northwestern J Int’l L & Bus 562, at 573-74 n 73. 
52 See Simon’s Direct Tax Service, Binder 3 Schedule D Capital Allowances (London: Butterworths, 1995), at 
3113. 
53 According to Mitchell Carroll, ‘the British Board of Inland Revenue [even] sought to impose liability…[on] 
sales through a local commission agent…[although]…the non-resident and his British intermediary took pains 
to conclude the contract abroad.’ M.J. Graetz & M. O’Hear, ‘The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International 
Taxation’ (1997) 46 Duke L.J. 1021. 
54 OECD (1992), supra  note 14, at M -10. 
55 O. Ralph, ‘Changing World Leaves PE standing’, (February 1999) 10 International Tax Review (No. 2) 17. See 
also OECD, ‘The Application of the Permanent Establishment Definition in the Context of Electronic 
Commerce: Proposed Clarification of the Commentary on Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention’, 
(May 2000) 40 European Taxation (No. 5) 190. 
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OECD, at the March 2000 Canadian Tax Conference whilst acknowledging the uncertainties 
relative to the concept concluded that: 
the question is not whether there is uncertainty at the margin, but whether we have reached a 
critical mass of uncertainty; I don’t think we’re there yet…I don’t see the urgent need for a change. 
56 
The notion of the PE, as conceived by the League of Nations, also acts as a check on 
governments’ propensity to exercise their taxing power based on insignificant presence within 
their jurisdictions. The PE threshold is higher than the British test. Its starting point is similar to 
the latter in that it encompasses the notion that a foreign corporation is taxable on its business 
profits only if it trades in rather than with a country. To trade in (or within) a country implies 
some form of economic presence that is substantial enough to justify taxing jurisdiction in terms 
of the benefit theory. The PE rule rationalises this initial test. It defines the depth of the 
economic presence required of an enterprise within a country in order to legitimately enable 
the taxation of that enterprise’s income. To reach that necessary depth of presence, an 
enterprise must exhibit a certain ‘stability, productivity and dependence’57 relative to the place 
where it operates. These requirements are satisfied if the enterprise operates from a fixed 
place of business. A fixed place of business is one which is established at a particular 
geographical location and is characterised by a degree of permanence, that is, one which is not 
temporary or tentative in character. The PE concept as wrought out by the League 
encompasses all these attributes, and its emergence was regarded as a fundamental 
breakthrough in the search for an appropriate jurisdictional rule. 
Nonetheless, while on a conceptual basis the PE was generally accepted as the optimum 
solution to the problem of allocating tax jurisdiction, consensus was more difficult to achieve 
with regard to the exact parameters of the notion. Thus, for example, the League of Nations 
Mexico Draft of 194358 provides a very wide definition of the PE concept. It has even been 
argued that under the Mexico Model ‘business profits could be taxed by the source state 
regardless of the existence of a PE, provided that the relevant activities did not merely take the 
form of isolated or occasional transactions.’59  
                                                             
56  A. Fernandez & T.F. Field, ‘Canadian Tax Foundation Holds First World Tax Conference’, (6 March 2000) 20 
Tax Notes Int’l (No. 10) 1056, at 1059. 
57 Krishna, supra note 49, at 41. 
58 Fiscal Committee, London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions, Commentary and Texts  League of Nations 
Document C. 88. M. 88. 1946. II. A., (November 1946) in Legislative History of United States Tax 
Conventions, Volume 4: Model Tax Conventions,  (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 
Articles IV(1) and IV(2), at 4319 and 4380 respectively. 
59 See S. Zapata, ‘The Latin American Approach to the Concept of Permanent Establishment in Tax treaties With 
Developed Countries’ (June 1998) 52 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, (No. 6) 252. 
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The United Nations Model Convention maintains, in general, the PE concept as in the OECD 
Model whose foundation was the League of Nations London Draft.60 Nevertheless, the U.N. 
Model’s definition of the PE is wider than that proposed in the OECD Model. Thus, the U.N. 
Model recognises a restricted ‘force of attraction’ principle according to which profits from 
direct sales and other business activities derived directly by the non-resident enterprise are 
also attributable to that PE.61 As for country practices in this area, they often differ markedly. 
Thus, in order to safeguard their interests, countries have routinely created ‘PE fictions’ which 
differ from the standard of the model conventions in several ways. 
Professor Richard Pomp has conducted in-depth studies of these difficult threshold questions 
applicable to a formulary system.62 In his view, there is a fundamental relationship between an 
apportionment formula and the jurisdictional threshold rules. This relationship may be 
illustrated by means of an example. Income arising from the manufacture of goods in one 
country and sales in another has an economic nexus in both the country of manufacture and the 
country of sale. Accordingly, in a combined reporting system the income is shared between the 
two jurisdictions. In the traditional system, taxing rights arise in the jurisdiction of the sales only 
if the sales are made through a PE of the manufacturing enterprise. Increasingly, however, 
especially with emerging technologies, an enterprise may conduct substantial business 
operations in a source country without establishing a level of presence that would be 
considered a PE pursuant to the provisions of Article 5 of the OECD Model. Therefore, if the 
high tax threshold embodied in the PE concept were to be adopted in a formulary-based 
system, TNCs might seek to avoid tax in one jurisdiction by deliberately structuring their 
presence so as to preclude the emergence of a PE. With this in mind, Pomp proposes, as an 
acceptable threshold, in lieu of the traditional PE, a certain level of market penetration 
evidenced by the level of gross receipts derived in a particular country.63 
                                                             
60 United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Model Double 
Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries  (United Nations publication ST/ESA/102, 
1980); League of Nations, Fiscal Committee, London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions, Commentary and 
Texts , supra note 58, at 4333. 
61 According to Sonia Zapata, ‘the principle is said to be a “restricted” one because the rule does not apply to all 
kinds of sales or activities effected by the non-resident, but only to those of the “same” or “similar” kind to 
those effected through the PE.’ See Zapata, supra note 59, at 253. 
62 Pomp, supra note 25, at 813. 
63 This entails a clear definition of sales as an apportionment factor. This issue will be examined in Chapter 7. The 
level of market penetration is an economically meaningful jurisdictional standard since it makes no sense that an 
enterprise capable of building a turnkey factory in a foreign country in a period of five months for $10 million 
should escape taxation merely because it did not have a permanent establishment (PE) as conceived in the 
conventional treaties. See Pomp, supra note 25, at 813-14 n 64. Obviously, any proposal at modifying the PE 
concept is an eminently political question rather than a pure technical one. 
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The objective of a threshold rule is to ensure that a particular jurisdiction obtains a fair share of 
tax revenue. In line with the OECD’s current thinking on this question, it is submitted that such 
a rule needs to reflect a jurisdiction’s commercial and economic contribution to the value 
created by a TNC operating within its bounds.64 In other words, what needs to be determined 
is the value added by the jurisdiction through it providing the necessary infrastructure for the 
derivation of that income by the TNC. To determine such value, one needs to focus on the 
activities of the TNC by submitting it to a comprehensive functional analysis. Income is derived 
primarily through commercial activities relying upon the ‘benefits’ provided by the jurisdiction 
as well as on the enterprise’s ability to exploit its own resources through the assets it uses and 
the risks it assumes. It follows that, in order to determine the quantum of profits resulting from 
such activities, one must consider all the factors whose presence in a particular location have 
contributed to the creation of income. Hence, one finds the relationship between 
apportionment factors and the jurisdictional rule. In other words, the focus must be on such 
factors, which, if present, should be regarded as equivalent to an enterprise having a PE in that 
jurisdiction. Put differently, if a TNC has apportionment factors in a country, then that 
enterprise is deemed to have a PE in that country. 65 Accordingly, the presence of such factors 
should be regarded as a sufficient connecting factor equivalent to the enterprise having a PE in 
that jurisdiction. Furthermore, this rule enables a particular jurisdiction to tax income 
attributable to the economic contribution made by factors located with the PE whether such 
income arises within or without that jurisdiction. It thus satisfies the theoretical objective of 
formulary apportionment, which, as examined earlier, is designed to capture such contributions 
regardless of where they arise. 
In a sense, therefore, this threshold rule comes close to the PE concept as defined in the 
OECD Model. However, it expands that concept by emphasising economic rather than purely 
legal relationships. It therefore fits the theory of economic allegiance as studied in Chapter 1. 
Moreover, a threshold rule of this nature is less likely to be avoided because it is consistent 
with the rules defining apportionment factors.66 Finally, if a TNC operates in several 
                                                             
64 See Australia, ‘Improving Australia’s International Tax Regime’ in Review of Business Taxation: A Tax System 
Redesigned, (Ralph Report) (Canberra: AGPS, 1999), at 686. 
65 McIntyre, supra note 2, at 789. 
66 Note, however, that the adoption of formulary apportio nment does not eliminate all possibilities for tax 
evasion. Theoretically, an enterprise may move its assets and employees to jurisdictions with low tax rates. 
However, manipulation of formula-based allocations would require an enterprise to incur real economic costs - 
those of moving assets or employees rather than just adjusting its bookkeeping entries. In addition, since the 
rationale for the formula is that its factors represent the situs of the enterprise’s economic activity, it follows 
that if an enterprise moves its assets and employees to another country, then the latter should tax a greater 
share of the enterprise’s income because it has become the situs of a greater portion of the enterprise’s 
economic activity. See A. Bhansali, ‘Globalizing Consolidated Taxation of United States Multinationals’, 4 
Texas Law Review (1996) 1401, at 1415 n 58. 
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jurisdictions through subsidiaries, then those subsidiaries are automatically regarded as PEs of 
the enterprise since, as shown, the proposed threshold rule focuses on economic rather than 
legal relationships. Thus, the whole purpose of global formulary apportionment, which is to 
treat ‘a group of affiliated companies as a common enterprise operating in branch form’67, is 
fully achieved. 
B The Unitary Business Concept Revisited  
Critics of the global formulary apportionment methodology have often argued that the apparent 
problems of defining a unitary business is one of the insurmountable difficulties inherent to the 
method.68 It is worthy to note, again, that what prevents the adoption of global formulary 
apportionment is the strong political opposition to the method rather than its inherent technical 
difficulties. Such opposition may well have been stirred by the TNCs, given that the 
implementation of global formulary apportionment could eliminate the almost intractable 
transfer pricing problems faced by tax authorities and, therefore, hinder their ability to minimise 
their overall tax burden by curtailing their ability to engage in aggressive tax planning.69 TNCs 
operating in California, for example, cannot claim that the method is unfamiliar to them. Their 
opposition to it may well stem from the fact that they do not want the methodology to be 
applied on a worldwide basis.70 Moreover, national governments are convinced that global 
formulary apportionment is a tax grab exercise by the U.S. and hinders the competitiveness of 
their national enterprises. They would rather, it would appear, risk a constant erosion of their 
tax revenue through, for example, a steady decrease of effective tax rates than forego their so-
                                                             
67 McIntyre, supra note 2, at 790. 
68 See, for example, E. Coffill & P. Wilson, ‘Federal Formulary Apportionment as an Alternative to Arm’s Length 
Pricing: From the Frying Pan to the Fire?’, (24 May 1993) Tax Notes 1103. 
69 It has been suggested that the opportunity to engage in transfer pricing is a major reason for the existence of 
TNCs. Transfer pricing provides these enterprises with a potential method of reducing the inefficiencies 
resulting from the discrepancies in tax rates among jurisdictions. See R.S. Avi-Yonah ‘The Structure of 
International Taxation’, (1996) 74 Texas Law Review  1301, at 1341. Pagan & Wilkie have recently argued that 
TNCs do not deliberately engage in international transfer pricing; see J. Pagan & S. Wilkie, Transfer Pricing 
Strategy in a Global Economy (IBFD Publications, 1993). However, evidence to the contrary is available from 
various sources. In this regard, see, for example, General Accounting Office, IRS Could Better Protect U.S. Tax 
Interests in Determining the Income of Multinational Corporations in The Auditor-General, Australian Taxation 
Office: International Profit Shifting, Efficiency Audit Report  (Canberra: AGPS, November 1987) 18. See also R. 
Altshuler & T.S. Newlon, ‘Effects of Tax Planning on the Foreign Income Flows of U.S. Multinational 
Corporations’, (1991) 84th Conf. on Tax’n, Nat’l Tax Ass’n, 205. For an insight into the connections between 
tax evasion, tax havens and Offshore Finance Centres, see M.P. Hampton, ‘Exploring the Offshore Interface: 
The Relationship Between Tax Havens, Tax Evasion, Corruption and Economic Development’ (1996) 24 
Crime Law &Social Change, at 293-317. 
70 As a result of the appreciation of the yen against the dollar in the late 1990s, Japanese TNCs were actually 
returning less income in California at the height of the dispute regarding WWCR. This opposition from these 
firms may be explained by their fear that the Californian system ‘would be replicated throughout the Pacific 
Rim’; see Pomp, supra note 25, at 797. 
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called tax sovereignty. In truth, by perpetuating the existing international tax system, countries 
may not appear to lose their tax sovereignty, but they are surely losing tax revenue.71 
In any event, the issue that needs to be dealt with at this stage is whether the unitary business 
principle, as evolved in the American states’ taxation context should be transposed to the 
model proposed in this thesis. At the outset, it is important to note that the concept of the 
unitary business has evolved in the U.S. in such a way as to satisfy the Due Process Clause of 
the American Constitution. Consequently, the concept is a non-essential element in the context 
of the proposed model. It follows that the objections to global formulary apportionment 
relative to the difficulties of determining a unitary business are not relevant here. Most countries 
already tax resident corporations on their worldwide income. A move to formulary 
apportionment would simply mean that a corporation would be required to file a combined 
statement as to its worldwide profits. However, one problem remains: that of finding an 
acceptable criterion for defining the scope of a business subject to global formulary 
apportionment. In other words, should an enterprise with different business lines still be 
required to file a combined report? Frank Keesling, the father of the extended unitary business 
concept, has advocated a radical solution to the problem of defining the scope of a unitary 
business. He has argued that ‘all income from commonly owned business activities should be 
combined and apportioned by a single formula whether or not such activities are unitary.’72 He 
justified his argument on the grounds of simplicity, uniformity and ease of administration.  
Keesling questioned the popular concept that there are unitary and non-unitary businesses. 
The starting point of his argument is the fact of common ownership. Indeed, there is consensus 
on this particular point: there cannot be a unitary business if there is no common ownership as 
between the various components or affiliates constituting a group. Keesling parts company 
with mainstream thinking in this area when he wrote: ‘At this point, it is questionable whether 
there is such a thing as a non-unitary business.’73 If there is common ownership, then, in 
Keesling’s view, certain amounts of common management as well as centralised performance 
of certain functions are bound to occur. Common ownership, therefore, brings a certain 
                                                             
71 In a release summarising his intervention at a Treasury conference of formulary apportionment held on 12 
December 1996, Senator Byron Dorgan claimed that under the separate entity/arm’s length standard, the U.S. 
fails to collect at least $10-15 billion in taxes each year. See Tax Analysts Document Number: Doc 96-32099. In 
his most recent allegation, Senator Dorgan, relying on a study by two Florida International University 
Professors, Simon J. Pak and John S. Zdanowicz, claims that TNCs avoid paying at least $35 billion a year to 
the IRS. However, the methodology of this study has been questioned. See R.A. Clark, ‘Dorgan’s Charges of 
Transfer Pricing Abuse Unfounded’, (31 May 1999) 18 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 22) 2263. 
72 F. Keesling, ‘A Current Look at the Combined Report and Uniformity in Allocation Practices’, (1975) 42 J. 
Tax’n 106. 
73 Id., at 109. 
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degree of integration regardless of whether the integrated businesses are engaged in diverse 
industries. Professor Pomp, formulates the same view: 
[A] corporation’s unitary business can be defined in various ways from the most specific to the 
most general. To illustrate, consider a corporation that manufactures widgets for use in the 
aerospace industry. On the least general level, the corporation could be described as conducting a 
unitary business of manufacturing widgets for the aerospace industry. On a slightly more general 
level, the unitary business could be described as manufacturing widgets. More generally, the 
unitary business could be described as a manufacturer. On the most general level, the corporation 
could be described as in the business of allocating its resources to maximise its internal rate of 
return. 74 
It follows that all of the corporate group’s activities and all of its profits would constitute a 
unitary business. Therefore, the simple fact that a business is fully integrated means that it 
should be considered a ‘unitary business’.75 
These arguments are eminently persuasive. A business does not commence operations in 
several different industries simultaneously. If it wishes to expand outside the particular industry 
where it operates, it usually uses its own accumulated resources, looks for new equity or 
obtains loan finance on the strength of its reputation in the market. Therefore, it can be argued 
that, in many instances, the original business has contributed significantly to the setting up of the 
new operations. For example, often, key personnel of the original business would be used to 
provide management expertise to the new business. In addition, it is quite common for different 
business lines, and indeed different entities within a group, to share expenses and other 
overheads, or participate in research and development efforts through the so-called cost 
sharing agreements. 
There are several advantages in adopting the accepted view that, by its very nature, a TNC is 
a unitary business. To start with, the difficulties of defining a unitary business along the 
American states’ practice would presumably disappear. So would the often-intractable 
administrative problems that still plague the application of the unitary concept in the U.S. 
Compliance would therefore be much easier to achieve.76 The rule would be simple and 
devoid of all these fine lines which are so easily misconstrued by either taxpayers or the 
                                                             
74 Pomp, supra note 25, at 805. 
75 R.M. Bird, ‘A View From the North’, (1994) 49 Tax Law Review  745, at 752. See also R.M. Bird, ‘Shaping a 
New International Tax Order’, (1988) 42 Bull Int’l Fiscal Documentation 292; R.M. Bird & D.J.S. Bream, ‘The 
Interjurisdictional Allocation of Income and the Unitary Tax Debate, (November/December 1986) 34 Canadian 
Tax Journal 1377. 
76  According to Binh Tran-Nam, ‘administrative costs are the costs to the government of collecting taxes and 
compliance costs the value of scarce resources expended by taxpayers in meeting their tax obligations. The sum 
of administrative and compliance costs are conceptually analogous to transaction costs of market activities.’ See 
Binh Tran-Nam, ‘Tax Reform and Tax Simplification: Some Conceptual Issues and a Preliminary Assessment’, 
(1999) 21 Sydney Law Review 500. 
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administration and, therefore, resulting in expensive and time-consuming litigation. Thus, from 
this point onwards, the term global formulary apportionment will refer to the broad application 
of a formula for the apportionment of the consolidated profits of a TNC without reference to 
the unitary character of such enterprises. 
A remaining problem is the level of ownership that would trigger the combined report. In 
California, the rule is that in order for combined reporting to occur more than 50 per cent of a 
corporation’s voting stock must be held directly or indirectly by another corporation.77 
Tennessee, by contrast, uses an 80 per cent test similar to the federal rules on electing 
consolidated return treatment.78  
Whatever the proposed threshold of common ownership, there will always be arguments 
demonstrating the arbitrariness of the figure. Indeed, the percentage of voting stocks enabling 
control is never definite. Rather, this figure depends on stock dispersion which, if wide, 
enables control to be achieved with a much lower threshold. 
In 1980 Eugene Corrigan proposed that the 50 per cent threshold be construed as 
presumptive evidence that two or more firms constitute a unitary business.79 This means that if 
the 50 per cent threshold appears to be too generous or restrictive, evidence may be adduced 
to that effect and a new threshold determined. Professor Charles McLure criticised this 
proposal.80 In his view, Corrigan’s proposal amounts to treating firms in the manufacturing 
sector differently to those in other sectors. In the first case the presumptive standard would be 
maintained, while in the other sectors ‘special consideration’ should be given before deciding 
on the appropriate threshold of ownership. McLure further argued that if special consideration 
were to be given to any sector, firms would by artificial means contrive to be classified in that 
sector. McLure’s argument reveals his unwillingness to consider firms operating in different 
sectors to be unitary. He rightly claims that, for example, the three-factor formula does not 
operate well when applied to the finance and service sector. It would seem though that the 
question at issue here is not so much the likely effects of a formula, but rather whether or not a 
group of companies is unitary. The appropriateness of any formula used can only be assessed 
after determining whether or not a unitary business is present. 
Corrigan’s proposal has some merit although it tends to move away from the objective test of 
a definite percentage of ownership. In certain cases, the most appropriate level of ownership 
                                                             
77 Keesling, supra note 72, at 109. A more than 50 per cent test is relatively easy to manipulate as shown with 
the Subpart F requirements of the IRC (IRC § 957(a)). See also Pomp, supra note 25, at 809 n 45. 
78 Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4812(c)(2) (1994). 
79 E. Corrigan, ‘Towards Uniformity in Interstate Taxation’, (15 September 1980) Tax Notes  507. 
80 McLure, Jr., supra note 8, at 134-36. 
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could be linked to the concept of control. If a corporate shareholder has effective control of a 
company, or has potential control of that company by virtue of its share ownership relative to 
the rest of the shareholding, then the two companies should file a combined report. This test 
would entail an analysis of each group of companies on a case-by-case basis. However, 
individual analysis could be avoided if the companies, on lodgement of their return, are 
required to declare whether or not they are in control as defined above. 
In any event, it is submitted that, for general purposes, a 50 percent ownership is an 
appropriate and objective test which, as Professor Pomp notes, has the additional merit of 
including legitimate joint ventures in a combined report.81 However, if it were to be shown that, 
in certain cases, a 50 per cent level of ownership is inadequate 82, then, as a matter of 
exception, a more appropriate level would need to be determined. Moreover, if there were to 
be any dispute concerning these questions, then the dispute resolution procedure could be 
invoked to determine the appropriate solution on a facts-and-circumstances basis.83 
Two other issues need to be examined: These are the determination of the tax base and the 
choice of appropriate formulas to apportion that base. Prior to doing so, the question relative 
to the creation of an international organisation to administer the proposed global formulary 
system must be addressed. The two main functions of this organisation would be to determine 
the pre-apportionment base and the apportionment formulas to  be used for allocating to 
various countries an appropriate share of the latter. However, before adopting this 
internationalist stance, it may be opportune to consider the implementation of global formulary 
apportionment on a more modest scale, that is, within an existing trading bloc. 
C The Trading Bloc As a Testing Ground for Formulary Apportionment 
The gradual emergence of the European Union (EU) as a significant economic unit may have 
convinced other countries of the advantages of a free market. Thus, for example, the creation 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),84 the Asia-Pacific Economic 
                                                             
81 Pomp, supra note 25, at 809. 
82 In this regard, the control rule as provided by the Australian Controlled Foreign Companies Legislation, Part X 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 provides for a strict control test whereby a foreign company is regarded as a 
CFC if a group of five or fewer Australian entities hold at least 50 per cent associate-inclusive control interest 
in the foreign company. To prevent manipulation of this rule, alternative tests based on an economic concept of 
control and the de facto control test are provided for in the legislation. There are two de facto tests referred to as 
the objective de facto control test and the subjective de facto control test; see L. Burns, Controlled Foreign 
Companies  (Melbourne: Longman Professional, 1992), at 18 para. 2-050. 
83 P.R. McDaniel, ‘Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone’, (1994a) 49 Tax Law Review 
691, at 712. 
84 See L. Eden, ‘The Emerging North American Investment Regime’, (December 1996) 5 Transnational 
Corporation,  (No. 3) 61. 
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Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),85 and the Indian 
Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation may be construed as an effort to duplicate 
the advantages achieved by the EU members. The development of such homogeneous trade 
blocs may well create novel problems in the taxation area. Conversely, if it is agreed that there 
are conceptual and practical links between trade policy and tax policy,86 then it is arguable that 
the presence of trading blocs may simplify the international tax problem. Indeed, if various 
trading blocs were to emerge, it may well be that, ultimately, the international tax problem 
would be that of adjusting the tax principles prevailing in a few major trading blocs in lieu of 
the seemingly impossible present task of coordinating the tax systems of numerous individual 
nations.87 
There have been numerous calls for the testing of some type of global formula apportionment 
within a homogeneous trading bloc such as NAFTA.88 It would seem that the EU offers such 
an ideal testing ground. It has moved to create a single market, a single currency, and is in the 
process of harmonising its accounting principles.89 In addition, since 1989 the European 
Commission has been exploring the possibility of a single European company (Societé 
Européenne or SE), which would be considered as a European company rather than an entity 
of a single member country. The profits of the SE would presumably be computed on a 
consolidated basis thus duplicating to some extent the conditions for the emergence of the U.S. 
concept of the unitary business.90 
The difficulties that both NAFTA and the EU would have to address, if they were to replace 
the separate accounting/arm’s length standard with some form of formulary apportionment 
may be regarded as less daunting compared with the prospect of implementing the system on a 
worldwide basis. Yet, even in these restricted environments objections abound. It is submitted 
that the first step in that direction would be the realisation that, in a common market as exists in 
                                                             
85  See at <www.us-asean.org>. For tax policy questions in the ASEAN, see H. Wunder, ‘Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations: Economic and Political Structure and Tax Policy’, (14 February 2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 7) 
763. 
86 This is a debatable issue. See New York University School of Law, ‘Colloquium on NAFTA and Taxation’, 49 
Tax L. Rev , at 525- 795. 
87 R.J. Vann, ‘A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region?’ (1991) 45 Bull Int’l Fiscal Documentation (Part 
I) 99. 
88 R.S. McIntyre & M.J. McIntyre, ‘Using NAFTA to Introduce Formulary Apportionment’, (April 5, 1993) 6 
Tax Notes Int’l (No. 14) 851; and PR McDaniel,  supra note 83, at 691. See also P.R. McDaniel, ‘NAFTA and 
Formulary Apportionment: An Exploration of the Issues’, (1994b) 3 Intertax 105. 
89 McLure, Jr., & Weiner, supra note 21. 
90 Sven-Olof Lodin & M. Gammie, ‘The Taxation of the European Company’, (1999) 39 European Taxation (No. 
8) 286. 
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the EU and as ultimately envisioned by NAFTA, a formulary apportionment methodology is 
the more logical method of allocating revenues among member countries.91  
The implementation of formulary apportionment in either NAFTA or the EU requires 
addressing such issues as the jurisdictional threshold question or the definition of the tax base. 
As for the nexus question, there arises the problem of the adequacy of the permanent 
establishment concept. If found to be inadequate for modern trading, then NAFTA and the 
EU would need to refine the standard to suit the evolution in business methods. Moreover, an 
acceptable definition of the taxable base is imperative. Should the distinction between business 
and non-business income as provided for by section 4 of the Uniform Division of Income for 
Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) in the American states’ context be transposed to these 
environments? What is the status of portfolio business income? Should it be allocated 
separately to the state of ‘commercial domicile’? 
One of the most contentious issues in the context of the American states’ taxation is the 
definition of the taxable unit, that is, the definition of a unitary business. Should the concept be 
transposed in the EU, as it would appear to be the case with the concept of the SE, or made 
applicable within NAFTA? In addition, there also arises the question of whether to include a 
corporation’s worldwide income and factors in the apportionment formulas, or whether 
NAFTA and the EU should elect to confine the base to the ‘water’s-edge’ concept. 
Harmonised solutions to such questions are critical if double taxation is to be avoided and if 
the concept of neutral taxation is to be the guiding principle within the trading blocs.  
Another important issue relates to the treatment to be afforded to the transactions carried out 
between the various unitary businesses of one enterprise. It has been suggested that the arm’s 
length principle be applicable to such situations.92 To Professor McDaniel, this is not the 
optimal solution, as it would entail applying both formulary apportionment and the arm’s length 
standard to TNCs, leading to unnecessary complications and compliance costs. In his view, if 
there is a significant level of transactions between supposedly separate unitary businesses, then 
a strong presumption is created to the effect that there is only one single unitary business. The 
burden of proof to the contrary should then rest with the TNC. They would be allowed to use 
the arm’s length reporting for inter-enterprise transactions if they can provided ultimately that 
                                                             
91 In a common market the driving principle should be a fair division of the tax base. Under the separate 
accounting/arm’s length standard, such a fair division, based as it is on the geographic source of income and the 
national location of a given corporate entity, are generally irrelevant. See McDaniel (1994b), supra  note 88, at 
106. 
92 McIntyre & McIntyre, supra note 88, at 121. 
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this choice does not lead to double taxation or produce a revenue loss for any member 
country.93 
Consensus would also be necessary in the choice of the apportionment formula or formulas. 
Within NAFTA it is unlikely that the adoption of the three-factor formula comprising payroll, 
assets, and sales, would be achieved without some opposition from Canada. Indeed, as 
studied in Chapter 4,94 the Canadian system involves a two-factor formula (sales and payroll) 
which is quite successful. A single sales factor has been advocated but the merits of this are 
debatable.95 Finally, there are also the difficulties of using different formulas for different 
industries and the possibility of manipulation that could arise thereof. 
It is arguable that the eventual implementation of formulary apportionment in the EU would be, 
as a result of the evolution of the tax harmonisation process there, a relatively less 
straightforward exercise. Whilst in both NAFTA and in the EU the difficulties of implementing 
the system are more political than technical, at least two of the NAFTA countries have 
substantial experience in handling the question. In the EU, the situation is quite different. The 
harmonisation effort has had sporadic successes in the field of direct taxation. It will be 
remembered that the Ruding Committee dismissed the method as inappropriate for the EU.96 
In fact, the root of the problem may be traced to the European ‘Constitution’, the Treaty of 
Rome which gave birth to the European Economic Community (EEC), now the European 
Union (EU). The aim of the Treaty of Rome (as amended) is to create a single market 
comprising all Member States. To achieve this, Article 3 of the Treaty seeks: 97 
· the abolition of obstacles to freedom of movement of persons, services, and capital; 
· the institution of a system which ensures that competition in the common market is not 
distorted; and 
· the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the proper 
functioning of the common market. 
                                                             
93 Professor McDaniel believes that the use of the arm’s length standard as a backstop is important, more 
especially if different apportionment formulas are adopted for particular industries. McDaniel (1994b), supra 
note 88, at 113. 
94  See Chapter 4, Section II, 1, A & B, at 143ff. 
95 See R.S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Slicing the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation’, (15 March 
1993) 58 Tax Notes 1511. 
96 The European Communities, Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992), at 129-30 (Ruding Report). 
97 See United Nations Treaty Series, ‘Traité Instituant la Communauté Economique Européenne’, No 4300, Vol. 
294, at 25. 
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Clearly, the authors of the EEC Treaty perceived ‘the need for harmonization of indirect 
taxation at least and specifically provided a juridical basis for such action’,98 for without such 
harmonisation their stated goal would have been unattainable. Moreover, Articles 95 to 99 of 
the Treaty of Rome deal explicitly with the harmonisation of indirect taxes, whereas Article 
100 provides for the approximation of laws, including tax laws, to establish the common 
market. The Treaty, therefore, does not contain any direct authority for dealing with the 
question of direct taxes, save the prohibition of double taxation of Article 220. It has 
nevertheless been accepted that the above provisions, read in conjunction with Article 52 of 
the Treaty prohibiting restriction in the establishment of enterprises in other Member States, 
‘can, with only a slight stretch, be interpreted as requiring harmonising of direct tax systems’.99 
Leaving aside the difficulties faced by the EU in its attempt to achieve the harmonisation of 
direct taxes, attention is drawn to the new environment created by the Maastricht Treaty100 
and the Treaty of Amsterdam101 which entered into force on 1 May 1999.102 
The amendments to the Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act wrought out by these 
two treaties, while reaffirming certain principles of Community Law, nonetheless, compounded 
the difficulties faced by the EU in its effort to achieve a harmonised tax system. Thus, the need 
to preserve the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of unanimity in the decision-making 
process upheld by such amendments do not facilitate the emergence of a European tax 
                                                             
98 A. Easson, ‘Harmonisation of Direct Taxation in the EEC’, (1992 a) 40 Canadian Tax Journal 3, at 602. 
99 C.E. McLure, Jr., ‘Coordinating Business Taxation in the Single European Market: The Ruding Committee 
Report’, (1992) 1  EC Tax Review 13. 
100 Treaty on European Union-Concluded at Maastricht on 7 February 1992, (1993) United Nations Treaty Series 
Vol. 1757, I. No. 30615. 
101 Treaty of Amsterdam signed on 2 October 1997, (1998) 37 ILM 56. 
102  Four basic treaties contain EU primary law:  
· the treaty establishing the European Community or TEC. This is consolidated version of the original 
1957 Treaty of Rome resulting in the 1997 Treat y of Amsterdam and its previous amendments and 
containing the institutional and substantive provisions of EC law; 
· the Treaty on European Union, or TEU. This is the consolidation version of the then 1992 Treaty of 
Maastricht, resulting in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and containing the fundamental rules on 
establishing the European Union starting in 1993;  
· the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, or ECSC, approved in Paris in 1951 and containing 
common rules for the coal and steel sector; and  
· the Europ ean Atomic Energy Community Treaty, or Euratom, approved in Rome in 1957 and 
containing the common rules and policies on atomic energy.  
 A report released on 14 May 2000 by the Robert Schuman Centre of the Florence European University 
Institute, Reorganiz ation of the European Treaties proposes the introduction of a new Basic Treaty on 
European Union that reorganise the legal framework of EU law. See P. Carlo, Report on Reorganization of EU 
Treaties Will Affect EU Tax Law, Tax Analysts Document No: Doc 2000-15676 (24 May 2000). 
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system.103 In the context of company taxation, the principle of subsidiarity mandates the EU’s 
action only if the interaction of different corporate systems across the EU results in serious 
distortions in the single market. The form of such action is on the coordination and 
approximation of policies rather than harmonisation.104  
The eventual adoption of a formulary apportionment methodology with a uniform definition of 
the tax base, uniform measurement of apportionment factors, and perhaps a uniform tax 
administration system could be, arguably, a violation of the principle of subsidiarity since it 
entails a loss of fiscal autonomy by Member States. In the EU, therefore, there is a challenge 
to reconcile uniformity and subsidiarity. It may well be that a form of equalisation, as present in 
Canada, would need to be implemented in the EU to overcome the eventual opposition of 
those Member States that would lose revenue as a result of the redistribution of the tax base 
that the introduction of formulary apportionment would entail. If this were to be achieved, then 
the application of formulary apportionment would be less problematic. 
A final point needs to be mentioned. If the formulary apportionment methodology were made 
to apply within a trading bloc, then the problem of interface with the rest of the world using the 
separate accounting/arm’s length standard would require attention. It would thus be necessary 
to develop an adequate mechanism to ensure that international double taxation does not result 
from this interaction.105 
Under a formulary system within the trading bloc certain administrative and procedural issues 
would need to be resolved. Businesses operating within the trading bloc would need to file 
consolidated returns or some form of combined returns with each country. A reliable system of 
exchange of information in tandem with a reinforced competent authority procedure would be 
essential. To cater for inevitable disputes some form of innovative dispute resolution involving 
the taxpayer would have to be put into place. In this regard, and as examined earlier, an 
arbitration procedure would have several advantages. To conclude, it is interesting to 
speculate on the relations between NAFTA and the EU if both were to adopt a formulary 
apportionment system. In such a scenario, a duplication of functions could be avoided if the 
two blocs could set up an organisation to deal with the procedural and technical aspects of the 
                                                             
103 F. Vanistendael, ‘The Limits to the New Community Tax Order’, (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review, at 
293-314. 
104 See M. Van Heukelen, ‘The Assignment of Corporate Tax Competencies in the European Community’, (1990) 
mimeo in McLure, Jr., & Weiner, supra note 21, at 30. 
105 According to Professor McDaniel, if a worldwide formula apportionment were used within the trading bloc, it 
would be rather simple to deal with tax haven activities. Under the so-called throwback rule, any of the factors, 
for example sales, otherwise attributable to a tax haven would be ignored. Consequently, each member would 
benefit from the share otherwise attributable to the tax haven. See McDaniel (1994a), supra note 83, at 733. 
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system.106 Nonetheless, in the model proposed in this thesis, these procedural matters would 
be handled by an international tax organisation. 
Section II: An Appropriate Environment for the 
Implementation of Global Formulary 
Apportionment 
This thesis is premised on the argument that it is time to implement a systemic rather than a 
cosmetic change to the prevailing system of international taxation. This entails the creation of 
an international organisation by way of a multilateral treaty to administer the nascent system. In 
fact, a multilateral treaty to replace the whole network of bilateral treaties is often portrayed as 
capable of solving some of the shortcomings of the present system of international taxation. 107 
1 A Multilateral Approach to International Taxation 
Obviously a fair division of the tax take cannot be envisaged without enhanced international 
cooperation, which exists in areas of common interest already exists and the vehicle for such 
cooperation is the multilateral treaty. For instance, one of the most recent multilateral treaties 
concerns the reduction of carbon emission for the protection of the ozone layer and the 
prevention of global warming.108 The non-existence of a multinational tax treaty and the 
resistance to its implementation is indeed an anachronism in today’s global economic 
integration. 
A The Characteristics of Multilateral Treaties  
As early as 1928 the option of a multilateral tax treaty was explored by the League of 
Nations.109 Unfortunately, an inter-governmental meeting designed to consider the proposals 
                                                             
106 A North Atlantic Tax Organisation? 
107 Since the inception of the League of Nations’ work on the problem of double taxation as described in Chapter 2, 
the possibility of a multilateral model had been canvassed. Thus, T.S. Adams, the U.S. representative with the 
League ‘pressed for a multilat eral solution to the problem of international taxation, despairing of the 
complexity, administrability, and manipulatibility of taxation under a large number of bilateral tax treaties.’ See 
Graetz & O’Hear , supra  note 53, at 1105. 
108 See the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, U.K.T.S. 1 (1990), Cm 910, and the 
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.K.T.S. 19 (1990), Cm 977. See also 
the United Nations framework Convention on Climate Change signed on 9 May 1992 in New York and the 
Kyoto Protocol to that Convention, at <http://www.unfccc.de/>. 
109 Earlier, on 12 October 1923, a multilateral tax treaty was signed between Austria, Hungary, Poland, Italy, 
Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; see M. Lang, ‘The Concept of a Multilateral Tax 
Treaty’, in M. Lang, ed., Multilateral Tax Treaties: New Developments in International Tax Law, (Kluwer Law 
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failed to achieve this objective. In recent years, a certain number of multilateral tax treaties 
have come into existence, for example, the Organisation Commune Africaine Malgache et 
Mauricienne (OCAM) Treaty of 1971, the Arab Treaty of 1972, the Nordic Tax Convention, 
the Andean Tax Treaty of 1972, and the Double Taxation of the Caribbean Community (the 
CARICOM group) of 1974.110  Of these, only the last three are in operation. 111 
Both the OECD and the U.N. have entertained hopes that their bilateral treaties would 
eventually evolve into multilateral treaties. It would seem, therefore, that a multilateral 
approach has always been regarded as having the potential to solve the inherent defects of the 
bilateral treaties.112 Unfortunately, this evolutionary change to multilateralism has not yet 
occurred. It never will unless ‘some fundamental shift in circumstances favourable to change’ 
first occurs.113 To date, experiments in regional multilateral tax treaties have met with limited 
success.114 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
International, 1998) 189, at 189. See also P.A. Harris, Corporate Shareholder Income Taxation and Allocating 
Taxing Rights Between Countries, (Amsterdam: IBFD Publication BV, 1996), at 298. 
110 CARICOM members are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
See Lang, ed., supra  note 109, at 88 n 3. Two multilateral tax treaties have also been concluded by Member 
States of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance also referred to as COMECON), that is, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the 
Soviet Union. The first treaty, the convention with respect to the avoidance of double taxation on income and 
net wealth of individuals, was signed on 27 May 1977 in Miskolc, Hungary. A similar treaty for the avoidance 
of double taxation with respect to income and capital of legal entities was signed on 19 May 1978 in Ulan 
Bator, Mongolia. The treaties were made effective from 1 January 1979. Although the CMEA as such no longer 
exists, both tax treaties are still applicable and the relationship among the CMEA countries in the field of 
international taxation is to a large extent still regulated by these multilateral agreements. See W.G. Kuiper, ‘The 
Multilateral CMEA Tax Treaty and its Relevance Today’, IBFD (1991) LEXIS/NEXIS database File IBFD. 
See also T. Nagy, ‘Multilateral Tax Agreements and Tax Coordination in the CMEA’, (1979) 19 European 
Taxation 379. 
111 H.M.A.L Hamaekers, ‘Multilateral Instruments on the Avoidance of Double Taxation’, (1986) 40 Bull Int’l 
Fiscal Documentation 99. 
112 Divergent bilateral tax treaties concluded between members of the EU may even be multilateralised, eventually, 
through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. See J. Schuch, ‘The Bilateral Tax Treaties 
Multilateralized by the EC Treaty’, in M. Lang, ed., supra note 109, at 35. 
113 R.J. Vann, ‘A Model Tax Treaty For the Asian-Pacific Region?’, (1991) 45 Bull Int’l Fiscal Documentation 
(No. 3) Part II, 151. 
114 Note, however, that  on 31 May 1996 the newly created Quadripartite Community within the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) (that is, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldava, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) announced that it would soon take initial 
steps toward the conclusion of a multilateral tax convention. See D.M. Henry, ‘New CIS Quadripartite 
Community to Explore Multilateral Tax Treaty’, 96 TNI 106-4. On 25 November 1998 eight members of the 
CIS signed an agreement on the principles of imposing indirect taxes on the export and import of goods and 
services on the destination principle. See S. Adamian, ‘Eight CIS Member Countries Sign Indirect Tax 
Agreement’ (21 June 1999) 18 Tax Notes Int’l 2545. On 4 June 1999, 11 members signed an agreement to 
cooperate and provide mutual assistance in tax related matters. See S. Adamian, ‘CIS Member Countries Sign 
Tax Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance’, (19 July 1999) 19 Tax Notes Int’l 247. 
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One of the fundamental characteristics of multilateral conventions is that they propose rules 
and regulations which are required to be applied and interpreted in a uniform way by their 
signatories. Multilateral conventions are, therefore, more likely to be construed in a uniform 
way. More uniformity of interpretation would be especially valuable in the field of international 
taxation where, even at the bilateral level, the OECD Model has failed to achieve such an 
outcome. Thus, in spite of the OECD Commentaries which aimed at encouraging uniform 
interpretation of the Model, Contracting States often favour interpretations that suit their 
immediate objectives. 
Although a multilateral treaty would presumably establish uniform tax norms in the major areas 
of international tax, thus facilitating the interpretation of uniform tax rules, there is serious doubt 
as to whether agreement could ever be reached on these highly sensitive matters. Certainly the 
fate of a multilateral tax convention covering one single class of income such as the UNESCO-
WIPO Convention on the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Copyright Royalties does 
not promote optimism.115 The Convention was drafted after five years of preparatory work 
and six weeks of experts’ meetings, a three-week diplomatic conference held in 1979. Of the 
44 countries taking part in the conference, only three have signed the Convention. 116 With this 
result as a precedent, it is perhaps unrealistic to believe that a multilateral treaty concerning the 
taxation of TNCs is feasible in the foreseeable future if the same paradigms are maintained. 
Multilateral conventions have their own shortcomings:117 They are often rigid and inflexible, 
and their revision has been described as ‘a heavy and lengthy procedure’.118 In general, one 
third of the countries which have ratified a multilateral convention must support a revision 
proposal before a conference can be organised.119 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to infer that 
                                                             
115 WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organisation), see at <http://www.wipo.org/eng>. 
116 Hamaekers, supra note 110, at 100. 
117 Thus, for example, the headquartering of TNCs within one country undoubtedly enhances the economic 
strength of that country since it often determines whether one country is a capital importer or capital exporter. 
Consequently, if that country were to be party to a multilateral tax treaty, then it is likely that these TNCs 
would, by lobbying the government, manage to influence the latter’s position on the drafting of such provisions 
as the article on associated enterprises and on the right to tax at source inter-company dividends, interest and 
royalties. Once these provisions are drawn, it is difficult, in a multilateral setting, to refine them in order to 
redress their most unfortunate consequences. In a bilateral framework, the differences between different parties 
may be bridged by reciprocal concessions. 
118 Hamaekers, supra note 110, at 100. The problem of amending, revising or modifying treaties appears to have 
attracted little academic attention. The International Law Commission has observed that the enormous variety 
of treaty clauses establishing amendment procedures makes it difficult to trace the development of any detailed 
customary rules. It thus contented itself with formulating a few very basic principles to govern the amendment 
process. These were incorporated with minor modifications as Articles 39-41 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. For an examination of this process, see M.J. Bow man, ‘The Multilateral Treaty Amendment 
Process-A Case Study’, (July 1995) 44 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 540. 
119 Hamaekers, supra note 110, at 100. 
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the amount of effort than would be necessary to revise an eventual multilateral tax treaty would 
not be greater that the aggregate efforts that are necessary to update, on an ongoing basis, the 
current network of bilateral tax treaties. 
Until recently a multilateral tax treaty was simply not conceivable on a worldwide basis. 
Although it may now be argued that the slow convergence of major economies is rendering the 
prospect of a multilateral tax treaty more probable, there still remain serious difficulties 
pertaining to the significant differences in the economic infrastructures and tax traditions among 
the different countries. The world is still a patchwork of nations with different economic 
strengths and different legal systems and tax traditions. Yet, in view of the serious limitations of 
the bilateral alternative, there cannot be any other option: sooner or later serious efforts would 
need to be made in order to produce a comprehensive multilateral tax treaty on income and 
capital.120 While this may be true, it is also important to note that in order to avoid the mistakes 
of the past: 
a multilateral treaty should build on bilateral treaty practice with which individual States are familiar to ensure 
that it will be generally accepted.   [W]e should be satisfied with putting former bilateral treaty practice on a 
multilateral level. For that reason, considerable significance must be given to the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, because the OECD Model Tax Convention has gained extraordinary distinction in bilateral treaty 
practice.  121 
B Attempts at Instituting Multilateral Treaties 
There are currently three multilateral tax treaties in operation: The first is the Nordic Tax 
Convention between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden;122 the second is the 
Andean Treaty between Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru;123 and the third is the 
Double Taxation of the CARICOM Group of 1974.124 Significantly, though, these treaties 
involve regional countries of similar social and economic traditions. The general sentiment is 
that if this type of experiment is attempted in countries of different cultures and traditions, 
                                                             
120 In a recent letter to the OECD Fiscal Committee and to the European Commission, ‘the Austrian Ministry of 
Finance recently suggested reviving the idea of a multilateral tax treaty. The Ministry of Finance believes that a 
multilateral tax convention would be an indispensable prerequisite to implement the single market in the 
European Union. In a single market it would be intolerable for international flows of capital and the 
international movement of individuals and businesses to be distorted through diverging rules of bilateral tax 
conventions or, even worse, through the lack of such conventions, as is the case in the area of inheritance and 
gift taxes. The ministry, therefore, has expressed support for a review of the idea of an EU-wide multilateral 
double taxation convention.’ See F. Rodler, ‘Austria Proposes Multilateral Tax Treaty’, 97 TNI 183-2. 
121  Lang, supra note 109, at 192-3. 
122 The Nordic Countries Multilateral Income and Capital Tax Convention signed on 23 September 1996 has 
replaced the 1972 Nordic Tax Convention; see 98 TNI 9-25. 
123 Chile has since left and Venezuela has joined the Andean Group. See Vann, supra  note 87, at 151. 
124  H.M.M Bierlaagh, ‘The CARICOM Income Tax Agreement for the Avoidance of (Double) Taxation? (March 
2000) 54 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (No. 3) 99. 
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friction is bound to occur, as with the EU, even though in this particular case the economic 
strengths of each is roughly comparable to the others. 
Moreover, even the promotion of regional multilateral treaties may, in certain circumstances, 
be counter-productive. This is because the bilateral mechanism is likely to reappear in relation 
with countries external to the group, with the latter on one side and the former on the other. It 
follows that the ‘adoption of regional norms in dealings by a regional group with outside 
countries then flows back to affect the tax relations within the grouping.’125 Therefore, in order 
for a multilateral tax treaty to be successful, it needs to be signed and implemented by the most 
significant countries of the world.  
The OECD still believes that its bilateral Model Convention could evolve into a multilateral 
convention. However, according to Ken Messere, then Head of the Fiscal Affairs Division of 
the OECD: 
the work done helped to persuade everyone that such a multilateral Convention could never work 
outside a limited number of countries with similar laws and traditions (e.g. the Nordic countries) s o 
there was no point in pursuing the idea. Again, the aim of agreeing a common OECD approach to 
cross-border investment when countries had different tax systems (classical, split rate, imputation, 
etc.) was found after hundreds of pages of documentation and hundreds of hours of discussion to 
be quite unrealistic, and it was accordingly agreed that these matters had to be resolved on a 
bilateral basis, which would take account of the economic relations between two would-be 
Contracting States. 126 
In spite of these difficulties, the resolution adopting the 1977 OECD Model encouraged 
groups of countries to use it as the basis of multilateral negotiations whenever possible. 
Whilst the idea of a comprehensive multilateral treaty on income and capital seems to be 
unattainable, in 1981 the OECD sponsored a bilateral model treaty entitled the Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters, which later became multilateral.127 There are 
indications that this multilateral treaty in the administrative area could be a success. Several 
reasons explain why a multilateral treaty could succeed in the administrative field:  
                                                             
125 Vann, supra note 87, at 151. 
126 K. Messere, ‘The Precursors and Successors of the New OECD Model Tax Convention On Income and 
Capital’, (1993) 33 European Taxation 246, at 249. 
127 OECD, Model Draft Convention for Mutual Administrative Assistance in the Recovery of Tax Claims (Paris: 
OECD, 1981). The OECD Council’s resolution recommending the model to its members referred back to the 
Fiscal Committee the possible future development of multilateral initiatives. On 25 January 1988 the Council of 
Europe and the OECD adopted the final version of the earlier draft under the title, Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters See W.H. Diamond & D.B. Diamond, eds, International Tax Treaties 
of All Nations  (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1988).Vol XXX111 Series B, at 497ff. For an analysis of the 
Convention, see Chapter 3, Section I, 2, A, iii, at 105. 
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· First, the development of a multilateral treaty in the administrative field is not hampered 
by the existence of a large network of bilateral treaties, as in the income tax area 
where their presence could conflict with the aims of the multilateral treaty. 
· Second, the objects of the multilateral treaty are not as ambitious as its bilateral 
counterpart.  
· Third, tax administrations in different jurisdictions have probably more in common in 
terms of objectives and methods.  
· Finally, most tax administrators experience the same type of problems regardless of 
their tax systems when it comes to assessing and collecting taxes and, therefore, they 
are more ready to cooperate in the administration of revenue laws.128 However, this 
cooperation ‘is regarded with considerable suspicion by many multinational groups’ 
because of the belief that ‘the tax authorities in certain countries are more interested 
in doing deals with their counterparts in other countries.’129 
Clearly, if there is not a fundamental shift in the perception of countries, the hopes of an 
evolution of the bilateral treaty into a multilateral one will always fall short of expectations. 
History suggests ‘that simple evolution will not lead to higher and better things for tax treaties 
(multilateralism).’130 The main reason for this pessimism is that nations still want to retain the 
positive side of bilateralism because a move to a multilateral treaty in the field of taxation 
would mean that their sovereignty in fiscal matters would necessarily be eroded. Such erosion 
is still regarded as unacceptable even if the advantages of multilateralism seem to be gathering 
momentum.131 However, there are signs that, although reluctant, countries are now more 
willing to seriously consider these advantages in the field of direct taxation. This can be seen in 
the efforts to combat harmful tax competition. As will be seen further on, the inadequacies of 
purely national tax policies in an increasingly globalised market has led to dramatic changes in 
the relationship among domestic tax systems. Globalisation not only leads to competition 
among businesses in the global market place, but it also has the potential of setting off 
competition between countries which, for the sake of attracting scarce foreign capital, may be 
tempted to alter their taxation structure. Whilst such competition is regarded as intrinsically 
beneficial, it may have some harmful effects arising out of intentional or unintentional 
mismatches between existing tax systems. Clearly, to eliminate those undesirable effects, the 
                                                             
128 Hamaekers, supra note 110, at 100. 
129 I.P.A. Stitt, ‘International Tax: Avoiding Parochialism’, [1997] BTR 19, at 30. 
130 Vann, supra note 87, at 151. 
131 A draft for a multilateral tax treaty based on the OECD Model has recently been proposed. See M. Lang et al., 
‘Draft for a Multilateral Tax Treaty’, in Lang, ed., supra note 109, at 197ff. 
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most efficient means appears to be cooperation on a multilateral basis as proposed by the 
OECD.132 
One of the major tenets of this thesis is that agreement for the worldwide implementation of 
global formulary apportionment needs to be achieved through a multilateral agreement. Such a 
multilateral treaty would also necessarily create an international tax organisation to administer 
the proposed system. Prior to examining the possible ramifications of an international tax 
organisation, it is appropriate to consider the role of existing international organisations in the 
taxation field and consider how they are evolving in the current economic climate. Indeed, 
there are certainly strong indications that some of these organisations are assuming a more 
dynamic role in the determination of tax policy and tax administration of their member 
countries. 
2 A Survey of International Organisations Concerned With 
Taxation 
Virtually every international organisation concerned with broad economic matters is, to a 
varying degree, necessarily concerned with taxation. A number of these organisations have a 
more prominent role than others in taxation matters.133 For the following five, taxation is of a 
major concern: 
· the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); 
· the European Union and the Monetary Union (EMU); 
· the International Monetary Fund (IMF); 
· the Inter-American Centre for Tax Administrations (CIAT);  
· the G-7 of industrialised nations. 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO), formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(the GATT), may also be regarded as concerned with taxation matters, albeit in an indirect 
way. 
A The OECD/IMF Axis 
From a broad point of view, there is a convenient sharing of functions and interests between 
the OECD and the IMF. Thus, the OECD is more concerned with international taxation 
problems affecting primarily developed countries, while the IMF is mainly involved with the 
                                                             
132 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (Paris: OECD, 1998). 
133 R. Goulder, ‘Reference Chart for Leading Multinational Economic and Fiscal Organisations’ (28 June 1999) 18 
Tax Notes Int’l 2603. 
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domestic tax matters of lesser developed countries (LDCs) such as the provision of technical 
assistance for the implementation of sensible tax policies and the creation of sound tax 
administration practices. Therefore, these two organisations may be viewed as complementary 
institutions but each with its own sphere of influence. However, if they are to survive in an 
increasingly interdependent world, clearly they need to coordinate their respective actions. In 
fact, cooperation between the OECD and the IMF is already occurring on a formal basis 
through the Joint Vienna Institute (JVI).134 
i  The OECD 
The historical genesis of the OECD’s involvement with international tax matters has already 
been examined.135 In terms of structure, the OECD comprises two main components: the 
Council and the Committees, with coordination being achieved through the secretariat.136 All 
Member Countries have an equal voice in the OECD irrespective of the size of their budget 
contribution. Article 6 of the OECD Convention, which requires unanimity, regulates the 
decision-taking process within the OECD. As a result, within the OECD, both the decision-
making and the decision-implementation processes are based on cooperation. Consequently, 
‘the OECD operates through...non-binding recommendations and informal peer review 
processes as means of achieving policy cooperation and coordination.’137 
Taxation is only a small part of the OECD’s work program: The Organisation is concerned 
with a wide range of economic issues and undertakes research in such areas as unemployment, 
                                                             
134 The Joint Vienna Institute (JVI) was established in 1992 to provide training and support to Central and Eastern 
Europe countries, the former republics of the USSR, and some others with the view to enabling them to make 
the transition from centrally -planned to market-based economies. Five parties have contributed to the 
establishment of the JVI: the Bank for International Settlements, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD. Recently, the World Trade Organisation joined them 
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assistance. According to John Lyons, former U.S. Competent Authority (CA), the work of U.S. Tax 
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providing advice and recommendations to other governments, particularly those with newly developed tax 
regimes, on the most effective way to administer their tax systems; see Deloitte & Touche, U.S. Competent 
Authority Into the New Millennium: A Look Back and Ahead, Tax Analysts Document Number: Doc 2000-
19211 (15 May 2000). It is suggested that such assistance could be provided by the international tax 
organisation proposed in this thesis. 
135 See Chapter 1, Section II, 2, A, ii, at 24. 
136 See How the OECD is Organised, at <http://www.oecd.org/about/organise.htm>. 
137 R.J. Vann, ‘The Future of International Tax Treaty or Institution? Small Step or Great Leap?’ (1996), 
unpublished paper, at 50. 
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education, labour, financial and investment affairs.138 The OECD is also increasingly 
performing important work in relation to Non-Member Countries, particularly those from the 
dynamic Asian and Latin American economies, Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the 
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. In addition, reports on the economies of 
individual Member Countries are produced on an annual basis. 
The taxation work is shared among the various working parties established by the Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs. These are: 
· Working Party No. 1, the original Fiscal Committee concerned with double taxation 
questions.  
Four other working parties were created in 1971: 
· Working Party No. 2 deals with tax analysis and tax statistics;  
· Working Party No. 3 manages issues pertaining to company taxation;  
· Working Party No. 4 handles questions relative to the taxation of interest paid on 
Eurobonds; and  
· Working Party No. 5 monitors problems relative to the issue and the tax treatment of 
securities.  
Various other working parties were established and wound up after they had accomplished 
their mission. Since 1977, the remaining working parties, apart from Nos. 1 and 2 are: 
· Working Party No. 6 dealing with taxation and multinational enterprises; and  
· Working Party No. 8 managing tax avoidance and evasion issues.139  
In addition, a Special Session on Innovative Financial Transactions has been created. 
The major tax success of the OECD is its Model Double Taxation Convention and its Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines. Other recent noteworthy contributions include reports on global trading of 
financial instruments, and on harmful tax competition, anti-bribery conventions and its current 
work in the field of electronic commerce. 
                                                             
138 See J. Sasseville, ‘The New OECD Model Tax Convention’, in OECD, Taxation and Investment Flows: An 
Exchange of Experiences Between the OECD and the Dynamic Asian Economies , (Paris: OECD, 1994) 131-43, 
at 131. 
139 Messere, supra note 126, at 247 n 8.  
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i i  The IMF  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is ‘a cooperative institution that 181 countries have 
voluntarily joined because they see the advantage of consulting with one another in this forum 
to maintain a stable system of buying and selling their currencies so that payments in foreign 
money can take place between countries smoothly and without delay.’140 In other words, the 
IMF is a cooperative inter-governmental monetary and financial institution.141  
The IMF is the sister organisation of the World Bank, but there are important functional 
differences between the two.142 At the Bretton Woods conference where both organisations 
were created, it was agreed that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), or the World Bank as it is commonly known, would have the primary responsibility 
for financing economic development. The IMF, for its part, was set up in a reaction to the 
financial problems which initiated and prolonged the Great Depression of the 1930s. The IMF 
is required to monitor the financial policies of member states in order to foster economic 
growth, international monetary cooperation and exchange stability. By virtue of their voluntary 
membership of the Fund, and in order to accommodate the needs of the Fund’s entire 
membership, individual Member Countries are expected to modify their economic and fiscal 
policies on the advice of the Fund. One of the core functions of the IMF, for which it is better 
known and often criticised, is the lending for short-term balance of payments support to 
stabilise currencies. By 1990 100 per cent of the IMF lending was to developing countries so 
that today most of IMF’s activities concern developing countries.143 
The influence of the IMF on the taxation policies of Member Countries is indirect. Its main 
concern is that a borrowing government abides by the conditions attached to the loans 
provided and repays the IMF promptly, usually between two to three years. In order to boost 
its repayment capacity, a borrowing government has two choices: it may either cut expenditure 
or increase taxes. The short-term conditions attached to the IMF loans mean that only crude 
tax measures are possible. In other words, governments faced with repayment obligations 
have to use blunt fiscal instruments, such as an increase in excise duties or sales taxes, because 
broad tax reform, which could also generate the required funds, takes too much time to 
implement. Moreover, the surveillance function of the IMF further requires it to ensure that 
                                                             
140 D.D. Driscoll, ‘What is the International Monetary Fund’, at  
 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm>. As at June 1999, the IMF consisted of 182 members. 
See also Goulder, supra  note 133, at 2606. 
141 See at <http://www.imf.org>. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Vann, supra note 137, at 52. 
Chapter 5   The Worldwide Implementat ion of Formulary Apport ionment:  Prel iminary Steps 
 218
coherent fiscal policies be in place in Member Countries so as to lessen the likelihood of that 
country requiring balance of payments assistance. Thus, the IMF has a strong interest in 
countries having good tax systems. 
B Other Organisations  
i   The WTO/EU 
There are two other major international institutions concerned with taxation: the European 
Union (EU) and the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) (or the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) since 1 January 1995).  
The involvement of the GATT with taxation has been intimately connected with settling 
disputes between the U.S. and the  EU. For example, it was called upon to determine whether 
the EU value-added tax (VAT) offended the GATT as claimed by the U.S. This question was 
answered in the negative, although the saga continues inasmuch as the first U.S. retaliation, the 
creation of the Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs) corporations, was 
considered as offending GATT’s rules.144 The U.S. then claimed that the exemption systems 
used by several European countries to relieve double taxation was against the GATT. This 
contention may be considered as technically justified.145 However, although the exemption 
system is still in place, the U.S. did not pursue the case, presumably because the results it has 
achieved with the Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) system, which replaced the disputed 
DISCs system, have until recently been perceived as being satisfactory.146 In spite of this 
sentiment, which prevailed in the U.S., the EU maintained its complaint with the WTO. It 
alleged that the rules establishing the U.S. FSCs violate a WTO agreement on export subsidies 
given that FSCs are not required to comply with the internationally recognised arm’s length 
principle. In October 1999, the WTO published its dispute panel’s final report on the EU’s 
complaint. The WTO found against the controversial U.S. foreign sales corporation tax 
regime, which it determined to be an illegal export subsidy. 147 Since more than USD 150 
                                                             
144 J. Fischer-Zernin, ‘GATT versus Tax Treaties? The Basic Conflicts Between International Taxation Methods 
and the Rules and Concepts of GATT’, (1987) 21 Journal of World Trade Law 39, at 40. 
145 Ibid. 
146 For an analysis of the utility of DISCs and FSCs and their use in transfer pricing malpractice cases in the U.S., 
see R. Feinschreiber & M. Kent, ‘U.S. International Tax Malpractice-DISCs, FSCs, and Transfer Pricing’, (31 
May 1999) 18 Tax Notes Int’l  2273.  
147 Anonymous, ‘WTO Publishes Full Text of Panel Report Slamming U.S. FSC Regime’, (October 13, 1999). Tax 
Analysts Document Number: Doc 1999-33168. See also R. Goulder, WTO’s Latest Opinion Substantially 
Adopts Reasoning of Lower Dispute Panel, Tax Analysts Document Number: Doc 2000-5913 (25 February 
2000); R. Goulder, ‘WTO Rejects U.S. Appeal Regarding FSC Regime’, (6 March 2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l 
(No. 10) 1044; C.M. Bruce, ‘The WTO’s FSC Ruling: Lets All Relax’, (27 March 2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l 
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billion worth of U.S. exports are currently covered by the FSC system, it is certain that the 
U.S. will act quickly to settle this problem. In May 2000, during talks with the EU, a 
replacement regime was proposed. The main features of the proposal are that eligible 
corporations would elect to be taxed under an alternative tax regime, and tax benefits would 
not be limited to export property although U.S. content would have to be significant.148 
It is worth noting that in terms of trade volume, the FSC controversy has turned out to be the 
biggest trade dispute to be brought before the WTO.149 
Finally, it has also been noted that the taxation question has again come to prominence with the 
General Agreement on Tariff and Services (GATS). The difficulties in this area abound 
because of a lack of uniform rules pertaining to the question of what is meant by services 
crossing international frontiers. 
i i  Emerging Trade Blocs and International Tax Associations 
Several other organisations and associations are involved in international taxation. The U.N., 
for example, attempted to enter the arena when in the 1960s it produced its Model Double 
Tax Convention for Developed and Developing Countries. However, since then nothing 
significant has happened. 
Finally, there are a number of associations of tax administrators attempting to share technical 
assistance or experience in the field of international taxation. Some of these are: 
· The Commonwealth Association of Tax Administrators (CATA); 
· The Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA); 
· The ‘Centre de rencontres et d’études des dirigeants des administrations fiscales’ 
(CREDAF); 
· The Study Group on Asian Tax Administrators and Research (SGATAR); 
· The Intra-European Organisation of Tax Administrators (IOTA); 
· Inter-American Centre of Tax Administrators (CIAT).150 
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148  For some details of the proposed regime, see The Ruchelman Law Firm’s Newsletter , ‘Successor Regime to 
Foreign Sales Corporation Proposed’, (May 2000), at <http://www.ruchelaw.com>. 
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It is also worth mentioning certain regional trade associations, such as the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), whose interest in taxation is growing151 as seen by its joint 
hosting with the OECD of a conference on taxation in Sydney, Australia in October 1996 and 
in Cebu, the Philippines in 1998. Moreover, the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has already taken some measures to address the challenges posed by the need to 
coordinate the taxation regime of its various members. The organisation has thus produced the 
Intra-ASEAN Model Double Tax Convention on Income ‘developed by an Ad-Hoc 
Committee on the Harmonization on [sic] Tax Treaties of ASEAN countries.’152 Moreover, 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) created in 1994 also has an interest in 
promoting common tax policy with the view to achieving deeper regional integration in the 
region.153 Finally, it is worth mentioning the G-7 countries, that is, the informal gathering of the 
seven richest countries whose objective is to foster common policies in the political, military 
and economic fields. As will be seen in Chapter 6, the G-7 is assuming a prominent role in 
promoting the idea of harmonised accounting standards.154 To be successful, any reform of the 
international tax system as proposed here would need to be supported by the G-7 countries. 
There is, obviously, a proliferation of organisations and associations concerned with taxation. 
Yet, these groups have only tentatively tried to coordinate their respective actions as can be 
seen, for example, with the joint efforts of the OECD and the IMF, the OECD and APEC, 
and the OECD and CIAT. What is therefore required is the creation of a compatible interface 
between these different organisations. Such an objective may be achieved by the creation of a 
‘General Agreement for Taxes’. 
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Section III   A General Agreement for Taxes 
The concept of a multilateral approach to the taxation of cross-border transactions in the form 
of a General Agreement for Taxes (GAT) has been examined over a number or years.155 
There have also been calls for a multilateral agreement on corporate governance such as a 
comprehensive set of rules relative to how corporations should be managed and liquidated if 
the need arises.156 In the field of investments, a multilateral convention has been attempted. 
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), if and when concluded, will be open to 
accession by OECD members and non-member alike.157 It is time for such a comprehensive 
system to be adopted in the broader context of international taxation. 
1 The Rationale for an International Tax Organisation 
There are several reasons that justify the creation of an organisation which would fulfil, in the 
taxation area, the same functions as the WTO in the trade area. However, any proposition to 
create an international agency to administer the taxation of TNCs in lieu of this function being 
carried out by national governments will raise political rather than technical objections. Myron 
J Frankman noted that: 
[T]he impediment to the establishment of such an organisation is not a technical one, but rather a 
political one. Mere technical questions are, in the immortal words of Stephen Leacock, ‘simplicity 
itself.’ The challenge is to change political perceptions that have been influenced and limited by 
carefully nurtured and often longstanding systems of myths and rationalizations.158 
Whatever be the weight of the argument, in the face of present political realities, the fact is that 
if the globalisation of world economies continues, then the chances for the successful 
implementation of isolated national policies, upon which the survival of the political elite is 
dependent, is highly compromised. Already, the usefulness of big governments is being 
questioned.159 If the survival of governments in their present form is to be achieved, then it is 
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arguable that they will need to adopt measures that would guarantee them access to the same 
level of financial resources necessary to fund the activities which justify their presence. 
A The Ineffectiveness of Isolated National Economic Policies 
One of the most important consequences of globalisation is that purely national problems have 
been transformed into international ones.160 Accordingly, the chances of conflict between the 
national economic policies of various jurisdictions are multiplied.161 Conventional economic 
theory holds that governments are required to intervene in order to reduce the impact of 
negative externalities that impede economic growth. Such intervention may be achieved 
through the use of various instruments such as taxes or subsidies, and regulations, which either 
encourage or discourage specific economic activities. In an environment of growing 
internationalisation, these externalities are likely to be international rather than national. 
Therefore, isolated government actions to control its national economy may not be successful. 
Indeed, uncoordinated actions have little effect on the power of the international market. 
Governments are well aware of their relative impotence to control the machinery of the 
international economy through localised efforts. Yet, ‘the mechanism for international 
coordination of economic policies remain weak [and] nowhere is this more evident than in the 
tax area.’162 
There can be no doubt that the present globalisation process is bound to create many 
deleterious effects which need to be corrected in a concerted way by existing national 
governments. As argued throughout this thesis, ‘the increased interdependency of national 
economies creates a lower tolerance for diverging national polices and a need for greater 
international coordination.’163 This has been demonstrated by the evident impact of the recent 
Asian financial crisis on Latin America and Russia. Moreover, in the absence of action, a 
conflict will arise because some countries will necessarily miss out on the benefits which 
globalisation promises to deliver.164 Therefore, the need for a supranational technical 
organisation, as opposed to a political one, with the mandate and power to deal with the 
internationalisation of externalities affecting national economies is increasingly being felt in the 
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area of international taxation. Indeed, the conflict that is brewing as a result of the 
internationalisation of world economies may erupt in the taxation area. 
In sectors other than taxation, serious efforts are being made towards international 
cooperation. Several international treaties dealing with matters that affect nations on a global 
basis have been signed. The so-called global warming phenomenon offers a potent example of 
the need for international cooperation in order to ease out the resistance of certain nations and 
to achieve the necessary compromises in order to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the 
problem of greenhouse gas emission. Other examples of international cooperation are often 
seen in other areas of human activities. Thus, for instance, the World Health Organisation’s 
efforts for controlling communicable diseases would have failed if a fragmented approach had 
been adopted. Again the IMF, and the OECD, because of their clear mandate, have been 
relatively successful in achieving their objectives. At times, the usefulness and the legitimacy of 
such organisations may be questioned,165 especially by people who hold the view that welfare 
is maximised if the public sector is maintained at the lowest possible level.166 However, 
objective analysis tends to show that whilst their action may seem laborious at times, they have 
had, in general, a beneficial impact on the human condition worldwide. 
In this increasingly integrated world, the allocation of profits from the activities of TNCs is 
becoming insurmountable. As Vito Tanzi observed: 
[L]ike tectonic plates grinding at each other, the tax systems of different countries will develop 
arbitrage pressures created by different tax rates, by differences in the bases that are taxed, by 
different possibilities of avoidance and evasion, and so forth. These pressures will be strong in 
some areas and less strong in some others and will become more intense as the process of world 
integration proceeds. 167 
The impact of globalisation on national economic policies must necessarily have serious 
consequences on the international tax policies of various countries. It has thus been suggested 
that: 
[T]he removal of economic borders among independent tax jurisdictions...has immense implications 
for both the structure and the overall burden o f the tax system in each of these jurisdictions. When 
capital, labour, [at least highly skilled] goods, and services can move freely from one tax jurisdiction 
to another, the tax base becomes global, and its distribution among various tax jurisdictions 
becomes endogenous to all various tax systems. 168 
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A country’s tax policy is often influenced by the taxation polices of its major trading 
partners.169 Similarly, TNC strategists also consider the taxation policies of various host 
nations as important elements when devising their own tax planning. In other words, major 
economies do not simply coexist: they are dependent upon each other. Therefore, the 
mechanisms developed to satisfy an age where economies coexisted cannot possibly satisfy 
the needs of one where an extremely high level of integration has been achieved.170 However, 
clearly, on the taxation front, as with other economic issues, national governments can do little 
on a unilateral basis. In fact, the action of one government in the taxation area may limit those 
of other governments. Thus, for instance, other governments out of concern that they might 
miss out on the proper division of the international tax cake often duplicate the action of one 
government in the taxation area. Thus, it is arguable that the worldwide wave of tax reform in 
the 1980s was a reaction to the U.S. tax reform process.171 
In today’s world, any tax initiative of one country is most likely to have spill-over effects 
across its frontiers prompting action by the foreign nations affected by it.172 For example, a 
low level of sales tax in one country may act as an export mechanism for that country’s tax 
burden. Indeed, if foreigners can easily acquire transportable goods at a low price in one 
country because of a low sales tax level, the incidence of such tax is then shared between its 
nationals and foreign shoppers. This means, therefore, that the sales tax yield in those countries 
whose nationals are shopping abroad would be lower because of lower sales.  
To conclude, if countries wish to sustain the current level of their individual tax yields, then an 
isolated approach to business taxation cannot be maintained. The absence of a coordinated 
approach to international business taxation in an integrated world could lead to severe tax 
competition that would decrease the overall tax cake to such an extent that the whole system 
of corporate taxation would be undermined.173 What is then needed is the transfer of the 
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responsibility for certain aspects of tax policy from the national to the international level. This 
measure would enable the institution of ‘a low-rate, broad-base tax system’ 174 which would 
promote competition ensuring, ultimately, a substantial increase in overall welfare. 
B Harmful Tax Competition and the Control of Tax Avoidance 
One of the major reasons for the creation of a general agreement for taxes arises from the 
necessity to maintain a level playing field in the area of international taxation. Indeed, as 
governments worldwide face increased pressure on the economic front, the temptation is to 
squeeze out certain benefits at the expense of others. On the other hand, TNCs may choose to 
react to competitive pressures by seeking through elaborate tax planning to avoid paying a fair 
share of taxes. 
i  The Proposed Regulation of Harmful Tax Co mpetition  
Economic interdependence is most evident when one examines the trends in capital 
movements on a worldwide basis. The liberalisation of various economies has resulted in a 
rapid growth in the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment. 
According to the United Nations (U.N.), investments flows in 1995 increased by 40 per cent 
to an unprecedented $315 billion.175 This spectacular growth is not restricted to the developed 
world. Whilst the latter accounted for the major part of this increase, FDIs in the LDCs 
reached $100 billion, and investment flows to Central and Eastern Europe nearly doubled to 
$12 billion in 1995.176 Clearly, FDI is a major force in shaping globalisation and its expansion 
is being fuelled by continuing liberalisation and privatisation in most countries.177 In order to 
attract part of this capital, some countries have put into place incentives which may be harmful 
to the economic interests of others.178 
Tax competition and ‘tax exportation’179 are the two by-products of the globalisation process. 
Both may be regarded as economic inefficiencies given that they reduce overall economic 
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welfare. Tax competition or, more precisely, harmful tax competition180 arises when a country 
deliberately exploits the unintentional mismatches which arise from the interaction of different 
tax systems in order to erode the tax base of another country.181 The net effect of tax 
competition is that ‘higher taxes in one country cause the tax base to flee to neighbouring 
jurisdictions with more favourable tax systems.’182 In order to attract FDI, many countries are 
more willing to create a favourable climate for investors by further liberalising their economic 
environment and providing other incentives in order to influence the locational decision of 
TNCs. Thus the phenomenon of ‘dowry chasing’ whereby TNCs ‘play off national and 
regional authorities against one another to gain the largest possible investment incentive.’183 An 
investment incentive has been defined as ‘any government measure designed to influence an 
investment decision, or having the effect of increasing the profit accruing to the potential 
investor or altering the risks attached to it.’184 Although such incentives may take several 
forms, including financial measures, assistance with infrastructure, or preferential government 
contracts, this thesis is only concerned with the effects of fiscal or tax incentives, which may 
take the form of tax exemptions, tax holidays, reduced rates or special deductions, or 
credits.185 
The major threat of harmful tax competition is that it may lead to the adoption of a least 
common denominator in the taxation field as governments jostle for scarce capital. 186 Given 
that governments generally attempt to cover their public spending through taxation, a reduction 
in tax revenue must necessarily result in a reduction of its public spending capacity.187 This may 
in turn bring about a reduction in overall national welfare.188 A reduction in tax revenue also 
means that private economic operators are less able to improve their economic welfare, thus 
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adversely impacting on economic efficiency and on the equity of the national tax system. 189 
This process of fiscal degradation is more likely to hurt countries with high tax ratios.190  
Tax competition is not limited to a race to the bottom as far as tax rates are concerned. In fact, 
tax competition may also come from changes in the tax bases of various countries. Such 
changes are less visible and more difficult to assess. The burden of taxes on enterprises is also 
dependent on the bases on which tax rates are applied. The lack of harmonised methods 
between countries for determining the corporate tax base no doubt creates arbitrage 
opportunities for TNCs. In addition, tax competition may also entail changes in the elements 
that are relevant to the determination of the tax base, for example, depreciation allowances. 
Thus, it is the relationship between tax rates and tax bases that result in effective tax rates 
which has ‘the greatest influence on where real investment goes.’191 
It can also be argued that high tax rates are inefficient, damage economic performance, and 
reduce the standard of living of future generations.192 Nonetheless, competition tends to 
equalise tax rates at low levels resulting in significant revenue loss for some countries. Such 
depletion of their revenue indubitably impedes their public-spending program.193 
Tax competition is further complicated with the intervention of tax havens.194 Tax competition 
provides incentives to some countries to become low-tax countries or even tax havens. Such 
countries are usually small but are strategically located in the right time zones and in the proper 
geographic area. By attracting transient financial capital and taxing it a modest rate they are 
able to increase their tax revenue without increasing the tax burden of their own residents. In 
fact, the proliferation of tax havens is such that they are required to compete with each other 
for capital. According to Vito Tanzi there is ample evidence of: 
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intensified competition among tax haven countries in providing tax advantages to those who invest 
in them. This competition may largely neutralize the effects of the intensified campaign against tax 
evasion. 195 
The above discussion shows that international cooperation in the taxation area is essential if an 
optimal allocation of world capital is to be achieved. In this regard, two initiatives need to be 
examined given that they aim at dealing with the problem of tax competition by advocating the 
harmonisation of certain tax fundamentals. The first is the adoption of the European 
Community (EC) Code of Conduct at the European Council of Economic Finance Ministers 
(ECOFIN) meeting of 1 December 1997,196 and the second is the OECD report on harmful 
tax competition (hereinafter the Guidelines).197 Both aim at removing distortion and unfairness 
stemming from harmful tax competition rather than penalising countries striving to modernise 
and rationalise their tax structures.198  
The Code of Conduct in business taxation is the first aspect of a package of measures 
designed to eliminate harmful tax practices among EU Member countries. 199 The second 
element of this strategy deals with the taxation of savings income,200 and the third is a draft 
directive concerning withholding taxes on interest and royalty payments.201 Following the Code 
of Conduct, the ECOFIN established a ‘Code of Conduct Business Taxation Group’ in 
March 1998 with Dawn Primarolo, the U.K. Paymaster General, as chairwoman and 
members from 15 EU Member States. The group (Primarolo Group) in a report to ECOFIN 
made public in February 2000 identifies 66 measures in the EU and dependent territories that 
have harmful effects on competition. As part of the Code of Conduct, EU Members are 
required to eliminate these practices by the end of December 2002.202 
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The OECD views harmful tax practices as those which are tailored to erode the tax base of 
other countries. In order to eliminate such practices, the Guidelines established a Forum on 
Harmful Tax Practices to coordinate national and treaty responses to harmful tax practices 
whilst encouraging Non-Member countries to associate themselves with the effort.203 During 
the first two years of its existence, the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices will be required to 
review countries’ tax practices in order to locate any harmful practice.204 The Forum on 
Harmful Tax Practices ‘is responsible for undertaking an ongoing evaluation of existing and 
proposed preferential tax regimes in Member and non-member countries, analysing the 
effectiveness of counteracting measures, including non-tax measures, and examining whether 
particular jurisdictions constitute tax havens.’205 Several criteria are used to define a tax haven. 
These are: 
· No, or only nominal, effective tax rates, 
· lack of effective exchange of information, 
· lack of transparency, and 
· absence of a requirement of substantial activities. 
After the initial period of review, where a country believes that a measure in another country 
may constitute a harmful tax practice, it may request the Forum to examine that measure and 
determine if indeed it is a harmful tax practice. Whilst the opinion of the Forum is non-binding, 
‘nonetheless, the existence of an opinion by an international body that a domestic measure is in 
violation of important political commitments undertaken by a Member country should have a 
strong impact.’206 
It is to be noted that the Guidelines on harmful tax practices incorporate a standstill and a 
rollback provision. Under the standstill provision, Member countries are required to abstain 
from adopting new measures, and extending the scope of, or the strengthening of, existing 
measures that constitute harmful tax practices.207 
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The rollback provision, for its part, requires the elimination of the harmful features of 
preferential regimes before the end of five years. 
The advent of the Guidelines has undoubtedly put pressure on some countries to adopt best 
practices in the field of taxation. Indeed, it was widely publicised that the OECD would 
release at a ministerial meeting its Report on Progress in Identifying and Eliminating 
Harmful Tax Practices on 26 June 2000.208 This Report would contain a list of jurisdictions 
that are tax havens under the criteria to be found in the Guidelines.209 In a scramble not to 
appear on this list, by 19 June 2000 six countries made specific commitments to the OECD to 
eliminate whatever harmful tax practices that they may have promoted by the end of 2005.210 
In June 2000, the OECD published a list of what it calls ‘uncooperative’ tax havens.211 It also 
recommended to its Members a series of ‘defensive tax measures’ to be taken against these 
tax havens. However, it has delayed the implementation of these measures until 31 July 2001 
in order to enable those appearing on the list that wish to do so to roll back these harmful 
practices. 
The OECD’s action may be viewed as one directed towards major TNCs operating in these 
tax havens.212 Unfortunately, the governments of these relatively poor countries are now being 
caught in the cross-fire,213 and one needs to acknowledge that the Organisation is slowly and 
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surely achieving a certain status as a major tax organization with enough power to sanction 
those jurisdictions which refuses its injunctions. Indeed, it is moving towards a strong 
organization as suggested in this thesis albeit in a more consensual way. The creation of the 
Forum on Harmful Tax Practices is a crucial development on the road to the setting of an 
international tax agency. Indeed, the Guidelines provide that Member countries should use the 
Forum to coordinate their national and treaty responses to harmful tax practices. Until recently, 
an embryonic form of cooperation had been achieved via the exchange of information 
provision present in most tax treaties. A step towards the OECD achieving some form of 
policing powers was taken with the establishment of peer review in the transfer pricing area. It 
is suggested that the creation of the Forum is a most important achievement to date. Whilst it 
may well be that its powers are symbolic, the important point is that countries are examining 
whether it is feasible to allow an international organisation to exercise certain tax policing 
powers. Indeed, it has been argued that the Guidelines is really a Trojan horse for 
harmonisation, an argument strongly denied by Frances Horner, head of the OECD Tax 
Competition Unit.214  
Whilst the efforts of the OECD may be regarded as aiming to achieve a certain coordination of 
the tax systems of its Members, one needs to keep in mind that its membership is limited to the 
29 most industrialised countries in the world. Therefore, the vast majority of countries have no 
direct influence on its decisions. Well aware of this limitation, the OECD has in recent years 
made significant overtures towards Non-Member countries including countries of the former 
Soviet Bloc, Latin America, and the newly industrialised nations. As the OECD’s efforts 
unfold in the next few years and the world sees the emerging direction in harmful tax practices, 
the challenge to the OECD will be to gain worldwide legitimacy for its actions as well as for its 
very existence. Indeed, while the reason for the attack on the harmful tax practices of certain 
countries, notably in the Caribbean, is on balance a laudable effort, the fact remains that for 
some poor countries losing to the forces of globalisation, turning to financial services as a 
legitimate economic alternative is often seen as the solution of last resort. It is submitted, 
therefore, that international cooperation must go beyond isolated measures, such as curbing 
harmful tax competition, and embrace a structural overhaul of the international taxation system 
by the creation of an international tax organization which would administer the sharing of the 
tax pie in a more equitable way.  
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i i  The Control of Tax Avoidance 
The least that can be said is that globalisation facilitates tax avoidance.215 Recently, it has been 
argued that today ‘tax avoidance, if present, is at the margins, not at the centre’ of TNCs’ 
preoccupations.216 However, there is little reason to believe that TNCs are only marginally 
concerned with such a universal phenomenon. In fact, recent work by the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service tend to show that TNCs are not reluctant to resort to tax avoidance in order 
to minimise their overall tax burden.217 Moreover, quite apart from elaborate tax avoidance 
schemes, there is also the problem of tax evasion. In fact, it has been said that ‘tax evasion is 
universal,...[it] takes place in all societies, social classes, all professions, all industries, and all 
economic system.’218 
It may well be that an international organisatio n would be in a much better position to deal with 
the problem. Such an organisation would need to have access to adequate tax information 
about various TNCs including access to their banking operations if there was any suspicion 
that they were using national banking secrecy provisions for tax avoidance purposes.219 Tax 
information, especially in the new globalised economic environment, is an essential prerequisite 
for the prevention of tax avoidance as the OECD has admitted in its recent report on the 
question.220 Following this report, the OECD has considered ways of improving international 
cooperation with respect to the exchange of information in possession of banks and other 
financial institution for tax purposes. Clearly, ‘access to bank information can greatly improve 
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the ability of tax authorities to effectively administer the tax laws enacted in their 
parliaments.’221 
The numerous problems arising from globalisation whether economic or social are ‘difficult to 
address on a unilateral basis’.222 Whilst recognising this limitation, especially in the field of 
international taxation, this thesis does not propose the creation of an international organisation 
with extended membership to deal exclusively with the problem of harmful tax competition or 
unacceptable tax avoidance practices. What is intended is an international organisation capable 
of dealing with such problems indirectly. Indeed, its main purpose is to implement a global 
formulary apportionment system which directly confronts the problem of international tax 
competition that free trade exacerbates.223 It is submitted that once this substantial question is 
resolved then the incidentals such as tax avoidance would be dealt with within the same 
cooperative structures. 
2 The Evolution of Transnational Operation s 
One result of the gradual liberalisation of national economies over the last two decades has 
been a significant change in the way in which TNCs conduct their business. This change 
maximises efficiency in the emerging global markets. As noted by Professor Galbraith: 
capitalism as it matures is basically an international system. Not only are its products traded across 
national frontiers, its enterprises also extends its plant and employment to other countries as a 
matter of course. Thus is born the transnat ional or international corporation. And thus diminished 
is its identification with any one country or government. 224 
The evolution of the private sector must, it is contended, be matched by a relatively similar 
evolution of the public sector, or at least some sectors of the public sector, such as the 
revenue. Such an evolution is essential because, without it, the utility of the public sector itself 
is at risk. Thus, if the basic purpose of government is to be maintained, then it must be given 
adequate financial means, through efficient taxation, to do so. 
A A New Corporate Environment 
The conclusion reached when the theory of the transnational firm was examined earlier was 
that the separate accounting/arm’s length standard is not readily applicable to TNCs. TNCs, 
relying on their inherent strengths, are expanding to an optimum level. Until recently many 
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TNCs consisted of a relatively large number of theoretically independent legal entities each 
enjoying a relatively large autonomy in the conduct of its business. These subsidiaries, whilst 
controlled by a local or regional holding company, were individually managed and served their 
respective markets independently. A flow of products from manufacturing subsidiaries to sales 
centres characterised inter-company transactions. Finance, licensing arrangements, or 
management services, were provided for by specialised vehicles or by the parent. 
This structure is rapidly being replaced by the fully integrated multinational. TNCs are currently 
undergoing significant restructuring processes in order to achieve the status of globally 
integrated businesses. The case of the manufacturing industry illustrates this transformation. 
Formerly, a TNC organised its production facilities to service specific markets. Thus, 
production facilities were designed to satisfy the North American, the Japanese, or the 
European markets separately, but this kind of market segmentation is now disappearing. 
Manufacturers are concentrating on the production of standardised products saleable in all 
three markets concurrently. This system avoids duplication in the conception, design, and 
engineering processes, and therefore achieves substantial economies of scale. 
In order to achieve this objective, TNCs engaged in the manufacturing industry are deliberately 
merging their European and North American operations into single operating units.225 Regional 
independent companies are fast disappearing. The new entities are reorganised along global 
product lines with centres for research and engineering achieving preponderance for the whole 
manufacturing operation regardless of their geographical location. The importance of these 
research centres is thus explained: 
[T]hey do basic engineering and integration of components and subsystems in one country, 
engineering of components in other countries and the logistics of the development is provided by 
video conference systems and supercomputers allowing simultaneous engineering in various 
countries. 226 
This evolution is not restricted to the manufacturing sector either. Similar developments are 
occurring in the fields of telecommunications and banking, as companies jostle for a share in 
the global market. Each and every significant player in various industries is remodelling itself 
into global companies, sharing technology across the group or even with competitors by way 
of strategic alliances involving technology transfers and cost-sharing agreements in the field of 
research and development as well as fixed costs.227 All this remodelling activity aims at 
achieving economies of scale and consistency in products. Consequently, the traditional legal 
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categories through which TNCs operate are quickly becoming obsolete. H Müller, quoting a 
recent survey, finds that TNCs: 
· re-engineer independent subsidiaries into dependent parts of a global business; 
· develop virtual rather than legal organisations breaching geographies and legal boundaries; 
and 
· integrate the resources of all group companies to develop global products. 228 
An integrated company is basically one where all group members have access to all the 
resources of the group. As a result, subsidiaries lose their independence and become part of a 
global machinery whose ultimate objective is the efficient production of a global product or 
service.229 The outcome of these developments is a substantial increase in intra-firm trading 
involving not only goods, but also intangibles, as well as an increase in the demand and supply 
of specialist management services. The emergence of global trading, especially in the financial 
sector, is really an amplification of this process. In this environment, it is especially difficulty to 
construct ‘a transfer pricing regime based on the identification of “inputs” to the productive 
process and the association of profit with particular inputs’.230 
TNCs constitute vast assemblages of companies comprising wholly owned subsidiaries and 
several dozens of branches all in different parts of the world. The production of a TNC’s final 
product is often the result of inputs originating from those foreign branches or subsidiaries.231 
The growth of such intra-group trade both in terms of goods and services232 puts an extra 
strain on the present systems of international taxation. 233 
International taxation must, in its principles and methods, match those used by international 
business.234 A new international tax organisation would replicate the integrated policy 
approach pursued by TNCs. It would permit the efficient management of vast resources, now 
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immobilised with separate sovereign tax authorities which are so often seen as marginally 
effective. Indeed, it would promote an internationalist culture based on higher productivity 
measured in relation to its ability to achieve its object. If such an organisation is able to mirror 
the operational performances of TNCs, then it is arguable that it would also generate 
synergetic advantages that would flow to the revenues of its members. Finally, if politically 
controversial decisions were to be taken by such an organisation, politicians may even view 
this as an advantage. Indeed, they would always be able to claim that their margin of action is 
constrained by a power centre outside their control. Thus, for example, when confronted by 
their constituents, politicians in the EU have been able to escape criticism arising from the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice by shifting the blame to the Court, although, 
clearly, the Court’s powers are subject to a certain political control through, for example, the 
appointment of the Court’s judges, or the power to amend the treaties instituting the Court.235 
One of the main arguments for the creation of an international tax organisation is premised on 
the claim that since there has been an evolution in the way international business is done, the 
taxation of such cross-border operations must also evolve in the same direction. Such an 
organisation is most likely to suit a world increasingly characterised by economic integration. 
TNCs now face dozens of different tax authorities each with its peculiar legal and 
administrative tax rules. If these TNCs were to face one central authority, it is obvious that 
their cost of compliance with that authority’s rules would be far less than those they face now. 
Thus valuable resources would be released from their present unproductive assignment. 
Moreover, with the advent of electronic commerce and the constant interaction of trade and 
taxation, tax administration must sooner or later embrace an international dimension. Today, 
trade is carried out by several thousand TNCs. A system that aims at taxing the gains arising 
from these international activities, while remaining national in nature, is simply not viable. To 
adequately solve an international problem, one requires an international response. This 
response must necessarily take the form of an international administrative agency. It is 
submitted that if countries were to leave the design of a tax system to competitive forces, then 
it is probable that the system of present corporate taxation would disappear and with it the 
method by which governments today are given the means to finance the stock of public goods. 
Whilst this may be seen by some as a positive development, the fact is that ‘governments have 
gotten larger rather than smaller in the face of globalization’.236 In such circumstances, in order 
to continue with the level of funding commensurate with their size, governments have but one 
                                                             
235 This option is difficult though because of the need to obtain the unanimous agreement of the 15 Member States. 
See Anne-Cécile Robert, ‘Ce juge méconnu de Luxembourg’, Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1999, at 14.  
236 Mintz, supra note 161, at 103. 
Chapter 5   The Worldwide Implementat ion of Formulary Apport ionment:  Prel iminary Steps 
 237
alternative: to improve the coordination of tax policies at the international level by making 
country tax systems similar to each other. In other words, they need to:237 
· harmonise their taxes,  
· decide on a minimum and maximum rate of tax, 
· implement adequate measures to prevent double taxation, 
· monitor transfer pricing activities of TNCs, and 
· achieve an acceptable level of exchange of information and prevent harmful tax 
competition.  
An adequate response to the objections as to the representative character of existing 
organisations dealing with tax matters is to set up a tax organisation open to all nations.  
B The Need for International Coordination  
The radical changes examined require the migration of revenue-raising from the national to the 
international domain.238 It may seem alien in the current economic climate, based on 
deregulation, to consider regulating on a worldwide basis the taxation of international business 
activities.239 Thus, it would appear that ‘the formally commonplace notion that taxation is the 
price we pay for civilization’240 is no longer applicable in a free market. It is submitted, though, 
that a free market is based principally on the notion of efficiency and not specifically on the 
absence of any regulatory power. In reality, what is unacceptable is the lack of accountability 
in the use made of that ‘price’ which taxpayers pay for civilisation.241 
Regulation to safeguard the tax base cannot be seen as a hindrance to the development of 
business. On the contrary, it aims at creating the necessary framework destined to prevent 
                                                             
237 Supra note 161, at 103. 
238 J. Ralph, ‘Ralph Sets His Sights on Tax in Cyberspace’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 October 1999, at 8, where 
‘the architect of the Federal Government’s business tax revamp’ said that ‘issues such as the source [of income] 
and residency are all going to be very difficult out there in cyberspace. The only way that is going to be 
addressed is through more co-operative international arrangements and countries coming together more than 
they have in the past. A more integrated system across jurisdictions will be needed.’ 
239 Proponents of smaller governments and free market have attacked the OECD initiative in the field of tax 
competition as an intolerable restraint on the free market. See B. Zagaris, ‘The Assault on Low Tax 
Jurisdictio ns: A Call for Balance Debate’, (13 August 1999) 28 Tax Management International Journal (No. 8) 
474. 
240 Frankman , supra  note 158, at 641. 
241 In this regard, note the correlation between low tax jurisdictions, bank secrecy and money laundering; see 
Zagaris, supra  note 239. 
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anarchic behaviour from both national governments and TNCs competing for revenue on the 
one hand, and for investment on the other.242 
Whilst tax competition might be a serious reason to contemplate the creation of an international 
organisation to deal with taxation, it is suggested that the most compelling reason for doing so 
arises from the constant erosion of the revenue base and the resulting inequities that it brings 
about, for example, in the heavier taxation of immobile labour.243 Moreover, by engaging in 
transfer pricing, TNCs effectively undermine the taxation policy of several national 
governments. Moreover, the manipulation of transfer prices within TNCs not only reduces 
their total tax liabilities, it also brings about a reallocation of the overall tax revenue among 
relevant countries with some gaining and some losing. Is it then acceptable that the worldwide 
allocation of revenue is to be made dependent on the commercial policies of TNCs? It is 
submitted that TNCs should have no say as to how the total tax revenue is to be distributed on 
a worldwide basis. Their major concern should be limited to ensuring that any policy initiative 
does not end up with their business operations being subjected to double or multiple taxation 
or unnecessary compliance costs. 
Finally, if the fiscal sovereignty of various nations is most likely to be undermined in a 
globalised world, then it is suggested that countries would be better off surrendering part of 
their fiscal sovereignty to an international organisation charged with resolving the allocation 
process. Indeed, countries would still have control of such an organisation and would, 
therefore, ease the control that the higher management of about 39,000 global enterprises 
maintain on world development. 
Various international bodies have endeavoured to find an adequate model for regulating and 
coordinating TNCs.244 The United Nations (U.N.) have established the U.N. Commission on 
Transnational Corporations. The OECD has been at the forefront of this effort, publishing, in 
the transfer pricing area, its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the latest version having 
been released in 1995.245 It has also pioneered the development of rules pertaining to the 
                                                             
242 See M.A. Sullivan, ‘The Luck of the Irish? Profits and Taxes of U.S. Multinational Abroad’, (3 June 1996) 12 
Tax Notes Int’l 1765, at 1767. See also J. Stopford & L. Turner, Britain and the Multinationals  (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1985), at 238-41 for an earlier study of the phenomenon of tax competition and dowry 
chasing. 
243 Mintz, supra note 161, at 103. 
244 For an analysis of the efforts of the U.N., the OECD and the ICC, see C.D. Wallace, ‘International Codes and 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Update and Selected Issues’, (1983) 17 The International Lawyer  
435. 
245 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (Paris: OECD, 
1995) [updated regularly]. 
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disclosure of information by TNCs.246 In addition, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the 
OECD, through a Special Session, is conducting useful consultations on global trading in 
financial instruments with the view to producing its own guidelines in this expanding market. 
Finally, it is to be noted that the Multinational Agreement on Investments sponsored by the 
OECD and the Council of Europe, which attempts to regulate cross-border investments,247 is 
still under negotiation.248 It is time that all these efforts, as far as the measuring and 
apportioning of the income of TNCs is concerned, be handled by one organisation.  
The complexity and interconnectedness of contemporary economic conditions arising from the 
globalisation of the world economies is such that the pressures for the emergence of a new 
international tax order built around a central coordinating institution are increasing.249 Justice 
Brennan in Container Corp. alluded to the necessity of such a coordinating authority in the 
purely American state context when he noted that: 
[I]n the absence of a central coordinating authority, absolute consistency, even among tax 
authorities whose basic approach is quite similar, may just be too much to ask. 250 
                                                             
246 OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises  (Paris: OECD, 1976); OECD, Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Disclosure of Information by Multinational Enterprises: Survey of 
the Application of the OECD Guidelines  (Paris: OECD, 1988) which is followed by a survey on the application 
of the guidelines therein proposed. 
247 R. Couzin, ‘Taxation and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment’, (24 June 1996) 12 Tax Notes Int’l 26, 
2049. It would appear that because negotiations on the MAI have stalled, the leaders at the London EU-U.S. 
Summit of 18 May 1998, have adopted a joint statement on the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) 
identifying a series of elements for an initiative to intensify and extend multilateral and bilateral cooperation and 
common actions in the field of trade and investment. 
248 As a result of sharp grassroots opposition to the MAI, the OECD Council of Ministers announced on 28 April 
1998 ‘a period of assessment and further consultation between the negotiating parties and with interested part 
of their societies.’ OECD Ministerial statement on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) (28 April 
1998), at <http://www.oecd.org/news_and_events/release/nw98-50a.html>. For a general discussion as to the 
advantages and disadvantages of the MAI, see Cornell International Law Journal Symposium, Regulating 
Foreign Direct Investment: Institutional Arrangements, (1998) 31 Cornell International Law Journal (No. 3), at 
455ff. 
249 This thesis proposes the creation of an international tax organisation to administer the taxation of cross-border 
income taxes on a worldwide basis. There have been, however, far more radical proposals dating as far back as 
1884 for global taxes to finance the global governance of mankind; see, for example, the work of J. Lorimer, 
‘Book V. The Ultimate Problem of International Jurisprudence’, in The Institutes of the Law of Nations; A 
Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities , (Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood & 
Sons, 1884) mentioned in M.J. Frankman ‘International Taxation: The Trajectory of an Idea from Lorimer to 
Brandt’, (May 1996) World Development 807-820. Moreover, in 1995 the Commission on Global Governance 
identified the following as potential global revenue sources to finance global governance: foreign exchange 
transactions (Tobin Tax), profits on TNCs, and use of common global resources (including flight lanes, sea-
lanes, ocean fishing areas, geostationary orbit, and the electromagnetic spectrum; see Report of The 
Commission on Global Governance Our Global Neighborhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), at 
217-121. 
250 Per Brennan J. in Container Corp.  v Franchise Tax Board  463 U.S. 159 (1983), at 192. 
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Obviously, Justice Brennan was concerned with the lack of a central coordinating authority to 
administer the U.S. state taxation system based on the formulary taxation of the unitary 
enterprise. If the need for such an agency has been felt in the U.S. state tax context, then 
arguably its creation is of fundamental importance if that system of corporate taxation were to 
be expanded from its relatively limited application, as in the U.S. states’ context, and made 
applicable on a worldwide basis. 
Professor Hellerstein has canvassed the creation of such a central coordinating agency in the 
U.S. state taxation context. It is submitted that Hellerstein’s arguments are readily transposable 
to strengthen the case for an international tax organisation251 because these arguments revolve 
around the advantages that such an international tax agency would provide. An international 
tax agency is necessary in order to systematically deal with tax matters instead of having these 
problems considered by the many and various organisations as examined earlier. Indeed, while 
such organisations have had varying degree of success in carrying out their objects, the fact is 
that they often act in isolation and, above all, none may claim to legitimately represent the 
interests of all nations as far as taxation questions are concerned. 
This thesis proposes the creation of an international tax organisation by means of a multilateral 
treaty to act as a central coordinating agency in the field of international taxation. The most 
salient functions of the organisation must now be studied. 
 
                                                             
251 J. Hellerstein, ‘Allocation and Nexus in State Taxation Interstate Businesses’ (1964) 20 Tax Law Review 259, at 
283. 
 Intertax: Its Role and Functions 
A world government may well be the most effective way of dealing with the various emerging 
global problems. However, in its absence, there are three possible ways to confront these 
issues: 
(i) relying on spontaneous market solutions;  
(ii) solutions through international agreements; and  
(iii) the creation of international institutions charged with the responsibility of dealing with the 
problems created by the above-described developments.1 
This thesis focuses on the third alternative identified above. Section I examines, in general 
terms, the functions and powers of an eventual international tax organisation, (referred to as 
Intertax).2 Section II concentrates on the need for harmonised accounting standards in order 
to facilitate the operation of the organisation. Finally, Section III explores the problems 
inherent to determining an international tax base for the purposes of allocation between 
different countries. 
Section I  Intertax’s Mandate  
How Intertax should operate may be analysed from both an idealistic and realistic point of 
view. The creation of such an organisation operating from an idealistic perspective is 
impossible in the current economic and political climate. Therefore, a more appropriate 
alternative needs to be considered. The realistic view, while still proposing the creation of 
Intertax, is more modest in its objective. What is claimed is that given the proper impetus the 
present system could evolve into one which is more appropriate to the current economic 
environment. The centrepiece of this alternative is an international organisation competent to 
deal with international tax matters in a coordinated way. It is therefore argued that the 
proposed model which is based on an integrated format, is superior to the dysfunctional 
approach that characterises the present system. 
                                                             
1 V. Tanzi, ‘The Impact of Economic Globalization on Taxation’, (August/September 1998) 52 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation (No. 8/9), at 341. 
2 This appellation is taken from J.V. Surr, ‘Intertax: Intergovernmental Cooperation in Taxation Matters’, (1966) 
7 The Harvard International Law Club Journal (No. 2) 179. 
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1 An Idealistic View 
In spite of claims to the contrary, especially at the peak of an economic cycle, ‘free market 
needs governance’3 since competition, for various reasons, often engenders instability. Thus, 
for example, such a local hazard as the recent Thai crisis achieved global status after having 
been transmitted, through fully deregulated financial markets and international commodity 
trade, to other parts of the world.4 Self-regulation is often proposed as a method of control. 
However, this alternative has its limitations given that it is frequently disregarded for short-term 
gains. It is therefore imperative that existing regulatory bodies be maintained and their 
operation coordinated with that of other organisations to be created on a needs basis in order 
to channel competition and initiate corrective actions when necessary. 5 
A The Aims of Intertax 
The advantages of a multilateral treaty that deal with the core problem of the allocation of the 
international tax base have already been explored. One of the central themes of this thesis is 
that if a multilateral tax treaty similar to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) is 
to be established, then a new international institution similar to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) may be required for its administration. Vito Tanzi sums up the functions that would be 
entrusted to it: 
[T]here is no world institution with the responsibility to establish desirable rules for taxation and 
with enough clout to induce countries to follow those rules. Perhaps the time has come to establish 
one. 6 
Basically, therefore, the primary objective of such an international tax organization as herein 
proposed is to establish and promote principled tax allocation rules and to ensure that these 
are followed.7 Indeed, the creation of Intertax would synthesise the actions of various 
international organisations such as the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the taxation area8 thus 
providing a neutral and non-discriminatory tax environment in which TNCs would operate to 
                                                             
3 W. Hutton, ‘Free Market Needs Governance’, Sydney Morning Herald , 29 October 1997, at 15. 
4 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs & United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, World Economic Situation and Prospects for 1999 , at <http://www.un.org>.  
5 See, for example, J. Slemrod, ‘Tax Principles in an International Economy’, in Boskin & McLure, eds., World 
Tax Reform  (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990), at 11-23. 
6 V. Tanzi, Taxation in an Integrating World (Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1995), at 140. 
7 Surr, supra  note 2, at 179. 
8 A. Weiss & F. Molnar, ‘International Cooperation Is Possible’, in H. Stein, ed., Tax Policy in the Twenty-First 
Century (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1988), at 103. 
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the optimum of their efficiency. The following may be considered the main functions of 
Intertax.  
i  Global Tax Administ ration 
The present international organisations dealing with tax matters have never been required to 
focus exclusively on taxation issues. In order for Intertax to achieve its main objective, which is 
the provision of the necessary impetus for the creation of international tax allocation rules, it 
should be endowed with sufficient legal powers together with an adequate mechanism to 
police the application of its decisions. In this regard, the question arises as to whether Intertax 
should be an organisation of the ‘weak’ type like, the former GATT, or a ‘strong’ one, like the 
IMF.  
An organisation of the ‘weak’ type is one that has very little power to coerce its members into 
adopting its decision. In essence, an organisation of the ‘weak’ form is one whose mandate is 
limited to giving advisory opinions and to recommending actions with the view to furthering its 
objects. It may also be charged with resolving disputes among its members. A ‘strong’ model, 
on the other hand, is one with enough powers to impose its decisions on its members. An 
organisation of this type is adequately staffed, its dispute-settling mechanisms are binding and, 
in general, it has the necessary authority to initiate and require its members to abide by major 
policy initiatives, as is the case, for example, with the European Union (EU) institutions. 
Writing in 1991 Professor Vann favours the first type because of the inherent reticence of 
nations to forgo their fiscal sovereignty. However, it is arguable that given the entrenchment of 
the principle of fiscal sovereignty in the national psyche, and the likely defence of localised tax 
advantages, an organisation of the ‘weak’ type may not be as effective as required. 
Consequently, instead of aiming at achieving consensus on a worldwide basis for a ‘weak’ 
organisation, it may well be that the most viable option is for the major industrialised countries 
to create a tax organisation as between themselves, and then after solving its teething troubles 
open it to accession to the rest of the world. Moreover, a strong organisation, such as the 
IMF, could easily impose its views on weaker nations through a series of rules, for example, 
the linking tax reform to economic aid. But more significantly, depending on the political will of 
its members, an eventual international tax organisation would need to be able to deal with 
powerful nations. Such a strong organisation is also more likely to have enough credibility to 
place greater constraints on stronger nations to abide by their international obligations. 
However, in the current situation, an eventual tax organisation of this type is not likely to 
eventuate in the near future. 
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i i  The Implementation of Worldwide Formulary Apportionment 
Although Intertax would ultimately be concerned with the management of the tax 
consequences of all cross-border transactions, this present thesis is restricted to the 
examination of its action as far as the taxation of TNCs is concerned. Intertax would be 
required to manage the change from the application of the separate accounting principle to a 
formulary apportionment methodology in the international field. 
In order to achieve this fundamental objective, Intertax would need to concentrate most of its 
efforts on two main areas; first, the determination of the worldwide income of TNCs; and 
second, the construction of a formula, or formulas, for the apportionment of that income to 
those countries entitled to it. 
B Intertax: The Institution 
i  The Sovereignty Question 
The major obstacle to the creation of an international tax institution is based on the argument 
that nation-states are unlikely to forsake their sovereignty in taxation matters. The principle of 
sovereignty is one of the most enduring principles in international law.9 The notion of 
sovereignty connotes the idea of autonomous and absolute political, military and economic 
power embodied in a ruler or governmental body. In the taxation field it is epitomised by the 
principle that ‘one nation does not take notice of the revenue laws of another.’10 
The concept of sovereignty was formally articulated at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and it 
has come to be regarded as the basis of the nation-state. However, it has never been 
considered as an immutable principle. Modern international law has modified the notion of 
absolute sovereignty as originally conceived. Thus, the United Nations (U.N.) has the legal 
power to check the sovereign pretensions of nations. Moreover, nation-states have always 
accommodated themselves with voluntary adjustments to their sovereignty when they 
perceived an immediate advantage for doing so. This is especially true in the field of economic 
policies where there is ample evidence of such abandonment of the sovereignty principle. An 
example may be found in U.S. history: 
[C]ertainly from the very beginning of U.S. history, with the treaty that in effect, created us, the Jay 
Treaty gave away fishing rights to Canada, or as it was then called, Nova Scotia in return for other 
English concessions. And no one blinked an eye that somehow we were sacrificing our sovereignty 
                                                             
9 In 1576, Jean Bodin published one of the earliest and most interesting theories of sovereignty; see J. Bodin, On 
Sovereignty, edited and translated by J.H. Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
10 Great Britain, Planche v Fletcher  99 Eng Rep 164 at 165. See also Government of India v Taylor [1955] A.C. 
491. 
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as part of a deal. So there has always been a long tradition in the economic sphere of people just 
going off and making deals because they made sense, and not bothering themselves too much with 
the sovereignty issue. It comes up all the time, but it has not been a major issue. 11 
Most certainly, the whole notion of sovereignty is undergoing a profound mutation with the 
recognition of the principle of intervention on humanitarian grounds following the excesses in 
certain countries, for example, in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and East Timor. On a purely 
economic basis, the internationalisation of global financial markets over the past quarter 
century and the constant expansion of free trade has sharply reduced national capacities for 
self-government.12 It may well be that economic peril on a globalised scale could in the near 
future be regarded as sound justification for the waning down of the sovereignty principle. 
Indeed, severe and sudden decrease in the economic well-being of nations have the potential 
to cause widespread misery and civil unrest which could, in certain circumstances, lead those 
affected to more serious actions of belligerence. Thus, Professor Galbraith rightly suggests that: 
one of the enemies of economic development, indeed of civilized society, has been the notion that 
national sovereignty is sacrosanct even when it protects the internal conflict that destroys the 
economy and the people themselves. The community of nations, however reluctantly, is coming to 
recognize that this is so; action by the United Nations to intervene against civil conflict, if still 
uncertain and exiguous, is achieving a certain acceptance. 13 
In sum, however sacrosanct the notion of sovereignty is, powerful strategic forces tend to 
ignore this principle forcing a ‘growing number of sovereign nations [to subordinate] some of 
their national policies and goals to regional agreements.’14 Nation-states, as the creation of the 
EU suggests, often choose to negotiate away sovereign rights, albeit with strong reluctance, 
when, as a result, everyone stands to gain some economic advantage. The same may be said 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which has been described as ‘an 
attempt to manage economic interdependence without a great deal of concern for 
sovereignty.’15 
Is fiscal sovereignty capable of accommodation as in other areas of economic life? There is a 
tremendous history of international cooperation in the tax area. However, one is forced to 
admit that nation-states remain fiercely attached to the notion of fiscal sovereignty. Thus, for 
                                                             
11 G.N. Horlich, ‘Sovereignty and International Trade Regulation’, (1994) 20 Canada-United States Law Journal 
57. 
12 H. Stretton, Inefficiencies of Global Capital Markets , (December 1998) United Nations, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Discussion Paper No. 2 ST/ESA/1998/DP.2, at <http://www.un.org/esa>. See also 
E.L. Jenkins, Address on Global Financial Reporting and the Global Financial Markets , 1999 Financial 
Executive Summit, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, 28 May 1999, at <http://www.isac.org.uk>. 
13 J.K. Galbraith, The World Economy Since the Wars: A Personal View (Mandarin Paperback, 1995), at 182. 
14 Jenkins, supra  note 12, at 3. 
15 Horlich, supra note 11, at 58. 
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instance, when in 1989 the Soviet Union imploded, the immediate result, in the taxation field, 
has been the creation of 15 or so taxing jurisdictions which are now all in competition with 
each other.16 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that since both the economic and the political worlds are shrinking, 
the adherence to the notion of sovereignty in the taxation area cannot be maintained ad 
infinitum, although ‘when it comes to taxation, countries jealously guard their independence’.17 
Internationalisation is seriously limiting the ability of national governments to effectively protect 
their tax base. To do so effectively governments need to enhance their cooperation through 
multilateral action as recommended by the OECD.18 The very notion of cooperation in this 
environment requires that participants dilute their claim to total fiscal sovereignty. What is 
required of them is that they agree to transfer part of that fiscal sovereignty to an international 
organisation. As will be seen further below, the result of this arrangement would be that 
countries would retain full sovereignty with regard to some crucial issues of fiscal policy but 
would confer comprehensive authority to an organisation in certain specific areas of 
international taxation. The dilution of fiscal sovereignty is not synonymous with its 
abandonment given that, in sum, no fiscal power is lost. Some aspect of Member countries’ 
fiscal power is merely transferred to an international tax organisation in order to enhance their 
ability to obtain a fair share of revenue. Moreover, the notion of fiscal sovereignty needs to be 
put into perspective. Fiscal sovereignty must be distinguished from political sovereignty. It 
consists of four distinct elements: 19 
· the choice of taxes to be levied, 
· the definition of tax base(s), including in this context the choice of an apportionment 
formula(s), 
· tax rates and credits, and  
· tax administration.  
As Professor McLure and Joann Weiner argue, the most important element of fiscal autonomy 
is the choice of tax rates (and tax credits). It is a nation’s ability to choose its tax rates which 
                                                             
16 D.H. Rosenbloom, ‘Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the Tax Area’, (1994) 20 
Canada-United States Law Journal 267. 
17  J. VanderWolk, ‘Direct Taxation in the Internet Age: A Fundamentalist Approach’, (April 2000) 54 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation (No. 4) 173, at 174. 
18 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (Paris: OECD, 1998), at 52 ff. 
19 C.E. McLure, Jr., & J.M. Weiner, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula 
Apportionment of Company Taxation’, paper prepared for presentation to the International Seminar in Public 
Economics/Research Center for Economic Policy Conference on Reform and Harmonization of Company Taxes 
in the European Union, at The Hague, 3-5 April 1997, at 37. 
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primarily determines the amount of revenue that nation will collect and thus the size of its public 
sector.20 
It is important to acknowledge that of all the elements of fiscal sovereignty, as mentioned 
above, the only one not exercisable by Intertax relates to the determination of tax rates which 
is, significantly, the one that happens to be the most important to any sovereign nation. 
Therefore, the devolution of the least important elements of fiscal sovereignty to Intertax can in 
no way be regarded as a complete abdication of the notion of fiscal sovereignty so 
characteristic of the nation-state. 
Clearly, the creation of an international institution to deal exclusively with the technical aspects 
of cross-border income flows would only mean that national sovereignty is exercised 
indirectly. The success of any international organisation depends on the collective will of its 
members, that is, nation-states. An international organisation dealing with taxation will, as is the 
case with any other organisation, coordinate policies adopted by a majority of members rather 
than create and impose a policy of its own which is disconnected with the will of its members. 
Therefore, the advent of such an international organisation would mean a transfer, rather than a 
loss, of sovereign fiscal power. 
The question of sovereignty is arguably a vexing one. While the cooperation of the most 
powerful states may be open to doubt when it comes to relinquishing their economic and 
political powers, it is submitted that the fear of losing ultimate control over potent economic 
forces unleashed by the globalisation process may be the prime mover in this area. Indeed, 
there are several indications that countries may accept the transfer of some of their sovereign 
power to international organisations with a mandate to control and harness the globalisation 
phenomenon on the express condition they maintain ultimate control over such organisations.21 
Thus, for example, in response to the Asian financial crisis which threatened the whole global 
financial system, the G-7 countries, at their meeting on 3 October 1998 in Washington D.C., 
were quick to call for the institution of standards and codes of best practices with, most 
importantly, a surveillance role to be attributed to the IMF and other international 
organisations.22 
                                                             
20 Ibid . 
21 T.S. Adams, arguably the most U.S. influential tax policy expert at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
believed that ‘nations would surrender tax jurisdiction only so long as they could do so without incurring 
significant harm: we shall eliminate, in the long run, only that measure and degree of multiple taxation which 
competing jurisdictions believe harmful to themselves.’ See T.S. Adams , Interstate and International Double 
Taxation, in Lectures on Taxation 101, at 102 (Roswell Magill, ed., 1932.) in M.J. Graetz & M. O’Hear, ‘The 
‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation’ (1997) 46 Duke L.J. 1021, at 1102. 
22 Anonymous, ‘Declaration of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’, (30 October 1998) 
reproduced in Notable Quotations about IASC, at <http://www.iasc.org.uk>. 
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At this stage, however, there is no point in being over-prescriptive about the details of the 
rights and duties of Intertax’s members. What is important is that the broad criteria for the 
proper operation of the organisation are met. For the moment the concept is more important 
than the design. One of the first principles of Intertax is that it would work in conjunction with 
the Bretton Woods institutions,23 the OECD and the WTO ,in order to secure consistency of 
goals and promote consensus-building dialogue between governments. 
i i  The Structure of Intertax: An Overview 
In the ideal, Intertax’s structure and methods of operations should be such that political 
resistance is kept to a minimum. The likelihood of Intertax successfully furthering its objects 
would be enhanced if its actions were perceived as being totally independent of vested national 
interests. 
The following is a hypothetical model based on an idealistic view of the world. The model 
speculates on the optimum structures that would enable Intertax to achieve its goals. To start 
with, the task of formulating rules for the taxation of cross-border income flows is to be 
entrusted to an organ composed principally of technical experts chosen in such a way as to 
equitably represent both capital-exporting and capital-importing countries. Care should be 
taken to achieve an equitable representation of various economic interests rather than 
promoting an elitist group. 
The formulation of the decision-making mechanism within Intertax would probably present the 
most serious difficulties. This is because nations will tend to look suspiciously at each other for 
fear of losing any significant amount of revenue if they do not control this decision-making 
process themselves. In the end, therefore, it would be of critical importance for the success of 
the organisation that it is viewed as being totally impartial in its decision-making process. In the 
case of the GATT, which has been suggested as a model to be emulated in the field of 
international taxation, one finds that although nominally all parties are regarded as equal, the 
fact is that the whole negotiating process is dominated by the major powers.24 In an ideal 
world, this situation is unacceptable. New and more democratic arrangements should be found 
in order to compensate less powerful countries for the loss of part of their fiscal sovereignty. 
There arises, therefore, the question of voting power which is crucial to the eventual success of 
the organisation. The question of voting power or, in other words, the decision-making 
                                                             
23 The Bretton Woods Conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA, in July 1944 resulted in the 
creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund. 
See Chapter 2, Section III, 1, A, at 77. 
24 The Report of The Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), at 147. 
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process, is at the very heart of the distinction between the U.N., a relative failure in economic 
matters, and the IMF where the prevailing system of weighted voting rights has probably been 
responsible for its relative success in achieving its mandate.25 
The Report of the Commission on Global Governance shows that if the purchasing power 
parity basis is taken as the reference point, then the world’s 10 biggest economies are, in 
descending order, Russia, Brazil, the U.K., India, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, China, and 
the U.S.26 In fact, Mexico, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea are not far behind in these 
statistics. At the same time the share of output accounted for by Members of the OECD 
shrinks to barely half once the underlying purchasing power of economies measured at 
comparable prices is taken into account.27 This new reality must be taken into consideration 
when allocating voting rights within Intertax because, as already argued, countries are more 
likely to cling to the concept of sovereignty if they believe that, in any international ‘deal’, their 
interests are ignored. 
In performing its major obligation, that is, the administration of a multilateral taxation treaty and 
the application of formulary apportionment for the allocation of income derived by TNCs, 
Intertax will necessarily be confronted with inevitable disputes, which will need to be solved. It 
is therefore important to determine, at least in the broad terms, an acceptable mechanism for 
the settlement of these disputes. It is suggested that arbitration would be the ideal solution to 
deal with disputes arising in either the management of the organisation, or in its application of 
the provisions of the multilateral treaty it is supposed to administer. The crucial aspect of the 
procedure is that all parties must compulsorily submit to the award of the court of arbitration.  
The idea for a court of arbitration in purely financial matters is not new. The International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was created as far back as 1965 by 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in order to promote the settlement of 
disputes relative to investments. Each Contracting State, whether or not it or any of its 
nationals have been party to the proceedings, is obliged to recognise an ICSID award and 
take the necessary steps to ensure that any pecuniary obligations imposed by the award are 
met as if it were a final judgment of one of its own courts. 
The ICSID is by no means the only case where nation-states have voluntarily accepted to 
forgo some of their sovereign powers in monetary matters. At the European Council meeting in 
                                                             
25 The recent difficulties faced by the IMF in dealing with the Asian crisis are however symptomatic of the 
inability of the organisation to deal with the consequences of globalisation with classical economic management 
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26 The Report of The Commission on Global Governance, supra note 24, at 148. 
27 Supra note 24 , at 148. 
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Maastricht in 1991 an agreement was reached on a Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union 
(Treaty on EMU) which includes provisions for a central EU monetary authority whose 
objective is to formulate and implement a single monetary policy for the EU.28 Although the 
scope of the Treaty on EMU is restricted to the EU, the point is that sovereign states are 
ready, in appropriate circumstances, to forgo some of their prerogatives even in such crucial 
areas as monetary policy. Consequently, if the necessary safeguards as to equitable and non-
discriminatory treatment are afforded by Intertax under the control of a court of arbitration, 
then there are reasons to believe that compliance of the member states would be 
forthcoming.29 
2 A General Agreement for Taxes: A Realistic View 
The idealistic view of the world that transcends national barriers has no chance of being 
implemented. Cooperation in the formulation of fiscal policy, more especially in the field of 
direct taxation, is still in its infancy even among countries within the EU. If the experience of the 
EU in the area of direct tax harmonisation is used as a guide, then, clearly, the task of trying to 
find a solution to the allocation problem that would be applicable on a worldwide basis is a 
practical impossibility.30 Yet, the difficulty for most countries to determine their fair share of 
taxes arising from cross-border transactions is nonetheless real, as evidenced by the increasing 
complexity of international taxation legislation in most industrialised countries. What is 
therefore needed ‘to stem the erosion of the capital income tax base - and preserve the 
income tax - is vastly increased multilateral cooperation among tax authorities, perhaps along 
the lines of the…GATT.’31 
What are the prospects of creating a General Agreement on Tariffs, Trade and Taxes, to use 
an expression of Professor Slemrod?32 Is it more realistic to propose a worldwide tax 
institution of the ‘weak’ type akin to the GATT as proposed by Professor Vann? 33 
                                                             
28 C.A. Whytock, ‘Eurofed: Toward a European System of Central Banks and a European Central Bank’, (1991-
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29 For a proposal to create an international tax court, see J. Azzi, ‘Tackling Tax Treaty Tensions: Time to Think 
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Documentation (No. 8/9) 344. 
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Views on European Tax Harmonisation?’, (June 2000) 54 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (No. 
6) 263. 
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For?’, (1992) 9 Australian Tax Forum  373, at 384. 
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A A Reinforcement of the IMF/OECD Axis 
Since taxation consumes a significant part of both the OECD and the IMF’s resources, it may 
be argued that these two organisations should at least coordinate their action in this area. Lack 
of political will and inertia, however, may be such that ‘the present will be the future’.34 In 
other words, the status quo will be maintained so that the OECD will remain concerned with 
international taxation and the IMF will continue to provide expertise in domestic tax policy and 
tax administration to developing countries. 
However, for several reasons, this immobility is unlikely to last. First, there is the magnitude of 
change occurring in all fields of human endeavour, particularly in computer technology and 
communications and the Internet.35 If the case of global trading in financial instruments is taken 
as an example, it is clear that change in this area is impacting very significantly on the way such 
instruments are traded. Electronic commerce has tax consequences that are still being analysed 
by various institutions including the OECD and the U.S. Treasury with the view to offering a 
coherent system for the tax treatment of gains and losses thereon.36 
Second, as already noted, in many instances, former capital-importing countries are now 
exporting capital. In other words, and most significantly, capital flows are no longer totally 
unidirectional.37 In addition, the traditional distinction between developed and less-developed 
countries (LDCs) cannot be applied to former Eastern bloc countries. Indeed, contrary to 
LDCs, the existing industrial capacity of these countries, though obsolete in many respects, is 
nevertheless real. As a result of all these mutations, the very premises of the present 
institutional arrangements are constantly being challenged. 
Third, the emerging economic environment requires innovative solutions to double taxation, 
and protection of the tax base, obtaining a fair share of the tax pie, which are concerns 
relevant to all countries. In spite of this, the OECD continues to maintain a firm control of all 
developments in the area of tax treaties, which still remains the primary mechanism to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
33 R.J. Vann, ‘A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region?’, (April 1991) 45 Bull Int’l Fiscal 
Documentation 151, at 156. 
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unpublished paper, at 55. 
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accommodate these pursuits. The IMF, for its part, has been forced in its dealings with the 
former Eastern bloc countries, to abandon its traditional insistence on the separation of 
technical assistance and conditionality in the tax area. 
There are different ways in which these two major international organisations could react to 
this state of affairs. They may expand their commitments and re-examine their operating 
principles. This has already occurred, for example, with the OECD which is becoming more 
open to non-member countries. In addition, its 1995 Guidelines, whilst remaining international 
in its outlook, contains recommendations, which are quite prescriptive in the domestic area. It 
also contains provisions for peer review of their application, a critical development that will be 
examined further below. Furthermore, the OECD has a formal ruling function under the 
Convention for Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; its mutual agreement 
procedure is being reinforced; and arbitration as a viable option for the settlement of tax 
disputes is being studied. 
As already implied, the IMF is not directly concerned with international taxation issues. It has, 
however, encouraged the development of standardised fiscal mechanisms through the 
provision of uniform training packages to tax and treasury officials of its members. In addition, 
it has mounted a huge effort to modernise the tax administration capabilities of the former 
Eastern bloc countries. In fact, its action has informally produced a certain harmonisation of 
the tax systems being implemented in those jurisdictions. 
It would seem, therefore, that both the OECD and the IMF are deliberately opting for 
preserving each other’s precinct without engaging in open competition, although the reality of 
such competition can be seen in the activities of both organisations in Eastern and Central 
Europe. Competition with other institutions, such as the WTO, is also a substantial risk as 
direct taxation becomes the focus of trade measures. 
Nevertheless, these two organisations may well consider more seriously the option of entering 
into cooperative arrangements, or to use a fashionable expression, a strategic alliance, to 
facilitate their work.38 To start with, it would be advisable if they were to carve up their 
respective spheres of influence in order to avoid wasteful competition which indeed is 
damaging to both. In the long run, however, these organisations could seek a merger of their 
fiscal affairs divisions into an international organisation dealing exclusively with taxation.  
Formal cooperative mechanisms between the IMF, the EU, the OECD and the WTO are 
already in place. The OECD has pledged to work with non-OECD member countries and 
other tax organizations such as CIAT, CATA, IOTA, and the United Nations ad hoc group of 
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experts on international tax matters.39 Thus, for example, apart from the Joint Vienna Institute, 
or the Joint Africa Institute, representatives of the EU and the IMF routinely attend the meeting 
of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs. A conceivable solution could well be the 
formation of an international organisation designed to deal exclusively with international 
taxation , incorporating those features of the OECD and the IMF, which have already proved 
their usefulness. Such an institution may even be set up by the combined efforts of these two 
organisations. More remotely, what if they were to merge into a new organisation given that 
their complementary functions would probably facilitate that operation? The complementarity 
of these organisations has been recognised recently. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the G-7 
countries are much in favour of the setting up of codes and standards with: 
the Fund [IMF], World Bank, OECD and the international regulatory and supervisory organisations 
to work closely together to provide advice and, where necessary, assistance to countries to help 
them meet these internationally agreed codes and standards. 40 
B A Conceivable Institutio n 
Embryonic institutions designed to harness the globalisation process are therefore already in 
gestation. As will be shown further on, others are being contemplated, for example, in the field 
of accounting or, more broadly, in the financial sector. 
In the words of Vito Tanzi: 
[A] keen observer must have noted the growing role that international institutions (such as DJF, 
the OECD, the WTO, YMO, the World Bank, the BIS, the UN, and so on) are playing in connection 
with issues with international ramifications. Such a role is at times controversial but most observers 
seem to accept the legitimacy of these institutions even though they may criticize some of their 
actions or policies. 41 
Notwithstanding this trend to deal with international economic affairs through specialised 
international institutions: 
[T]he keen observer must also have noted that there is now no international institution responsible 
for dealing with the cross-border externalities or spillovers created by tax systems. 42 
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i  The Progress Towards an  International Tax Institution  
The passing of tax jurisdiction from national to international jurisdiction is, in the words of 
Professor Vann, a multifaceted process.43 Most international organisations concerned with 
economic matters are also required to deal with taxation. Consequently, a certain convergence 
of these heterogeneous efforts is necessary. The objective meeting point for this convergence 
may well be some special forum designed to coordinate the various informal working 
arrangements, which already exist among current international organisations. 
An example of a coordinating body, which might exercise quasi-supranational powers in the 
future, is already in place in the tax administration field. This is the coordinating body 
established by the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
(MAATM) sponsored by the OECD and the Council of Europe.44 The Convention provides, 
as already discussed,45 for the multilateral exchange of information and mutual administrative 
assistance in recovering tax claims in participating countries. Significantly, the Convention 
marks a real departure from bilateral tax treaties in that it provides for international 
cooperation in recovering taxes. Articles 24(3) and (4) of the Convention provide for a 
coordinating body to ‘monitor the implementation and development of this Convention, under 
the aegis of the OECD.’46 The body is to be made up of representatives of signatories. 
Pursuant to Article 24(4), if one of the signatories so requests, the coordinating body needs ‘to 
furnish opinions on the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention’.47 The coordinating 
body is at this stage a sub-set of Working Party No. 8 on Tax Avoidance and Evasion of the 
OECD Committee of Fiscal Affairs.48 However, if in the future non-OECD Members become 
parties to the Convention, this coordinating body may well take on an independent life whilst 
being closely tied to the OECD. This possibility for the coordinating ‘body becoming a quasi-
judicial forum is acknowledged in the Commentary on Article 24.’49 
The evolution in proposed solutions to the problem of compliance and administration in 
international taxation from a bilateral to a multilateral level is also significant in the more specific 
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area of transfer pricing. The point of reference in this sector is the OECD 1995 Guidelines.50 
While the Guidelines deal basically with transfer pricing issues and other related tax issues with 
respect to multinational enterprises,51 ‘what may prove to be of most importance in the future 
is the public agreement of OECD countries to subject themselves to a process of peer review 
in the transfer pricing area.’52 Although this was already happening on an informal basis, the 
point is that the role of the OECD as an arbiter in the taxation area is gradually being 
strengthened. This process of a gradual surrender of tax jurisdiction from the national to the 
international level is thus being achieved in a gradual way within the existing treaty domain.53 
The influence of broad international economic principles on international taxation principles has 
already been examined.54 This interaction is becoming increasingly significant and may lead to 
a new international order in the field of taxation. When one considers the trend set by 
standards such as the most favoured nation (MFN) principle, the national treatment (non-
discrimination) obligation, or other trade and investment agreements prohibiting expropriations, 
for example, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), although now on hold, one may 
perceive a steady movement towards the creation of an embryonic tax organisation. However, 
to accelerate this process, it may well be that a carve out of the taxation measures contained in 
these international economic principles should first be agreed upon and then transferred to an 
organisation specifically designed to deal with the numerous issues arising from the encounter 
of international business taxation and international economic principles. After all, the WTO, 
and especially GATS, deal, inter alia, with tariffs which are basically a special kind of tax on 
commodities so that now, in a world where trade in services, in ideas and in other intangibles is 
growing, the need for a multilateral treaty dealing with the taxation issues arising from this type 
of trade has become a fundamental necessity. 55 
There are other strands now being explored in the present system of international taxation that 
may ultimately be considered as a prelude to the formation of a more conventional international 
tax organisation, for instance, the availability of the simultaneous tax examination, defined as 
‘an arrangement between two or more parties to examine simultaneously and independently, 
each on its own territory, the tax affairs of (a) taxpayer(s) in which they have a common or 
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related interest with a view to exchanging any relevant information which they so obtain.’56 A 
simultaneous examination is a form of mutual assistance that allows countries to cooperate in 
tax investigations. The procedure is authorised pursuant to Article 26 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention.57 Article 8 of MAATM also authorises the conduct of simultaneous tax 
examinations.58 Furthermore, pursuant to Article 9 of the Convention, a country requesting a 
tax examination to be carried out by another may also request that its representatives be 
allowed to be present in the other country when the examination is being conducted. 
Acceptance by the requested state is optional rather than imperative. Nonetheless, if such a 
request is accepted, it is arguable that the requested state, by allowing foreign fiscal 
representatives on its territory, is agreeing to limit its sovereignty in fiscal matters.59 Given that 
this convention is multilateral and that its implementation is to be coordinated by a body 
composed of the representatives of the competent authorities of the parties pursuant to Article 
24 of the Convention, it is arguable that it provides yet more evidence of a subtle move 
towards the creation of an international organisation to which its members will devolve some of 
their fiscal sovereignty. 
In recent years, there has been a widespread use of Advance Pricing Arrangements (APAs) 
as a method of cooperation between tax administration and taxpayers in the transfer pricing 
area.60 In 1994, anticipating a wider use of this procedure, the Pacific Association of Tax 
Administrators (PATA), grouping Australia, Canada, Japan and the U.S., agreed to a 
standardised process in handling the competent authority aspects of bilateral APAs involving 
its members.61 As for the OECD, its 1995 Guidelines admit that APAs could aid in resolving 
transfer pricing disputes and avoid double taxation,62 and it recommends that APAs be 
concluded on a bilateral or multilateral basis. In 1999, in order to harmonise standards in 
regard to APAs, the OECD released its guidelines thereon.63 In the words of Jeffrey Owens, 
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the head of the Fiscal Division of the OECD, these guidelines are meant to propose ‘some 
type of international APA standards’.64 However, one must keep in mind that whilst the APA 
is a practical solution to transfer pricing issues, it is nonetheless a time-consuming process and 
‘is certainly not optimal from a policy perspective.’65 
Moreover, again in the field of international tax administration, and in relation to the mutual 
agreement procedure (MAP) of Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
and Capital,66 there is renewed interest in the development of arbitration as a means of dealing 
with tax disputes. The MAP is an example of how cooperation between fiscal authorities is 
managed in order to reach an acceptable outcome for all parties concerned, including a 
taxpayer. The MAP may be considered as the most significant effort to deal with transfer 
pricing and other allocation questions that ‘are by far the most important source of international 
disputes’.67 The MAP has, however, some important shortcomings.68 Consequently, the 
OECD has sought to strengthen Article 25. Thus, for example, the OECD 1995 Guidelines69 
propose certain recommendations designed to address these concerns. Recently, two other 
difficulties have arisen relative to the MAP. First, there is the emerging use of secret 
comparables in competent authority cases which, in the words of the former U.S. Competent 
Authority (CA), ‘poses an immediate threat to competent authority procedures’.70 Indeed, the 
release of ‘secret comparables to third parties to support tax adjustments would violate the tax 
return confidentiality provisions of section 6103 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.’71 The 
second threat to the MAP comes from the uncertainly resulting from the lawsuits initiated by 
Tax Analysts, the publisher of World Tax Daily  and Tax Notes International under the U.S. 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking access to advance pricing agreements, the 
records of the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators, and field service advice. The 
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provision of information by a foreign jurisdiction is made on the assumption that such 
information should remain confidential. If the U.S. were to disclose this information, the 
confidence of foreign tax officials in the MAP procedure would be severely curtailed and 
would give rise to serious disputes between various CAs. 
Such disputes have always arisen in the past, so much so in fact that, since 1972 at least, there 
have been discussions in various forums, for example, the OECD, the International Fiscal 
Association, and the International Chamber of Commerce, to find other acceptable methods 
for settling international tax disputes.72 Arbitration in tax matters has been proposed as a 
possible solution. It has, however, been argued that the availability of arbitration, rather that 
arbitration itself, may be a powerful incentive for parties to reach a resolution under the MAP 
in order to prevent the intervention of third parties.73 A potent example where use of 
arbitration is provided for is the EU Convention on Arbitration74 in transfer pricing which came 
into effect on 1 January 1995 for a period of five years.75 It expired but was extended for a 
further five-year period from 1 January 2000.76 The Convention provides for a mandatory 
arbitration procedure whose mechanics have already been examined.77 The OECD, for its 
part, notes in its 1995 Guidelines that, as ‘trade and investment have taken on an increasingly 
international character, the tax disputes that, on occasion, arise from such activities have 
likewise become increasingly international.’78 Therefore, in order to deal with these disputes, 
the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs has agreed to undertake a study on the topic of 
arbitration in the context of transfer pricing, which will eventually be incorporated in the 
Guidelines. 
Recently, those welcome but as yet incomplete moves towards enhancing cooperation 
between countries through institutional means have been boosted by the OECD’s bold move 
against what it terms harmful tax competition. Basically, the major effect of the OECD’s 
intervention is that it has initiated an evolution of the present system of international 
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cooperation from a purely monitoring role into one characterised by intervention, albeit 
indirectly, through peer pressure. This novel approach is illustrated by the mechanism set up to 
deal with the most blatant cases of harmful tax competition. At present, countries no longer 
compete with one another through the use of tariffs, non-tariff barriers, or quantitative 
restrictions. Rather, competition is often driven by such measures as tax incentives, decreases 
in tax rates, or the abandonment of some types of taxes, for example, withholding taxes. 
Whilst competition often maximises welfare, clearly when these methods aim at securing an 
advantage at the expense of another country’s tax base, then it seems logical that intervention 
is required. The OECD’s determination to deal with such harmful tax competition has already 
been mentioned.79 However, what is really significant for the present discussion is the means 
by which the OECD intends to use to deal with the problem. In its endeavour to phase out 
harmful tax measures by 31 December 2005,80 perhaps the most important of the 19 detailed 
recommendations proposed by the OECD81 is the establishment of the Forum on Harmful Tax 
Practice. This Forum ‘is the first broadly mandated international institutional structure directly 
responsible for the evaluation and coordination of existing and proposed tax measures.’82 The 
operational aspects of the Forum, it is submitted, come very close to what an international tax 
organisation of the ‘weak’ type ought to be doing, as mentioned earlier. For an initial period of 
two years the Forum will carry out cross-country reviews designed to determine which 
countries use preferential tax regimes and in what instances these regimes become harmful. 
Once this information is available, countries that do have these regimes will be requested to 
remove them. After the review process, a country may request the Forum to examine any 
measure taken by another country which it considers to be harmful. If the Forum does find that 
a tax measure is indeed a harmful practice, then the country at fault will be requested to 
remove the offending measure though the Forum’s recommendations are not binding. 
However ‘the existence of an opinion that a domestic measure is in violation of important 
political commitments undertaken by a Member country should have a strong impact.’83 
Moreover, since the OECD intends to associate non-member countries to this process, it is 
reasonable to infer that the Forum may well have a significant impact on the fiscal policies of all 
major economies in the coming years. The real test for this initiative will be whether both 
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OECD and non-OECD countries are prepared to commit to a program that significantly 
reduces their sovereignty in fiscal matters.84  
To sum up then, it is clear that, as a result of both intrinsic and extrinsic pressures on the 
existing principles of international taxation, a variety of avenues are now being explored in 
order to enhance international cooperation in tax matters. There also arises the question of the 
relationship between proposed solutions and, most significantly, the cumulative impact of these 
developments on the future of international taxation. The fact that ‘international taxation is 
moving to a higher plane cannot be understated.’85 The conclusion is that the newly found 
cooperation between the existing various international organisations concerned with taxation 
on the one hand, and the emergence of new rules, practices, and dispute resolution which need 
to be coordination by various institutions on the other, already amount to an embryonic tax 
organisation. However, as Professor Vann observed, ‘it remains an open question whether 
and how the new developments can be given recognition as amounting to an international tax 
institution.’86 
i i . The Operational Aspects of Intertax 
The creation of Intertax under a multilateral treaty would free the principles of international 
taxation from the constraints of the current bilateral structure into which they are forged. Thus, 
for example, under a multilateral approach, the strict reciprocity that characterises bilateral 
treaties could be abandoned. This means that countries would be able to adopt different tax 
ceilings applicable to TNCs operating within their jurisdiction and ‘those rates would 
automatically be extended to all parties to the treaty irrespective of whether other countries 
adopted the same or different rates.’87 This arrangement is particularly important in the 
proposed model where, as will be examined later, governments would be free to apply to their 
allocated share of the tax base whatever tax rate they think fit in order to achieve their 
economic objectives. 
Furthermore, the flexibility of a multilateral convention is such that parties could opt out of 
certain parts provided these are not the core provisions instituting the proposed model. These 
core provisions should be minimal with progressively more binding undertakings as Intertax 
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moves slowly towards becoming a stronger institution. Again, the analogy with the GATT is 
appropriate. Over the years the number of binding commitments under the GATT have 
increased although countries still have much latitude in deciding which part of the agreement 
would bind them. It is arguable that uncertainty in international taxation might emerge if 
countries are allowed to avail themselves of too many flexible rules in the convention. After all, 
in the transfer pricing area, the whole purpose of APAs is to achieve certainty of outcome for 
both the taxpayer and the taxation authorities. Certainty is achievable if Intertax were to 
provide authoritative binding determinations on the contents of the rules it is required to 
administer. Thus, the presence of an interpretative body charged with producing an 
increasingly detailed jurisprudence relative to the agreed rules makes it possible, in the 
multilateral context with an international tax institution, to assist in achieving a certain uniformity 
of tax systems. Obviously, an organisation of the ‘weak’ type may find it particularly difficult to 
impose such rules unless they are particularly flexible. However, rather than adopting positive 
prescriptions whose success could be uncertain, Intertax could proceed by way of negative 
rules, or what has been called ‘negative harmonisation’.88 Reliance on negative rules implies 
that Intertax would regulate what tax systems cannot do, rather than what they should do. 
Countries would thus be able to maintain an appearance of control on their tax systems. Any 
factual surrender to an external body could be presented to the nation as merely being in the 
nature of a peer review rather than a capitulation to a supranational body. 
In providing for authoritative binding determinations, Intertax would stand as an arbiter 
between the competitive interests of its members. A more formal aspect of this function would 
be the presence of some kind of dispute resolution mechanism exercisable by the institution. 
As already suggested, arbitration would be an adequate way to resolve any disputes that 
would arise between Intertax member states. It is inevitable that arbitration would become a 
standard practice in international taxation because of the evolution of ideas and the pressures 
from other economic sectors where the procedure is prevalent. Thus, the presence of an 
international tax institution will also tend to satisfy the desire of tax officials to retain the right to 
resolve tax disputes through the MAP as expressed in the 1995 update of the OECD 
Model.89 
The consolidation of corporate group accounts for taxation purposes, by eliminating intra-
group transactions, would identify an indisputable tax base.90 Once this is achieved, the second 
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step requires that Intertax determines each country’s share of that base. To do so, an 
appropriate formula will need to be used. Once each country’s share is established, that 
country would be free to apply whatever tax rate it believes is conducive to achieving its fiscal 
objectives provided these rates remain within an agreed band. The residence country would 
then decide how to tax its share of the income. 
C The Advantages of the Proposed Institutional Approach  
The proposed institutional approach would deal simultaneously with several of the most acute 
problems identified with the present system of international business taxation. First, the 
recharacterisation of income under the proposed system loses its effectiveness within a TNC. 
This is because of the elimination of intra-group transactions resulting from the consolidation 
process. Similarly, it would lose its attractiveness outside the group as a result of the division of 
the tax base by means of an appropriate formula and the application of single-source country 
taxation.  
Second, the choice of a formulary apportionment methodology over the arm’s length principle 
has often been demonstrated as being theoretically correct. Thus, according to Professor 
Peggy Musgrave: 
[F]ormula apportionment under the unitary approach...recognises the integrated nature of the 
related parts of the modern business enterprise and avoids the arbitrariness inherent in intra-firm 
pricing. Most important, it allows the application of a formula designed to be consistent with equity 
principles, that is, to conform with ‘fair share’ standards. 91 
Formulary apportionment applied on worldwide consolidated profits of TNCs administered by 
Intertax is therefore a viable method to capture the synergy profits arising from the 
interdependence of various entities forming part of a TNC.92 This holistic method also 
bypasses the problem of defining a unitary enterprise.93 
Third, consolidation eliminates treaty shopping which is often used to either recharacterise 
income or divert it to more favourable jurisdictions.94 Under the proposed system, treaty 
shopping is effectively dealt with since a share of the international tax base is allocated to a 
particular country only if it has effectively contributed to the derivation of that base. This is 
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achieved by the formula that encapsulates all the factors which would have contributed to that 
derivation.  
Clearly, a tax haven, where most conduit companies are situated, does not contribute to the 
tax base because these conduit companies do not carry any real operation in the jurisdiction. 
Consequently, the apportionment formula would apportion nothing to the tax haven. 
Fourth, thin capitalisation ceases to be a concern because interest payments between members 
of the TNC are ignored, just as any other intra-firm remuneration. Interest payments by the 
TNC to third parties would still have to be considered but only for establishing the total tax 
base subject to division. 95 
Fifth, controlled foreign corporation (CFC) legislation would become obsolete because the 
consolidation function on which it is based would be carried out for the purpose of defining the 
corporate group’s international tax base. This would then provide the residence country with a 
comprehensive tax base which it could tax. Consolidation eliminates the problem of deferral, 
that is, the postponement of tax on foreign income of a resident taxpayer until it is repatriated. 
Sixth, with a single tax authority to police the allocation to each country of its fair share of the 
tax base, the risk of international double taxation is eliminated. Thus ‘the allocational efficiency 
of the new system would also score better than the present highly contorted roundabout 
procedures under the separate entity paradigm.’96 
Finally, foreign exchange transactions and finance leases within TNCs would also be 
effectively dealt with. However, as shown below, it will be necessary to have consistent rules 
regarding currency translations, that is, the conversion of the currency used for tax accounts by 
various TNCs into the currencies of the various countries sharing the tax base. 
The consolidation approach through a multilateral effort subject to the surveillance authority of 
Intertax will result in a dramatic improvement of the present international tax scene, but in 
order for Intertax to achieve its objective, agreement on certain technical points needs to be 
achieved. How is the tax base to be defined? In this regard, it is important to note that what 
Intertax needs to achieve is not strictly speaking the definition of each country’s tax base. 
Rather, it only needs to determine the accounting profits of TNCs using a set of international 
accounting standards, and then to apportion this ‘base’ to each country entitled to tax by 
means of certain reasonable apportionment formulas. 
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Section II Implementing Harmonised Accounting Standards 
In order for a global formulary approach to be properly and equitably applied on a worldwide 
basis, TNCs must be required to lodge with Intertax accounting and other financial records 
kept in a standardised fashion, disclosing comparable information. Therefore, the need to 
determine the commercial profits of TNCs on the basis of standardised international 
accounting principles is of paramount importance for the success of the system. 
1 The Need for the Harmonisation of Accounting Principles 
and Policies  
One of the numerous consequences of the emergence of a global market economy and new 
information technologies is the perception that in order to maximise efficiency a certain degree 
of harmonisation of financial reporting and disclosure standards is essential.97 Several 
organisations are at the forefront of the harmonisation of accounting standards movement. The 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the U.N., the OECD, and the EU are all interested in the 
issue. Whilst it is arguable that harmonised accounting and disclosure standards would facilitate 
business taxation, it must be borne in mind that such harmonised standards would first and 
foremost ‘help market forces to impose discipline and thus improve financial stability’.98 
Indeed, the inherent feature of financial transactions is that they all involve a degree of credit 
risk. Therefore, it is crucial for counterparties to reasonably determine the extent of this risk by 
accessing transparent and harmonised accounting data. 
A The Advantages of a Harmonised Accounting System 
The laws of various nations may be brought closer together by three methods: unification, 
standardisation, and harmonisation.99 The first two are more readily relevant when political 
union is contemplated, for example. Harmonisation, which has been described as ‘a movement 
away from total diversity of practice,’100 may be viewed from two distinct viewpoints: formal 
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and material harmonisation. Formal harmonisation is defined as ‘the degree of similarity 
existing among the sets of financial standards of various nations,’101 whereas material 
harmonisation is defined as ‘the degree of similarity among financial reports of enterprises’.102 
In the present context, if formal harmonisation is achieved on an international level, then 
material harmonisation is likely to follow in practice. For Intertax to operate efficiently it is 
essential to achieve the harmonisation of accounting principles and policies including the 
harmonisation of consolidation methods. 
Much has been said about the enormous expansion in foreign investments made by TNCs 
both in developed and developing countries. In fact, many governments are truly incapable of 
monitoring foreign investors on the basis of information available through the use of present 
accounting standards. This defect has not gone unnoticed in the U.S. where Congress, in 
legislation passed in 1996, recognised that: 
a high-quality comprehensive set of generally accepted international accounting standards would 
generally facilitate international financing activities and, most significantly, would enhance the 
ability of foreign corporations to access and list in the United States Markets. 103 
The potential revenue loss arising from the dysfunctionalities of different accounting standards 
interacting with each other in one global market is enormous as shown by figures published by 
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO).104 On the other hand, it is arguable that a 
rationalisation of accounting standards is likely to have beneficial consequences for TNCs, 
given that ‘disclosure requirements increase the confidence of individual investors in the 
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fairness and integrity of financial markets and, by fostering confidence, encourage 
investments.’105  
The objective of financial statements, as recognised by the U.N. Working Group of Experts 
on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting, is ‘to provide information about the 
financial position, performance and changes in financial position of an enterprise, which is 
useful to a wide range of users in making decisions...106 
The primary source of information on TNCs is their general purpose annual report. The 
diversity of users of general purpose reports is  great and consists, for example, of creditors, 
suppliers, investors, employees, government bodies, and the general public. If the focus is 
maintained on the need of governments, then it is fairly obvious that governments require more 
specific data in order to elicit specific information relevant to their revenue collection function 
as well as for other policy decisions. In addition, as a result of the internationalisation of capital 
markets, market operators worldwide are becoming more aware of the need for one common 
business and accounting language.107 Such uniformity would promote greater confidence in 
both the financial and non-financial information in TNC reports enabling investors to properly 
assess the risks of particular investment opportunities.108  
In general, the range of information disclosed in TNC financial accounts needs to be 
broadened in order to provide relevant, reliable, neutral and comparable information. 109 To 
achieve these objectives, agreement on a worldwide basis ‘on a body of information necessary 
to form such a nucleus and to harmonise the differing methodologies used to quantify those 
data’110 is essential. 
Currently, there are fundamental differences in the ways in which financial information is 
presented around the world. For example, consolidation of accounts is by no means a 
universal practice, even in certain industrialised countries.111 In some countries there is an 
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actual or practical linkage between income tax and financial reporting, which results in a clash 
between the needs of fiscal authorities and the needs of other users. Again, in such areas as 
leases, or foreign currency translations, significant differences exist. The periodicity of financial 
statements also varies widely. In some jurisdictions a statement as to the source and 
application of funds is not required. Finally, there are wide variations as to the standard 
qualification of independent auditors and audit examinations of financial statements. 
B Efforts to Harmonise 
Calls for more uniformity in the accounting laws, albeit in the American context, were made as 
far back as at the first International Congress of Public Accountants held in September 1904 
in St Louis, Missouri.112 President John F Kennedy’s address to the Eight International 
Congress of Accountants held in New York in September 1962 clearly demonstrates that at 
the political level, at least at that time, the advantages of achieving uniformity on a worldwide 
basis were clearly understood. The President said: 
[Y]our Congress, meeting at the invitation of the American Institute of CPAs, offers an excellent 
opportunity for the exchange of information and ideas. As we gain confidence in each other’s 
policies of economic disclosures, accounting can indeed become an international language of 
business. As a result, capital will flow more freely and the international exchange of goods and 
services will increase more rapidly. Many of the problems with which you will concern yourselves 
during your meeting will, I am sure, bear directly on the ability of all of us to strengthen the spirit of 
international economic confidence.113 
A pioneer in the search of accounting uniformity is the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC). The IASC, an independent private sector body, was founded in 1973 by 
the accountancy bodies in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, the U.K., Ireland and the U.S.114  
The primary objectives of the IASC are: 115 
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· to formulate and publish accounting standards to be observed in the presentation of 
financial statements, and to promote their world wide acceptance and observance; and  
· to work generally for the improvement and harmonisation of regulations, accounting 
standards, and procedures relating to the presentation of financial statements. 
The IASC is not alone in its ambition to implement harmonised accounting standards on a 
worldwide basis. For example, in 1982 the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
held its XII International Congress where it was resolved that a formal relationship be 
established between the IFAC and IASC. As part of the agreement, the IFAC resolved to 
promote the worldwide acceptance of IASC standards. In addition, as from 1 January 1996, 
a representative of the International Association of Financial Executives Institutes (IAFEI) is 
on the IASC Board.116 
The OECD is also concerned with the formulation and promotion of international accounting 
standards. It formally recognised the need for better quality information when it published its 
first Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in June 1976.117 In 1978, the OECD Committee 
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises established an ad hoc working group 
on accounting standards and a permanent group in 1979. The group developed 
recommendations destined to harmonise international accounting and reporting standards. In 
addition, with the view to promoting international comparability of accounts and identifying 
‘possible solution for greater harmonization’ of the different approaches of its Members 
regarding tax accounting, the OECD published recommendations relative to the harmonisation 
of accounting standards in 1987.118 
Likewise, the European Union is actively involved in the process of harmonising the conditions 
in which business is done within Member countries. The Fourth Directive adopted in 1978 sets 
forth requirements governing the form and content of financial statements for limited liability 
companies. This involves the harmonisation of company financial reporting, while the Seventh 
Directive relates to the consolidation of group company accounts. In November 1995, the 
European Commission released a policy statement entiltled Accounting Harmonisation: A 
New Strategy vis-à-vis International Harmonisation where the Commission decided to 
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associate the EU with the efforts undertaken by the IASC and IOSCO to achieve a broader 
international harmonisation of accounting standards rather than amend existing directives 
dealing with the question.119 
The U.N., too, has been part of the harmonisation process. In 1973 the Secretary-General 
appointed the Group of Eminent Persons to study the impact of TNCs on development and 
international relations. In its report, the Group deplored the serious lack of useful financial and 
non-financial information on the activities of TNCs as well as limited comparability of 
corporate reports.120 According to the Group, the solution to the problem resides in the 
creation of an international system of standardised accounting and reporting system. It 
recommended the convening of a group of experts under the auspices of the newly created 
Commission on Transnational Corporations to formulate such a system. The Secretary-
General then appointed a group of experts to study the question of information disclosure. In 
July 1977 the experts issued a list of what they considered to be the minimum requirements in 
the field of information disclosure, but the Commission on Transnational Corporations did not 
approve that list. The Commission then advocated the creation of an ad hoc inter-
governmental group of experts. In 1979 the Economic and Social Council created the ad hoc 
Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and 
Reporting. After several interim reports, the Intergovernmental Working Group published its 
final report in 1994.121 
Finally, while not participating directly in the harmonisation efforts, there has been support for 
these efforts from various sectors, both private and public, comprising the U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development, the then Prime Minister of Russia, Victor Chernomyrdin, and 
various national accounting bodies including those of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, to 
name but a few.122 In December 1996, even the WTO stated that it encourages the successful 
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completion of international standards in the accountancy sector by the IASC, IFAC and 
IOSCO.123 
Moreover, recognising the efforts made by the IASC in this area, the European Commission 
established a committee, named the Contact Committee, to examine the conformity between 
the international accounting standards produced by the  IASC with the European Accounting 
Directives.124 In order to facilitate the application of International Accounting Standards 
(IASs) by European Companies for the 1998 financial reporting term, the Contact Committee 
examined the conformity between all applicable IASs and the European Accounting 
Directives. This examination covered not only all IASs, but also the interpretations of the 
Standing Interpretations Committee (SIC)125 applicable to accounting periods prior to 1 July 
1998. The objective of this examination was to determine whether and, if so, to what extent 
conflicts subsist between IASs applicable to accounting periods beginning prior to 1 July 1998 
and the European Accounting Directives. The purpose of the exercise was reassure European 
companies wishing and able to apply relevant IASs in their consolidated accounts that in doing 
so they were not acting contrary to European legislation. 126  
The Contact Committee concluded that there are no significant conflicts between the 
Directives and those IASs and the interpretations of the SIC that have been issued and are 
currently applicable. However, one minor conflict between IAS 27 and the relevant Directives 
remains. IAS 27 deals with consolidated financial statements and accounting for investments in 
subsidiaries. It would appear that some of its provisions conflict with Article 14(1) of the 
Seventh Directive. However, the Contact Committee questioned whether this conflict would 
have any serious effect in practice.127 
Following the views of the Contact Committee, five EU Member States have already 
introduced dispensations allowing major corporations to use IASs rather than comply with 
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national standards implementing various mandatory accounting Directives for their 
consolidated accounts.128  
The need for harmonised accounting standards for taxation purposes is also one of the major 
preoccupations of the OECD. The current view within the organisation is that, in order to 
obtain consensus on international accounting standards, a separation of tax and financial 
reporting must be achieved. Once this outcome is reached, then a substantial effort to 
harmonise the various prevailing financial accounting systems could be made.129 Comparability 
of financial accounting systems, that is, comparability in the methods of computing company 
profits, is therefore viewed by the OECD as essential in order to achieve a harmonised system 
in the taxation of cross-border transactions. It would seem that this is also the view of the 
Ruding Committee on the question.130 
Demand for harmonised accounting information does not originate exclusively from those 
operating in sophisticated capital markets around the world. Many developing countries have 
adopted accounting standards produced by the IASC since they do not have the resources to 
develop their own methods.131 Notwithstanding the constant expansion in the use of its 
standards, the IASC still needs to obtain the approval of the major economies, especially the 
U.S., if it hopes to see its standards achieve undisputed international status. 
To further this acceptance process, in 1995 the IASC agreed with IOSCO to complete a core 
set of 40 International Accounting Standards. Recently, IAS 39, Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement, has been approved. This means that all 40 topics have been 
addressed. The IOSCO is now required to consider endorsing IASC standards for 
acceptance by its members for (at a minimum) cross-border listings. At the same time, 
individual IOSCO members are formulating their plans for evaluating the core standards based 
on their domestic requirements. 
A key IOSCO committee, Working Party No. 1, has already begun a detailed standard-by-
standard review of the IASC core standards package. Working Party No 1. focuses on 
multinational accounting and disclosure issues. It is required to make a recommendation 
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regarding endorsement to IOSCO’s Technical Committee. The latter is composed of 16 
regulatory agencies from countries with the world’s largest securities markets, including, 
obviously, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). If the Technical Committee 
endorses the standards, the next step would be for these to be considered at individual 
national levels. 
In April 1996, the SEC released a statement in support of the efforts of the IOSCO and the 
IASC to develop a core set of accounting standards that could become a framework for 
financial reporting in cross-border securities offerings. The SEC’s statement indicated that, if 
the IASC successfully completes the work plan agreed with the IOSCO, the SEC would 
consider accepting the core standards in securities offerings by cross-border issuers in the 
U.S. if those standards satisfy the following criteria for acceptance. To do so, the SEC is 
required to make its own independent assessment of the acceptability of the completed core 
standards for use in the U.S. markets. In Australia, the view shared by both the government 
and the accounting profession is that while at this point in time the level of international 
acceptance of IASs is far too low to enable Australia to simply adopt them: 
[T]he development of a high quality set of IASC standards, and their adoption by major capital 
markets, offers the best prospect for the establishment of globally accepted accounting standards. 
132 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has for its part indicated that it 
supports the harmonisation of Australian accounting standards with the IASs produced by the 
IASC. Indeed, ASIC has contributed financially to the development of these IASs.133 
Moreover, the Australian Government, in its Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
announced by the Treasurer in March 1997, contemplates a fundamental review of key areas 
of regulation which affect business and investment activity. Measures proposed include the 
complete revamp of the accounting standards setting body with instruction to begin issuing 
IASC exposure drafts and standards as its own from 1 January 1999, unless advice from the 
proposed Financial Reporting Council (FRC) indicates that it would not be in the interest of 
Australia to do so. In the interim, Australia would continue to harmonise its standards with 
those of the IASC so that compliance with the IASC’s IASs would automatically result in 
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compliance with the Australian standards.134 Clearly, therefore, the onus is with the IASC to 
improve the standard of its work if the latter is to gain international acceptance.135 
2 The Relative Failure of the Harmonisation Effort 
The harmonisation effort has been substantial, and a number of countries, including China and 
other emerging countries in the South East Asian region such as Malaysia and Hong Kong, 
‘have moved to substantially adopt IASC accounting standards’.136 In addition, Germany, 
Italy and France, together with Australia,137 are contemplating harmonising their standards with 
those of the IASC.138 In spite of these successes, there are still no uniform accounting 
principles applicable to all TNCs regardless of their geographical location.139 
The greatest challenge to the harmonisation of accounting standards arises from a significant 
difference in the approach of the IASC and that of the U.S. While the former addresses the 
substance of a particular subject matter in its IASs, leaving room for the exercise of 
professional judgement on the part of the users, the latter has opted for an extensive body of 
detailed financial reporting requirements. The U.S. position cannot be ignored because of the 
strength of its securities market. Consequently, as will be examined later, in order to win U.S. 
approval, the IASC has initiated a process whereby its standards are being subjected to a 
rigorous revision procedure.  
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A The Causes of the Apparent Failure  
The official reason for the slow progress towards adopting the IASC standards are 
summarised by the Australian Corporate Law Economic Reform Program.140 The main 
concerns are that the IASC allows for too many options in the preparation of financial reports, 
and that its standards contain insufficient explanatory material and guidance on use, or are 
incomplete.  
However, the fundamental problem is that each industrialised country believes that its own set 
of accounting rules are the best in the world. In 1991, Arthur R Wyatt, the then Chairman of 
the IASC, commented that resistance from the U.S. to the adoption of international standards 
that deviate from American practice is notable. In an interview, Professor Wyatt even 
suggested the proper course of action to take in order to achieve the desired outcome: 
[M]ost of the advice I get from my colleagues in the United States is to fight for the conclusions we 
have reached [in] our [own] way...We have to be willing to concede on some issues if we expect 
others to do the same...the dynamics of the process are difficult to envision if you haven’t 
participated, but the bottom line is we must be willing to concede some existing U.S. practices aren’t 
supportable worldwide. 141 
In order to fully appreciate the difficulties in arriving at harmonised accounting standards on a 
worldwide basis, it is important to consider the political and financial consequences of 
harmonisation. It would appear that there is, at this stage, little available research 
demonstrating the full range of benefits likely to accrue from harmonisation. The question may 
be asked as to how an eventual elimination of the accounting diversity is likely to impact on 
share market activity. It has been suggested that in the event of substantial harmonisation some 
small stock exchanges, for example, the Australian Stock Exchange, are likely to lose out to 
the big overseas exchanges.142 Such uncertainties are not likely to induce acceptance of 
harmonised accounting standards in some sectors. What is certain is that important exchanges, 
such as the New York Stock Exchange, are more likely to derive substantial benefits from 
harmonisation. Hence the pressure the latter is currently exerting in order to influence the 
adoption of the IASC’s standards. 
The key obstacle to the worldwide adoption of IASC’s standards is the reluctance of the U.S. 
to endorse them. The U.S. finds support from Canada and Japan. Canada holds the view that 
its proximity with the U.S. requires it to support the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
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Principles (GAAP).143 Japan does not have a national independent standard setter. The 
Ministry of Finance carries out this activity and sometimes the process of setting Japanese 
accounting standards has been politicised. Japan, therefore, fears if it were to support the 
IASC it would lose its sovereign powers in this area.144 The attitude of the U.S. is 
understandable. If the U.S. were to support the IASC’s standards, then ‘the real brand loser 
would be the U.S. GAAP.’145 Indeed, while the IASs are often very close to the U.S. GAAP, 
they are more in the tradition of the U.K. GAAP. Thus, the U.K. recently released a 
discussion paper canvassing the possibility of U.K. companies adopting IASs.146 
Until recently, the harmonisation project was not considered as achievable even in such a 
relatively homogeneous market as prevailing in the EU where the harmonisation of accounting 
standards has been significantly delayed. The doubt about the effectiveness of the provisions of 
the Maastricht Treaty, as well as, for example, the uncompromising attitude of Germany in this 
area, together with the uncertainty on the political front, have combined to hinder progress 
towards the adoption of harmonised accounting rules.147 However, as will be explored further 
below, the European Commission is now committed to adopting IASC’s standards. 
B The Decisive Battle for Harmonised Accounting Standards  
Although conventional wisdom holds that global capital is driving the need for one set of 
international standards, until 1998, the quest for international accounting standards had been 
carried out at a very slow pace. Then, a series of events precipitated the countdown to 
harmonisation. Among those, undoubtedly the Asian financial crisis had the most pervasive 
effect. Starting in Thailand, the crisis spread to other Asian countries, Russia and Brazil and 
other developed countries through the global financial markets and international commodity 
trade.148 Thus was forcefully demonstrated the intensive trade and financial linkages among 
world economies. As lenders reacted to the perception of increased risk, credit availability 
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decreased, world trade slowed, and output per capita plummeted in spite of the fact that most 
of these countries had strong macroeconomic fundamentals.149 
What has emerged from these events is that because investors and lenders have gone global, 
financial reports need to be written in a common accounting language, which is understood 
globally. In other words, the definition of assets and liabilities and the methods of defining 
profits and losses must be the same across political boundaries.150 In the absence of such a 
common lingua franca it is reasonable to infer that lenders and investors are more likely to 
panic at the slightest tremor hitting global markets, given that they would have committed funds 
based on economic data which, at best, is fragmentary or inadequate. Panic reaction, needless 
to say, could easily bring about the failure of the current financial system, thus the increased 
demand for accounting standards comparable across national borders in order to avoid risk.151 
As already mentioned, this demand was heeded by the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors who, in October 1998, agreed to intensify co-operation among member 
countries in order to strengthen the international financial system. The G-7 ministers also stated 
that, in order to achieve this objective, a key part would be render capital less expensive by 
identifying risk through greater transparency of accounting standards. The G-7 then expressed 
support for the IASC, which it believes should be supported by business corporations and 
financial institutions.152 
However, the momentum towards achieving market-driven harmonised accounting standards 
remains stalled by the hesitations of the U.S. In the U.S., the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) establishes accounting standards, while the SEC ‘retains the authority to 
promulgate accounting principles for SEC registrants and to prescribe the form and content of 
financial statements filed with the Commission.’153 Both institutions feel that some of the IASC 
standards ‘are not tough enough and that others need more tinkering.’154 The general feeling is 
that while the SEC may yield to pressure and accept IASC standards, it may well require 
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numerical reconciliation of at least some of the latter to the U.S. GAAP.155 In this regard, the 
SEC faces a dilemma. On the international scene it may find itself accused of rejecting a 
movement towards international accounting standards and, on the domestic front, it may be 
accused of granting an unfair advantage to foreign firms over U.S. corporations by agreeing 
that the former use more flexible accounting standards.156 The shift to international accounting 
rules is inevitable although strong SEC and FASB resistance may hold the shift for a while yet. 
It is now believed that if agreement is not reached within a reasonable time frame ‘such 
international economic bodies as the IMF, the World Bank or the Basle Committee on 
Banking supervision of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) may step in to break the 
impasse.’157 
C The Shift towards an International Accounting Body  
There is every indication that the question of international accounting standards will be 
resolved in the next few years. The progress towards a solution has also uncovered the need 
to deal with the problem in ways that go beyond the mere task of harmonising present 
accounting standards.  
In December 1998, the IASC released a paper outlining its plan to ‘bring about the 
convergence between national accounting standards and practices and high-quality global 
accounting standards.’158 The document canvasses changes to the structure of the IASC which 
would be implemented by July 2000. The purpose of the proposed changes is to create the 
necessary environment for the emergence of a ‘partnership’ between national standard setters 
and the IASC, with the view to accelerating the convergence between national standards and 
the IASC’s own international standards. What is envisaged is the creation of a Standards 
Development Committee (SDC) composed predominantly of national standard setters. The 
SDC, working in close cooperation with national standard setters of various countries and 
subject to the rules of due process and accountability, would be required to prepare exposure 
and final drafts of international accounting standards. Then, these standards would be 
simultaneously approved nationally and by the IASC. Such an arrangement, it would seem, 
satisfies the need to preserve the sovereignty of each nation given that acceptance of IASC 
standards would be achieved on a country-by-country basis. Moreover, the IASC Board 
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would be expanded to 25 members. Whether the Board should have the power to delay or 
reject the publication of drafts or the adoption of standards is still not decided. This power of 
veto has proved to be the most controversial recommendation in the discussion paper.159 The 
U.S. FASB does not approve of the SDC being ‘an autonomous and independent decision 
making body.’160 The same reservations have been expressed by the American Institute of 
Certified Accountants which ‘contemplates an independent standard setting board, not directly 
associated with any professional organization, country or national standard setter.’161 
An examination of the arguments as to how a revamped IASC should operate anticipates the 
debate that would occur if an international tax organisation is to be set up. Controversy is 
bound to occur when consid ering how such an organisation is to derive its legitimacy. Some 
believe that legitimacy for the IASC standards should arise from the competence and 
independence of the SDC members.162 Others hold the view that ‘legitimacy should come 
through approval by a relatively large and geographically diverse group of carefully selected 
and informed persons.’163 In other words, one can see the tensions between those who favour 
legitimacy through competence and independence and those who favour it through the political 
process. It may well be that a compromise would be reached by reconciliation of both views. 
In any event, the point to note is that the IASC is slowly emerging as an international 
organisation to which would be devolved the power to set international accounting 
standards.164 In its bid to become such an organisation, the IASC is probably preempting 
other organisations. One must keep in mind that whilst the G-7 ministers and central bank 
governors have, in their Declaration of the 30 October 1998, called the IASC to finalise a 
proposal for a full range of internationally agreed accounting standards, they have also required 
the IMF, in close cooperation with standard setting bodies such as the Bank for International 
Settlements, the OECD, and the World Bank, to monitor the application of these standards 
and to publish the results of its surveillance activities.165 
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To sum up, it would appear that the demand for international accounting standards is 
irresistible. When such standards are in place, which it would seem likely to be achieved in a 
matter of a few years, then, arguably, the architecture would have been set to enable an 
international tax organisation to adequately compute the tax base resulting from TNC 
operations and to allocate it to countries with a legitimate claim to it. 
Section III Problems in Determining an International Tax 
Base 
The tax base refers to the taxable income of a taxpayer. It consists, therefore, of that figure to 
which relevant tax rates are to be applied in order to determine gross tax liability.166 
There are fundamental differences in the determination of the corporate income tax base as 
between countries depending upon whether those countries favour a policy of tax conformity 
or not. Tax conformity implies the adoption of a general presumption that taxable profit is 
computed on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles. 
In other countries, while the starting point is profit before tax as determined by commercial 
accounting, there is no further reliance on accounting principles but reliance on specific tax 
accounting rules to arrive at taxable income. This solution is premised on the belief that 
accounting principles per se are inadequate, as the sole determinants of taxable profit, since 
they lack sufficient precision and often permit wide variations in the practical aspects of 
drawing up company accounts.167 
Whether a country favours conformity as opposed to another that does not, there exists a 
common denominator between their respective systems. Indeed, if Country A equates taxable 
profit with accounting profit while Country B determines taxable profit by making adjustments 
to accounting profit, the constant between the two systems is the notion of accounting profit. 
In this environment, to achieve uniformity in the determination of TNCs’ tax base, it is 
submitted that a two-step process is essential. First, if accounting profit is computed pursuant 
to harmonised international accounting standards, then uniformity in tax base calculations 
would have been achieved for those countries favouring conformity. The second step would 
then be to move towards adopting measures designed to favour, in the long run, a certain 
convergence between accounting and taxable profit. 
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1 A Further Step towards Achieving Uniformity in Tax Base 
Calculations 
The need to have general accounting standards for the determination of accounting profit has 
already been examined. However, TNCs, by definition, operate in various jurisdictions by 
means of numerous legal vehicles which together constitute the group. It is therefore essential, 
for equity purposes, for example, that these TNCs use harmonised consolidation and currency 
translation methods. 
A The Need for Harmonised Consolidation Methods  
When an enterprise forms part of a large and complex network of companies commonly 
referred to as a group, it has long been accepted that the accounts of individual members are 
meaningless if a full view of the economic and financial position of the group is to be 
ascertained.168 In the U.S., consolidated statements for group companies came to be regarded 
as the ideal solution as far back as 1900.169 Consolidated statements were introduced in the 
U.K. in the 1920s, and by the 1940s consolidated statements had become customary in most 
jurisdictions worldwide. 
Although the IASC has published two IASs on the question of consolidation, 170 there is in this 
area no standardised methodology applicable on a worldwide basis. It is generally agreed that 
consolidated statements are required in the case of a group of companies consisting of a 
parent and subsidiaries that are under the parent’s control. Basically, consolidation aims at 
presenting a group’s financial statements as if it was a single entity. The process, therefore, 
disregards the separate legal personalities of the group of enterprises.171 There are different 
consolidation rules prevailing in different countries. The need for a comprehensive 
harmonisation effort is therefore evident in, for example, the decision to include or to exclude a 
particular company from the consolidation process. How then is a consolidation policy 
formulated? Are there any prospects for such policies to be harmonised in order to facilitate 
the task of Intertax? 
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i  The Origins of Consolidation 
Modern corporation law hinges on the principle that ‘upon incorporation a new legal entity 
comes into existence which is separate and distinct from its creditors and shareholders.’172 The 
House of Lords’ decision in Salomon v Salomon & Co173 effectively enshrined the concept 
of separate personality in the common law tradition. That concept was quickly exported to 
other legal systems and eventually gained universal recognition. 
However, necessity required that at times the separate personality concept be ignored. There 
are many instances where this occurs so that the corporate veil is lifted. Specific tax law may 
so dictate, for example, with the CFC legislation, or in the case of blatant tax evasion 
arrangements. In relation to financial disclosure, the separate entity principle needs to be 
ignored if a fair view of the overall position of a group is to be presented. To achieve this 
objective, group accounts rather than individual accounts of members of that group are 
required, and they generally take the form of a consolidated balance sheet and a consolidated 
profit and loss account.174 
The evolution of the law and professional regulation in this area has been slow. Ultimately, 
however, there emerged the concept of consolidated accounting which was the legal 
expression of the need to recognise the existence of the ‘economic group’ concept.175 
i i  The Objectives and Methods of Consolidation 
Consolidated financial statements disclose the financial affairs of a consolidated group of 
companies united for economic activity by common control. 176 The main criterion for 
determining the consolidation of any group is control. In general, it is admitted that the usual 
condition for a controlling financial interest is ownership. When a parent has a 100 per cent 
ownership in a subsidiary, the consolidation process is relatively simple: the assets, liabilities, 
revenues and expenses of the group entities are aggregated on a line-by-line basis.177 
Difficulties arise when the parent has either directly or indirectly less than 100 per cent of 
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ownership. According to the OECD report on the question of consolidation, there are three 
different approaches, as explained below.178 
a. The proprietary approach 
Under this approach only the parent’s portion of the assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses 
in the subsidiary together with the parent’s own assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses are 
included in the consolidated financial statement. Therefore, the interests of other investors, for 
example, minority interests, are excluded. This results in partial, rather than, full consolidation.  
b. The parent company approach 
In this instance, the first step is to allow full consolidation, that is, all the assets, liabilities, 
revenues and expenses of subsidiaries as well as those of the parent are included in the 
consolidated statement. However, the focus is on the parent’s interest, since equity and net 
income represent those of the parent company. The interest of other investors is disclosed as 
‘a separate item outside equity and in arriving at net income. Only the parent’s company’s 
interests in any intra-group profit, transactions or balances are eliminated.’179 
c. The entity approach 
The entity approach starts with full consolidation, that is, all assets, liabilities, revenue and 
expenses of the subsidiary are included in the consolidated statement along with those of the 
parent company. However, equal emphasis is given to the interests of both the parent and that 
of other investors such as minority interests. Equity and net income reflect those of both 
groups, although they are disclosed separately. The total amounts of intra-group profit, 
transactions or balances are eliminated. 
If one company does not have control over a particular entity but is capable of exercising a 
significant influence over the latter, the equity method is often used. In this case, ‘the 
proportionate  interests of the company exercising such influence in the assets, liabilities, 
revenues and expenses of entities in which it has investments are presented as a single-line item 
in the component financial statements.’180 
The difficulties of achieving international comparability are due to the various practices 
prevailing in the field of consolidation. A number of initiatives designed to achieve a certain 
uniformity have been proposed. The OECD has long provided that enterprises should, at least 
once a year ,publish ‘financial statements and other pertinent information relating to the 
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enterprises as a whole.’181 The OECD guidelines also discuss, in certain instances, the 
question of consolidation. However, the guidelines are only meant to be indicative of what is 
reasonably to be expected from TNCs in the field of information disclosure. 
In reality, the major obstacle to achieving a harmonised system in the preparation of 
consolidated financial accounts arises because the various entities forming part of a TNC, 
depending on where they operate, are each subject to accounting laws and standards which, 
as noted earlier, differ from one country to another. For example, for the purposes of 
consolidation, national prescriptions relative to the criterion for control differ widely ranging 
from a 100 per cent ownership to unified management.182 Yet, if the relevant principles set 
forth by the OECD were to be followed by TNCs, a certain uniformity could be achieved. But 
as usual, the OECD’s rules are not prescriptive and, therefore, relatively ineffective. 
The IASC initially formulated a definition of control which rested entirely on ownership. It now 
advocates a new definition of the word pursuant to which control means ‘the power to govern 
the financial and operating policies of the management of the enterprise so as to obtain benefits 
from the activities of the enterprise.’183 This definition effectively recognises that while control 
usually results from ownership, it may also be achieved through various other means. For 
example , it may be granted by the constitutive documents of the enterprise, or from a long-
term agreement, or it can result from the ability to appoint a majority of directors. 
In the EU, the 7th Directive also attempts to provide certain guiding principles relative to the 
preparation of consolidated accounts within Member States.184 However, it was thought that 
its numerous exceptions and other exclusions do not really favour the emergence of a truly 
European system of consolidation. It would appear though that the  concerns expressed when 
the Directive was issued ‘that the many options and loopholes that coloured the text of the 
seventh company law directive on consolidated accounts would cause a lot of practical 
problems were unfounded.’185 
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Finally, whilst the benefits of consolidation cannot be ignored, it has been claimed that it 
defeats its own purpose, and in the end, provides a distorted picture of group operations.186 
Notwithstanding this, consolidation is justifiable at both the theoretical and practical levels. It 
first enables TNCs to be treated as they should be, that is, as fully integrated businesses 
carried out in a legal form that reflects reality. Second, it is a prerequisite for the creation of a 
register for TNCs, which could then be realistically monitored.187 Finally and most importantly, 
from the perspective of this thesis, consolidation paves the way for a more effective 
application, on a worldwide basis, by Intertax, of the formulary apportionment of profits 
derived by each of the TNC branches. 
B The Need for Harmonised Currency Translation Methods  
One of the perennial issues in consolidation accounting is the question of currency translation. 
Translation is the process by which the currencies in which financial statements of foreign 
subsidiaries of a group of companies whose financial statements are to be consolidated, are 
changed from the domestic currency into the currency of the parent company’s country so that 
those statements can be consolidated with the financial statements of the parent and other 
domestic subsidiaries. 
The financial statements of a parent company are stated in the domestic currency of its situs, 
for example, Australian Dollars (AUD) for Australian parent companies. In the same way the 
financial statements of a foreign subsidiary of the Australian parent are stated in the currency of 
the place where it operates. In order for the Australian parent to achieve the consolidation of 
the group’s financial position it must first change the amounts stated in the foreign currency into 
amounts denominated in its own currency. Changing the amounts from those stated in the 
foreign currency to those stated in the domestic currency is called translation, an undisguised 
analogy to the translation from one language to another.188 
The comment in the introduction of the OECD report on foreign currency translation indicates 
the difficulties encountered on an international level when different translation standards 
coexist. It this respect it is noted that: 
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[T]he Working Group on Accounting Standards has identified foreign currency translation as a 
major issue where considerable benefits could be derived from greater harmonisation of accounting 
practices. The use of different accounting practices can give rise to substantial variations in the 
reported amount of net assets and financial results of enterprises. The differences between 
practices are so great that comparability cannot be achieved by disclosure alone. Consequently, the 
absence of a common method of translation has been a major obstacle to achieving comparability 
between financial statements. 189 
The two major problems that arise with financial translation relate to the selection of the foreign 
exchange rate to be used for translation and the treatment of translation differences. There are 
two methods to select the rate used in translating the various items expressed in foreign 
currency: the temporal and the closing rate methods of translation. As for the treatment of 
translation differences, the first option is to include them in the group’s income statement in 
whole or in part, either immediately or later, and the second option is to treat them as a direct 
charge or credit to the group’s equity without first going through the income statement.190 
Recently the ‘net investment approach’ has been developed. Basically, it combines the 
temporal and closing rate method in an attempt to gain more precision. This method is 
favoured by the USA, Canada, the U.K, Australia, and, more importantly, by the IASC, 
which has issued IAS 21 on the question. 
There are different rationales underlying the principal methods of translation. The net 
investment approach is favoured by the IASC. It distinguishes between a foreign operation 
whose economic activities are substantially self-contained from one which is highly integrated 
with those of the parent company. The interesting feature of the net investment approach is that 
it can readily be applied to highly integrated TNCs without being constrained by legal 
subdivisions of the group. Thus, a legally separate subsidiary may be classified as an operation 
integrated with that of the parent whilst a branch may be classified as a foreign entity. 
Judgement therefore plays an important role in determining the consolidation policy under the 
net investment approach. 
The OECD in its report on foreign currency translation warns that it may be more difficult to 
achieve international harmonisation as far as the question of currency translation is 
concerned.191 This arises because some of the points at issue represent conflicting positions on 
the interpretation of such accounting concepts as prudence and materiality. However, it is 
submitted that the net investment approach might turn out to be the bridging method among the 
diverging practices. Indeed, it is particularly suitable for highly integrated operations as those 
carried out by enterprises trading in the global financial industry. 
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2 The Final Step towards Achieving Uniform Tax Base 
Calculations 
The final step towards achieving worldwide uniformity in tax base calculations requires a 
greater matching of tax and accounting requirements. Indeed, achieving substantial 
correspondence between tax and accounting income at the conceptual level would mean 
achieving greater equity in the way TNCs are treated. In addition, this would level the playing 
field by reducing the compliance cost of those enterprises operating in jurisdictions where such 
conformity is absent. 
A The Conformity Issue192 
The successful implementation of the model proposed in this thesis depends on achieving three 
objectives: 
· the harmonisation of general accounting standards and policies, 
· the harmonisation of consolidation methods, and  
· common translation methods. 
These three requirements have already been analysed earlier in this chapter. A fourth objective 
is the need for consensus regarding the ways of achieving a certain degree of convergence 
between tax and financial accounting. The question of conformity between these types of 
accounting arises because of the uneasy relationship between accounting and legal principles. 
The search for a suitable interface between law and accountancy is still being pursued.193 In an 
international context, the power struggle and conflict of interests which arise at the point of 
contact between the two disciplines are exacerbated. Yet, the growing sophistication and 
internationalisation of financial markets demands that a reasonable solution be found. In a 
purely taxation context, it is clear that accounting and law can no longer be juxtaposed. 
The purpose of financial accounting is to provide financial information on an enterprise. This 
information consists of a computation of the profit derived by that enterprise for a given period 
of time as well as a snapshot of its financial position at a particular date.194 Financial 
accounting, therefore, calculates profit and loss, and allocates that profit over an arbitrarily 
chosen period. In order to achieve this, financial accounting attempts to select the correct 
period of time for reporting income and expenses (the matching principle) on the assumption 
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that ‘there ought to be reporting and recognition of related revenue and expenses 
coincidentally’.195 
In Australia, for example, tax accounting has one particular goal: the allocation of income and 
deductions to their appropriate tax period in order to enable the annual assessment of the tax 
payable by a particular taxpayer to be made. The need to compute taxable income on a yearly 
basis means that income derived and expenses incurred be calculable and allocatable for that 
particular period. The tax accountant needs to assert when an item of income is derived and 
when an item of expense is incurred, which is to be contrasted with the commercial accountant 
preoccupation with ascertaining when items of income and expense ought to be recognised in 
the books of the enterprise. 
The question of conformity is often debated in the U.S., the U.K., Canada and Australia 
where accounting principles of the Anglo-American tradition is applicable. In these countries, 
there is little conformity between financial and tax accounting. Professional bodies regulate 
financial accounting, while tax accounting is determined by either legislation or the courts. 
Consequently, there is a lack of correspondence between the concepts of accounting profit 
and taxable income.196 The problems of this mismatch have been clearly exposed by various 
tax reform advocates. Thus, for example, in Australia, the Asprey Committee argued that the 
two systems ought to have identical rules, more especially in the international tax area, in order 
to permit a ‘meaningful international comparison of the incidence of tax on business 
operations’.197 More recently, the theme has been canvassed in the Ralph Report.198 
The problem of conformity is clearly expressed by Professor Graeme Cooper: ‘[T]he merit of 
conformity or divergence between tax and financial accounting is an issue both perennial and 
pervasive perhaps even eternal and universal.’199 Professor Cooper also mentions that, almost 
without exception, legislators worldwide engaged in the process of tax reform invariably 
consider such conformity as a major goal. 
Basically, the debate about conformity arises because both financial and tax accounting, while 
purporting to measure income derived by an enterprise, arrive at figures which differ 
significantly. These disparities arise presumably, inter alia, because each system has different 
objectives, financial accounting being designed to provide useful information to present and 
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potential investors, creditors and other users, while the primary objective of a tax system is to 
raise revenue to fund government programs. 
According to the OECD, there are three main methods of reconciling financial accounting and 
tax accounting.200 Financial statements may be drawn according to accounting principles and 
methods independent of tax rules. The converse tradition is to permit accounting practices to 
be largely influenced by tax rules. Finally, there is the method whereby the presentation of 
financial statements is based on accounting principles and standards with exceptions designed 
to meet specific tax purposes. 
As the OECD has found, all these differences constitute major obstacles to achieving a greater 
comparability of performance in both the domestic and international context. They further 
inhibit the harmonisation of accounting practices. However, it appears that there is a general 
tendency to move away from strict conformity towards a total separation of financial and tax 
accounting.201 
Notwithstanding this trend, the issue is whether greater comparability between the two systems 
is desirable. The benefits of conformity may be analysed relative to the traditional policy 
objectives of taxation law. Put differently, does conformity satisfy the equity, simplicity, and 
efficiency benchmarks? As far as the simplicity criterion is concerned, it appears that 
conformity would reduce complexity. The end result of conformity is the preparation of one 
rather than two sets of accounts. Accordingly, in countries where conformity is the norm, it 
would seem that complexity in preparing tax returns is mitigated. With regard to the efficiency 
criterion, again it seems that conformity is desirable. If the rules of commercial accounting are 
well defined and consistent, then it is clear that more certainty and efficiency are achieved in 
determining both profits and taxable income since these two are the same. Finally, ‘equity 
would be increased because conformity would increase certainty and simplicity, and would 
lead to greater uniformity.’202 The benefits of conformity may also be examined both in terms 
of administrative convenience and that of taxpayer’s compliance. According to one author,203 
the apparent benefits include simplification, greater certainty in the determination of taxable 
income, and greater confidence in the integrity and equity of the self-assessment process. 
However, it is also arguable that commercial and tax accounting have different objectives. The 
quest for conformity between the two inevitably means that one needs to become subservient 
                                                             
200 OECD (1987), supra  note 118, at 9. 
201 Supra note 118, at 11. 
202 T.M. Porcano, et al., ‘Alignment of Taxable Income with Accounting Profit’, (1993) 10 Australian Tax Forum 
475, at 502 
203 J.S. Nolan, ‘The Merit in Conformity of Tax to Financial Accounting’, (1972) 50 Taxes: The Tax Magazine 
761. 
Chapter 6  Intertax: I ts Role and Funct ions 
 290
to the other. Basically the question at issue in the conformity debate is whether ‘taxable income 
should be made to correspond with commercial profits.’204 As already mentioned, in Australia, 
the Asprey Committee held that such conformity was desirable. The Committee also believed 
that it was unattainable. In the Committee’s view: 
[T]he first and overriding principle…is that income tax should be levied on true profits flowing from 
the business or professional activity during its whole period of operations. If this is not achieved 
the rates of tax, be they progressive as for individuals or proportionate as for companies, become 
meaningless and misleading as an indication of the weight of tax. The true after-tax profits 
remaining and available for maintenance or expansion of the activity cease to be readily apparent 
and become distorted. 205 
In other words, if income tax is levied on a base which is larger than true profits, then such a 
tax is inherently inequitable. Is ‘true profits’ synonymous to accounting profits? True profits 
remain an elusive concept. As Professor Cooper points out, the tax base will never coincide 
with accounting profit in many instances.206 In Australia, amounts that are deductible in 
financial accounting are often not recognised as allowable deductions for tax purposes. The 
converse is also true, with the ultimate result that in the first case income for taxation purposes 
is artificially inflated and in the second it is decreased. The outcome therefore depends on the 
policy of the government of the day. 
Moreover, accounting profit is not determined by a mechanical process similar to a scientific 
investigation. Rather, it is determined by taking into consideration various parameters and by 
the exercise of judgement. In reality, there are three distinct branches of accounting, namely 
enterprise accounting, government accounting, and social accounting.207 Each branch attends 
to different needs and has different goals. In spite of the basic accounting concepts that 
underlie all three branches, differences in outcomes are likely to result because consumers in 
each branch are looking for different data to satisfy their needs. 
The need to ‘move tax and accounting treatments of income closer together’ as a way of 
promoting simplicity and achieving reduced compliance costs is again at the forefront of tax 
reform both in Australia and in the U.K.208 No doubt this renewed interest in the issue has 
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been prompted by the ‘increased global harmonisation of accounting standards, together with 
the increasing emphasis placed by the courts on accounting figure’.209 
While the question of conformity is of significance in certain countries, it is submitted that this 
not the case when it comes to Intertax exercising its main function, that of the apportionment 
between relevant countries of the worldwide commercial profit of TNCs. As will be examined 
further on, the role of Intertax is not to determine the corporate tax base of its members. In the 
proposed model this remains the prerogative of national governments. Intertax is simply 
required to determine, from the overall commercial profits of TNCs measured in a 
standardised fashion, the appropriate share of such profits allocatable to each country with a 
legitimate claim to tax. 
B The European Experience with the Conformity Issue  
Efforts to reach this objective of convergence have been expended in the EU in order to 
enable the internal market to function smoothly.210 For its part, the OECD favours the 
separation of tax and financial reporting.211 
The debate over the issue of tax harmonisation within the EU has been at the forefront of the 
European Commission agenda for the last 30 years. In 1975 a draft directive was proposed in 
order to achieve a common partial imputation system of company taxation. It is significant that 
the draft directive ran into difficulties in the European Parliament: 
where it was criticized on the ground that it made little sense to harmonize corporate tax systems 
and statutory rates as long as differences continued to exist among Member States in the rules for 
computing taxable company profits, that is, the tax base.212 
The Ruding Report noted that since 1980 the importance of moving towards a common tax 
base had been a major preoccupation of the European Commission.213 The Commission is 
first concerned with promoting efficient methods of allocating resources within the EU through 
the elimination of distortive pressures stemming from, inter alia, tax regimes in competition with 
each other. The aim of the Commission is thus to prevent the allocation of capital within the 
EU based solely on where the highest after-tax returns can be obtained. It follows, therefore, 
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that the Commission is much concerned with the differences among Member States in the rules 
for the computation of the corporation tax base, in statutory tax rates, and other tax incentives 
which all result in the effective tax rate on investment varying across countries. 
As expected, the Ruding Committee’s recommendations reiterated the conviction that 
differences in the rules which determine the level of taxable income for taxation purposes 
among Member States create distortions which are incompatible with the efficient operation of 
the internal market. It also noted that the harmonisation of corporate tax rates ‘makes little 
sense without some minimum degree of harmonization of the corporate tax base.’214 The 
Committee then went on to propose the creation of a group of technical experts to examine, 
and make firm recommendations for action, the various aspects relating to the calculation of 
the corporate tax base. 
Basically, the Ruding Committee concluded that ‘commercial accounts produced for financial 
reporting purposes should form the starting-point for the computation of taxable income in all 
Member States.’215 One cannot but fully agree with the Committee on this finding. In addition, 
the Committee further recommended that the European Commission ‘take appropriate 
measures to reduce the differences between commercial accounts and the accounts used for 
tax purposes.’216 The most effective way of achieving this objective is by the application of 
common accounting standards within Member States. 
C The Role of Intertax  
It is arguable that Intertax has, at the most, a marginal role in determining the corporate tax 
base. The question of what the corporate tax base should be, that is, what in the corporate 
sector one ought to tax is left to the discretion of each member country in the proposed model. 
Intertax is solely concerned with the allocation of a fair share of commercial profits to each 
relevant jurisdiction, and is therefore not concerned with what the governments of these 
jurisdictions do to convert the allocated profits into taxable income. To put it simply: Intertax 
would have a very limited role in the determination of the tax base of its members, that is, what 
a particular legislation in a particular country elicits as taxable income. As the OECD report on 
accounting standards and harmonisation pointed out, in taxation a state has an instrument for 
achieving two main purposes.217 First, taxation enables a state to cover its financial 
requirements, and second, it enables a nation to achieve its economic policy by dissuasive or 
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incentive measures. In these pursuits, which basically amount to the forced transfer of 
resources, a state must still remain sovereign. Therefore, the determination of the tax base is a 
notion best left to the individual determination of each country.  
In order for Intertax to fulfil its role, however, it is imperative that the greatest convergence 
between the different methods of determining commercial profits be achieved. This would 
enable the proposed system to operate coherently. Indeed, when computing TNCs’ 
commercial, Intertax would be pursuing accounting standards that clearly reflect the actual 
performance of an enterprise, as generally perceived by the market. The application of 
harmonised accounting standards drawn along the principle that companies should pay tax on 
their commercial profits would go a long way to reducing the complexity which characterises 
present tax systems. By adhering to this principle, it is submitted that Intertax would promote a 
system which would provide certainty to taxpayers and would certainly be easier to 
administer. In addition, in most probability, the neutrality of the system would be enhanced by 
levelling the playing field for the taxation of TNCs. 
Increased conformity between commercial accounting and tax rules, whilst desirable, should 
not however be achieved at the expense of flexibility. On the national level, it has been argued 
that conformity could lead to pressure on the standard-setting body to adopt standards that 
produce tax savings.218 If this were to occur, then the value of financial statements to their main 
users would be reduced, and the ultimate result would be a constraint on the development of 
accounting standards. This has happened, it would  appear, in Germany219 and in Japan where 
authorities are ‘now facing the challenge of reducing conformity so as to permit accounting 
practices to develop and provide reports that are useful to businesses.’220  
In the proposed model this danger is largely mitigated. Indeed, the accounting body 
responsible for developing these accounting standards is the IASC, an independent body 
subject to stringent transparency standards, while the task of using them to achieve its stated 
objective rests with Intertax, another independent body whose influence on the IASC is likely 
to be marginal. Indeed, Intertax should not, pursuant to its constitutive powers, interfere with 
the work of the IASC.  
The first and primary objective of Intertax, therefore, is to manage the application of 
worldwide combined reporting for the taxation of TNCs. Consequently, all that Intertax is 
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required to achieve is the sharing of commercial profits between relevant jurisdictions. These 
commercial profits are determinable by strictly following the complete set of international 
accounting standards produced by the IASC. Apportionment of these profits is then made by 
way of an apportionment formula, or formulas ,so that each jurisdiction is given a share of the 
profits based on the contributions achieved by the factors located within its borders, such as 
capital assets, payrolls, and sales. Once this is achieved, each country would then be free, 
starting from its share of the commercial profits, to determine the taxable income, and, 
ultimately, the tax payable within its jurisdiction. In other words, each country, would remain 
sovereign in determining what it considers as taxable income whether or not such taxable 
income is in conformity with the share of accounting profits allocated to it by Intertax. Thus, 
starting from its allocated share of accounting profits, a particular country would be able to 
independently set whatever depreciation schedules or investment tax credits it chooses, and 
adopt whatever tax accounting rules it deems fit relative to its policy objectives. 
It is convenient to bear in mind that the aims of taxing international income flows, as Professor 
Bird stressed, is threefold: 221 
· To allocate tax revenues between jurisdictions in a way recognized by each as fair; 
· To neither encourage nor discourage international capital flows; and  
· To enable countries, within reason, to impose the domestic tax system of their choice. 
Taxable income forms part of a continuum that starts with gross income. The method for the 
determination of taxable income is a matter of national choice. The evolution from gross 
income to taxable income is achieved through the operation of national tax accounting rules. 
Therefore, if the third aim of taxing international flows as determined by Professor Bird is to be 
achieved, or in other words, if the primacy of national legislation for the determination of the 
tax base is to be safeguarded, then, it is again submitted Intertax should be exclusively 
concerned with allocating to each relevant jurisdiction simply the commercial profits or gross 
income attributable to a particular operation. This attribution is to be carried by means of a 
formula or formulas and ,therefore, constitute a rather minimalist approach which is realistic 
given that the world is not ready as yet for any supranational body to which countries would 
surrender their entire fiscal prerogative. 
In this particular model, harmonised accounting rules used to determine, on a consolidated 
basis, the worldwide commercial profits derived by a TNC is therefore of critical importance. 
This is because if, in the first place, the reality and correct determination of such profits were 
beyond dispute, then in most probability, if there were to be any further disputes, these would 
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be confined to the apportionment process and would thus not extend to the earlier 
measurement stage. 
A particular country may disagree with the figure allocated to it. If the disagreement arises 
from the application of the apportionment formula, then that country may invoke the dispute 
settling mechanism provided for by the multilateral treaty creating Intertax. Basically, as 
already noted, disputes that are incapable of being solved by agreement would be submitted to 
arbitration.222 
It may be argued that such a system imposes an additional burden on TNCs on the ground 
that apart from the consolidated accounts to be filed with Intertax, it would still be required to 
satisfy local authorities as far as the domestic operations are concerned. The problem is more 
apparent than real. Large TNCs operating in many countries already have ‘parallel systems of 
accounting and financial information alongside the official accounting system.’223 These systems 
serve different purposes. Whilst formerly their creation was a source of complication, today 
the use of computer processing has made it possible to integrate these different systems by the 
use of special codes and other similar techniques.  
Even the language problem has long been solved with large TNCs. Accounts are kept in a 
local language to satisfy national authorities and are immediately translated into the language 
that central management is capable of understanding. Had it not been so one wonders how 
such phenomenon as global round-the-clock trading in, for example, foreign exchange, could 
have occurred. 
Furthermore, from the TNCs’ point of view, the determination of commercial profits 
independently from tax accounting preoccupations has undeniable advantages. Indeed, the 
independence of financial reporting from the constraints of tax reporting ‘substantially reduces 
the difficulties involved in the international harmonization of the information’224 thus rendering 
the disclosure requirements less onerous. The reason for this is that TNCs would follow a set 
of fully recognised International Accounting Standards and would, to a large extent, be freed 
from the impediment of having to satisfy a particular category of users of financial accounts, 
namely different national governments. 
The creation of an international organisation to administer the system seems to be an ideal 
solution in today’s global world. Yet, there seem to be a serious divergence of views as to the 
advisability of this solution. Hence, the Deputy Secretary-General of the OECD speaks 
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224 Supra note 118, at 21. 
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‘facetiously’ of the idea and discards it as a visionary development.225 On the other hand, the 
Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund believes that 
‘perhaps the time has come to establish [an international institution that would provide] a kind 
of “surveillance” function over the developments in tax systems.’226  
There is little doubt that ‘an international tax institution structured like the GATT’227 would 
greatly assist in the successful initiation and administration of a multilateral treaty implementing 
worldwide combined reporting. 228 Nevertheless, if countries cannot reach agreement regarding 
the transfer of some of their fiscal sovereignty to an international tax organisation, the proposed 
formulary system may still be implemented on a national basis. The notable difficulty with the 
proposed system and its formulary apportionment methodology is that it is not considered a 
viable alternative to the arm’s length principle. As such it is not an international norm. 
However, given the rapid global integration of certain industries, especially in the financial area, 
some operators therein are seriously considering it as a viable option. Thus there is anecdotal 
evidence showing that certain multilateral APA requests have been lodged with various 
revenue authorities in which the chosen transfer pricing methodology is formulary 
apportionment.229 In addition, it has been argued that the APA process is merely a secret 
method of applying formulary apportionment on a business-by-business basis.230 
A national approach to the implementation of the proposed formulary system is necessarily 
more onerous. One thing is certain, the system cannot be resorted to by one country 
unilaterally because of the high risk of double taxation and the likelihood of its trading partners 
reacting with discriminatory measures. Therefore, the multilateral model remains the most 
suitable framework for its implementation. The same problems faced by Intertax would have 
to be solved, namely the delineation of TNCs that would be subjected to the system, 
coordination in the design and implementation of the regime, and obtaining agreement as to the 
                                                             
225 See the opening remarks by Ms J.R. Shelton, Deputy Secretary-General of the OECD, at the OECD-APEC 
Symposium held in Sydney on 30 October 1996 in J.R. Shelton, ‘Emerging Issues in Taxing Business in a 
Global Economy’, (20 January 1997) Tax Notes Int’l 221, at 222. 
226 Tanzi, supra note 6, at 140. 
227 Vann, supra note 33, at 100. 
228 D. Sandler, ‘Slicing the Shadow-The Continuing Debate Over Unitary Taxation and Worldwide Combined 
Reporting’, [1994] 6 BTR, 572, at 593. 
229 It would appear that while Barclays Bank was challenging California’s use of the WWCR, it negotiated an APA 
with the IRS that used principles of formulary apportionment. See G.C. Shea, ‘APAs may Effectively Address 
Income & Expense Allocation Problems Faced by Global Trading Businesses’, (18 May 1992) 4 Tax Notes Int’l 
1022. Moreover, it would appear that ‘Barclays Bank was the recipient of the global trading ruling addressed in 
Notice 94-40.’ See letter of M.J. McIntyre to the Editor TNI, ‘McIntyre on APA Report and More’, (17 April 
2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 16) 1775. (Notice 94-40, 1994-1 C.B. 351, issued on 25 April 1994.) 
230 See ‘In Congress’, (16 August 1995) 4 Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report 240. 
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factors that would compose any chosen formula/formulas. Indeed, compromises would have 
to be reached between nations competing for tax revenue. The next point where consensus 
would need to be reached is the method for the calculation of the worldwide profits of TNCs 
to which the formula would be applied.  
In view of these difficulties it seems that an international tax organisation remains the most 
viable option for an orderly application of the proposed formulary system. On the assumption 
that the Intertax option is chosen, then one of the most crucial functions of the organisation, 
that of determining an acceptable formula/formulas for the apportionment of the commercial 
profits derived by TNCs, remains to be examined. 
 
 The Search for an Appropriate Formula(s) 
The aim of Section I in this chapter is to outline the characteristics of current apportionment 
formulas used in the American state taxation context. The major limitations of the U.S. states’ 
practice are then studied in Section II. Finally, in light of these findings, tentative solutions 
aimed at avoiding these limitations in a worldwide system are proposed in Section III. 
Section I  The Characteristics of Current Apportionment 
Formulas 
The principles at the base of the American State taxation system, especially the Californian 
Worldwide Combined Reporting (WWCR) method, may be useful in devising a formulary 
apportionment system applicable by Intertax. Indeed, the experience of U.S. state tax 
bureaucrats in dealing with this methodology could, with necessary adaptations, serve as a 
guide for the application of the proposed system on a worldwide basis. By referring to that 
knowledge and jurisprudence, Intertax is likely to immediately benefit and become fully 
operational in a shorter period of time rather than submitting itself to undue teething 
experiences. 
1 The Choice of Appropriate Factors 
An apportionment formula is composed of certain elements which attempt to attribute a 
portion of the entire business income to a particular jurisdiction. It assumes that ‘the entire 
income of a business enterprise is the final result of certain income producing factors or 
elements such as property, payrolls, sales, and costs of manufacturing.’1 Pursuant to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,2 it is 
generally accepted that an apportionment formula should neither be arbitrary in its concept nor 
unreasonable in its results. In addition, rather than reflecting some sort of scientific precision, 
the Court held that such a formula is acceptable even though it achieves a rough approximation 
of attributable income. 
                                                             
1 P.J. Hartman, ‘State Taxation of Corporate Income From a Multistate Business’, (1960a) 13 Vand. Law Review 
21, at 64. 
2 463 U.S. 159 (1983). 
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Two concerns, theory and administrative ease, influence the choice of the elements in an 
apportionment formula.3 In order to satisfy theoretical considerations, a formula for 
apportioning business income should reflect the elements that contribute to or measure the 
processes involved in the earning of that income. In addition, a formula needs to be relatively 
easy to administer. 
A The Basic Economic Rationale of Apportionment Formulas 
Formulary apportionment operates along the following principles:  
· First, the entire net income of the whole enterprise is computed.  
· Second, in the U.S. states’ context, income not connected with the unitary business is 
deducted from the entire net income.4  
· Third, the residue, considered as net income for tax purposes, is apportioned by way of 
a relevant formula to the particular taxing jurisdiction. This apportionment is made on 
the basis of what the average of the factors of the formula within the taxing jurisdiction 
bears to the average of the total of such factors within and without the taxing state.5 
An apportionment formula should reflect the elements that contribute to or measure the 
processes involved in earning business income. How are these elements to be identified? Are 
they consistently present across the wide range of different businesses operating on a global 
basis? If so, do they contribute equally in the income generation processes? 
An apportionment formula is primarily a compromise. From an economic point of view, there 
are four factors of production that interact to produce income and wealth, namely land, labour, 
capital, and organisation. The reward of each group is rent, wages, interest, and profit.6 The 
way these factors interact and their degree of interaction to produce their economic purpose is 
different depending on industry characteristics. Therefore, it is unrealistic to assume that a 
single relatively uncomplicated formula would be applicable to any enterprise regardless of 
where it operates. If a reasonable amount of precision were required, especially on the ground 
                                                             
3 B.F. Miller, ‘Worldwide Unitary Combination: The Californian Practice’, in C.E. McLure, Jr., ed., The State 
Corporation Income Tax, Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (Hoover Institution Press, 1984) 132, at 
133.  
4 For example, capital gains, interest, dividends, etc., which may be subject to specific allocation rules. 
5 Hartman, supra note 1, at 65. 
6 J. Harvey, Modern Economics: An Introduction for Business and Professional Students  (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1969) 96. This analysis, because of certain theoretical weaknesses, is no longer favoured. Modern 
economists speak of factors of production in a general way, that is, in the sense of resources which cooperate in 
the production of goods and services wanted by the community. In this regard, a debate arises as to whether 
‘sales’ contributes to the creation of income. The question will be extensively studied further below. 
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of equity, then different formulas would need to be designed for different industries. At the 
extreme, since no two businesses are managed in the same way, it would be reasonable for 
each taxpayer to seek an individualised formula. 
The basic economic rationale of apportionment formulas may be apprehended in examining, 
for example, the efforts of California to devise a formulary system that would broadly satisfy 
the requirements of a fair system of taxation. The Californian Franchise Tax Board (FTB) has 
over the years used various formulas to divide the income and franchise tax base of 
multijurisdictional businesses. Pursuant to the Bank and Corporation Tax Code of 1929, the 
portion of a taxpayer’s net income derived from business carried out in California was 
apportioned on the basis of sales, purchases, manufacturing expenses, payroll, and value and 
situs of tangible property, ‘or by reference to other factors’.7 Notwithstanding this 
prescription, in general, California applied a three-factor formula comprising tangible property, 
payroll, and sales factors.8 One of the main features of this earlier Californian system was that 
the FTB did not advocate a rigid application of a single formula across the wide spectrum of 
businesses operating within the state. It had wide discretionary power to modify the formula 
ordinarily applied in order to satisfy the needs of various industries. 
Other American states applying the formulary apportionment methodology also exercised this 
discretionary power. As a result, multistate enterprises began encountering problems of 
compliance and multiple taxation.9 As shown in Chapter 4, an attempt was made to remedy 
the situation with the promulgation of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act 
(UDITPA) and the advent of the Multistate Tax Compact. It will be recalled that the primary 
objective of UDITPA is to provide a state level solution to a uniform approach to the division 
of a multistate enterprises’ income.10 
It is often argued that ‘the American experience is characterized by features that are specific to 
it and thus may reduce its value as a guide to future developments in an integrating world with 
nation-states, frontiers, different currencies, different legal systems, and different rules and 
regulations.’11 As such, the U.S. system cannot be duplicated on a worldwide basis. Whilst 
this may be true in terms of value and output, it is clear that most of the developed world, and 
                                                             
7 United States, Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, s 10, 1929 Cal Stat 19, 24, in E. Coffill & P. Wilson, 
‘Federal Formulary Apportionment as an Alternative to Arm’s Length Pricing: From the Frying Pan to the 
Fire?’, (24 May 1993) Tax Notes 1103, at 1105.  
8 Miller, in McLure, supra note 3, at 133.  
9 D.M. Hudson & D.C. Turner, ‘International and Interstate Approaches to Taxing Business Income’, (1984) 6 
Northwestern J Int’l Law & Bus 562, at 594.  
10 Id., at 563. 
11 V. Tanzi, Taxation in an Integrating World (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), at 29. 
Chapter  7  The Search for  an Appropr iate Formula(s)  
 303
to some extent the newly industrialised countries as well as the developing countries, mirror 
with a certain time lag the situation which prevailed in the U.S. when the unit rule was 
established. Thus the world economy is composed of highly industrialised economies, and 
less-developed countries whose economies are mainly agricultural with a certain number in a 
transitional state. A similar division prevailed in the U.S. when the unit rule was implemented. 
There were mainly industrial and agricultural states, or states where goods were produced and 
states where they were marketed and consumed. In spite of these large differences, a coherent 
system of formulary apportionment has been established and, la ter through the Multistate Tax 
Compact, that system has, to a certain extent, been harmonised whilst preserving the 
sovereignty of various state governments in matters of economic policy. This has been 
achieved through the imposition of certain necessary compromises, especially in the 
composition of apportionment formulas.  
If formulary apportionment is to be implemented worldwide, then these compromises will need 
to be replicated at the international level. This is indeed a challenging prospect. As an interim 
measure designed to smooth the implementation of the system, it is submitted that Intertax 
should promote the use of formulas that would roughly apportion to each member state the 
level of revenue which it is collecting at the present time. Only when countries realise that the 
proposed system has some definite advantages likely to be decisive in an increasingly 
integrated world that finetuning of the system could be attempted. 
B Types of Allocation Factors Used  
According to the theory of formulary apportionment income is derived by an integrated 
enterprise as a result of the interaction of complex factors. Formulary apportionment is based 
on the idea that the determination of the income of one establishment of an enterprise is 
achieved by dividing total income in the ratio of these factors. Obviously, not all of the latter 
should be, or indeed are capable of being included in an apportionment formula.12 All 
allocation factors used by various American states prior to UDITPA contained items such as 
property or payroll. These are relatively easy to locate within or without the boundaries of a 
particular state. Alongside these comparatively direct factors there were others whose 
presence in an apportionment formula was more controversial. Different types of formulas for 
different businesses were required. For instance, a particular formula composed of certain 
                                                             
12 A.D. Lynn, ‘The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act Re-Examined’, (1960) 46 Virginia Law 
Review 1257, at 1261. 
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elements would be applied to the income of manufacturing corporations, another to the income 
of mercantile enterprises, and a third type to corporations dealing with intangible property. 
As a result of the numerous allocation formulas, a certain classification has emerged. Allocation 
formulas may be classified as simple or complex.13 A simple formula apportions income on the 
basis of one factor, for example, tangible property, whereas a complex formula includes two 
or more factors. The most obvious advantage of a simple formula is its easy formulation and 
administration, especially if the chosen factor is readily capable of being adequately and 
objectively measured. On the other hand, it displays a number of serious theoretical 
weaknesses. For example, a simple fraction apportions income on the basis of one activity 
alone, ‘but it can hardly be said that the income of a corporation is derived entirely from 
manufacturing, or entirely from sales, or even from the ownership of property.’14 Therefore, 
the advantages associated with the use of a simple factor may be outweighed by the need to 
include other factors so as to satisfy a fair segregation of income. The complexity of modern 
enterprises, especially transnational corporations (TNCs) where income is not derived entirely 
from one operation alone be it manufacturing, sales, or the provision of services, disqualifies 
the use of a simple formula by Intertax. 
Since simple formulas proved to be inadequate in the U.S. context, complex formulas were 
introduced to give a more balanced allocation result. Such complex formulas consisted of two, 
and sometimes up to five, different elements ranging from sales, payroll, property, purchases, 
cost of manufacture, cost of raw material, and so on. 
Complex formulas are often difficult to administer the more so if different weights are given to 
various factors within the formula. The theory behind ascribing different weights to different 
factors comprising an apportionment formula is that the factors therein do not contribute 
equally to the derivation of income. In the U.S., this practice arose as an attempt to increase a 
state’s share of the corporation income under the guise of enhanced precision. Such practices, 
because of their complexity, not only increased administrative costs but also raised compliance 
costs. Proper tax administration requires that a balance between simplicity, ease of 
administration, equity, and low compliance costs be achieved. This objective has broadly been 
realised by the UDITPA which proposes the use of a common three-factor formula, the so-
called Massachusetts Formula. 
                                                             
13 J.W. Huston, ‘Allocation of Corporate Income for Purposes of Taxation’, (1932) XXVI Illinois L Rev  725, at 
735.  
14 Id., at 736.  
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2 The Massachusetts Formula  
The Multistates Tax Compact, under which a Multistates Tax Commission emerged, 
promoted the use of the Massachusetts Formula. The Formula evolved as a matter of trial and 
error over more than 40 years in the U.S. state taxation context.15 It consists of three factors, 
property, payroll, and sales assigned on the basis of destination with a throwback rule to 
ensure 100 per cent taxation.  
A The Property Factor  
The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the average value of the taxpayer’s 
real and tangible property, owned or rented, and used, or availa ble for use, in one state during 
the income year. The denominator is the average value of all the taxpayer’s real and tangible 
property owned or rented during the income year.16 
The property factor contains all tangible property used to produce business income as 
opposed to non-business income. Such property, if owned by the business, is valued at 
original cost, and if rented it is valued at eight times the rental value. If property is used free of 
charge, a notional value is included representing a fair rental value.17 
It is arguable that whilst the presence of the property factor in an apportionment formula is 
reasonable on the basis that it represents the investment of capital, it contains two theoretical 
imperfections:18 First, it includes property that is not owned, and second, it does not include 
intangible property. The absence of intangible property is certainly a serious omission, the 
consequences of which will be fully examined below. However, the inclusion of rented 
property or property used for free is fully justified as they both produce income regardless of 
their ownership status. Thus, regardless of its ownership status, property is included in the 
formula on the basis of its temporal relationship to the business. 
                                                             
15 Lynn, supra note 12, at 1261. 
16 United states, section 10 of the UDITPA as reproduced in J.R. Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation: Cases 
and Materials , 3rd ed., (St Paul: West Publishing, 1969) 344.  
17 Id., UDITPA sections 11 and 12. Prior to this attempt at uniformity, states used at least six different standards 
for valuing property owned by a taxpayer as well as a variety of standards for valuing leased property; see 
House Committee on the Judiciary, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Report of the Special Subcommittee 
on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce H.R. Rep. No. 565, 88th Cong, 1st Sess., (1965) (Willis Committee 
Report) in Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 310. 
18 Miller, in McLure, Jr., supra note 3, at 134.  
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B The Payroll Factor 
The use of a payroll factor in the apportionment formula is justified on the basis that labour 
produces income.19 The presence of labour as an apportionment factor allocates part of a 
corporation’s income to the state where the services are rendered. Payroll consists of salaries, 
wages, commissions, and any other form of remuneration paid to employees for personal 
services rendered to the employer. There seems to be little disagreement as to who is an 
employee. Generally, an employment relationship exists when the person for whom the 
services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the 
services both as to the results to be obtained and the means of attaining that result. 
Nevertheless, recent developments in the labour market may cause a significant problem at this 
level. In certain sectors, more especially in the computer industry, for example, the trend is to 
‘employ’ software engineers who are referred to as ‘contractors’ for the production of unique 
programs for the enterprise. Should these ‘contractors’ be deemed to be employees, or 
should the enterprise be considered as purchasing the output of these persons? It is suggested 
that the first solution may be more acceptable. Indeed, ‘contractors’ are substitutes for in-
house engineers whose formal employment is considered to be less attractive to enterprises. 
Thus, ‘contractors’ and in-house engineers are performing equivalent economic activities and 
should thus be treated in the same way for the purposes of the formula. 
The most serious problem involving the payroll factor, if used on a worldwide basis, relates to 
the fact that productivity and the level of compensation of employees are not the same in 
different countries. In addition, because of cultural and political differences, the amount paid as 
compensation for work performed may or may not include social costs. Both direct wages and 
social costs are part of the measure of labour contributions to the production effort. However, 
social costs are generally excluded from the payroll factor since they do not constitute taxable 
income to the employee as determined by U.S. federal rules.20 Therefore, although a business 
would have made social security contributions on behalf of its employees and paid other 
insurance contributions depending on the employment philosophy of a particular country, these 
payments are not included in the factor. 
Furthermore, in the labour market the practice is irresistibly moving towards subcontracting 
and individual contracts which eliminate to a large extent the problem of social costs for 
TNCs. If this trend continues, it is difficult to predict how a decreasing level of social 
                                                             
19 Again, prior to the UDITPA there were substantial variations in the attribution rules of the payroll factor. The 
three basic standards used either separately or in combination were: place of service; place of the business with 
which the employee is connected; or place of residence of the employee; see Willis Committee Report in 
Hellerstein, supra  note 16, at 310. 
20 R.A. Peterson, ‘Comments on Miller’, in McLure, supra note 3, at 167.  
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contributions would significantly impact on the payroll factor. Again, the trend is also to 
compensate employees through their participation in bonus payments or retirement pensions, 
employee share schemes, or generous superannuation contributions, for example, while 
keeping salaries to a minimum. Such payments designed primarily to compensate labour for 
work performed, albeit in a tax effective way should be included in the payroll factor. There 
are currently manoeuvres destined to delay the derivation of these types of payments by the 
employees concerned in order to postpone their taxation. A clear distinction must be made 
between the time at which the payer unconditionally incurs those liabilities and the time when a 
beneficiary actually derives its share of it. It is submitted that such liability is incurred when the 
firm irrevocably allocates the funds destined to finance future derivation by its employees. It 
follows that such funds should be included in the payroll factor in the year where such 
allocation occurs. 
C The Sales Factor 
The sales or revenue factor is the third and last of the apportionment factors as proposed by 
the UDITPA. This factor is a fraction of which the denominator is total overall sales and the 
numerator is total sales in a particular state during the income year.21 The sales factor is not 
taken to mean mere sales or trade revenues of a taxpayer. Essentially, it includes not only sales 
of tangible personal property, but also of real and intangible property as well as the 
performance of services, that is, all gross receipts of the taxpayer giving rise to business 
income, although certain extraordinary receipts that would be distortive to the sales factor are 
excluded. 
Some economists have questioned the propriety of the inclusion of the sales factor in the 
Massachusetts Formula by maintaining that wealth is created by the production of goods and 
the rendering of services rather than by selling.22 The contrary view is that without sales no 
income would have been generated. As a result, the sales factor, in that instance, has a 
balancing effect since it provides the market state with an appropriate share of the income 
base which, but for its presence, would have been unduly apportioned to the manufacturing 
state.23 Indeed, the state that provides a market for goods is: 
furnishing a key link in the chain of income production; and since the other two factors, property 
and payroll, weight the apportionment heavily in favour of the manufacturing states, the use of a 
                                                             
21 See section 15 of the UDITPA as reproduced in Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 345.  
22 See, for example, C.L. Harriss, ‘Economic Aspects of Interstate Apportionment of Business Income’, (1959) 
37 Taxes  327.  
23 See Kust, ‘State Taxation of Interstate Income: New Dimensions of an Old Problem’, (1959) 12  Tax Executive 
45. 
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sales factor and the destination rule of apportionment of sales receipts, is necessary to provide 
market states which do not have heavy manufacturing industries with an equitable portion of 
interstate net income.24 
Sales has turned out to be the most troublesome of the factors in the various apportionment 
formulas used in the U.S.25 Professor Musgrave even believes that ‘much of the tension in 
argument between those who advocate formula apportionment and those who in principle 
prefer separate accounting is attributable to the inclusion of the sales factor in the formula.’26 In 
view of these difficulties, the problems relating to the sale factor will be examined in detail 
further below. 
The Massachusetts Formula or certain variations thereof, are almost exclusively used in the 
U.S. state taxation context. It has certain limitations but is generally regarded as reasonably 
appropriate.27 These limitations and their likely effect if applied in a global context need now to 
be examined. 
Section II The Limitations of Present Formulas 
All formulas used since the inception of the system in the U.S. state taxation context have been 
criticised on various grounds. The Massachusetts Formula, although approved by the 
American Tax Association, is no exception. The main criticisms relate to the diversity of 
factors and to the difficulties inherent in their valuation. Therefore, there is no doubt that if a 
formulary system were to be implemented on a worldwide basis, specific problems would 
arise in this environment too. These problems are illustrative of the controversies arising from 
the inevitable interference of political considerations in the field of taxation. 
1 Diversity of Factors and Valuation Problems 
A Is a Variety of Factors Necessary? 
From the early days of state income taxation the U.S. states have been free to adopt any 
apportionment formula provided it withstood the constitutional scrutiny of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The various states used a variety of factors to achieve their taxation objectives. 
Property, payroll, and sales were often present in conjunction with other factors, or even on 
                                                             
24 Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 341.  
25 Supra note 16, at 311. 
26 P. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing State Corporate Tax Base’, in McLure, Jr., supra  note 3, at 240.  
27 J.R. Hellerstein, ‘Comments on McLure’, in McLure, supra note 3, at 130.  
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their own as a one-factor formula. Among the most prominent factors used at different times 
within the U.S. states were the following: 
· Cost of manufacturing, expressed ‘as a ratio of total cost of manufacturing, collecting, 
assembling or processing within the state, to the total cost of manufacturing, collecting, 
assembling or processing everywhere.’28 
· Gross receipts, defined as the ratio of gross receipts accruing to business within the state 
to total gross receipts resulting from business done everywhere. 
· Purchase as a factor was used by Arizona alone. Its code merely provided that ‘the 
numerator of the purchases faction shall include all purchases resulting from [the] 
employee buying activity of the taxpayer in Arizona.’29 
· Average inventory has also been used as a factor. Thus, in Georgia, it was understood 
that the factor consisted of the average monthly inventories of all products held in this 
state for sale, lease, or other business purposes over the average of the total monthly 
inventories of all products held everywhere else for the same purposes as those 
inventories held in Georgia.30 
· Business done within a state as measured by the amount of payment such as salaries, 
purchases of inventories, compensation to employees and the amount of sales receipts 
over those total amounts for the enterprise as a whole. 
Such a wide variety of factors contributed to the adverse reputation of state taxation, the most 
serious objection related to the obvious danger of double, or indeed multiple taxation. There 
were also concerns about taxpayers’ compliance because of the confusion created by such 
diversity.31 
Too great a variety of apportionment formulas lead to inequitable taxation. Apportionment 
formulas vary not only with regard to the factors used, but also with respect to the definition of 
each of the factors used therein. Therefore, it seems important that Intertax be well aware of 
the dangers of yielding to pressure for unrealistic formulas promoted in order to satisfy, in most 
instances, the political rather than economic aspirations of its various members. However, 
whilst uniformity is required to satisfy administrative ease and to promote compliance, one 
must also consider the fact that apportionment formulas need to cater for the needs of different 
taxpayers operating in different industries. Therefore, a certain relativity in the concept of 
                                                             
28 P.L. Hartman, ‘State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multistate Business’, (1959) 13 Vand LR. 21, at 70.  
29 Ibid .  
30 Ibid. 
31 Hellerstein, supra  note 16, at 310-11.  
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uniformity needs to be adopted. This may be achieved by enabling the use of different formulas 
for different industries as explored further below. 
B Formula Apportionment in an International context  
A state is entitled to tax its residents as well as non-residents on their in-state income because 
it provides them with protection and privileges, including the right to receive and enjoy 
income.32 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court held that taxing power through formulary 
apportionment is exercisable by the state if the state has afforded to the taxpayer ‘protection, 
opportunities, and benefits’.33 A state must have given something ‘for which it can ask 
return’.34 
It is now argued that the benefit theory as the rationale for taxation must be expanded to fit 
with the modern theory of the TNC. The protection afforded by a jurisdiction’s legal regime 
contributes to the worldwide profits of the TNC. Moreover, an enterprise’s profits are the 
measure of its taxpaying capacity in toto.35 In other words, a jurisdiction’s contribution to a 
TNC goes beyond the benefits it offers. In reality, a country contributes to the TNC’s ability 
to pay by providing it with an environment that is conducive for the production and acquisition 
of wealth. Consequently, these invisible contributions need to be reflected in any formula 
designed to tax such an enterprise on its worldwide income.  
Transposed to the international setting, the starting point in choosing a formula for allocating a 
TNC’s income among jurisdictions remains the benefit theory since a TNC derives certain 
benefits form the jurisdictions where it operates, for example, payroll, property, and sales, as 
well as the protection afforded to it by the jurisdiction’s legal regime.36 However, in reality, it is 
questionable whether the sole criterion for the taxation of TNCs is the fact that these 
enterprises use the infrastructure of their host countries. Governments not only actively seek to 
attract TNCs; they also compete to facilitate the location of TNC headquarter activities within 
their jurisdiction.37 It may well be that the reasons for this range from positive spillover effects 
                                                             
32 Lawrence v State Tax Comm’n of Mississippi, 286 U.S. 276, at 281 (1932). 
33 Wisconsin v J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 333 (1940). 
34 Ibid. 
35 S.I. Langbein, ‘A Modified Fractional Apportionment Proposal for Tax Transfer Pricing’, (10 February 1992) 
Tax Notes 719, at 730. 
36 R.S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Slicing the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation’, (15 March 1993) 
Tax Notes 1511, at 1513. 
37 G.C. Hufbauer & J.M. Van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income: Blueprint for Reform  (Washington 
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on the national economy to the creation of positive externalities that ultimately benefit both 
parties. 
Nonetheless, it may be necessary to look beyond the classical explanation of the benefit 
principle to justify the exercise of taxing power through the use of global formulary 
apportionment. The integration theory, as expounded by Harding as far back as 1933,38 
justifies a jurisdiction’s entitlement to tax income arising from the interaction of all the factors of 
production assembled by an enterprise and integrated within the economic structure of that 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the state within which the TNC is located has jurisdiction to tax the 
whole of the income generated by such factors regardless of where it is sourced. 
Once the question of jurisdictional nexus in a global formulary apportionment is solved, there 
arises the issue of whether the system reasonably identifies the value contributed by each 
component part of an integrated business. In other words, in order for it to be universally 
accepted, formulary apportionment must, as a matter of principle, identify the contribution of 
each constituent part of a TNC to the overall profit, and assign an acceptable value to such 
contributions. This question of assigning value is inextricably linked to the choice, the definition, 
and the valuation of factor components. This valuation question is a particularly vexing one 
since it is very difficult, for example, to define and value the factors of the Massachusetts 
Formula. Some of these difficulties pertaining to the sales factor have already been discussed 
while others will be examined later. There is little doubt that in an international context, 
because of different legal and traditional methods of doing business, these difficulties are likely 
to be exacerbated. However, since time immemorial such differences have constantly been 
dealt with successfully in international trade. Consequently, it is probable that compromises will 
be found in order to make such a system workable. 
As for the issue of property valuation, it is submitted that if a clear definition of property is 
reached, especially tangible property, then an acceptable value is also achieved. Property 
should comprise both tangible and intangible property owned by the taxpayer, as well as 
rented property. The question of tangible and rented property has been solved in the U.S. 
state taxation context and there seems to be no serious problem in adopting the same 
compromises on a worldwide basis. Intangible property is ignored by the UDITPA, 
presumably to avoid the problem of assigning them a location.39 In reality a TNC’s portfolio of 
intangible assets is an attribute of the whole enterprise. As such, it does not need to be 
assigned to a particular situs. Furthermore, since the benefits arising from its ownership accrue 
to the whole enterprise, there is strictly no reason to justify its valuation and the allocation of 
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part of that value to the components of the TNC. The problem of intangible property, with all 
its nuances, will be explored below. As for the many valuation methods currently advocated 
for tangible property, the debate centres on whether use should be made of either historical 
costs or present net worth or some other valuation method. 
Referring back to the question in the American context there was, prior to the relative 
uniformity brought about by the UDITPA, a wide diversity in the methods of valuing property. 
Hartman documents at least five methods of valuation of real and tangible personal property 
owned by businesses:40 annual average value, market value, average monthly net book value, 
average quarterly value, and original costs adjusted for depreciation. The problem is seemingly 
solved in the U.S. by the UDITPA adopting valuation of property at its original cost. 
The original cost method has some undeniable advantages. It avoids the difficulties associated 
with either current market value or any method requiring the use of depreciation allowances. 
However, whilst the use of original cost may favour older TNCs, or those whose acquisitions 
were made in times of low inflation, it remains nevertheless easier to administer as it is easily 
ascertainable from the books of the taxpayer. The discussion as to what is the most 
appropriate method of valuation of tangible property is strictly not relevant in this context. 
What is crucial to achieve is uniformity in valuation methods so that TNCs are treated on an 
equitable basis. Such uniformity can only be achieved by the implementation of international 
standards for the valuation of property and for depreciation allowances. Until such 
international standards are implemented, Intertax may well have to use original cost for the 
valuation of tangible-owned property. Unfortunately, even the use of original cost is not likely 
to be universally acceptable. There is a wide disparity as to the cost of plant and property 
between various jurisdictions. Petersen notes that ‘it would have cost $244 million in California 
in 1969, to build an oil refinery to produce 125,000 barrels per day; the cost of the same 
refinery in Germany, however, would have been only about $190 million.’41 
Yet another problem arises from the use of original cost in valuing property. In the Californian 
practice the numerator of the property factor, that is, that part of property owned by the TNC 
within California, is calculated on the basis of original cost. However, the denominator of the 
property factor, that is, the worldwide property of that TNC is computed ‘by converting the 
original cost of the property worldwide at current exchange rates’.42 As a result, the 
                                                             
40 Hartman , supra note 28, at 68. 
41 R. Petersen, ‘California Franchise Tax: Combined Income Report affects Foreign Companies’, (1976) 44 J 
Tax’n 184, at 187. 
42 F. Latchan, ‘Unitary Doctrine in Applying Franchise Tax, Statement to the Franchise Tax Bd. on Behalf of 
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denominator is often understated thus increasing the weight of the property factor in favour of 
allocating income to California. This problem may be obviated by utilising historical exchange 
rates to compute the denominator of the property factor. However, this leads to complications 
and increased costs for both the taxpayer and the tax administration. 
Rented property poses a similar problem. The UDITPA provides for the valuation of rented 
property at eight times the annual gross rent, that is, including all consideration paid by the 
taxpayer for the use of the rented property. This valuation method seems to be acceptable. 
However, if possible, it is perhaps more equitable if the opportunity cost theory be applied in 
this context. In other words, the value of rented property should equate to that which the 
tenant would have paid had it chosen to purchase the desired property at the time it entered 
into the lease. There might be a certain percentage discount allowed in order to reflect the 
uncertainty that a tenant faces. 
Even if these methods were to be proposed by Intertax, their appropriateness is still 
questionable. This is because on a worldwide basis there is a serious differential in the rate of 
factor return and that of factor productivity. Thus in Container43 it was argued that the profit 
margins of the various components of a TNC vary considerably. The allocation formula, 
however, assumes a uniform rate of return and thus overstated the value contributed by some 
of these various components. For instance, it was demonstrated that the cost of production 
fluctuates as between jurisdictions and that: 
[E]xcept for the possibility that lower gross sale prices may offset lower production costs, the 
apportionment formula contains no adjustment for the fact that higher rates of return may be 
available in some jurisdictions because of lower plant and labour costs. 44 
Therefore, if a TNC produces income at a lower cost in terms of property and payroll, then 
the result of a normal apportionment formula is that jurisdictions with higher costs are able to 
unfairly tax value generated outside their borders. This claim is pertinent and must be 
recognised as one whose resolution is fundamental to the acceptance of formulary 
apportionment on a worldwide basis. 
The payroll factor has the same inherent problem since wage rates differ substantially between 
countries. For example, if the salary of a U.S. executive is taken to be double that of his 
counterpart in a particular jurisdiction while the productivity of both remains constant, then the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
14 (on file at Santa Clara Law Review), in G.T. Yamate, ‘Comment’ (1980) 20 Santa Clara Law Review  123, at 
139. 
43 103 S Ct, at 2933. 
44 D.L. Simmons, ‘Worldwide Unitary Taxation: Retain and Rationalize, or Block at the Water’s Edge?’, (1985) 
21 Stanford J Int’l L 157, at 167. 
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U.S. executive salary is double-weighted in the apportionment formula. As a result if payroll is 
computed on a monetary basis a disproportionate amount of income is allocated to the U.S.45 
The fact that wage levels vary considerably on a worldwide basis has also been convincingly 
demonstrated. Although the figures used by Petersen may have changed, a substantial disparity 
between countries as to the remuneration of labour remains. Such disparity would presumably 
be greater as between industrialised and less-developed countries. Petersen found that: 
[W]age levels are considerably lower in Japan, Italy or almost any other country than in the United 
states for the same work. In 1969, the cost of engineering work in Japan was only 70 per cent of that 
in the U.S. (England was 75 per cent, Holland 80 per cent, France 90 per cent). In 1972 the cost of 
skilled labour in Japan was approximately $14 per day including social charges. In Argentina, the 
cost was $7 per day. In England, it was $10 per day. In the United states, the cost is about $25 per 
day. 46 
Petersen also documents the same type of disparity that exists as to the cost of plant or 
property.47 Petersen’s work was carried out in 1976 and it is doubtful whether the same 
conclusion could be drawn today. Indeed, because of the strength of the yen, costs in Japan 
are relatively higher than in other industrialised countries.48 However, the point is that such 
disparities could be mitigated through the use of a formula based on ‘units’ rather than 
monetary values. Thus, the size of real property used in various jurisdictions rather than its 
monetary value would be an appropriate solution. Likewise, the size of the workforce rather 
than the size of the payroll, or the volume of sales rather than the value of sales could well 
prove to be adequate.49 
2 The Sales Factor Revisited 
History, in the U.S. state taxation context, shows that the sales factor is more open to 
manipulation. Therefore, its presence in an apportionment formula represents a major cause of 
conflict which is still not settled.  
                                                             
45 J. Condrau, ‘Statement by the Union Bank of Switzerland to the California Franchise Tax Board Regarding the 
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Chapter  7  The Search for  an Appropr iate Formula(s)  
 315
The sales factor attributes the proceeds of a sale to either:50 
· the state of destination, or the market state, 
· the state of origin, or the manufacturing state, or 
· the state where the sale was solicited, negotiated, or executed. 
Therefore, income from sales may be included in the tax base of at least three different 
jurisdictions if each uses a different concept for locating the sale in a formula. Consequently, as 
one author puts it, ‘it [the sale factor] is perhaps the most difficult part of the entire problem to 
resolve in an equitable and acceptable fashion.’51 The controversies about which of the 
manufacturing or sale components of a business is responsible for generating an enterprise’s 
income are not new.52 Yet, the debate is far from over as evidenced by recent developments 
in the U.S. states’ taxation environment. 
A Analysis of the Sales Factor  
Basically, the issue that needs investigation is whether sales add value to an enterprise. Two 
lines of arguments are put forward in the debate: The first relies on the benefit theory, and the 
second on a purely economic analysis. 
The question as to whether a state where an enterprise sells its products has a legitimate claim 
to tax the proceeds may be analysed on the basis of the benefit theory. Viewed differently the 
question is: does a sale constitute a sufficient nexus or connection as is required for exercising 
taxing jurisdiction? 
An enterprise that makes a sale in a particular jurisdiction receives from that jurisdiction 
protection and other benefits. For example, that enterprise may sue the market state for the 
payment of any moneys owed to it as a result of the transaction. Moreover, by permitting an 
enterprise to exploit its market, a marketing state is entitled to a return for providing that 
enterprise with the opportunity to make profits. In short, the justification of the sales factor 
rests on the view that both the market and the manufacturing states are entitled to a share of 
the tax base. This result is perceived as being equitable since income is generated by both 
manufacturing and selling activities. 
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However, serious reservations as to the inclusion of the sale s factor in an apportionment 
formula have been voiced, more especially by economists.53 For example, it has been argued 
that: 
the situs of sales is a particularly volatile element, often determined by trivial variations in the 
circumstances of the sale. In a fully competitive world, indeed, the net income of a firm would be 
attributable to capital and entrepreneurial effort, not to payroll or sales. 54 
Again it is claimed that: 
one serious defect of most of today’s formulas is use of the receipts (sales) factor. This has little or 
no economic justifications, and analysis leads to a conclusion sharply at variance with established 
practice. 55 
At the outset, it is arguable that economists have a very limited role in determining the 
composition of an apportionment factor.56 After all, the choice of factors in this formula is a 
political matter often justified ahead of purely economic considerations. Yet, even after the 
UDITPA and the MTC had more or less harmonised the system applicable in the U.S. states’ 
context by proposing the Massachusetts Formula, an economist maintained that: 
[T]his simple but arbitrary and capricious formula has all the earmarks of having been concocted by 
a committee of lawyers who had forgotten anything they were ever taught about statistics and 
economics. 57 
The truth is that ‘none of the existing formulas that the states use is grounded on economic 
principles or on economic models, nor were they intended to be.’58 However, the absence of 
economic theory in the design of a formula does not mean that attention should not be paid to 
broad taxation policy objectives, themselves designed with economic efficiency in mind. 
Professor Michael McIntyre has in fact developed a set of principles which he considers as 
essential in this context.59 These are, inter alia, administrative simplicity, neutrality, economic 
nexus, inclination to tax, and sovereign control of tax. These criteria will be studied further 
down. 
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i  The Supply -Based and Supply/Demand-Based Source Rules 
It is not clear, even at a purely conceptual level, what factors should be included in a formula 
and how they should be weighted. Whilst formula apportionment is not an attempt to 
determine the true source of income,60 an economic analysis aimed at deciding what factors 
should be used to apportion a TNC’s income may start with an attempt to determine, on an 
objective basis, the geographic source of that income. Professor Peggy Musgrave has made 
such an attempt. 
Professor Musgrave does not favour the triple-factor formula consisting of payroll, assets and 
sales. Starting from the assumption that corporate taxation is motivated by an effort to attribute 
the tax base to the taxing jurisdictions that are ‘entitled’ to tax it, Professor Musgrave inquires 
as to whether entitlement is to be based sole ly on ‘supply’ (production) considerations or 
whether it needs to also reflect ‘demand’ (consumption) considerations. She thus distinguishes 
between supply-based source rules and supply-demand-based source rules.61 In the supply-
based source rule paradigm consideration is put on payroll and property, but not on sales 
since these two factors adequately capture the contributions of a sales force and sales-related 
capital. If a supply-based source rules paradigm is considered, Professor Musgrave concludes 
that: 
[I]nclusion of sales makes no sense for a formula designed to implement a supply-based entitlement 
rule, but it does make sense if the entitlement is broadened to allow for demand as a source of 
value. 62 
Professor Musgrave’s reasons take into consideration a state’s entitlement to tax as explored 
earlier. She also claims that in: 
the more complex situations where the interjurisdictional business units exhibit interdependence in 
their operations and when separate accounting is simply not applicable, the choice of formula 
cannot readily be derived. 63 
If the supply-demand view of the source principle is favoured, then the inclusion of sales in the 
formula becomes necessary. Therefore, a formula based only on property and payroll is 
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inadequate in more complex situations where economic rents can be traced to market power 
instead of other factors. Sales clearly play a different role in these cases compared to other 
highly competitive situations. The inclusion of the sales factor is therefore justified only if it is 
intended to broaden the entitlement rule to allow for demand as a source of value. Having 
broadened the base, the relative weights assigned to sales and supply factors become merely a 
matter of entitlement judgement. However, Professor Musgrave concedes that it would be 
impractical to attempt to consider market power in designing apportionment formulas. In short, 
beyond recommending that the factors reflect what generates income, according to Professor 
Musgrave, economists have relatively little to say about the design of apportionment formulas. 
The views expressed by Professor Musgrave are heavily reliant on pure economic analysis. It 
ignores the fact that formulary apportionment is not an exact science.64 Pure theory cannot 
take precedence over pragmatism. Rather, a blend of both is necessary. A system will be 
successful only if it is administratively capable of being implemented and intrinsically satisfies 
the needs of those to whom it is to apply. Furthermore, Professor Musgrave argues that the 
problem relates to a source rule aspect of entitlement rather than ‘the assignment of the profits 
tax base to meet a benefit-based criterion of entitlement [and as such] this may well be best 
implemented by a single-factor formula involving only capital entering into that formula.’65 In 
addition, such a formula does not require any weighting system. It would seem, though, that 
primarily, the question revolves around the question of entitlement to tax rather than on pure 
source rules as argued by Professor McIntyre.66 Moreover, it is generally agreed that 
entitlement to tax on the basis of a formula does not rest primarily on source rules, but rather 
on the benefit principle, as demonstrated throughout this thesis. 
i i  The Contribution Analysis Approach 
In 1992 Professor Stanley Langbein grappled with ‘the more complex situations where the 
interjurisdictional business units exhibits interdependence in their operations’ as identified by 
Professor Musgrave.67 This approach, which according to Professor Langbein is in accord 
with the contemporary theory of the multinational firm, consists of a two-step process. The 
first step would require that each component of a TNC be granted a return on its costs plus an 
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appropriate return on its assets (about 20 per cent). The second step would allocate any 
residual profit by way of a two-factor formula consisting of assets and sales. Professor 
Langbein argues that this method would approximate the component’s relative contribution to 
the enterprise’s total profit. 
To justify his method Professor Langbein relies on the modern theory of the multinational firm 
as examined earlier in this thesis.68 Briefly, the very essence of the TNC is to integrate its 
operations thereby generating ‘joint’ profits greater than the profits achievable by the separate 
parts.69 In a forward integration model Professor Langbein demonstrates that a pure sales 
allocation figure splits the profit between the home and satellite jurisdictions in such a way that 
the relative contribution of each of the two components, that is, manufacturing and sales, are 
taken into account.70 The method used to control this result involves the disaffiliation of the 
constitutive components of the TNC and an approximate determination of the profits that each 
part would have derived in these circumstances, that is, an arm’s length result. 
Professor Langbein concedes that the examples he uses to illustrate his model have obvious 
shortcomings, including the administrative difficulties of determining what kind of integration a 
particular TNC is constituted. He therefore concludes that it would be administratively more 
expedient to settle on ‘a residual allocation scheme that would give 50 percent weight to the 
sales factor and 50 percent to the asset factor in all settings’ in spite of the fact that this 
solution departs from a ‘relative contribution’ standard as defined.71 However, he maintains 
that: 
sales, if anything, are the more or most important factor in indicating the ‘relative contribution’ of a 
component of an enterprise’s group profit. 72 
i i i Sales as a Positive Externality 
Professor Rueven Avi-Yonah has put this concept forward. When a corporation sells its 
products in a particular market, it provides a service in that market for which it receives a 
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concurrent and full compensation in the form of income.73 The same does not hold when a 
corporation pays its employees compensation on a consensual basis for whatever services the 
latter provides it with. For instance, a corporation employing labour provides over and above 
the normal wages and salaries valuable training that is highly portable. Since a corporation 
cannot bind its labour force to it, it receives an inadequate compensation for the training it has 
dispensed. Thus society receives a benefit in excess of what the corporation receives in return.  
Given the fact that a corporation’s outlay and its receipts are matched only when it sells its 
product, then, according to the author, an apportionment formula needs to be based solely on 
sales. First, Professor Avi-Yonah argues that a market sta te has a right to tax income derived 
from exploiting its market.74 Second, he maintains that the modern theory of the TNC 
demonstrate that these firms exist because of advantages inherent in controlling sales directly in 
order to control the various hazards faced by TNCs as examined in Chapter 2. 
Professor Avi-Yonah, however, does not examine the concept of the jurisdictional threshold 
that would be required in his proposal to trigger the market state’s right to tax. In a formulary 
apportionment system, it is critical for the threshold rules to be coordinated with the rules 
defining the apportionment factors.75 This coordination is what Professor McIntyre calls ‘the 
inclination to tax’ criterion. An illustration of the interaction of these principles may be found in 
the provisions of Article 5(4) of the OECD Model. 76 Pursuant to this provision, the 
maintenance of a stock of goods solely for display does not constitute a permanent 
establishment (PE). In Professor Avi-Yonah’s model it would suffice for a TNC to maintain 
such a showroom from which orders are referred to head office, for example, to allow an 
enterprise to avoid the PE categorisation, unless the system is cluttered with throwback or 
throwout rules.77 In the words of Professor Pomp: 
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[I]f receipts are one of the factors in the apportionment formula, the consequent of a permanent 
establishment threshold rule is that income may be assigned to countries unable to tax it. 78 
To sum up, it is perhaps necessary to reconsider the questions at issue in designing an 
apportionment formula. It would seem that the question that needs to be resolved does not 
relate to the issue of determining the source of income. Rather, the fundamental question is: 
what produces income? It seems that income is produced by the combination of human effort 
and property, such as land buildings and equipment, in a two-tier operation. First, the 
manufacturing side, using capital under the direction of the entrepreneur, produces the goods, 
and second, the sales force transforms these goods into income. Even this analysis is fraught 
with uncertainties. The confusion in determining what constitutes the true source of income is 
enduring. Some argue that it is essential to distinguish between where income is earned and 
where it is paid.79 In this scenario, sales contribute to the production of income but are 
certainly not an independent factor in the income-producing process. Clearly, therefore, the 
contribution of the sale personnel is already reflected in the payroll factor. If this analysis were 
correct, then an appropriate formula would consist of property and payroll only as only these 
two factors produce income. 
As examined earlier, in designing a formulary apportionment system, regard must be had to the 
crucial relationship that exists between the formula and the jurisdictional threshold rules. What 
has been proposed earlier in this thesis is that the jurisdictional threshold rule be based on the 
functions performed by an enterprise in a particular jurisdiction. Given that functions performed 
must involve a certain number of factors such as the assets used and risk assumed, to use the 
OECD’s terminology, then a country’s ability to tax depends on the presence of such factors 
within its jurisdiction. Therefore, the presence of such factors should be regarded as a 
sufficient connecting factor equivalent to the enterprise having a PE in that jurisdiction.  
A further question revolves around the weighting of the two elements in the formula. In other 
words, the issue is that of determining the proportion by which labour and property 
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construction of this section has been subject to litigation. The judiciary has  consistently held that ‘within the 
state’ modifies the word ‘purchaser’ thereby attributing back sales to the state of ultimate destination; see, for 
example, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Franchise Tax Board  No. B 064073 (Calif. Ct. App., Second App. Dist. 
July 7, 1994; modified 8 August 1994 in J.A. Liss, ‘Factually Speaking: An Overview of the Sales Factor’, 
(Sep/Oct 1995) 47 Tax Executive (Issue 5) 372. 
78 Pomp, supra note 58, at 813, and more specially at n 3 where Professor Pomp writes that this defect ‘greatly 
undermines Professor Avi-Yonah’s proposal for a one factor formula based on sales’. 
79 D.K. Barnes, ‘Prerequisites of a Federal Statute Regulating State Taxation of Interstate Commerce’, (1960) 46 
Virginia Law Review  1121. 
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respectively contribute to the creation of income. Questions relative to the productivity of 
labour or the optimum return on equity capital are notoriously difficult to ascertain.80 Thus: 
[F]or the economy as a whole, labor produces about four times as much as property. Yet there is no 
reason to believe that labor produces even as much of business net income - the tax base we seek 
to apportion - as property produces. 81 
In view of these difficulties, Professor Harriss suggests that equal weighting of the payroll and 
property factors ‘will probably give results which are reasonably close to the underlying 
economic reality’.82 If no data is available as to the exact measure of the productivity of these 
factors in the U.S., then it is reasonable to conclude that the same applies on a worldwide 
basis. Consequently, one might venture to conclude that the solution proposed for the U.S. 
should be applicable on a worldwide basis. Thus, a two-factor formula consisting of property 
and payroll could be opted for until such time that reliable data is collected to finetune this 
option. However, it is doubtful whether consensus could be obtained on such a formula. 
Indeed, it is most likely that political considerations would demand that a sales factor be 
included in any global apportionment formula. 
B The Sales Factor: The Meeting Point of Economic and Political 
Considerations 
A formulary apportionment system will not work in the international context if Intertax is 
incapable of devising formula/formulas that would be sanctioned by national governments 
eager to safeguard their revenue base. The question that arises, therefore, is whether it is 
advisable for Intertax to include sales in such formulas. In reality, such an agreement hinges on 
both technical and political considerations. 
If the premises of the economic debate are not construed narrowly, as is the case when the 
analysis is locked in neo-classical economics, then it seems that even then there are good 
reasons to include the sales factor in an apportionment formula. In the modern world value has 
more to do with cost of production theories. Value is created not only by the combination of 
property and labour, but arises also through the intervention of sociological and political 
considerations.83 Indeed, the classical economic conception of value ‘has little or no bearing 
on tax policy’.84 Tax policy in most countries has long recognised that the nexus between the 
                                                             
80 See, for example, F.M. Fisher & J.J. McGowan, ‘On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer 
Monopoly Profits’, (1983) 73 Am. Econ. Rev . 82. 
81 Harriss, supra  note 22, at 363. 
82 Supra note 22, at 362. 
83 J. Hellerstein, ‘Allocation and Nexus in State Taxation Interstate Busin esses’ (1964) 20  Tax Law Review 259, at 
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taxing jurisdiction and the tax subject ‘includes a whole gamut of legal and economic 
relationships, benefits and protections, and encompasses virtually every step in the economic 
process, from the creation of the goods to their conversion into dollars in the market place.’85 
Consequently, a sensible tax policy requires that all those steps in the economic process to be 
recognised, to a certain degree, as constituting a suitable basis for tax.  
This being said, there remains the practical question of determining the most appropriate basis 
for assigning sales to the sales factor. There are several general bases for assigning sales to the 
sales factor of the numerator. These are: sales office location, customer location or point of 
delivery, location of goods sold at time shipped or appropriated to order, and the place where 
the goods are manufactured or mined.86 In the U.S. context, the controversy is based on 
purely political considerations and it still rages on as to the choice of the appropriate base.87 
Various states have adjusted the factor composition of their apportionment formula to improve 
their business climate and their competitive position relative to neighbouring states.88 However, 
these instances of predatory behaviour should not prevail in the proposed model since the 
exclusivity of designing the apportionment formulas rests with Intertax, which is required to 
accommodate the interests of both manufacturing and market countries. 
The present tendency of TNCs is to locate production in less-developed countries (LDCs) 
where property value and labour costs are low. If sales on a destination basis were to be 
excluded from any apportionment formula developed by Intertax for the manufacturing sector, 
then it is clear that many countries would reject such a formula on the ground that such a 
measure would attribute virtually all income to the LDCs where the manufacturing plants and 
                                                             
85 Id., at 275-76. 
86 Lynn, supra note 51, at 50. 
87 See section 16(a) of the UDITPA as reproduced in Hellerstein, supra  note 16, at 345. In his comments to this 
section, Professor Hellerstein mentions that sales to the United States Government are treated separately 
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payroll are concentrated.89 Conversely, if the sales factor is ignored for purely practical 
reasons, for example, to promote simplicity, this omission may have serious effects on the 
revenue side. 
In 1964, the Willis Committee recommended strongly that the sales-receipt factor be 
abandoned altogether.90 The Committee based its recommendations not on theory but from a 
practical standpoint. It argued that the sales factor caused the most serious difficulties in 
formulary apportionment. It required precise record-keeping, involved additional costs, 
favoured non-compliance, and rendered enforcement particularly difficult. The Committee 
went on to demonstrate that no significant revenue loss would be suffered by any state by 
shifting to a two-factor non-receipts formula.91 Sheffrin and Fulcher reached the same 
conclusion. They showed that the inclusion of the sales factor makes relatively little difference 
to the inter-state distribution of the tax base.92 
Whether the findings of the Willis Committee are applicable in a worldwide context is not 
known. If national governments were to support a two-factor formula on the ground of 
simplicity, as far as manufacturing and mercantile corporations are concerned, it is essential to 
demonstrate that such simplicity is not achieved at the expense of revenue. Unfortunately, there 
is little systematic empirical evidence on that particular issue in state taxation of corporate 
income, let alone in the taxation of cross-border income. 
An attempt to determine whether the amount of the tax base or revenue involved is truly 
substantial in the U.S. states context was made by Sheffrin and Fulcher.93 One of the questions 
that these authors set themselves to answer is whether the variations in factors used in 
apportionment formulas could be used by the states in order to ‘pirate’ some of the tax base 
of another state. The data that Sheffrin and Fulcher used originated from two sources: the 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), and the Californian Franchise 
Tax Board (FTB), that is, data collected from the actual returns filed in California. The result 
                                                             
89 Miller, in McLure, supra note 3, at 135. 
90 United States, House Committee on the Judiciary, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Report of the Special 
Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 88th Cong, 2nd Sess., 1964, H Rept 1480 in M 
Sheffrin & J Fulcher, ‘Alternative Divisions of the Tax Base: How much is at Stake?’, in McLure, supra  note 3, 
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of this study shows that in some industries it is the sales factor which attributes the greater 
percentage of income, whereas for some other industries another factor, such as, payroll, will 
do this.94 The authors thus support the findings of the Willis Report which stated ‘[C]ontrary to 
common belief, it will be seen that the choice among...formulas is not an issue involving great 
amounts of money. ’95 
Moreover, the authors point out that as far as the U.S. is concerned, there is a balanced 
distribution of industries across the various states. On a worldwide basis, industries tend to be 
concentrated in a few developed countries. Nevertheless, there seems to be a tendency to 
decentralise both production and management in the evolution of TNCs. Thus, in the 
automobile industry, for example, the various components are designed, manufactured, and 
assembled in different countries. There is an obvious dispersion of operations within various 
jurisdictions that tends therefore to reproduce the U.S. conditions. If this trend continues, then 
it may well be that the above conclusions would become more and more relevant in a 
worldwide context. 
However, even if the pace at which such reorganisation is occurring accelerates, for the 
foreseeable future there will still be major manufacturing centres located in particular 
jurisdictions, whilst sales are concentrated in others. Therefore, many countries would oppose 
the exclusion of the sales factor computed on a destination basis in any formula developed by 
Intertax for the apportionment of income derived by manufacturing industries. Moreover, the 
inclusion of sales is of vital importance to resource rich countries ‘since it greatly reduces the 
scope of their entitlement and spreads the base among the consumer states.’96 
When all these often conflicting interests are considered relative to their effects on a global 
apportionment formula, the most reasonable conclusion that may be drawn is that it would be 
unwise to disregard the claims of the market jurisdictions. As Professor Hellerstein puts it: 
the use of a receipts factor with the sales destination test commends itself on a pragmatic basis ... 
Moreover, that test sets up a standard not easily avoided under a properly drafted formula, a fact of 
no little significance in this area. 97 
It follows that a destination sales factor needs to be present in any formula developed by 
Intertax for manufacturing industries and the like as adopted by the UDITPA in the U.S. 
states’ context appears to be reasonable. However, in order to ensure that sales not taxable in 
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the state of destination are nevertheless taxable somewhere, that is, in order to avoid the so-
called ‘nowhere income’, the ‘throwback’ rule provided for by the UDITPA would have to be 
included in the definition of the sales factor by Intertax. 98 It will be recalled that the 
‘throwback’ rule provides that if a taxpayer is not taxable in the state of destination, then the 
sale is attributable to the state from which the property is shipped. 
Section III   Other Possible Solutions 
An acceptable formulary apportionment methodology must imperatively reconcile theory and 
ease of administration. It must clearly and unambiguously reflect ‘the elements that contribute 
to or measure the processes involved in the earning of net income.’99 With these objectives in 
mind it is now appropriate to examine the ways and means of addressing the major objections 
to the use of formulary apportionment for the taxation of TNCs. 
These objections fall into three main categories:  
· First, formulary apportionment is perceived as being arbitrary. In this regard, 
reservations have been made as to the inherently unrealistic expectation that one 
formula alone would adequately apply to all types of business activities.  
· Second, it is claimed that differences in business practices, both in terms of traditions 
and specific practices such as valuation methods, are likely to inhibit the emergence of 
uniformed procedures, which are the prerequisites for the application of formulary 
apportionment on a worldwide basis.  
· Finally, there is some concern as to the impartiality of the method because of the major 
differences in either the returns on capital invested or the costs and productivity of 
labour.  
In addition, the failure of the current formulas to account for intangible property, and the 
absence of any plausible method for attributing income generated by such property, are 
portrayed as serious shortcomings of present day formulas. 
                                                             
98 See section 16 of the UDITPA in Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 310. Moreover, if sales were to be included in 
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1 The Arbitrariness and the Valuation Question Revisited 
All apportionment methods, whether based on the separate accounting/arm’s length method, 
or the global formulary method, are intrinsically arbitrary. Therefore, there can be no valuation 
methods that would be universally accepted. As far back as 1922 a Committee of the 
National Tax Association observed: 
[A]ll methods of apportionment of trading profits are arbitrary - the cutting of the Gordian 
knot...there is no one right rule of apportionment, notwithstanding that there are probably a number 
of different rules, all of which may work substantial justice...the only right rule of procedure is a rule 
on which the several states can and will get together as a matter of comity. Getting together by the 
uniform adoption of some equitable method and finding the right rule are synonymous. 100 
In the apportionment field, therefore, what needs to be aimed at is relative fairness, ease of 
administration, and relative low compliance cost, rather than scientific precision. It is in this 
spirit that these questions are examined and solutions proposed. 
A Segmentation by Industry 
Prior to the adoption of the UDITPA, the various states in the U.S. used a plethora of 
formulas to apportion income of multistates or even multinational enterprises.101 In addition, tax 
administrators were often granted the power to modify the existing formulas in order to suit the 
needs of taxpayers in special circumstances and industries.102 In the U.S. many states sought 
the objective of uniformity by first adopting the UDITPA, and second, by entering into the 
Multistate Tax Compact (MTC). However, even under these regimes the ability of tax 
administrators to modify the apportionment formulas remained unchecked. 
If it is agreed that Intertax is to be solely responsible for devising, implementing and policing 
these measures, then the fear that different countries would utilise different definitions of the 
taxable unit, different tax bases, or indeed different formulas in order to maximise their income 
share is eliminated. However, uniformity is a relative concept and must be apprehended in a 
holistic way rather than as a concept applicable to all with no nuances. On a worldwide basis, 
TNCs operate in such diverse fields as agriculture, mining, pharmaceutical, and services. 
Intertax must be made to provide for the conflicting requirements of these different 
environments. Consequently, in the American states taxation system, even under the UDITPA, 
the need to modify the standard Massachusetts Formula was clearly understood. For example, 
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‘a two-factor formula of payroll and sales was used for most service businesses and the 
average value of outstanding loans replaced the property factor for financial corporations.’103 
In addition, as Miller observed, ‘efforts to provide a precise formula would certainly require 
the design of formulas for each industry and, in a perfect world, require that any industry 
formula be individualized for a specific taxpayer.’104 
It may not seem feasible to reach this perfect state of having one formula for each TNC, 
although it can be argued that if most TNCs choose to pursue the advance pricing arrangement 
(APA) route, then their individual particularities would be reflected in the particular transfer 
pricing methodologies that they would put forward in negotiations with various tax authorities. 
In short, the possibility for Intertax to propose different formulas to suit different industries is 
achievable if adequate time and resources are allocated to the organisation. In addition, the 
need for precision may be satisfied if the formulas adopted are flexible enough ‘to reflect the 
dynamics of both a business organization and the variety of economies in which the business 
operates.’105  
In order to achieve this objective, agreement needs to be reached on the various categories of 
industry types and the necessary criteria which, if depicted by a TNC, would determine its 
inclusion in each specific category. Some TNCs would engage in activities that straddle two 
different categories, although the present business strategy of TNCs is to concentrate on core 
activities where they have a ‘comparative’ advantage. There must obviously be a threshold 
level of activity that triggers the classification into a particular type of industry. Indeed, in many 
instances certain activities are necessarily predominant. Such TNCs would be classified in that 
category where their activities are predominant. If a TNC operates to an equal level in two 
different categories it could be assessed as two different entities, or it may well be that the 
formulas that would have been applicable to the two different categories are combined to 
provide a new one applicable to such cases. In any event, Intertax, in conjunction with the 
concerned TNCs and relevant tax administrations, might duplicate the existing APA procedure 
and determine how this classification could be achieved in a manner equitable to all parties 
concerned. 
A broad definition of industry types to suit the present needs may follow the classification used 
in statistics and economics. There could be at least four broad categories: Manufacturing, 
Financial Services, Natural Resources/Extracting Operations, and Agriculture and Agro-
Industries. Each type could then be subdivided into further categories to suit the particular 
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circumstances of each. Such subdivisions must obviously be limited to a number which is 
administratively convenient relative to the resources of Intertax. 
Once agreement is reached on the optimum number of classification types, efforts should be 
made to determine the elements and processes that contribute to the creation of income within 
each division or sector. Functional analyses would be important tools in the search for these 
elements. When found, only those elements would be included in a formula developed for each 
particular type. In this way, the desire for precision and the need to secure a system that is 
coherent and which can be administered with relative ease could be achieved. 
Moreover, a TNC may operate more than one line of business in more than one industry. The 
questions that arise in these situations relate to the determination of which subsidiaries and 
branches are engaged in which industry and the delineation of the commercial profits derived in 
each instance. As suggested, ‘this is a far simpler matter than engaging in a functional analysis 
for transfer pricing purposes, which may require not only the determination, but also precise 
measurement, of which of two parties to a particular transaction contributed with assets, 
incurred with expenses, and bore which risks.’106 Such problems have already been dealt with 
in the U.S. states’ practice. The solution has been to employ separate accounting in 
transactions between commonly controlled unitary businesses.107 In an international context, 
Professor McIntyre has suggested that the arm’s length principle should govern such 
transactions,108 and the objections to the use of this have been voiced109 examined earlier in 
Chapter 4.110 
Since the system proposed in this thesis disregards the concept of the unitary business, the 
problem is limited to the choice of factors in case of a multi-industry TNC. It is submitted that 
there should be no major problem in determining the commercial profits of each line of 
business even if these are concerned with different industries. Indeed, the accounting systems 
of TNCs are sophisticated enough to enable the determination of the profits or loss of each of 
the TNC’s line of business, if only for management purposes. Therefore, the question of what 
base to be used for apportionment purposes is a relatively easy one to determine. In any 
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event, in case of non-agreement between the TNC and Intertax, the dispute settlement 
mechanism provided would be called into action. 
B Unit Rather than Value  
Once the elements that contribute to the earning of income are isolated the need to adequately 
value them arises. If the valuation problem is restricted to two common factors in present 
formulas, that is, property and payroll, then one finds that the strongest critique refers to 
certain particular traits in the valuation of these two factors. First, as far as the property factor 
is concerned, there is reference to the inherent unfairness of historical cost, the impracticality of 
ascertaining net worth, and the differences in return on investment. Second, with regard to the 
payroll factor, the major objections are the difference in costs and productivity of labour in 
different jurisdictions. 
It is essential that uniformity in the methods for the valuation of assets for accounting purposes 
be achieved in order to determine the accounting profits of TNCs. In this way the value of 
property in the numerator of a formula would not be easily contested. However, difficulties 
arise when the value to be included in the denominator of the formula is compiled. This is 
because of the perceived differentials that exist, for example, in real-estate values as between 
jurisdictions. The denominator represents the whole of the property owned by the concerned 
TNC worldwide. A simple addition of all the individual country valuation results, when 
translated into one currency with all the problems pertaining to that translation, and simply 
does not reflect these differentials. 
The major cause of these difficulties is that the point of focus is the monetary value of these 
factors. The monetary value of a factor of production is irrelevant to the process of 
production. To take an extreme example, if a factory is required to house a manufacturing 
concern in a given location, it matters little whether that factory is built in brick or in marble. 
Any building material that suits the local climatic conditions would be sufficient. What is 
important though is that the factory is, for example, large enough to achieve the production 
capacity for which it was planned. It follows that it is strictly not necessary to view the 
monetary value of that factory as an essential element of an apportionment formula. In this 
particular example, factory space would probably suit the purpose in a more neutral way. 
Comparisons between jurisdictions therefore may be made by using factory floor space.111 
Thus the arbitrariness of monetary valuation with rented premises is also resolved. Likewise 
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for machinery where numbers of any type in one jurisdiction may be compared to those of the 
rest of the world where the relevant manufacturing concern is operating. 
With the payroll factor too, monetary valuations have been responsible for the major problem 
in computing an acceptable ratio, the existence of different salary levels as between 
jurisdictions and the differences of productivity being the main causes of controversy. 
However, using labour dollars across a spectrum of economies may not be acceptable 
because pay rates are bound to be different between countries. Instead of remuneration the 
number of people that participate in the production process may be considered as satisfactory. 
In this instance equal weight would be given to the contribution of the CEO and that of a 
janitor. This proposition has certain advantages, as it is neutral and easy to determine.112 
Labour may, however, be divided into different categories and the number of workers in each 
category in one jurisdiction being compared to other jurisdictions.  
These solutions are likely to favour certain countries. For example, if the taxpayer is a 
manufacturing enterprise, factories and the number of workers that work therein are located in 
one jurisdiction alone. In these instances, it is important to prevent the apportionment to the 
manufacturing jurisdiction of a larger than the normal share of the income generated by such 
activities. The inadequate solution to this problem developed by the U.S. states is to include in 
the apportionment formula a sales factor. 
A possible solution, in the absence of a worldwide tax equalisation scheme as available in 
Canada, is the adoption of the former Swiss practice of using a préciput to compensate for 
cases where too little weight is given to the activities of the TNC headquarters relative to its 
branches.113 
2 The Question of Intangible Property  
Intangible property represents a different problem. Such property, whether it be stocks, 
bonds, or patents, has a capitalised value based upon actual out-of-pocket investment of 
corporate assets.114 The complications that are likely to be encountered in a formulary system 
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of taxation inclusive of intangible property are of two kinds.115 First, there arises the question 
of the inclusion or exclusion of intangibles from the property factor. Second, if a sales factor 
were present in the apportionment formula, then how would the receipts from such intangibles 
be included in that factor? Moreover, one of the main difficulties of establishing transfer prices 
for intangibles is the lack of clear definition of what exactly constitutes an intangible.116 
A What is an Intangible?  
Chandler and Plotkin117 observe that the unclear picture of what is an intangible stems from the 
fact that all companies have some form of intangible property which, viewed solely from their 
perspective, is extremely valuable. From a commercial and a taxation point of view the only 
intangible assets that have any significance are those that have a positive market price. An 
eventual purchaser of that intangible property expects that, ceteris paribus, it can earn higher 
profits through its use as compared to using only tangible assets. An intangible asset may 
therefore be defined as ‘any non-physical asset that allows a firm to earn higher profits than 
would be expected given its stock of tangible (physical) assets.’118 
Moreover, the value that the market is likely to ascribe to an intangible asset is dependent 
upon its ability to generate ‘above-average profits or economic rents’.119 Such above-average 
profits or economic rents are generated principally because of the uniqueness of the intangible 
asset. It entails ownership and control of something to which competitors have no access.  
Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code gives a comprehensive list of 
intangible property as follows: 
· patents, inventions, formulas, processes, designs, patterns, or know-how; 
· copyrights and literary, musical or artistic compositions; 
· trade marks, trade names or brand names; 
· franchises, licences or contracts; 
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· methods, programmes, systems, procedures, campaigns, surveys, studies, forecasts, 
estimates, customer lists, or technical data; or 
· other similar items. 
The theoretical justification for the inclusion of intangible assets in the property factor is easily 
stated, but its practical articulation is fraught with apparently insurmountable difficulties. The 
separate accounting/arm’s length methodology has been incapable of developing any 
satisfactory practical solutions to the problem of valuing intangibles. The 1996 update of the 
OECD 1995 Guidelines120 covers the application of the arm’s length principle relative to inter-
company transfer of intangible property. It would appear that ‘much of the discussion suggests 
refinements rather than changes to the OECD’s views on these issues.’121 However, Boatman 
also recognises that the OECD’s views in this area are evolving in the sense that the Guidelines 
promote an expanded definition of intangibles. It distinguishes between marketing and trade 
intangibles whereas the 1979 OECD Report122 focused on patents, know-how, and 
trademarks. Furthermore, the OECD acknowledges the difficulties arising with the valuation of 
intangible property and thus concedes that changed facts and circumstances may justify a 
hindsight adjustment to their transfer price. However, the OECD falls short of endorsing the 
‘commensurate with income’ of IRC section 482. In fact, the crisis of the arm’s length 
standard can largely be attributed to the increasing use of intangible property by TNCs. 
Intangible assets are especially important to TNCs since often their worldwide pre-eminence is 
due ‘to technological advances, product differentiation, market positioning and distinctive 
managerial methods.’123 Intangible property, therefore, contributes to the total net income of 
TNCs. As such the question arises as to whether they should be a component part of any 
formula designed to reflect, or to measure, the processes involved in earning income.124 
                                                             
120 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators, (Paris: OECD 
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B Solving the Impasse: A Tentative Route 
In the transfer pricing environment intangibles are classified as either manufacturing or 
marketing intangibles.125 As with any other form of categorisation there are some intangibles 
that are hybrids while others ‘are not clearly distinguishable as either manufacturing or 
marketing’.126 The hybrids derive their value through the activities of the ‘R&D/manufacturing 
and through the activities of marketing/sales’.127 Finally, there are other intangibles that are not 
classifiable. They include software and methods of doing business. However, for the present 
purpose, the two broad classes consisting of manufacturing and marketing intangibles are 
considered as sufficient. 
i  Manufacturing Intangibles  
Patents, trade secrets. or unpatented technical know-how are generally considered to be 
manufacturing intangibles since they are usually developed either by the company’s research 
and develo pment (R&D) department or by its manufacturing activity. 128 The primary difficulty 
with respect to intangible property used for production purposes lies in ascertaining their 
location. Unlike tangible property, even those which are highly mobile, a discernible location 
cannot be easily ascribed to intangible property. A second not less formidable task is to 
determine the value of an intangible asset. These complications, as already shown, have been 
dealt with by the UDITPA by excluding intangible property from the property factor.129 
At the core of the problem, as far as manufacturing intangibles as valuable items of property 
are concerned, is whether such items should be included in the property factor. In order to be 
able to do so both questions of situs and valuation must be solved. It is submitted that 
concerning intangible property a methodology different to the traditional means of approaching 
property questions could be adopted. The property factor would consist of two parts; a 
tangible property part and a notional intangible property part. 
If the question of proprietary interest in the intangible is ignored, then both questions of situs 
and valuation become relatively unimportant. Manufacturing intangibles are developed as a 
result of considerable investments in R&D activities. So important are these expenses that 
each component part of TNCs, which is likely to benefit from the results of these activities, are 
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made to contribute to their financing. These contributions are normally made through formal 
R&D cost contribution arrangements. It is relatively simple to determine the contributions of 
each entity located in a particular jurisdiction as these are normally claimed as deductions for 
tax purposes. This figure would form the numerator of the notional intangible property factor. 
Likewise the total R&D costs on a worldwide basis could be easily computed. Moreover, 
activities that constitute R&D must be clearly defined according to an international standard. 
This will no doubt mitigate any dispute as to what constitutes R&D activities. The total of the 
R&D costs would then form part of the denominator of the notional intangible property factor.  
This method focuses on the process of creating intangible property rather than on the ultimate 
question of ownership. Indeed, in the real world the question of ownership of the intangible 
does not pose any real problem. Ownership is vested in one entity of the group in order to 
facilitate the initiation and follow-up of protective measures designed to safeguard the 
monopolistic exploitation of the developed intangible. However, the free use of the intangible 
by those entities of the group that have contributed to the financing of its development is 
assured. 
This arrangement reflects the continental concept of proprietary rights.130 In one entity is 
vested the bare ownership of the intangible and in all the others the right to use (the usufruct) of 
the intangible. In the model described, the right to use, which clearly is a proprietary right, 
should be valued as being equal to the sum of all the entity’s contributions that have permitted 
the creation of that intangible property. Indeed, what matters in a productive context is the 
right to use. Ownership rights are only important insofar as the sale of the intangible is 
concerned. 
The situation of the jurisdictions where the contributing members of the group are located 
needs to be examined. In the present model for apportioning intangible property the focus is 
on the process of creating items of intangible property. If a contributing entity were given the 
full use of an item of intangible property developed in consideration for its monetary 
contributions to the development effort, then the proceeds from such property, that is, any 
income generated, would automatically be sourced within that jurisdiction either through 
increased manufacturing output or through increased sales. In any event the standard formula 
would reflect these increased activities and attribute income to that jurisdiction probably in the 
same proportion as the increased level of activity. 
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The inclusion of the costs of developing intangible property is in reality an extension of the 
cost-based approach to the valuation of that type of property. The cost-based approach has 
serious defects, as with anything else involving the pricing of intangible property. However, for 
the purposes of the present model, the costs concerned are those that have already been 
incurred. In addition, such costs do not relate to a particular item of intangible property but 
relate to the whole of the R&D effort. The need to include in these costs other development 
costs requires further consideration. At this stage, however, the development of a notional 
intangible property component alongside the traditional intangible property concept could be 
the way out of the present impasse. 
Whether this simple solution is feasible, and indeed technically sound, needs to be further 
explored. It can be argued that all the contributions of each component part of a TNC 
towards R&D would not automatically result in valuable intangible property being developed. 
This is because R&D efforts are characterised by high investment and high risk. It is because 
all the contributions made do not necessarily result in an identifiable intangible asset that the 
fraction in the present model is regarded as a notional intangible property factor rather than an 
intangible property factor per se. 
It may be objected that since not all contributions result in valuable intangible property the 
system fails the test of equity. However, since all TNCs would be treated identically it is 
difficult to see how the concept is breached. Furthermore, a particular member of a TNC 
engaged in a cost contribution arrangement would normally claim as a deduction all of the 
contributions it has made to the development of an intangible asset. The latter, being 
developed and owned elsewhere, amounts to the subsidising of R&D carried on abroad. It 
may well be that the consideration for this subsidy is the inclusion of such payments in the 
notional intangible property factor. In addition, that inclusion may also be justified on the 
grounds of the benefit principle. 
i i  Marketing Intangibles 
There is some difficulty in defining marketing intangibles. In general a marketing intangible is 
taken to mean one that has been developed by the marketing and/or sales personnel of a 
company.131 Marketing intangibles ‘include trademarks and tradenames that aid in the 
commercial exploitation of a product or service.’132 
One of the most complicated problems that Intertax would have to face is the attribution of 
income derived from marketing intangible property through formulary apportionment to the 
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various jurisdictions that may, on existing rules, claim jurisdiction to tax. In the American states 
taxation context the trend is to treat income from both manufacturing and marketing intangibles 
as apportionable ‘business income’, that is, income arising from transactions and activity in the 
regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business. Such income is then assigned to the state in 
which the income-producing activity is performed, or if the income-producing activity is 
performed in multiple states, the state where the greatest proportion is performed ‘based on 
costs of performance’.133 
The definition of intangible property in the U.S. for the purposes of federal taxation, as already 
shown, is very broad. Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that income 
attributed to the transfer of intangibles must be commensurate with the income earned by that 
intangible. This is the so-called super royalty or ‘commensurate with income’ standard.134 This 
provision requires the determination of whether an intangible has been transferred and what 
value was transferred. It can scarcely be said that the various regulations or recommendations 
designed to tax income from intangibles have been successful. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
say that even in the traditional transfer pricing environment the tax treatment of income from 
intangibles is unsettled. 
The 1995 OECD Guidelines maintains that the ‘general guidance set out in Chapters I, II, and 
III for applying the arm’s length principle pertains equally to the determination of transfer 
pricing between associated enterprises for intangible property.’135 The Guidelines, however, 
concede that to apply the arm’s length principle to controlled transactions involving intangible 
property could be difficult ‘because such property may have a special character complicating 
the search for comparables and in some cases making value difficult to determine at the time of 
the transaction.’136 
The nature of intangibles, that is their uniqueness, makes it extremely difficult to establish an 
arm’s length price for their transfer albeit forecasting the returns that could be expected from 
their use. This is particularly true with marketing intangibles where the imperfect alternative of 
using a pricing method based on costs, as with manufacturing intangibles, is likely to be 
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unacceptable. Determining which legal entity in an integrated TNC has developed a particular 
marketing intangible can be extremely difficult. 
In essence, a marketing intangible aids in the commercial exploitation of a product or service 
for the group as a whole. As such it is responsible for the derivation of synergy profits that are 
not attributable to any specific entity within the TNC. In reality synergy profits result from the 
strategic management of internal transactions so that they are attributable to the organisation as 
a whole rather than to any of its particular components. Since marketing intangibles are 
responsible to a large extent for the derivation of synergy profits, it is submitted that they 
should be ignored. 
As already argued, synergy profits are attributed to each particular jurisdiction by the effect of 
the apportionment formula. It is precisely the existence of such synergy profits that have led to 
the adoption of profit-splits, first proposed in an articulate way in the U.S. with the 1993 
Proposed Regulations. Clearly therefore, ‘apportionment methodology is now an accepted 
and commonly used transfer pricing method under U.S. rules, particularly when intangible 
property is involved.’137 
Profit-split methodologies concentrate on sharing profits derived by associated enterprises 
rather than focusing on the transactions that have given rise to such profits. They are seen as 
useful in sharing ‘profit arising from high-value, sometimes unique intangibles.’138 Although care 
has been taken to maintain the perception that profit -split methods do not contravene the 
arm’s length principle, it has been contended that such methods may not be popular outside 
the U.S. However, it is also conceded that ‘APAs may convince foreign taxpayers that 
acceptance of an apportionment approach within the context of an APA may be a pragmatic 
solution to what will surely become a very difficult technical issue.’139 
The profit-split methodology still clings to the arm’s length standard by providing that any 
profit-split must correspond to the division of profit or loss that would result in transactions 
involving unrelated parties each performing the same functions as the related taxpayers 
engaged in the same business activity under consideration. Formulas are thus still regarded as 
arbitrary whereas the separate accounting/arm’s length method is deemed free from this 
defect. Yet, one needs to bear in mind that there is no one right rule in the apportionment 
debate as a Committee of the National Tax Association observed as far back as 1922.140 
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What is essential is that the preferred methodology should give a correct reflex of the income 
of TNCs taking into consideration the conditions in which business operates. The acceptance 
of profit-splits in international taxation is but a first step in the search for the correct 
apportionment method. Eventually, the adoption of a full formulary apportionment 
methodology is likely to be the only feasible alternative in an increasingly integrated 
international framework. 
As shown throughout this thesis, two approaches are advocated for the taxation of TNCs. 
Each aims at determining a country’s fair share of taxes in the corporate tax bases created by 
the activities of TNCs. The separate entity method has been successfully applied to traditional 
manufacturing TNCs which operated until the end of the Second World War where the 
foreign subsidiaries of such TNCs may be regarded as mere clones of the parent company 
rather that forming part of a fully integrated business operating as a single entity.141 
The unitary theory or worldwide combined reporting, for its part, views a TNC as a single 
business which, for legal or economic reasons, are divided into independent branches or 
separately incorporated subsidiaries.142 This system in its concepts mirrors the truly global 
company where ‘there are no subsidiaries...but only locations ...[so that] there are few 
‘exports’ and ‘imports’...but [only] intra-country shipments.’143 
At first sight, it may appear as if the separate accounting/arm’s length method and formulary 
apportionment are meant to apply in a mutually exclusive way. However, the OECD has 
maintained Article 7(4) in its Model Tax Convention. This provision is the direct successor of 
the League of Nation’s Models. It allows the profits of a PE to be calculated ‘on the basis of 
an apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise to its various parts’144 if it is customary to 
do so in a particular country and if it accords with the arm’s length principle. It follows that 
Article 7(4) may be considered as a proxy for what may be termed an ‘arm’s length formulary 
apportionment’ methodology. Therefore, what OECD emphatically rejects is not formulary 
apportionment per se, but rather, global formulary apportionment methods such as the 
Californian WWCR which it regards as an unrealistic alternative to the arm’s length 
principle.145 
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Yet, as already argued, there is, notwithstanding this rejection, a indirect move towards a 
solution of compromise in cases where obviously the arm’s length standard shows its obvious 
limitations. Thus, for example, the introduction of the transactional profit methodologies in the 
1995 Guidelines,146 or the introduction in the U.S. of the comparable profit method (CPM).147 
Whilst the final version of the U.S. CPM takes into account some of the objections voiced by 
the OECD,148 the fact is that the final section 482 regulations aims at finding an arm’s length 
outcome or result based upon formulary profitability indicators, such as:149 
· the ratio of gross profit to operating expenses, 
· the ratio of operating profit to sales, 
· the ratio of gross income/revenue to operating expenses, 
· the rate of return on capital employed. 
The U.S. final transfer pricing regulations under section 482, therefore, substitute the arm’s 
length price with the arm’s length result. As a consequence, ‘although the traditional 
transaction-based methods continue to be favoured, the new regulations allow the adoption 
of profit-based methods, whereby a comparable profit indicator derived from similar 
uncontrolled companies can be used.’150 
Other revenue authorities have not welcomed such steps. Japan, for example, believes that 
these methods, especially the CPM do not satisfy the arm’s length criterion. 151 However, the 
Japanese National Tax Administration (NTA) and the IRS are seeking a common ground 
relative to this issue. This has been achieved through the APA process since both authorities 
have reached agreement for the use of a hybrid profit -split/CPM methodology in a bilateral 
APA with Komatsu, the Japanese conglomerate.152 What is of critical importance is the fact 
that following this breakthrough, the NTA will more likely adopt a more ‘flexible [line] and is 
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willing to focus on the bottom line, rather than on theoretical principles of transfer pricing 
methodology themselves.’153 
The disparity between the two alternative methods of allocating TNC income is further being 
resolved by the recognition that in certain sectors, more specifically in global trading, the most 
realistic approach for achieving a proper allocation of cross-border income is through some 
form of global formulary apportionment method. Thus, although the expression global 
formulary apportionment is not used, the IRS has demonstrated its flexibility by agreeing to the 
use of a profit-split methodology for ‘functionally fully integrated global trading operations,’154 
albeit in the restricted context of an APA, and along specific product lines. In Notice 94-40, 
the IRS developed a three-factor formula ‘that may be weighted to reflect the relative 
contribution of each trading location to the overall profitability of the worldwide business.’155 
This profit-split methodology attempts to recognise the true economic profit or loss of each 
business unit in a worldwide trading entity. To achieve this outcome, the IRS has markedly 
departed from traditional approaches of section 482 for apportioning income and has thus 
indirectly acknowledged ‘that current U.S. tax laws are inadequate to treat these financial 
activities’.156  
The OECD, in a Revised Discussion Paper on global trading in financial instruments, 
acknowledges the efforts of the IRS and its reliance on the APA process as steps in the right 
direction in the global trading area.157 The Revised Discussion Paper then advocates the use of 
those profit-split methods described in Chapter III of the 1995 Guidelines as the appropriate 
method for highly integrated global trading operations, whilst maintaining that ‘global formulary 
apportionment would not be acceptable’.158 Notwithstanding this objection, formulary 
apportionment may be the most pragmatic method of income apportionment in the increasingly 
integrated world of global finance. 
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 Formulary Apportionment Applied to the 
Global Financial Industry 
This chapter seeks to apply the proposed formulary apportionment methodology to the 
emerging global financial industry. The hypothesis is that the global financial industry, as 
described in Section I, offers a clear and unequivocal instance where many of the players truly 
operate in an integrated way. If this is the case, then it is submitted in Section III that the 
application of the formulary apportionment method to transnational corporations (TNCs) 
engaged in financial trade is the only realistic method for the apportionment of their global 
profits. However, prior to examining this question, Section II explores the contemporary 
taxation principles applicable to the emerging world of global finance. 
Section I  The Contemporary World of Global Finance 
In a period of 20 years, the financial industry, one of the most regulated industries anywhere in 
the world, has opened up increasingly to global competition. Trading in financial instruments is 
now carried out around the clock with few government constraints.1  
1 The Nature of Global Trading in the Financial Sector 
A global market may be defined as:  
one which has no national boundaries, to which participants - be they investors, issuers , 
borrowers, or savers–from all over the world have access, in which price is established by supply 
and demand from around the world, not from a single domestic market, and in which transactions 
can be effected on a twenty-four hour basis or close to it. 2 
The global financial industry is generally regarded as highly integrated. However, integration is 
a matter of degree and depends on which particular line of business is considered. Thus, 
integration is highest in the foreign exchange market and lowest in equity markets.3 
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Chapter 
8 
Chapter 8  Formulary Apport ionment Appl ied to the Global Financial  Industry 
 344
A An Insight in Global Trading Model  
The trend towards globalisation in the financial industry is economically and technologically 
driven. It aims at increasing trade between various nations on a quantitative as well as 
qualitative level. This is not a new phenomenon. According to Professor Otmar Issing, in the 
period of the ‘gold standard’, that is from the mid nineteenth century to 1914, financial 
markets had been well integrated.4 In fact, if the ratio of current account balance over gross 
national product (GDP) averaged across a number of countries is taken as an indicator of 
cross-border flows, one finds an increase in the international orientation of financial markets 
since the mid-1960s which is still below the levels reached from the mids–1870s to 1914.5 
In the late 1950s, the effects of the Bretton Woods system inaugurated after World War II in 
conjunction with a successful reconstruction program in Europe and Japan, and accelerated 
industrialisation elsewhere, created an unprecedented trade boom. Once the volume of trade 
had reached a certain mass, it became necessary to ease national controls in order to promote 
further developments. 
Paradoxically, this process accelerated the demise of the prevailing trade system based on 
fixed rates of exchange as established at Bretton Woods. The introduction of a floating 
exchange rate regime in 1973 in conjunction with the Organisation of Petroleum Export 
Countries (OPEC) oil shocks opened an era of volatility in the foreign exchange markets. 
Volatility breeds risk which in turn requires recourse to risk management techniques. Such 
techniques are often based on sophisticated models which are not only dependent on 
technology for their implementation, but also require deep and liquid markets.6 To reach the 
depth and liquidity required by industry, most advanced economies started to dismantle in the 
1980s the quantitative restrictions on domestic markets with the view to promoting 
international capital flows. In other words, these countries started the process now generically 
known as deregulation7, the ultimate result of which is the globalisation phenomenon. 
Global markets rely on technology for their efficient operation. For example, automation in the 
securities trading industry has not only boosted trading, but has also strengthened the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of the globalisation process. For an analysis of the distinction between ‘globalisation’ and ‘internationalisation’, 
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globalisation process in the securities markets.8 Advances in computer technology and 
telecommunications have further facilitated the high volume and rapid turnover, which 
characterise global trading. Technologies, such as automatic quotation and communication 
systems, have displaced traditional trading methods. Today, the so-called screen trading 
systems are in current use in major exchanges and are rapidly expanding around the world.9 
Technology, however, ignores national boundaries. As such it requires the convergence of 
national regulations in the global securities market. 
Another factor that initiated and consolidated the trend towards globalisation is the emergence 
of a wide variety of ‘new’ financial instruments. In truth, it is difficult to say whether the 
emergence of these instruments has been the cause, or an effect, of globalisation. It is 
unquestionably a concurrent development. For example, currency and interest rate swaps have 
enabled the linkage of all major capital markets and have thus been a major contributor to the 
globalisation process. The expansion of the global market in financial products has had serious 
consequences as to how these products are viewed from both a legal and from a taxation 
viewpoint. One of the major consequences of the evolution of the market is that: 
the traditional market distinction between long and short term instruments, between bank loans and 
securities, between debt and equity and even between different currencies, have all been 
significantly eroded as market participants have sought to develop innovative instruments tailored 
to the specific needs of issuers or investors, combining products and bridging markets, all with the 
objective of improved returns and reduced expenses. 10 
The ultimate challenge to tax administrations all over the world is whether they will manage to 
adopt a concerted approach to the taxation of these financial instruments. 
B The Players in the Global Financial Market 
There are two types of players in the world of finance: those who create wealth and those who 
regulate that process. The first category consists of those who use capital to create wealth and 
those who provide such capital. Traditionally banks have enjoyed a quasi-monopoly in the 
world of international finance. However, although both commercial and investment banks are 
still important providers of capital on a worldwide basis, they have now been joined by major 
corporations, securities firms, and institutional investors like mutual funds and pension funds. 
The proliferation of players in the globalised financial markets means that it is difficult to define 
the characteristics of those who operate there. In the past, the overlapping of functions 
                                                             
8 P.A. Abken, ‘Globalisation of Stock, Futures, and Options Markets’ in Financial Derivatives: New 
Instruments And Their Uses  (Federal Reserve of Atlanta, 1993), at 3. 
9 Debs, supra note 2, at 199. 
10 Supra note 2, at 200. 
Chapter 8  Formulary Apport ionment Appl ied to the Global Financial  Industry 
 346
between various operators in the financial markets was minimal. For example, commercial 
banks took deposits and made loans, merchant banks floated shares and traded them, while 
brokers did brokerage business and corporations borrowed money to further their objects. In 
the present globalised markets these boundaries have disappeared and traditional legal 
distinctions between different types of institutions engaged in the business of international 
finance are gradually becoming irrelevant. A corporation engaged in mining activities, for 
example, may turn out to be a major player in the derivative market. Therefore, the financial 
services industry may now be described as a single worldwide industry in which most of the 
participants trade in a whole range of available financial services. Consequently, the industry is 
now more homogeneous in nature. To sum up ‘[F]inancial transactions are being increasingly 
conducted on a multi-currency, global level; and the intensity of competition between firms 
continues to increase’.11 
The second category of players in the global financial services industry is the regulators, for 
example, the central banks, the stock exchange authorities, and the national trade regulators. 
They ensure that the market runs smoothly. Today, these authorities can no longer act in 
isolation, or rely purely on national legislation to regulate their national markets. For instance, 
they do not have the necessary financial resources to match those available to traders 
operating in the global, rather than in purely national, markets. Consequently, the question of 
control and protection of the market itself needs to be addressed.  
The fundamental flaw in the present system is that the supervisory structure designed to police 
the global financial services market is not only national in its structure, but it is also hopelessly 
fragmented even at a purely domestic level. In the U.S. or Japan, for example, several 
regulatory institutions exist for the purpose of control. However, the jurisdiction of each of 
these institutions is limited to a specific category of market players and, more importantly, they 
very rarely coordinate their action. Their mandates are also very different. In the U.S., the 
mandate of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to protect the public investor. 
This is achieved through the publication of information concerning the firms that are quoted on 
the U.S. exchanges.  
When financial regulation is considered in its classical form, one finds that it no longer 
corresponds to conditions that prevailed when such regulation was inaugurated. In the classical 
model, central banks regulate commercial banks, investment banks, and other financial 
institutions. They are also required to protect the national banking system and manage all 
                                                             
11 See W.R. White, International Agreements in the Area of Banking and Finance: Accomplishments and 
Outstanding Issues (Basle: Bank for International Settlements, October 1996), at  
 <http://www.bis.org/publ/work38.pdf>. 
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monetary questions whilst they act also as the lender of last resort. These regulatory measures 
were, therefore, predominantly national in their application. The advent of deregulation, the 
emergence of innovative financial instruments, and the use of technology have eroded the 
effectiveness of these measures. Already, certain regulatory functions in this area are carried 
out through ‘internationalised’ mechanisms such as the Bank for International Settlements.12 In 
addition, in recent years, a bilateral dialogue has been initiated between various supervisory 
bodies, for example, the major securities regulators in order to coordinate their regulatory 
efforts. Indeed, it is now felt that only a multilateral effort to coordinate supervisory action 
would create the optimum conditions for the efficient running of the global financial market. 13 
2 The Organisation of Global Trading of Financial Instruments  
In the deregulated financial market now established, financial institutions, mainly banks and 
securities firms, do act as financial intermediaries as they have always done. However, these 
institutions are now increasingly seeking to earn profits by directly managing the risks arising 
from their customers’ transactions. To manage risks, financial institutions have pioneered the 
use of derivative instruments. This is a dynamic process given that new products are constantly 
being developed in order to meet their clients’ needs. Moreover, in order to meet the demands 
of an international client base, financial institutions have developed the ability to execute client 
orders around the clock, thus the term ‘global trading’. Therefore, a financial institution 
engages in global trading when it has the capacity to execute customers’ orders in financial 
products in any market around the world and/or around the clock.14 
A The Emergence of Innovative Financial Instruments 
The emergence of a global financial market has also seen the appearance of new capital 
market instruments which are creating complex problems for tax administrations. For instance, 
tax administrations are experiencing problems in identifying and taxing income generated by 
such instruments. 
                                                             
12 Id., for coverage of international agreements in the financial area. 
13 Id., at 6. ‘Many of the most important agreements pertaining to international banking and finance have been 
reached only informally after discussion among a limited number of important nation states or market 
participants. These agreements have been enforced using domestic legislation or other means, and have been 
extended to a wider international community only by force of example.’ 
14 OECD, The Taxation of Global Trading of Financial Instruments  (Paris: OECD, 1998) para. 9, at 12. 
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i  Primary and Secondary Instruments 
Financial instruments may be classified into two groups: basic or primary instruments and 
derivative instruments. Within the first class of instruments are two sub-classes: debt and 
equity. The debt instruments comprise, for example, such products as junk bonds, deep 
discount bonds, note issuance facilities, and commercial paper. The evolution of the basic 
instruments has been such, however, that convenient classifications such as debt and equity are 
no longer absolute, given the emergence of the so-called hybrids which combine the 
characteristics of both debt and equity. 
i i  Derivative Financial Instruments  
Derivative financial instruments (DFI), for their part, are instruments which are based on the 
value of a primary instrument but are not themselves primary instruments. Thus the expression 
derivative given that they derive their value from the existence of the basic or primary 
instrument. In its paper on global trading, the OECD proposes the following definition of 
derivative instruments ‘[A] derivative instrument is a contractual right that derives its value from 
the value of something else, such as a debt security, equity, commodity, or a specified index’.15 
There are basically two types of derivative financial instruments: the option contract and the 
forward contract. These may be combined to form new instruments as will be examined later. 
A DFI enables one party to match its inflows and outflows by shifting the risk to which it is 
exposed to another party in consideration for a fee. In other words, a DFI is akin to an 
insurance contract where A pays a fee called a premium to B in consideration of which B 
undertakes the risk of paying A an agreed sum if a specified event occurs, for example, a fire 
or a theft. If the specified event occurs, then A has a claim on B thus giving value to the 
insurance contract. Therefore, value depends or derives from the occurrence of an event 
beyond the control or influence of either party. If the specified event does not occur, the 
contract expires without any value to A. Clearly, the utility of the transaction arises because 
during the specified period, A (the insured) is relieved of the risk of suffering loss by shifting 
that risk, which is the economic burden that could have occurred as a result of the specified 
event, to B (the insurer). 
Contrary to insurance contracts, DFIs are purely concerned with ‘financial’ risks such as: a 
given currency, the price of a given commodity, or interest rate which can all either rise or fall. 
In addition, where with the insurance contract risk is particular, DFIs are concerned with 
general risks. The economic consequences of such general risks, for example, the incidence of 
                                                             
15 Id., at 11 para. 4. 
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a fall in a commodity price for a primary producer, can be accurately calculated. 
Consequently, parties to a DFI need not refer to a particular event, require its verification, or 
provide for the measurement of its economic consequence. They ‘can enter into a contract 
whose terms will give it value only if and when the specified event occurs, and then only to the 
precise extent desired.’16 
One common DFI, ‘the option’, is similar to the standard insurance contract in the sense that it 
calls for a contingent payment. The holder of an option to purchase USD 100,000 at AUD 
1.28 per USD will exercise his or her right against the option writer only if the price of one 
USD rises above AUD 1.28. If this happens, or in other words if the risk occurs, the holder of 
the option has an economic incentive to require the option writer to sell the USD at the option 
price of AUD 1.28. The holder’s gain on the exercise of the option therefore reflects the risk 
that USD 100,000 would rise above the designated level. 
A certain type of DFI calls for unconditional rather than contingent payment, for example, the 
forward contract. Therefore, this type of DFI is different to the standard insurance contract: It 
resembles another insurance product, the annuity. Basically, the contract of annuity is one 
whereby in return for a payment of say AUD 100,000, A agrees to pay B AUD 1000 per 
month for each month of B’s life from say his or her sixty-fifth birthday till his or her death. In 
this case both parties are required to make payments. This is to be contrasted with the 
situation that arises under a standard contract of insurance. In this case no payment is made, 
apart from the payment of the premium, the insurer being required to pay only if the specified 
event occurs and the insured makes a claim. The same consequences arise with the option 
where the writer is not required to make any payment unless the option holder makes a claim 
which would be forthcoming only if the value of the USD, relative to the AUD had risen at the 
specified date. 
With the forward contract, if the parties agree to buy and sell a certain amount of USDs at a 
specified future date at a price of AUD 1.28 per USD, the obligation to carry out the 
transaction is fixed and unrelated to the value of the USD on the specified date. However, the 
financial value of this contract can be computed at any time by reference to the market value of 
the USD and the parties may choose to settle at the specified date with a net payment flowing 
one way or another.17 It is to be noted that whilst DFIs shift risk from one party to another, the 
party that wants to shift that risk may not be the one that bears that risk primarily. When A 
                                                             
16 H.D. Rosenbloom, ‘Source-Basis Taxation of Derivative Financial Instruments: Some Unanswered Questions’, 
(April 1996) 50 Univ Miami L Rev  3 597, at 598. 
17 Contrast with the annuity where such contracts are not settled on a net basis because they are meant to provide 
a continuing flow of funds. 
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seeks to shift a risk by the use of a DFI, although it does not bear that risk primarily, A in 
engaged in speculation.  
The major difference between the option contract and the forward contract is that the option 
holder has a right, for which it has paid a premium, but no obligation to exercise this right, 
whereas the forward contract creates mutual obligations and rights. Since either of the parties 
may gain from the forward contract there is normally no payment of premiums at its inception. 
The exchange value takes place at the specified date although that exchange may occur earlier. 
When either an option or a forward contract requires more than one payment it is said to be a 
multi-payment contract. A common form of a multi-payment forward contract is a ‘swap’, 
which is merely a series of forward contracts each with a payment at a specified date. Another 
multi-payment contract is a ‘cap’, which is basically a series of options to claim reimbursement 
for interest in excess of a specified rate. 
Yet another type of DFI is the ‘notional principal contract’. It is an instrument, either a forward 
or an option, where the obligations of the parties are referenced to a stated sum that need not 
be exchanged, thus the term ‘notional principal’. If A contracts to make payments to B for five 
years to the extent that prevailing interest rates exceed 10 per cent (a cap), the parties need to 
know the multiplicand in order to compute the required payment. This multiplicand, for 
example, USD 10 million, is the notional principal. Moreover, an arrangement designed to 
compensate for the difference in interest rates between two currencies is when A agrees to 
pay to B for a period of three years interest in say USDs while B agrees to pay to A interest in 
AUD. In order to do so A and B will need notional principal bases in USD and AUD in order 
to make the necessary computations. In other words, A and B will pretend to exchange USD 
for AUD at the outset of the transactions in order to compute their respective obligations. At 
the end of the specified period they will notionally re-exchange principal amounts in order to 
compute and pay over the value changes resulting from currency fluctuations.18 
Innovative financial instruments pose some intricate tax issues in the sense that they appear to 
change the characteristics of well-known economic transactions. As a result the appropriate 
tax treatment for such products is unclear.19 On a policy level the question arises as to whether 
these instruments require a complete set of new tax rules. DFIs have put considerable pressure 
on established tax definitions and categories, both in the domestic and international tax fields. 
                                                             
18 In cross-currency swaps there is an exchange of principal at the beginning of the contract and a re-exchange at 
the end. 
19 For an insight into the inconsistencies in the U.S. tax treatment of various derivative financial instruments, see 
R.S. Avi-Yonah & L.Z. Swartz, ‘U.S. International Tax Treatment of Financial Derivatives’, (31 March 1997) 
Tax Notes  1703, where the authors demonstrate that two derivative instruments producing the same economic 
results are nevertheless taxed differently. 
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In general, tax law in various jurisdictions, have responded on an ad hoc and piecemeal basis 
to the problem posed by these products. This has led to rules that are often haphazard, 
incomplete and inconsistent and often create the possibility for tax arbitrage or double 
taxation.20 Clearly, at the taxation level, an appropriate solution needs to found. 
B The Characteristics of Global Trading Operations  
Whilst not immutable, most global trading structures can be represented along a continuum, at 
one end of which one finds, to use the OECD’s terminology, the ‘Integrated Trading’ model 
and the ‘Separate Enterprise Trading’ model at the other. In the middle is the ‘Centralised 
Product Management’ model. These models are defined by reference to the organisation of 
the trading and risk management activities.21 The classification of a particular global trading 
business under one of the above models does not therefore mean that other activities, such as 
marketing and support, are organised in the same manner as the trading and risk management 
activities. 
A 24-hour global trading operation centres on the aggregation of four elements: trading, 
management, sales, and support.22 The trading element is the crucial component of the 
structure. Traders have two important functions. First, they quote prices that result in either a 
buy or a sell transaction. 23 Second, they decide whether and how to hedge the position 
taken.24 Normally, traders in a 24-hour global trading operation model have a wide discretion 
as to the decisions they make provided they remain within limits defined by management. A 
trader’s decision is based on his or her knowledge of the firm’s needs, the client’s needs, and 
his or her expectations as to price movements in the market. In the ideal, a quote minimises the 
firm’s position and maximises turnover. 
The second element that binds the rest of the operation is managerial. Managerial functions are 
carried out by a strategist, or a trading manager, responsible for the implementation of the 
broad policy and strategic decisions of a particular global trading enterprise as well as the 
control of all those engaged in these activities 
The third component of any global trading operation is the sales and marketing personnel. The 
first are responsible for finding customers and the second are in charge of running the deal.25 
                                                             
20 Id., at 1712. 
21 OECD (1998), supra  note 14 para. 48, at 19. 
22 C.T. Plambeck, ‘The Taxation Implications of Global Trading’, (2 August 1990) Tax Notes 1143, at 1147. 
23 C.T. Plambeck, ‘Transfer Pricing Analysis of Global Trading Operations and Procedural Alternatives’, 
(December 1996) Taxes  1129, at 1132. 
24 OECD (1998), supra note 14, at 23 para. 74. 
25 Supra,  note 14, at 21 paras. 64ff.  
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Salespersons are liable to the firm’s customers on whose behalf sales and purchases have 
been effected. They advise customers regarding asset, liability and risk management. 
Salespersons are able to simulate the effects of their advice on their clients’ position. They use 
scenario modelling to analyse and portray the impact of a particular security or financial 
product on a client’s portfolio. They are remunerated by way of commissions for transactions 
procured. 
Finally, support staff or clerical personnel form part of the so-called back office whereas the 
middle office consists of professionals such as economists, lawyers, financial engineers and 
accountants.26 The functions of both back-office and middle-office labour is to provide the first 
three elements of a global trading operation with all the service they require to fulfil their 
primary role. They do so by administering operational systems that are capable of 
communicating the position of the trading book worldwide, and giving traders up-to-the-
minute information on price quotes, past trades, volume, price movements and exchange rates. 
Support staff is responsible for the provision to senior management of fully integrated systems 
that monitor exposure, enable adequate control, and improve reporting. In addition, they are 
also required to execute certain routine functions, for example, the settlement of transactions, 
their accounting and invoicing, or other purely administrative functions. 
One of the most important functions that are executed in the back office is the funding of 
operations. This is carried out by the Treasury whose ‘book traders are responsible for 
ensuring that the financial institution has sufficient cash to meet its payment obligations but does 
not have excess cash that is not being used profitably.’27 Often, the Treasury is regarded as a 
separate profit centre and as such contributes to the problem of characterising internal 
payments such as internal hedging transactions for taxation purposes.28 
Yet another characteristic of a global trading operation relates to the location of the operators. 
In the taxation context location traditionally determines source questions.29 In general, traders 
and strategists are located at major trading centres while risk managers and senior 
management may be located more centrally, for example, at the head office or the primary 
market for a particular product. Salespersons are located in the geographical area of their 
customers. The support staff is located in those centres where demand is heaviest, or at the 
head office when they are in charge of functions that are required by all the trading centres. 
                                                             
26 Supra note 14, at 24 para. 85. 
27 Supra note 14, at 25 para. 87. 
28 Supra note 14, at 25 para. 89. 
29 R.L. Hamilton & R. Deutsch, Guidebook to Australian International Taxation, 4th ed., (Sydney: Legal Books, 
1996), at 1-18, elaborating on D.R. Tillinghast, Tax Aspects of International Transactions, (Matthew Bender, 
1978). 
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The different locations of personnel crucial to a 24-hour global operation do not facilitate the 
application of the traditional source rules. In the particular context of global trading, therefore, 
the operation of those rules is particularly problematic. 
An additional distinctive feature of global trading is ‘the book’. The book is essentially the 
firm’s trading position. Its implications will be analysed further below when the problems with 
the identification of the tax base are considered. 
Finally, global trading relies heavily on telecommunications and computer technology. Special 
software used by the participants undergoes constant refinement to maximise its 
effectiveness.30 These tools record deals, tracks risk positions, marks products to market, and 
interrelates such information. Computer technology not only enables the global market in 
financial instruments to operate, it also substantially adds to its efficiency. As such, special 
attention needs to be paid to these sophisticated tools in determining the functions carried out 
in the global trading context. 
Section II Taxation Principles Applicable to New Financial 
Instruments  
In its report on the taxation of new financial instruments, the OECD admits that the prevailing 
tax rules ‘have proved ill-equipped to cope with the difficult problems which they have 
presented.’31 Tax authorities worldwide are finding it difficult to keep pace with the 
developments in this field given that the domestic and international tax treatment of financial 
instruments is often uncertain. Accounting standards bodies are also have ‘to cope with the 
same problems as tax administrators.’32  
1 General Taxation Issues  
The taxation of financial services gives rise to complex problems both at the national and the 
international levels. The major issue is whether a national tax policy relative to financial 
instruments is viable in the face of the globalisation of the industry. 
                                                             
30 OECD (1998), supra  note 14, at 26 para. 95. 
31 OECD, Taxation of New Financial Instruments  (Paris: OECD, 1994), at 7 para. 5. 
32 Id., at 8. 
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A Domestic Issues 
According to the OECD, three main challenges have to be met in the domestic treatment of 
new financial instruments.33 
i  Characterisation as ordinary income or capital gain  
A certain number of taxation systems distinguish between capital and ordinary income. This 
gives rise to the problem of determining whether payments and receipts under financial 
instruments are capital gains or ordinary income.  
If, in a given system, all receipts are treated as ordinary income and taxed as such, then it is 
fair to say that system has achieved the goal of simplicity. However, this situation may well be 
at odds with commercial reality. For example, if a financial instrument is purchased as a hedge 
for a non-trading debt thereby satisfying commercial requirements, that hedge may well lose its 
attractiveness in after-tax terms if the income or payments on the hedge are treated in a 
different way from the instrument that is being hedged. If, however, income or payments on a 
hedge are treated in the same way as the asset or liability that is being hedged, then a number 
of difficulties arise. First, the closeness of the correlation between the two instruments subject 
to the hedge is open to question. It is unlikely that this correlation will be exact, ‘and the points 
where the correlation could break down are innumerable.’34 Second, assets and liabilities may 
be hedged on a portfolio basis rather than individually. In addition, they may be hedged only 
periodically in times of uncertainty when markets are most volatile. Finally, a hedge may be 
retained long after the asset or liability it was meant to hedge has been liquidated. Such 
problems cannot be readily solved. 
i i  Timing  
Timing rules determine when profits and losses are recognised for taxation purposes. There 
are three main timing bases: 
· a payment or cash basis under which an amount is taxed or relieved when it is paid; 
· an accruals basis under which receipts and payments are taxed or relieved over the life 
of the financial instrument; 
                                                             
33 Id., at 29 para. 121. 
34 Id., at 30 para. 127. 
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· a ‘mark-to-market’ basis ‘under which all instruments held at an accounting date are 
brought to account at their market value and realised and unrealised profits and losses 
are accounted for by reference to the change from the last accounting date.’35 
Each timing basis has advantages and disadvantages. For example, the use of a cash basis is 
relatively inadequate when reciprocal payments are involved. Thus, in an interest rate swap, 
one party may receive a single commuted payment up-front in consideration of which it is 
required to make recurring payments throughout the life of the financial instrument. In such a 
case it is probably inequitable to tax the payment wholly on receipt and to allow for 
corresponding deductions on the counterflow payment when they are made over the life of the 
instrument. Indeed, if relief is allowed for up-front payments at the time when these are made 
while receipts are taxed when received throughout the life of the instrument, then timing of 
payments between associated enterprises may be exploited to defer tax.  
Conversely, the use of an accruals or mark-to-market basis may result in enterprises being 
taxed on profits which have not been realised. In addition, ‘as with the payment basis, 
arguably a mark-to-market or accruals basis requires greater flexibility in the utilisation of 
losses in order to ensure that only the ultimate economic profit is eventually taxed.’36 
In addition, if an instrument is of the option type and the option is never exercised, the difficulty 
of applying the accruals method arises as it is difficult to find a suitable tax treatment for single -
sum termination payments. 
i i i Source 
The determination of the source of income arising from financial instruments is of crucial 
importance for their proper taxation. However, coherent source rules for income generated by 
these new financial instruments are non-existent in most countries. This is because there are still 
uncertainties as to the proper characterisation of such income. Income from these instruments 
may be characterised as interest, dividends, or gains from the sale of property. As such, the 
relevant traditional source rules would be applicable. But, it may well be that, in the case of 
new financial instruments, the basis for such characterisation is flawed. Indeed, those rules are 
frequently based on notions pertaining to the location of the functions that gave rise to the 
income, and therefore, tend to accurately identify such locations. To precisely pinpoint the 
location of the various functions that are carried out in global trading is particularly difficult 
given that these are carried out in more than one jurisdiction.37 
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36 Id., at 29 para. 124. 
37 OECD (1998), supra  note 14, at 13 para. 16. 
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Source rules are important for several reasons. In brief, they determine which of the competing 
jurisdictions has the primary right to tax a particular income stream. Traditionally, at least two 
jurisdictions may find themselves in competition to tax a particular income stream resulting 
from certain cross-border transactions. However, the nature of global trading, especially in 
financial instruments, is such that today more that two countries may claim source taxation 
rights on income arising from these instruments. Furthermore, source rules play an important 
part when determining the quantum of foreign income for the purposes of granting tax credit 
relief in respect of tax already paid on foreign sourced income, and they are also significant for 
withholding tax purposes.38  
The need to provide for clearer source rules has been canvassed by the Ralph Committee 
examining the reform of business taxation in Australia.39 The Committee held the view that the 
place where a contract is concluded should not determine the source of income arising from 
the contract. Instead, it recommended that a general source rule be implemented based on the 
principle that income is to be considered as sourced in Australia if such income is derived from 
functions performed in Australia, assets located in Australia, or risks assumed in Australia.40 In 
addition, to this general source rule, the Committee is of the opinion that a specific source rule 
needs to be inserted in Australian law. It suggested that if a non-resident conducts business in 
Australia though a permanent establishment (PE), then the foreign source income attributable 
to that PE be subject to assessment in Australia.41 The jurisdictional threshold rule proposed 
by the Ralph Committee is articulated on the concept of the functional analysis. As such, it is 
arguable this jurisdictional threshold rule is very close to that proposed in this thesis.42 
B Cross-Border Issues  
A review of country practices carried out by the OECD in 1994 revealed the absence of 
consistency in the ways countries classify payments relating to new financial instruments for 
treaty purposes.43 This situation occurs because the domestic legislation of most countries 
                                                             
38 For a discussion concerning the appropriateness of gross basis taxation at source as opposed to net basis 
taxation at source relative to new financial instruments, see C.T. Plambeck et al., General Report, 49th Congress 
of the International Fiscal Association, (Cannes, 1995) ‘Tax Treatment of Derivative Financial Instruments’, 
Vol. 80b Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International,  651, at 685ff. 
39 See Australia, ‘Responding to Globalisation’ in Review of Business Taxation: A Tax System Redesigned , (Ralph 
Report) (Canberra: AGPS, 1999) 623ff. 
40 Id., at 684. 
41 Ibid. There is nothing new in this suggestion as the current PE concept captures this income in so far as the 
latter is ‘attributable’ to it. 
42 See Chapter 5, Section I, 2, A, at 192. 
43 OECD (1994), supra  note 31. 
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does not even contain rules that are comparable to each other. The classification of payments 
made under financial instruments is of fundamental importance because the taxation of gains 
resulting from these instruments follows a standard sequence. Thus, prior to determining taxing 
rights or withholding taxes, the source of a payment must first be determined. In other words, 
a payment must first be classified for tax treaty purposes. Classification then depends on a 
number of factors, such as the character of the taxpayer, the nature of the instrument, the 
nature of any underlying transaction, and the intention of the parties. Clearly, the presence in 
any particular legislation of a ‘substance-over-form’ approach goes a long way to facilitate the 
re-characterisation of transactions in order to determine their true economic utility, and 
consequently, the true economic profit which is the ultimate taxable amount. With global 
trading these problems are exacerbated while others emerge. Briefly, the most salient of these 
issues as identified by the OECD are the following:44 
· When do trading activities conducted in other countries constitute a permanent 
establishment? 
· How is income to be attributed to such PEs? 
· How are traditional transfer pricing methodologies to be applied between the associated 
enterprises of a TNC? 
· What are the basic timing issues involved? 
Unfortunately, at this time, there is no agreement as to how these questions should be 
addressed. 
As usual with international tax questions, the immediate issues that come to mind is that of 
double or under-taxation of gains (or losses) that follow from the global trading of new 
financial instruments if countries fail to reach agreement on a cohesive method for such 
taxation.45 A cohesive approach in this field is required because first, countries have often 
found that it is particularly ‘difficult to measure the mobile tax base because income or 
transactions are not easily identified to a particular location’ 46 and second, the existence of 
different tax systems for such instruments enables ‘regulatory arbitrage’ which impacts on the 
efficiency of worldwide production given that business strive to allocate resources to 
jurisdiction with favourable tax regimes. 
                                                             
44 OECD (1998), supra  note 14, at 13 para. 16. 
45 OECD (1998), supra  note 14, at 28 para. 104. 
46 See J.M. Mintz, ‘Is National Tax Policy Viable In the face of Global Competition?’, (5 July 1999) 19 Tax 
Notes Int’l  (No. 1) 99, at 100. 
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Do the issues of derivative financial instruments really matter in an international context? This is 
the ‘fairly extraordinary question’47 that Malcolm Gammie asks after three years of research 
with the International Fiscal Association on this issue. Gammie acknowledges a number of 
articles and books purporting to explain the mechanics of DFIs and the taxation issues that 
these instruments raise on a purely domestic level. He notes, however, that there is ‘a notable 
absence in the tax literature of any sustained debate on what the appropriate international tax 
response to derivative financial instruments should be.’48 DFIs shift risks from one party to 
another. In a closed economy aggregate risk arising from the use of DFIs is not reduced given 
that what is gained by one party is offset by the loss sustained by the counterparty. Moreover, 
if both counterparties were to gain, then arguably, such gain is achieved as a result of a 
reduction in tax liabilities. In an international environment, risk and taxable value are shifted 
between jurisdictions by DFIs. When both risk and taxable value are shifted from one 
jurisdiction to another, the first jurisdiction should not be concerned as to whether the second 
properly assesses the value associated with the risk assumed within its borders, as long as ‘the 
price paid properly reflects a current assessment of the price attaching to the risk assumed’.49 
Thus, while it would seem that DFIs raise issues pertaining to domestic tax bases only, these 
instruments create a transfer pricing issue if involved in cross-border arrangements. 
The OECD, in its Revised Discussion Paper on global trading, is well aware of this transfer 
pricing issue when it calls for ‘some international consensus so that double, or less than single 
taxation can be avoided.’50 However, the Revised Discussion Paper continues to hold that the 
arm’s length principle remains predominantly applicable to transfer pricing issues arising from 
global trading cases.51 The contention of this thesis is that the integrated nature of those 
involved in the global trading of DFIs is such that the arm’s length principle is inadequate for 
assessing the price attached to such complex transactions.52 Instead, it proposes a formulary 
profit-split system similar to a large extent to that advocated by the OECD as a method of last 
resort. 
                                                             
47 M. Gammie, ‘The Source Taxation of Derivative Financial Instruments, “Synthetic Securities”, Financial 
Hedging Transactions and Similar Innovative Financial Transactions’ (September/October 1999) 1 Derivatives 
& Financial Investments  (No. 5) 231, at 232. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Id., at 233. 
50 OECD (1998), supra  note 14, at 28 para. 104. 
51 Supra note 14, at 31  para. 118. 
52 See Chapter 2, Section II, 1, A & B, at 57ff.  
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C The Relationship between Accounting and Tax Principles 
The broad relationship between taxation and accounting principles has already been examined 
in Chapter 6. The conclusion reached is that the incidence of tax considerations on financial 
reporting is responsible for the difficulties of achieving worldwide harmonised accounting 
practices. The emergence of innovative financial instruments has further complicated this issue 
leaving all interested parties, for example, regulatory authorities, tax authorities, shareholders, 
traders, and others with serious difficulties in fully apprehending the activities of the industry, 
and more especially their tax consequences. 
One of the main problems in this area is that innovative financial instruments have transformed 
conventional balance sheet analysis since transactions which they represent are ‘off balance 
sheet’. In these circumstances, there arises a problem of disclosure quite distinct from that of 
the proper accounting treatment of these new instruments. In order to adequately determine 
the right tax liability, authorities are in need of adequate information. The disclosure problem 
which arises because of the off balance sheet nature of these new instruments does not 
facilitate this determination.  
In view of the paucity of rules in the area, tax authorities rely on general principles of taxation 
in order to ascertain relevant tax liabilities. However, general principles of taxation are 
themselves sustained by accounting principles and the lack of widely accepted principles in the 
area ‘exacerbates the difficulties of taxing authorities in dealing with such instruments’ and 
renders the development of new tax rules capable of coping with the continuing developments 
in this field extremely difficult.53  
Basically, accounting principles enable the determination of an enterprise’s financial position. 
This is achieved, as far as financial instruments are concerned, if there are coherent rules for 
the recognition and measurement of the effects of engaging in transactions involving financial 
instruments. In this connection, several questions need to be addressed, and, according to the 
OECD, work is continuing ‘on the complex recognition and measurement issues which need to 
be resolved’.54 Some of these questions identified by the OECD include: 
· When should financial assets and liabilities be recognised for balance sheet purposes? 
· When should they be ‘derecognised’? 
· How should they be valued? 
· Should they be amortised? 
                                                             
53 OECD (1994), supra  note 31, at 27 para. 113. 
54 Supra note 31, at 27 para. 114. 
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In an international context, an additional question arises as to where profits and losses are to 
be recognised.55 
To answer these questions is far from easy given that countries have different traditions with 
regard to tax and commercial accounting. To harmonise such diverging practices is indeed a 
daunting task. A further problem arises in that while accountancy relies on the presence of 
flexible rules in order to provide a fair and true view of the economic performance of an 
enterprise, taxation authorities for their part strive for certainty in determining the correct tax 
base. In order to achieve any meaningful result, particularly in the context of financial 
instruments, taxation authorities and accounting standard-setting bodies need to cooperate in 
establishing suitable principles and rules. 
The OECD has attempted to reach such a synthesis with the publication in 1994 of its booklet 
entitled ‘New Financial Instruments No. 6’. This document represents the findings of the 
Working Group on Accounting Standards. Unfortunately the Working Group did not approve 
it and it did not reach any conclusion on the issues discussed therein. 
The advent of global trading has exacerbated these problems while creating new ones. The 
perennial question of international taxation, that is, the apportionment of the tax base between 
countries having a legitimate claim to the latter, must now be examined in the context of global 
trading. 
2 The Apportionment Question in Global Trading Operations  
Global operations pose a series of problems for tax authorities worldwide. Both the OECD 
and the U.S. Treasury/IRS have suggested tentative solutions to some of these problems. In 
1998, the IRS and the OECD almost concomitantly released respectively the Proposed 
Regulations (PR) on the allocation and sourcing of income from a global dealing operation and 
an updated Revised Discussion Paper on the same topic.56 These two documents canvass the 
more important questions relative to the taxation of income from global trading.57 
                                                             
55 Supra note 31, at 27 para. 114. 
56 The U.S. Proposed Regulations (Prop. Regs.) were released on 2 March 1998. See Lexis Doc 98-8571 98 TNI 
58-32. On 17 March 1998 the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs published its updated discussion draft 
OECD, The Taxation of Global Trading of Financial Instruments  (Paris: OECD,1998), (OECD Revised 
Discussion Draft). The OECD Revised Discussion Draft supersedes an earlier draft released on 14 February 
1997. 
57 According to Michael Danilack, IRS’s Associate Chief Counsel (International), the finalisation of the global 
dealing regulations (63 Fed.Regs.11177[REG -208299-90] (6 March 1998)) has been included in the IRS’s 1999 
business plan; see A.M. Fernandez, ‘U.S. Global Dealing Regs. to Be Finalized in 1999’, (8 March 1999) 18 
Tax Notes Int’l (No. 10) 945. 
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A The U.S. Treasury/IRS’ Practice  
i  Transfer Pricing Methodologies (TPMs) 
In the U.S., guidance for the apportionment of income from global trading operations are to be 
found in Notice 94-4058 and the PR. Notice 94-40 embodies instructions for negotiating 
APAs with functionally fully integrated global trading enterprises.59 The PR deals 
comprehensively with the question of global trading.60 It retains some of the fundamental policy 
conclusions reflected in Notice 94-40 and rejects others. For example, the PR maintains a 
preference for the profit-split method. However, contrary to Notice 94-40, capital is no longer 
regarded as a profit factor but is considered to be only entitled to a routine return where it is 
employed.61 
Fundamentally, the PR operates as a method for determining, allocating, and sourcing income 
(whilst applying the U.S. concept of effectively connected income) arising from global dealing 
operations on an arm’s length basis.62 It aims at enabling ‘participant’ taxpayers63 to establish 
and recognise, on an arm’s length basis, the contributions of each participant to the global 
                                                             
58 Notice 94-40, 1994-1 C.B. 351, issued on 25 April 1994. 
59 For the advantages of Notice 94-40 as a prime example of the IRS providing guidance in areas with special 
technical difficulties, see S.C. Wrappe, ‘APA Guidance: What Ever Happened to Notice 94-40?’, (21 April 
1999) 7 Transfer Pricing Report (No. 25) 978. 
60 There is a difference in terminology between the OECD Revised Discussion Draft and the Proposed 
Regulations. The first uses the expression global trading while the second opts for the term global dealing. 
Richard Hoge, from the IRS Office of Financial Institutions & Products, described the commonly used term 
‘global trading’ as something of a misnomer. The proposed regulations apply to dealers in the financial service 
industry, not traders. Unfortunately, the name has stuck. See Tax Analysts ‘IRS Officials Discuss Global-
Dealing Regs’, (18 February 1999), WTD 33-4, Lexis Doc 1999-6857. 
61 Notice 94-40 was based upon the IRS’ experience in issuing APAs involving the allocation of profit from 
functionally fully integrated global dealing operations. The implicit conclusions of the IRS as reflected in Notice 
94-40 were that traditional transfer pricing methodologies are inapplicable in global trading carried out through 
the fully  integrated model. Thus, the use of a profit -split method to allocate the income of functionally fully 
integrated global dealing businesses is viewed as the most appropriate method applicable in these cases as it 
mirrors what occurs in joint ventures. Factors that could be considered for splitting profit include trader and 
support staff remuneration as well as capital provision/risk assumption. Moreover, sourcing follows the 
allocation of profit and the sourcing of capital is determined by the place where it is employed. As already 
mentioned, it would appear that ‘Barclays Bank was the recipient of the global trading ruling addressed in 
Notice 94-40.’ See M.J. McIntyre’s letter to the Editor TNI, ‘McIntyre on APA Report and More’, (17 April 
2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 16) 1775. 
62 E. Breindel, D. Considine, B. Mace, K. Sorrells & T. Wolosoff, ‘U.S. Treasury Issues Proposed Global Dealing 
Regulations’, (16 March 1998) Tax Notes Int’l 837. 
63 The term ‘participant’ is defined as a controlled taxpayer, that is, either a regular dealer in securities or a 
member of a group of controlled taxpayers. It includes a regular dealer in securities, so long as that member 
conducts one or more activities related to the activities of such a dealer. Related activities are defined as the 
marketing, sales, pricing, and risk management activities necessary to the definition of a global dealing operation. 
Additionally, brokering is a related activity that may give rise to participant status. 
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dealing operation. Where global dealing operations are conducted by a branch or a deemed 
branch, the PR applies the arm’s length principle as provided for by section 482 in order to 
determine the source of income, and the extent to which it is ‘effectively connected’ with the 
conduct of a U.S. trade or business and attributable to a U.S. PE under U.S. income tax 
treaties. 
New transfer pricing methodologies (TPMs) are provided for in the PR. A TPM is to be 
selected pursuant to the ‘best method’ rule.64 The best method rule consists of two principal 
elements: the comparability of the transaction, and the quality of the data and assumptions, in 
terms of completeness, accuracy, and reliability. 65 Accordingly, taxpayers are required to 
perform a functional analysis to determine the appropriate TPM.66  
The TPMs applicable to global dealing operations that would replace the specified methods 
under section 482 regulations 67 are discussed below. 
1. The Comparable Uncontrolled Financial Transaction Method 
The comparable uncontrolled financial transaction method (CUFT) evaluates whether 
controlled transactions satisfy the arm’s length standard by comparing the price of a controlled 
financial transaction with the price of a comparable uncontrolled financial transaction.68 Under 
this method, the contractual terms, risks assumed, and the economic factors prevailing when 
the parties entered into the controlled financial transaction are considered as the most 
important comparability factors. 
2. The Gross Margin Method 
The gross margin method (GMM) determines if the gross profit realised on the sales of 
financial products acquired from controlled parties is at arm’s length by comparing that profit 
to the gross profit earned on uncontrolled transactions.69 The GMM measures the arm’s length 
price by subtracting the appropriate gross profit from the applicable resale price for the 
financial transaction under examination. 
3. The Gross Mark-Up Method 
                                                             
64 Regs. §1.482-1(c). 
65 Regs. §1.482-1(c)(2). 
66 Prop. Regs. §1.482-8(a)(3)(i). 
67  §§1.482-3 through 1.482-6. 
68 Prop. Regs. §1.482-8(b)(1). 
69 Prop. Regs. §1.482-8(c)(1). 
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The gross mark-up method (GMUM) determines if the gross profit earned on the purchase of 
financial products from uncontrolled parties and sold to controlled taxpayers is at arm’s length 
by comparing that profit to the gross profit earned on uncontrolled transactions.70 Like the 
GMM, comparability under this method depends on the similarity of the functions performed 
and risks assumed in the controlled and uncontrolled transactions. Accordingly, adjustments 
should be made for differences between the functions performed in the sale or transfer of 
financial products to controlled parties and the functions performed with respect to the sale or 
transfer of financial products to uncontrolled parties.71 
4. Profit-Split Methods 
The profit-split method is the only specified method applicable if neither the CUFF nor the 
GMM or GMUM apply. An implicit preference for the profit -split method may be found in the 
preamble to the PR where it is stated that the integrated structure of some global dealing 
operations may make it difficult to apply a traditional transactional method. 
The profit-split method evaluates whether the allocation of the combined operating profits of a 
global financial institution is at arm’s length by focusing on the relative value of each 
participant’s contributions. The profit or loss generated by the activities of the participants is 
combined and then divided between them based upon the relative value of each participant’s 
economic contribution to the combine venture.72 In other words, profit-splits aim at sharing the 
outcome by reflecting in each share the functions performed, risks assumed and the assets 
used by each participant. Two new profit -split methods are proposed for global dealing 
participants, as detailed next.  
a. The total profit-split method73 
The total profit-split method entails a one-step process whereby the operating profit is 
allocated among the participants based on their relative contributions to the profitability of the 
global dealing operation. The total profit-split method may be useful to allocate income earned 
by a highly integrated global dealing operation where each participant in each location 
performs all routine and non-routine dealer functions. Accordingly, total profit or loss of the 
global dealing operation may be allocated among various jurisdictions based on the relative 
performance of equivalent functions in each jurisdiction. 
                                                             
70 Prop. Regs. §1.482-8(d)(1). 
71 For the difficulties in making such adjustments in the context of integrated economies, see H.N. Higinbotham, 
‘When Arm’s Length Isn’t Really Arm’s Length: Issues in Application of the Arm’s-Length Standard’, (1998) 
Intertax (Issue 8-9) 235. 
72 Prop. Regs. §1.482-8(e)(1). 
73 Prop. Regs. §1 .482-8(e)(5). 
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b. The residual profit-split method74 
The residual profit-split method entails a two-step process. In the first step, the routine 
functions are compensated with a market return based upon the best transfer pricing method 
applicable to that transaction. Routine functions may include, but are not limited to, functions 
that would not give rise to participant status. 
After compensating the routine functions, the remaining operating profit (the residual profit) is 
allocated among the participants based upon their respective non-routine contributions. Again, 
heavy reliance is put on a careful functional analysis that would identify the functions performed 
by each participant, the risks assumed, and the resources employed. 
Profit split methods may be used to evaluate if the allocation of operating profit from a global 
dealing operation compensates the participants at arm’s length for their contribution by 
evaluating if the allocation is one that uncontrolled parties would agree to. Accordingly, the 
reliability of this method is dependent upon clear identification of the respective contributions 
of each participant to the global dealing operation. 
As for the profit-split factors, a taxpayer can use any factor or factors that accurately measure 
contribution to value.75 The PR suggests that profits should be split according to the value 
assigned to the ‘integral’ functions of the global trading operation, such as trading.76 Finally, the 
profit-split method generally allocates net operating profit, with the exception of interest 
expense and taxes.77 
i i  The Question of Capital 
The PR specifies, however, that certain activities, such as the provision of capital through a 
guarantee or other credit support, are either not within the scope of global dealing operations, 
or merit a routine return. By contrast, the OECD Revised Discussion Draft makes no such 
clear distinction. Therefore, the unsettled nature of the treatment of capital as evidenced by the 
difference between the OECD and the IRS could lead to vastly different allocations by various 
taxing authorities.78 
                                                             
74 Prop. Regs. §1 .482-8(e)(6). 
75 Prop. Regs. §1.482-8(e). 
76 Prop. Regs. §1.482-8(e)(6). 
77 Prop. Regs. §§ I.482-8(e)(3); 1.482-8(e)(5)(i); 1.482-8(e)(6)(i). 
78 D.M. Aaron et al., ‘Proposed IRS Regulations on Global Dealing: Ignoring Capital and Taxing it Too?’, (26 
October 1998) 39 Tax Management Memorandum Special Edition 1998-10, from Proquest Database, at 
<http://Proquest.umi.com>. 
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Under the PR, contrary to the treatment accorded in Notice 94-40, capital put at risk in a 
global dealing operation is treated as a routine function that does not deserve a profit share. It 
would appear that this shift might be attributable in part to the U.S. Treasury’s conclusion that 
determining the profit attributable to capital is infeasible.79 It is arguable, though, that financial 
institutions are now in possession of sophisticated methods for measuring the amount of capital 
placed at risk by each party in a global dealing operation. Thus, it may well be that the 
Treasury might reconsider its position on this question when issuing final regulations.80 
The PR gives two reasons as to why capital is to be remunerated through a routine return. 
First, an affiliate is not a participant in a global dealing operation if it has only provided a 
guarantee, or some other access to capital, to the exclusion of any other activity. Therefore, 
the affiliate’s return on the capital it has provided needs to be ascertained under traditional 
TPMs. For example, an entity or branch that serves as a booking location will not be a 
participant if its only activity is providing a guarantee or acting as counterparty to third-party 
transactions.81 It will not be entitled to a share of profits, but only to an arm’s-length return for 
its ‘limited’ function.  
Second, in the case of the residual profit-split method, capital is treated as a routine function 
such as back-office activity. An entity is entitled to receive a market return (for example, 
                                                             
79 Id. The reluctance of the Treasury to consider the effectiveness of models attributing a return on capital at risk 
is puzzling. Financial institutions have developed sophisticated capital asset pricing models in order to measure 
the earnings on capital exposed or employed. Financial institutions routinely use such models to determine 
regulatory capital requirements. Two prominent techniques are the risk adjusted return on cap ital (RAROC) 
and the return on risk-adjusted capital (RORAC). Use of these methods permits an accurate allocation of 
capital to each party in a global dealing operation. The appropriate rate of return can be determined by reference 
to a capital asset pricing model, the internal hurdle rate or a published market rate. Indeed, the Proposed 
Regulations contemplate that indirect evidence of the price of a CUFT may be derived from a proprietary 
pricing model if the data used in the model is widely and routinely used in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s 
business to price uncontrolled transactions provided adjustments are made to the amount charged to reflect 
differences in the factors that affect the price to which uncontrolled taxpayers would agree. Prop. Regs. §1.482-
8(b)(5), and Example 4. For the U.K. view as to the role of capital, see U.K. Inland Revenue, Inland Revenue 
Bulletin Issue 38, at <http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/bulletins/tb38>. 
80 Nevertheless, it is also arguable that methods for determining capital at risk predate the Proposed Regulations 
and that in spite of this the Treasury has thought fit to adopt the present position. Moreover, the Proposed 
Regulations recognise that proprietary valuation models have probative value for allocating income. See Prop. 
Regs. §§1.482-8(b)(2)(iii); 1.482 8(b)(5), Example 4 (allowing the use of internal pricing models to establish a 
CUFT). Accordingly, there is no logical reason why internal measurements of the amount of capital placed at 
risk should not be considered in allocating the profits from a global dealing operation. See Aaron et al., supra 
note 78. As will be argued further below in this thesis, there is no need to remunerate capital separately in the 
presence of the property factor. 
81 Prop. Regs. §§1.482-8(a)(2)(ii); 1.482-8(a)(5), Example 2. 
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interest or a guarantee fee) on any capital that it provides to an affiliate rather than having a 
portion of the global dealing operation’s profits allocated to it.82 
Moreover, the PR moves away from the application in Notice 94-40 of the fungibility 
principle. Notice 94-40 provides that capital is a key factor in generating profit. Thus, the risk 
factor measured the potential risk to which a particular trading function exposed the worldwide 
capital of the organisation.  
In fact, Notice 94-40 states that the risk factor provides an important indication of the 
contribution of that trading location to the production of gross profits of the business. Based on 
the unique characteristics of each taxpayer, the risk factor is measured in several different 
ways such as the maturity-weighted volume of swap transactions or open commodity 
positions. The reasons for the departure from the position in Notice 94-40 are not entirely 
clear, but may, in part as indicated earlier, reflect the position that measuring the return due to 
capital put at risk by each party in a global dealing operation is not feasible. 
i i i The Permanent Establishment Threshold Question 
The PR suggests certain rules for determining whether a vehicle used for global dealing 
operations satisfies the PE threshold. It is thus provided that, for purposes of making an inter-
branch allocation of global dealing income, a qualified business unit (QBU)83 shall include a 
U.S. trade or business that is deemed to exist because of the activities of a dependent agent in 
the U.S.84 However, it is arguable that this special rule regarding a deemed QBU may conflict 
with the provisions of the OECD Revised Discussion Draft, the OECD Model Treaty, as well 
as the U.S. Model Treaty.85 Indeed, the PR expands the definition of ‘dependent agent’ to 
                                                             
82 Prop. Regs.§§1.482-8(e)(8), Example 5; 1.863 3(h)(v), Example 3. 
83 Branches and other divisions of a multinational company may be treated as qualified business units (QBU) for 
tax purposes; see Regs. §1.989 (a)-1(b) which defines a ‘qualified business unit’ as any separate and clearly 
identified unit of a trade or business of a taxpayer that maintain separate books and records. 
84 Pursuant to the preamble to the Proposed Regulations, a special rule provides that activities of a dependent 
agent may give rise to participant status through a deemed QBU that performs its participant functions in the 
same location where the dependent agent performs its participant functions. Accordingly, §1.863-3(h)(3)(iv) of 
the Proposed Regulation provides that, for purposes of making the inter-branch allocation of global dealing 
income, a QBU shall include a U.S. trade or business that is deemed to exist because of the activities of a 
dependent agent in the U.S. (without regard to the Regs. §1.989(a)-i(b) books and records requirements for a 
QBU). 
85 Pursuant to Article 5(6) of the U.S. Model Treaty, if an agent is determined to be independent and acting in the 
ordinary course of its business, the activities of that independent agent do not give rise to a PE. The exact 
definition of the concept of independence is, however, unclear. The Treasury’s Technical Explanation to the 
U.S. Model Treaty provides that whether an agent is independent is a factual determination with respect to two 
requirements: the legal and economic independence of the agent. In other words, the existence of a deemed PE is 
not based on the ownership or control relationship between the companies, but rather on these factors only. As 
for the test for legal agency, it is agreed that a contract of agency exists if the agent is subject to detailed 
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include subsidiaries properly characterised as ‘independent agents.’ Moreover, since the 
application of this special rule to the activities of dependent agents is open-ended, there are 
concerns that it might apply to activities beyond those covered by the dependent agent PE 
rules.86 The deemed QBU/PE provisions of the PR may, therefore, cause great uncertainty for 
taxpayers and have other far-reaching implications.87 
iv Inter-Branch Allocations 
In the context of branch taxation as perceived by the Proposed Regulations, three points need 
to be noted as explained below. 
1. Split-Sourcing 
Extending the implicit conclusions of Notice 94-40, the PR largely eliminate the ‘all or nothing’ 
rule of current regulations under which the full amount of profit from a global dealing 
transaction is attributed to a U.S. branch that ‘materially participates’ in such a transaction. 88  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
instructions regarding the conduct of its operations or is under comprehensive control. In determining whether 
the agent is economically independent, a relevant factor is the extent to which the agent bears business risk: an 
independent agent typically bears risk of loss from its own activities. In the absence of other factors that would 
establish dependence, an agent that shares business risk with the enterprise, or has its own business risk, is 
economically independent because its business activities are not integrated with those of the principal. See also 
Taisei Fire and Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., et al. v. Comr, 104 T.C. 535. Moreover, the Treasury’s Technical 
Explanation provides further that an agent may be economically independent, notwithstanding an exclusive 
relationship with the principal, if it has the capacity to diversify and acquire other clients without substantial 
modification to its current business and without substantial harm to its business profits; see Aaron et al., supra 
note 78. 
 As for the dependent agents, Article 5(5) of the U.S. Model Treaty provides that, if an agent is determined to 
be a dependent agent, its actions will give rise to a PE if the agent has and habitually exercises the authority to 
conclude contracts in the name of the principal. The Treasury’s Technical Explanation states that the purpose 
of Article 5(5) is to encompass those persons who have ‘sufficient authority to bind the enterprise’s 
participation in the business activity in the State concerned.’ The Technical Explanation also makes clear that 
the activities referred to in Article 5(5) are those relating to the essential business operations of the enterprise, 
rather than ancillary activities. With respect to the issue of habitually executing contracts, several questions 
arise in the specific context of a global trading operation. It is not clear that a U.S. participant with severely 
restricted authority to execute contracts (e.g., only when the markets are closed abroad and within certain value 
or risk guidelines) would qualify under Article 5(5). Moreover, it is not always clear when marketing or 
customising activities blur into concluding contracts. To conclude, therefore, this issue is particularly difficult in 
the context of global dealing operations. In the absence of  more detailed guidance in the final regulations, the 
IRS could attempt to apply the deemed QBU/PE rule to such activities; see Aaron et al., supra note 78. 
86 Aaron et al., supra note 78. 
87 Thus, for example, the consequences of having a deemed QBU/PE go beyond direct taxation of the global 
trading income allocated to such QBU/PE. A foreign participant with a deemed QBU/PE could be subject to 
section 884 branch profits tax. In addition, a failure to file U.S. returns could result in the denial of deductions in 
computing taxable income and give rise to section 6114 penalties; see Aaron et al., supra note 78. 
88 Regs. §§ 1.863-7(b)(3), 1.864-4(c)(1)(i), 1.864 4(c)(5)(iii). 
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Under the PR, entities engaged in a global dealing operation within the United States will be 
taxable in the U.S. on the basis of an arm’s-length allocation reflecting the relative economic 
contribution of each QBU.89 This split-sourcing rule does not apply to income from activities 
that do not give rise to participant status, for example, interest, dividend, or guarantee fee 
income received by an owner or guarantor of a global dealing operation that is conducted by 
another controlled taxpayer.90  The source of such income continues to be determined under 
current applicable regulations.91 
2. Treatment of Capital  
The PR contains specific provisions regarding the sourcing of capital within an entity. These 
provisions maintain the principle of fungibility as expressed in Notice 94-40, but eliminate the 
use of capital provision/risk assumption as a factor for allocating global dealing income. 
Because capital is viewed as fungible and sourced wherever it is employed, that is, the branch 
where traders are located, neither a routine return, for example, a guarantee fee, nor a profit 
allocation for the provision of capital is permitted within a single legal entity under the profit-
split method. In other words, capital is ignored as a factor for allocating profit among the 
different branches of an entity. Thus, Proposed Regulation §1.863-3(h)(3)(ii) states: 
[S]ince the entire capital of a corporation supports all of the entity's transactions, regardless of 
where those transactions may be booked, the payment of a guarantee fee within the entity is 
inappropriate and will be disregarded. 
Therefore, the allocation of global dealing income carried out through inter-branch transactions 
is made on the basis of the non-routine functions mentioned above (for example, marketing, 
and trading). 
3. Fungibility of Money  
The inter-branch sourcing/allocation of capital reflects two long-standing IRS/Treasury policy 
principles: money is fungible and branches are not respected as separate legal entities. There 
seems to be little other reason justifying the differing treatment of (wholly owned) subsidiaries 
and branches, as both are equally subject to the control of either the parent or head office, as 
the case may be.92 
4. Interest Expense Allocation  
                                                             
89 Regs. § 1.863-3(h)(3)(i).10. 
90 Prop. Regs. §1.863-3(h)(1); Preamble. 
91 Prop. Regs. §1.863-3(h)(1); Preamble. 
92 See Aaron et al., supra note 78. 
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In accord with the principle of fungibility, interest expense cannot be allocated under a profit-
split method but must be allocated in accordance with Regulation Section 1.882-5. Under 
these long controversial rules, interest expense is allocated under a three-step formula, which 
attributes interest expense to ‘U.S. assets’. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that Regulation 
Section 1.882-5 conflicts with the OECD Revised Discussion Draft’s criticism on allocating 
interest expense according to gross income. It also conflicts with most of U.S.’s trading 
partners’ treatment of the amount of taxable income attributable to a global dealing operation. 
As such, these provisions may have the potential to expose the income of a foreign bank 
operating globally to more than single taxation. 
The fate of these controversial provisions relating to interest expense allocation rules have now 
been judicially adjudicated. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims, in a decision dated 7 July 
1999, ruled that the IRS incorrectly imposed tax on the National Westminster Bank PLC 
(Natwest) based on Regula tion Section 1.882-5 to compute the interest expense of the bank’s 
U.S. branch. 93 The Court held that these provisions were inconsistent with Article 7 of the 
U.S.–U.K. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation. In essence, the Court found 
that the regulation treated Natwest’s U.S. branch as a unit of a foreign enterprise in violation of 
the treaty’s separate entity provision which requires that the profits of a PE be computed as if 
it were a distinct and separate enterprise dealing independently with the rest of the enterprise 
of which it is an integral part.94 It can thus be seen that the extension of the separate 
accounting/arm’s length methodology in the field of global banking is bound to cause severe 
strain on the system. In spite of these difficulties, the OECD is proceeding with its attempt to 
treat a PE as a hypothetically separate entity from the enterprise of which it is a part. In other 
words, in order to determine, on an arm’s length basis, the profits arising from the business of 
international banking carried out in branch form, the OECD purports to create yet another 
fiction when, for the purposes of calculating the profit attributable to PEs, it proposes to treat 
such branches as if they were subsidiaries of the enterprise. 
                                                             
93 National Westminster Bank PLC v United States of America 84 AFTR2d Par. 99-5017 reproduced in Tax 
Analysts Document Number: Doc 1999-234444, at <http://taxbase.tax.org/taxbase/tni3>. See also K. Vogel, 
‘Tax Treaty News’, (June 2000) 54 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (No. 6) 254. 
94 See H.L. Adrion, ‘U.S. Court Holds That Separate Entity Approach Under U.K.-U.S. treaty Overrides IRS 
Regulations’, (19 July 1999) 19 Tax Notes Int’l  (No. 3) 216. 
Chapter 8  Formulary Apport ionment Appl ied to the Global Financial  Industry 
 370
B The OECD’s Position 
i  TPMs  
The OECD Revised Discussion Draft maintains that traditional transactional methods of 
taxation should remain the primary methods for analysing global trading.95 However, because 
the activities of each location engaged in global trading are often so highly integrated, or 
conducted in such a different manner from the activities that are conducted between 
independent parties,96 the OECD Revised Discussion Draft concludes that traditional 
transactional methods may not be fully capable of reaching appropriate results. Furthermore, 
the OECD Revised Discussion Draft also states that the transactional net margin method97 may 
not be generally applicable to test the profits from a global trading operation. Accordingly, 
profit-split methods may have to be applied as a ‘last resort’ whilst the use of unspecified 
TPMs is also not precluded. 
The OECD Revised Discussion Draft discusses a number of possible ways of applying profit-
split methods but offers few firm conclusions.98 It considers both the ‘contribution analysis’ 
and ‘residual analysis’ methods but does not recommend one over the other.99 Moreover, it 
provides that if a profit-split method is to be used, care must be taken to ensure that its use is 
in conformity with the arm’s length principle. In particular, it warns against the application of 
global formulary apportionment methods.100 It notes the three factors as set forth in Notice 94-
40, that is, the value factor, the risk factor and the activity factor, but states that Notice 94-40 
is merely a starting point for the analysis.101  
The OECD Revised Discussion Draft provides generally that trading, marketing, management, 
and major supporting activities should share in profits and losses. It does note that 
performance of both traders and specialised marketers is the key to the profitability of global 
                                                             
95 R.T. Clair et al., ‘Is the OECD’s View of Global Trading Consistent With the Arm’s Length Standard: A U.S. 
Perspective’, (26 March 1997) 24 Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report (No. 5) 752. 
96 OECD (1998), supra  note 14, at 39 para. 154. 
97 The similarity of the transactional net margin method (TNMM) and the U.S. comparable profits method 
(CPM) has already been examined. An important provision of the PR is that for purposes of the best method 
rule (which applies in the context of global dealing), the CPM is not available under the ‘specified methods’ 
pursuant to Regs. §1.482-8. The reason given is that in the finance industry, profits are too volatile to serve as 
the basis for income allocation. Because profits are prone to fluctuate radically, even over a short duration, use 
of the CPM is likely to yield unusual and unreliable results; see Aaron et al., supra note 78. 
98 OECD (1998), supra  note 14, at 65 para. 258. 
99 Supra note 14, at 43-44 paras 174, 176, 178. 
100 Supra note 14, at 34 & 43 paras 133, 173. 
101 Supra note 14, at 44-45 paras 180-81. 
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trading, but offers no guidance with respect to measurement. It states further that the proper 
treatment of capital provision/risk assumption is perhaps the most difficult global trading issue 
to resolve.102 Although the OECD Revised Discussion Draft states that there is obviously a 
relationship between capital provision/risk assumption and expected profits, it notes that 
member countries disagree regarding whether it is possible to measure the contribution.103 
Finally, the OECD Revised Discussion Draft notes that no satisfactory basis for assigning 
weights to the selected factors has yet been articulated.104 
One significant point of divergence between the PR and the OECD Revised Discussion Paper 
is that the first provides that the choice of the profit-split method is to be determined under the 
‘best method’ rule whereas the second expresses a preference for traditional transactional 
methods,105 with the use of profit-split admitted as a method of ‘last resort’ in instances of 
highly integrated operations.106 
It is arguable that, in most likelihood, the profit-split method will be the best method for the 
IRS and would thus be applied as a matter of first, rather than one of last resort.107 
Consequently, it may well be that the differences between the two documents lie in application 
of the various TPMs rather than the choice of TPMs. Moreover, there are also significant 
differences in the treatment of capital in the two documents. 
i i  The Question of Capital 
The OECD Revised Discussion Draft, in contrast to the PR, advocates the treatment of capital 
provision/risk assumption as a factor for allocating profits from a global trading operation. 
However, the OECD Revised Discussion Draft documents the lack of consensus among 
members regarding the treatment of capital provision/risk assumption. Therefore, rather than 
coming to a definite conclusion, it specifically requests guidance from the business community 
regarding the role of capital.  
                                                             
102 Supra note 14, at 46 para. 190. 
103 Supra note 14, at 46-48 paras 191-96. 
104 Supra note 14, at 50 para. 205. 
105 Supra note 14, at 32 para. 121. 
106 Supra note 14, at 41 para. 165. 
107  In fact, ‘profit -based transfer pricing are becoming more popular than traditional methods in many of the 
countries that have adopted them.’ This trend is ‘unavoidable’ according to Robert E. Culbertson ‘a former IRS 
official who participated in the drafting of the U.S. regs that introduced the comparable profit method in the 
United States.’ See A. Fernandez & T.F. Field, ‘Canadian Tax Foundation Holds First World Tax Conference’, 
(6 March 2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 10) 1056, at 1060. 
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The OECD Revised Discussion Draft emphasises the fact that access to capital is essential to 
engage in global trading.108 It is capital that enables a global trading business to fund its cash 
needs and assume the variety of risks, for example, credit and market risks, arising from its 
global dealing operations. It therefore states that it is very important to examine the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the provision of capital in order to evaluate exactly what function is 
being undertaken.109 If the capital provider is simply lending money, then its reward may be a 
simple arm’s length interest rate. If, however, the capital provider acts as an entrepreneur, for 
example, if it underwrites all the risks of the activity, it is likely to demand a share of the profits 
commensurate with the risks undertaken. In between these extremes are capital providers 
whose function may be similar to that of an intermediary. In such cases it may be possible to 
apply traditional transactional methods reliably. This position is underscored by the OECD’s 
assertion that the influence of capital is likely to be more important for products that are 
complex and innovative and where the duration of a contract is long rather than short.110 
Finally, the OECD Revised Discussion Draft maintains that there is a relationship between 
capital provision/risk assumption and expected profits. However, given that Member States 
disagree on whether it is possible to measure the contribution, the OECD Revised Discussion 
Draft invites comments specifically on the general issue of risk and more specifically on the 
inclusion of capital provision/risk assumption as a factor in a profit-split method.111 
i i i The Permanent Establishment Threshold Question 
The OECD Revised Discussion Draft largely refers to the OECD Model Treaty and the 
OECD Commentary thereto with respect to the issue of deemed PEs. Moreover, it rejects the 
position of the business community that sought to treat all global dealing operators as 
independent agents in order to avoid the problems posed by branch taxation.112 
Article 5(6) of the OECD Model Treaty provides that an enterprise shall not be deemed to 
have a PE in a Contracting State merely because it carries on business in that state through a 
broker, general commission agent, or any other agent of an independent status, provided that 
such persons are acting in the ordinary course of their business.113 In this area, it has always 
                                                             
108 Supra note 14, at 27 paras 100-102. 
109 Supra note 14, at 41 para. 164. 
110 Supra note 14, at 41 para. 166. 
111 Supra note 14, at 46-48 paras 191-96. 
112 Supra note 14, at 59 para. 234. 
113 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (Paris: OECD, 1992) loose leaf (1997 update). (Note: A 
2000 update is now available.) Paragraphs 36-39 of the OECD Commentary discuss the definition of 
independent agent. 
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been agreed that an agent’s independence is ascertainable relative to whether he or she 
demonstrates a certain level of legal as well as economic independence relative to his or her 
principal. Both the U.S. Treasury’s Technical Explanations and the OECD Commentary 
recognise this practice. Legal independence is thus ascertained relative to the existence or not 
of detailed instructions and comprehensive control emanating from the principal. As for 
economic independence, it is gauged by the degree of entrepreneurial risk that the agent 
assumes. In addition, the OECD Commentary provides that ownership is not determinative of 
dependence. 
Moreover, Article 5(5) of the OECD Model Treaty provides that where a person ‘other than 
an agent of independent status to whom paragraph 6 applies’ is acting on behalf of an 
enterprise, that enterprise shall be deemed to have a PE in a particular country in respect of 
any activities which that person undertakes for the enterprise if that person has, and habitually 
exercises an authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise. The OECD 
Commentary mirrors the Technical Explanation in requiring the agent to bind the principal’s 
participation in the business activity in the state concerned.114 
The OECD Revised Discussion Draft states that one of the most difficult issues presented by 
global trading is whether the activities of one enterprise constitute a PE of another 
enterprise.115 The OECD Revised Discussion Draft does not provide clear guidelines other 
than that this determination depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. It ‘refers to 
problems’ in deciding whether certain kinds of activities carried on in a particular jurisdiction 
give rise to a PE.116 It notes that, given the nature of global dealing, it is likely that most global 
dealing activities performed in one jurisdiction by an enterprise resident in another jurisdiction 
will be essential and significant enough to pass the threshold of ‘auxiliary and preparatory’.117 
Thus, Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Treaty considers that preparatory or auxiliary activities 
do not constitute a PE. It notes further that the ‘mere purchase’ exception contained in Article 
5(7) of the OECD Model Treaty does not apply in the context of global dealing. 118 
iv Inter-Branch Allocations 
The OECD Revised Discussion Draft refers largely to the OECD Model Treaty in addressing 
the issue of inter-branch allocation. Under the OECD Model Treaty, branches are generally 
                                                             
114 Id., paras 31-35 of the OECD Commentary is concerned with the dependent agent provision.  
115 OECD (1998), supra  note 14, at 58 para. 230. 
116 Supra note 14, at 57ff paras. 224ff. 
117 Supra note 14, at 58 para. 229. 
118 Supra note 14, at 58 para. 229.  
Chapter 8  Formulary Apport ionment Appl ied to the Global Financial  Industry 
 374
treated on a separate entity basis.119 Therefore, some of the OECD Members have been 
critical of the U.S. ‘all-or-nothing’ rule which have, in certain cases, been supplanted by split 
sourcing in the PR, and current applicable special interest allocation rules. 
With respect to the inter-branch treatment of capital, the OECD Revised Discussion Draft 
does not reach any conclusions. It generally considers problems concerning the attribution of 
income and expenses to a PE of a global dealing business. It specifically criticises the 
mismatching of income and expense that may result from requiring taxpayers to allocate 
interest (or other expenses) according to gross income.120 
To conclude, the most significant differences between the PR and the OECD Revised 
Discussion Draft, therefore, are: 
· The implicit preference in the PR for the profit-split method; 
· The treatment under the PR of capital provision/risk assumption as a routine function;  
· The creation of a deemed PE in circumstances not necessarily contemplated by the 
OECD Model Treaty; and  
                                                             
119 The OECD’s paper issued on 1 October 1998, (OECD Steering Group on the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, The Working Hypothesis for Attributing Profit to a Permanent Establishment (PE) , 
DAFFE/CFA/TP(98)1/REV1), proposes a basis of interpretation of Article 7 of the OECD Model Convention 
which considers a PE as a hypothetical enterprise dist inct and separate from the enterprise of which it is a 
permanent establishment. If this interpretation gains worldwide consensus, then it is arguable that inter-branch 
deals such as hedging transactions would be properly ascribed to a particular location. However, hedging 
transactions associated with global trading are often carried out from specific locations whereas their ultimate 
effects are accounted for in the global book of the global trading enterprise. A similar situation occurs, for 
example, with the hedging transactions carried out by the Treasury acting as a separate profit centre. These 
situations invariably lead to instances where losses are recognised for tax purposes in a jurisdiction other than that 
in which the gain from an off-setting position is recognised (generally referred to as ‘split hedges’). The fact is that 
there are economies in engaging in inter-desk deals rather than having to transact with an external party in every 
situation and that such synergy gains are not capable of being ascribed on an arm’s length basis to a particular 
location. It follows, therefore, that the Working Hypothesis would have little positive incidence on the question 
of inter-branch allocations. 
120 OECD (1998), supra note 14, at 13 para. 17: ‘Although several different jurisdictions may participate in a 
single transaction, domestic tax rules may not provide for the income generated by that transaction to be split 
between different jurisdictions. If global trading is conducted through branch form, transactions may be taxed, 
under domestic rules, on an “all-or-nothing” basis; if sufficient activity takes place in a jurisdiction, then all of 
the gross income from the transaction is taken into account for purposes of determining taxable income; if not, 
then none of the income from the transaction is taken into account. Expenses, including losses from transactions 
entered into to hedge the risk arising from the customer transaction, may be allocated against the gross profit 
arising from the transaction in order to determine the net taxable income. Unless the rules regarding expense or 
loss allocation are clear, this approach is unlikely to produce, in practice, a result consistent with the arm’s 
length principle.’ 
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· The IRS treatment of inter-branch transactions as different from affiliated enterprise 
transactions, including the fungibility of capital (that is, capital sourcing and interest 
expense allocation). 
The OECD’s position on the question of intangibles also reflects its long-standing opposition 
to interbranch royalty payments, a position which is thus transported in the global trading 
context. Intangibles owned by the enterprise, for example, trading methods, valuation 
programs, are considered as belonging to the whole entity and not to a particular location. 
Accordingly, the OECD Revised Discussion Draft states that it would be inconsistent to 
consider intangibles as an allocation factor for the profit-split or to allow inter-branch 
deductions for them.121 
Other than these conclusions, however, the OECD Revised Discussion Draft provides that 
resolution of inter-branch income allocation issues will have to await further agreement on how 
Article 7(2) of the OECD Model Treaty operates. Although the OECD Revised Discussion 
Draft notes that a deduction for payments made as an appropriate contribution toward the 
actual cost of capital or intangibles is authorised by the commentary to the OECD Model 
Treaty, it states that it is less clear in what circumstances that deduction may be increased to 
cover a mark-up over actual costs.122 
Finally, true to its stated policy, the OECD Revised Discussion Draft rejects formulary 
apportionment, whether as contemplated by Article 7(4) of the OECD Model Treaty or 
otherwise, in the global dealing context.123 
C Possible Alternative Approaches 
i  An Appropriate Definition of Interest  
The extensive analysis of the PR and the OECD Revised Discussion Draft carried out above 
shows that there is substantial indecision as to the proper treatment of gains arising from global 
trading. This situation has led some to canvass possible innovative solutions to some of the 
problems arising in this environment.124 A good example illustrative of such novel ways of 
dealing with the taxation of income generated by new financial instruments relates to the 
treatment of ‘interest’ under a swap. Many payments relating to new financial instruments are 
similar in economic functions to interest. However, the definition of interest in the OECD 
                                                             
121 Supra note 14, at 49-50, 61 paras 202, 243. 
122 Supra note 14, at 61 para. 242. 
123 Supra note 14, at 60-61 paras 238-40. 
124 Plambeck, supra note 22. 
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Model Tax Convention is not broad enough to encompass all such payments. Thus, while 
discounts are considered as income from debt claims and so fall within the definition, payments 
from an interest rate swap are not income from a debt claim and are therefore outside the 
scope of the definition. Although there is no doubt that such payments are calculated on an 
interest basis, they are considered as income from debt claims and are characterised as 
income ‘in the nature of interest’. This interpretation is however not universally accepted. In 
countries where legislation subscribes to a substance-over-form approach, payments that are 
not legally interest may nevertheless be considered as interest for the purposes of construing 
the Model Tax Convention. In such cases, taxing rights relating to such payments are to be 
shared between the source country and the country of residence. 
In view of the confusion that may arise from conflicting interpretations of Article 11 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention relating to the interest article, the latter may well need to be 
revised in order to make it clear that the definition of interest does not extend to payments 
under swaps or other financial instruments. Such a measure would significantly reduce the risk 
of double taxation. Moreover, the elimination of double taxation could be achieved by not 
subjecting payments made in respect of financial instruments to tax in the source country, an 
alternative unlikely to be favoured as a result of the loss of revenue that such a measure would 
entail. 
Furthermore, since payments under a swap, for example, are not characterised as interest, 
they are exempt from withholding tax provisions. However, an exemption from withholding tax 
of payments made under financial instruments may encourage tax avoidance.125 Indeed, there 
would be a strong incentive to change the nature of the payments from one easily identifiable 
as interest to one that would not be so characterised in order to escape withholding tax 
payments. Such transmutation can be easily achieved through the operation of modern financial 
instruments. 
In view of such difficulties, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs examined the possibility of 
including a separate article for novel financial instruments in the Model Convention.126 The 
objective of such an article would be to ensure that every payment under all financial 
instruments would not be subjected to source taxation. The problem with this solution is that it 
is unlikely that a single article could contain a definition broad enough to cover all financial 
instruments present and future. 
                                                             
125 For the use of derivatives for tax avoidance purposes, see, for example, U.K. Inland Revenue, ‘Use of 
Derivatives and Financial Instruments to Convert Interest into Capital’, (June 1997) U.K. Inland Revenue 
Bulletin , at <http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk>. 
126 OECD (1994), supra  note 31. 
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Finally, the Committee also examined the effects of amending Article 21, the Other Income 
Article, in order to incorporate therein an anti-abuse provision that would enable the 
application of the arm’s length principle to payments made under the new financial instruments.  
The emergence of new financial instruments posits new challenges to the taxation of cross-
border income flows of income. The question is whether the existing rules are adequate to 
meet the challenge or whether a rethink of the whole system is inevitable. 
i i  Towards a Multilateral APA? 
The rules for determining income attributable to the various participants in a global financial 
operation ‘are simply not workable’127 and it remain to be seen whether the proposals put 
forward by the OECD and the U.S. Treasury/IRS are capable of preventing double taxation if 
applied in their format. 
An interim solution is available in the form of advance pricing arrangements/agreements 
(APAs). The trend towards the use of APAs to encourage voluntary compliance in the transfer 
pricing area is gathering momentum. The IRS holds the view that the number of APAs will 
increase significantly especially in the global financial industry.128 
In view of this, the IRS has embarked on a modernisation program and is building expertise by 
creating a new Office of Financial Products and Transactions and has commissioned the Los 
Alamos National Library ‘to research and develop models for valuing derivative transactions’ 
presumably in order to enable it to obtain a better knowledge of the industry.129 
It would appear, therefore, that the U.S., at least, has put into place the necessary structures 
for an expansion of the APA process in the global trading industries. Even prior to these 
developments Barclays Bank plc and Sumitomo Bank Capital Markets Inc. have signed 
APAs with the IRS and the U.K. Inland Revenue which reportedly covered global derivative 
products.130 Interestingly, it appears that ‘while the details of the APAs are not public, they are 
said to contain formulas for allocating income and deductions attributable to global derivative 
                                                             
127 Y.Z. Reich, ‘U.S. Federal Income Taxation of U.S. Branches of Foreign Banks’, (10 June 1994) Tax Notes 
Today (Lexis, Fedtax, TNT File, Elec Cit 94 Tnt) 112-31. 
128 M.M. Richardson, ‘Richardson Outlines Progress in International Tax Issues’, (19 December 1994) State Tax 
Notes  (Lexis, Fedtax, Stn File, Elec Cit 94 Stn) 243-41. 
129 Ibid . See also note from the U.S. Department of Treasury soliciting comments on the scope, algorithms, and use 
of a mark-to-market software that is being developed by the IRS through the Los Alamos Project, in Federal 
Register (May 29, 1997), at <http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prov/tax_regs/comments.html>. The Los Alamos 
Project has been criticised by the Institute of International Bankers; see L. Uhlick, ‘International Bankers 
Question Valuation Software’, (13 October 1997) 15 Tax Notes Int’l 1225. 
130 M.M. Levey, ‘Proposed 482 Regs.: Attacked at Hearing; Two Banks Sign  APAs’, (November/December 1992) 
J Int’l Tax’n 248, at 250. 
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products transactions between the U.S. and the U.K.’131 If the APA approach is favoured, 
then the following questions arise: 
· Would the current bilateral APAs evolve into multilateral agreements? 
· Would the profit-split method as favoured by the U.S.132 likely to incorporated within all 
multilateral APAs when these eventuate? 
According to Michael Durst, a former Director of the IRS APA Program, the next generation 
of APAs will be agreed on a multilateral basis.133 Already, the U.S., Canada, Australia, and 
Japan have reached agreement on common procedures for reaching bilateral APAs.134 This 
presumably covers applicable methodologies. Significantly, the APA process may be 
coordinated with other tax authorities. This may be achieved through the mutual agreement 
procedure under tax treaty provisions. It may be argued that the OECD’s Revised Discussion 
Draft envisages such a multilateral APA when it invites ‘multilateral discussions’ to consider the 
taxation principles applicable to global trading.135 Moreover, with the IRS enabling banks to 
apply the arm’s length principle to inter-branch transactions as examined earlier, the way has 
been opened for the IRS to enter into unilateral APAs for global inter-branch financial 
dealings.136 In the opinion of the head of IRS APA Program, Peter Kocis, many of such APAs 
will use the profit-split methodology which he foresees as ‘the wave of the future’.137 
The APA route seems to be the most valuable method available to TNCs and revenue 
authorities to achieve some degree of certainty relative to transfer pricing methodologies.138 
Nevertheless, one must bear in mind some of the reservations regarding the APA as the 
universal solution to transfer pricing problems. First, it has been argued that for several reasons 
‘APAs are not beneficial for every taxpayer engaged in a global trading operation.’139 Thus, 
                                                             
131 Ibid . 
132 M.M. Levey & G.A. Grauer, ‘IRS Indicates a Preference for Profit-split Method in Global Trading’, (July 
1994) J Int’l Tax’n 300, at 301. 
133 J. McKinnon, ‘IFA’s U.S. Branch Considers Recent Worldwide APA Developments, U.S. Conduit Regs.’, (12 
December 1994) 9 Tax Notes Int’l 1815. 
134 Ibid . 
135 OECD (1998), supra  note 14, at 26 para. 96. 
136 Anonymous, ‘Advance Pricing Agreements: Proposed Interbranch Bank Rules Open Way for Unilateral 
Interbranch APAs, Official say’, (30 June 1999) 8 Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report, (No. 5) 163. 
137 Id., at 164. A new type of APA has appeared in the U.S. These are the so-called head office expense APAs that 
allow foreign banks to plan for future allocation of expenses to their branches in the U.S. 
138 See Chapter 3, Section I, 2, B, ii, at 109. 
139 Note, ‘Taxation of Global Trading Operations: Use of Advance Pricing Agreements and Profit-Split 
Methodology’, (1994-95) 48 Tax Lawyer  1057, at 1072. 
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the Institute of International Bankers has urged the development of a realistic alternative to 
APAs.140 Second, on 13 May 1999, Karl Kellar, an IRS official said that the service is seeing 
a decline in demand for APAs involving cross-border inter-branch financial transactions. The 
official reason for this decline was that the IRS Proposed Regulations intend to allow 
taxpayers to apply section 482 transfer pricing methodologies to financial institutions’ 
derivatives and financial instrument trading.141 However, it may well be that the reason for this 
decline is the uncertainty as to the confidentiality of information submitted for APA negotiation 
as a result of the litigation initiated by the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.142 Therefore, as far 
as globally integrated operations are concerned, there is still a need to find an acceptable 
worldwide solution. 
Section III  A Realistic Alternative: Applying Formulary 
Apportionment to the Global Financial 
Industry 
Generally available evidence shows that ‘financial income is impossible to tax at the 
international level under the arm’s length and separate accounting principle.’143 Resorting to 
APAs may be regarded as ‘an interim process...a stop-gap measure that is appropriate and 
sensible.’144 Therefore, ‘unless the existing APA process in the global trading area is viewed as 
an interim step towards a revision of the applicable substantive rules, it will become 
increasingly vulnerable to criticism that it is private law.’145  
The mechanical aspect of formulary apportionment methodology does offer certainty for all 
stakeholders in the field of international taxation.  The IRS has even studied its benefits. Indeed, 
prior to the release of the Temporary Regulations, the sentiment was that the IRS was 
‘exploring different basic typologies of TPMs, including in particular a worldwide formulary 
                                                             
140 D. Bodner & L. Uhlick, ‘International Bankers Comment on Advance Pricing Agreement Program’, (4 August 
1994) Tax Notes Today LEXIS, FEDTAX, TNT file, elec. cit 94 TNT 152-40.  
141 M.J. Tropin, ‘Demand Down for Interbranch APAs but not for Global Trading APAs, IRS Says’, (31 May 
1999) 72 BNA’s Banking Report (No. 22), at 982-83.  
142 See Wrappe, supra note 56, at 978. See also Chapter 3, Section I, 2, B, ii, at 109. Legislation is now in place 
guaranteeing this confidentiality. However, it is arguable that banks remain reluctant to disclose highly strategic 
information to Revenue Authorities to obtain in return limited protection from a full-blown audit of their 
activities. 
143 See Mintz, supra note 46, at 101. 
144 Y.Z. Reich, ‘U.S. Federal Income Taxation of U.S. Branches of Foreign Banks’, (10 June 1994) Tax Notes 
Today (LEXIS, FEDTAX, TNT file elec. cit. 94 TNT 112-31). 
145 Ibid . 
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apportionment’.146 It would appear, though, that for the time being, the IRS remains 
committed to the arm’s length standard although it advocates new profit-split methods.147 
As for the OECD, its Revised Discussion Draft does not propose any original solution to the 
various problems in the area. Whilst this was not meant to be the outcome of the draft, yet one 
would have thought that the OECD would have at least agreed to reconsider its position in 
order to be at par with the innovative spirit that permeates global trading. Can the OECD 
maintain its current intransigence in view of the pace at which new business paradigms are 
emerging? This is not so certain. One of the most significant findings of the Revised Discussion 
Draft is that in the integrated trading model ‘it is not possible to identify any specific 
transactions between the different locations to which traditional methods could be applied.’148 
However, for the moment, the farthest that the Organisation is prepared to go is to suggest that 
it is possible to determine: 
the arm’s length profit of the permanent establishment by using profit-split methods based on the 
principles of Articles 7(2) and (3) and for these to be applied in a manner consistent with the profit-
split methods described for associated enterprises in the Guidelines. In particular, although it is the 
profit of a particular trading book which is split, rather than individual transactions, these methods 
are permitted, provided the individual transactions could be combined in accordance with the 
principles set out at Chapter I, Part C (iii) of the Guidelines. To ensure conformity with the 
Guidelines, profit-split methods must only be applied to the profits from trading books which 
consists only of an aggregation of similar and linked transactions. 149 
To ensure that it is not even remotely contemplating global formulary apportionment as a 
possible solution to the problem, the OECD Revised Discussion Draft stresses the point that 
‘there is no need to apply the approach envisaged by Article 7(4) to global trading cases’.150 
Nonetheless, this thesis submits that, as far as the financial sector is concerned, formulary 
apportionment, in spite of its imperfections, either real or perceived, is the most appropriate 
methodology for the apportionment of income generated by TNCs operating in truly globalised 
markets. It is certainly simple in its concept and in its application. To be convinced one needs 
only to take note of the confusion generated by the provisions of the U.S. Proposed 
Regulations and the indecisiveness of the OECD Revised Discussion Draft trying to make the 
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separate accounting/arm’s length method work in an environment so alien to it. The world is 
fast reaching the point when the question is not whether international taxation should be based 
on formulary apportionment but rather when should serious thought be devoted to finding how 
to implement the methodology without serious disruption to countries’ comparative positions in 
the tax field.  
The successful application of a formulary apportionment methodology on a worldwide basis 
requires that three broad conditions be met: 
· first, the taxpayer must be properly identified; 
· second, general agreement as to the identification of the tax base must be reached; 
and  
· finally, there must be agreement as to what factors to include in the apportionment 
formula. 
1 Preliminary Considerations 
The players in the global financial industry are diverse and there is a variety of trading models 
to carry out global trading. Some of these trading models are fully integrated and truly act as a 
single  entity. This model creates significant benefits from the various synergies resulting from 
their mode of operation. Worldwide formulary apportionment should be applied primarily to 
those entities operating under this model as it fits their requirements. In fact, rather than waiting 
for the system to be agreed by the OECD, some fully integrated operators are actively 
seeking, on an individual basis, through the APA process, to have that particular methodology 
applied to their operations. 
A Identifying the Ta xpayer  
In 1993 Ernst & Young carried out a survey of approximately 100 member banks of the 
Institute of International Bankers (IIB). The report, published in the U.K.151 in the same year, 
confirmed the methods of operation of international banks as described by Plambeck.152 In 
general, international banks operate in branch form. There are nevertheless instances where, 
for regulatory or tax reasons, the subsidiary format is used.153 Three main categories of cross-
border operations have been observed as follows. 
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i  The Integrated Trading Model  
There is some confusion in the terms used in the context of global trading. Global trading may 
be viewed from three different angles: 
· First, there is the time dimension where the activity of trading is carried out virtually non-
stop during a 24-hour period.  
· Second, there is the geographical dimension of the trade, where emphasis is put on the 
fact that financial intermediaries have the capacity ‘to execute customer orders and to 
take proprietary positions in financial products in markets around the world and around 
the clock.’154  
· Third, there is also the possibility of viewing the term global trading as meaning the 
involvement of different business units located in different parts of the world taking part 
in a single transaction. In the following pages, the expressions global trading and global 
24-hour trading are used interchangeably.  
An international bank engaged in global 24-hour trading maintains an inventory of financial 
products. It then systematically passes the authority to trade these products around the world. 
Each trading centre may make deals and trades during the time slot where authority is vested 
with it during the 24-hour period. In this model, the management of the assets and liabilities of 
the banking enterprise is carried out on a global and integrated basis. Indeed, the whole 
enterprise functions as a single business whether the operation involves subsidiaries or 
branches. 
Such an integrated operation is achieved along the following lines. An inventory of financial 
products is maintained in each of the major trading regions, which are North America, Europe 
and the Far East. According to Plambeck, the main markets for each of these regions are 
located in New York, London and Tokyo respectively. There is also very significant trading 
occurring in Hong Kong, Sydney, Chicago, Singapore and Toronto and to a lesser extent in 
Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels and Los Angeles.155 In each of the trading regions, 
primary trading responsibility for each regional inventory is entrusted to respective regional 
traders. Trading responsibility rotates from one geographical region to another during a 24-
hour period when one region closes and the other opens for business. This permits a ‘single 
book’ or globally integrated operation to be transacted worldwide. 
                                                             
154 Plambeck, supra note 22, at 1143-44. 
155 Supra note 22, at 1144. 
Chapter 8  Formulary Apport ionment Appl ied to the Global Financial  Industry 
 383
The shifting of trading responsibility is illustrated through the operation of Merrill Lynch’s 
government securities arm.156 For example, it is 12.35 pm London time and the ‘book’, that is, 
Merrill’s open trading positions, is about to be transferred from London to New York where it 
is 7.35 am. The two regional managers exchange valuable information over the telephone while 
data from a centralised computer system used to keep track of all trading for the book is made 
available to New York traders. At the end of the trading day in New York, the regional 
manager there goes through the same ritual by passing the book to his Tokyo counterpart. 
To apply a functional analysis as proposed by the OECD is not feasible within the integrated 
trading model. Where the trading book is passed from one country to another and the value of 
the book is achieved by the cooperative effort of staff in more than one location, it is not 
possible to identify and evaluate the different functions in isolation.157 Thus, as the U.K. inland 
revenue admits, ‘if the performers of these functions were acting for independent enterprises 
they might well have agreed to split the profits arising from their activities rather than attempt to 
price distinct transactions and services between them.’158 Thus, a profit-split approach must 
necessarily be the most appropriate apportionment method in such situations.159 
i i  Centralised Product Management Model 
This type of enterprise is composed of a certain number of trading centres clustering around a 
primary trading office called the ‘coordinating office’. Under this structure, the different trading 
centres of the firm maintain separate ‘books’ in a given financial product. Each of the trading 
centres has a limited discretion as to the amount of trade that it can initiate in a particular 
product. However, only the coordinating office has overall authority to monitor the trading 
activities of all the trading centres. Indeed, the coordinating office is responsible for each of its 
trading centres remaining within the limits of exposure determined by higher management.160 
The supervisory role of the coordinating office is facilitated by the fact that individual trading 
centres often enter into inter-branch transactions with the coordinating office that offset their 
third-party transactions. Thus, risks and liabilities are globally adjusted and assets are also 
globally managed to maximise efficiency.161 Enterprises operating along these lines require a 
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‘congruent worldwide portfolio strategy to achieve the goals of cross-border trading (that is, 
to ensure the maximum worldwide portfolio return).’162 Information may be gathered centrally 
or throughout the enterprise network. Such information is then centralised, processed and 
disseminated throughout the network. This trading method establishes a global portfolio 
strategy, it maximises efficiency in the management of a worldwide portfolio, and it reduces 
administrative and infrastructure costs. 
At a particular location, not necessarily that of central management, a product manager is 
entrusted with the responsibility of managing trade in that particular product on a global basis. 
He or she then oversees book runners in the various trade centres around the world while 
traders report to these book runners. Central management is not necessarily a single function 
located exclusively in one jurisdiction. It may be transferred to a particular trading centre on 
the basis of that centre’s level of association with a given transaction. In this configuration 
trading discretion is also passed from one time zone to another but ‘is limited by parameters to 
ensure that jurisdictions comply with the established portfolio strategy.’163 In other words, 
whilst trading authority is passed from one time zone to another, such authority is limited to 
certain specifics or is valid only within set parameters. The key point, therefore, is that although 
authority to trade is passed from one time zone to another, that authority is not general, but is 
restricted to a certain number of products rather than to all the products within the book. In 
addition, limits and restrictions are also imposed as to the level of trading within that particular 
product. 
The centralised product management model is characterised by the moving of risk from sales 
offices, the originating office, to the centre. The main tax issue in this model is whether the 
originating office can be recognised for tax purposes and, if so, on what terms.164 If, by virtue 
of the mirror transaction risk, is transferred from the originating office, then given that it no 
longer assumes any such risk, a mere commission or a share of the initial profit on the deal may 
well be considered as a proper remuneration payable to the originating office. How then 
should the quantum of this commission be determined to satisfy the arm’s length principle? 
Clearly, the issue of comparability again arises. In Professor’s Issing words ‘it is difficult, if at 
all possible, to identify financial products which are fully comparable in the various national 
financial market.’ 165 
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This means that once again taxation authorities are confronted with the difficulties of concluding 
that an appropriate arm’s length ‘price’ for the mirror transaction has been achieved. Several 
other vexed questions arise. For example, if the originating office has participated in the 
structuring of a derivative, is it reasonable to assume that it requires a share of the total profit 
on the deal over and above a commission? If inter-branch transactions are not recognised on a 
worldwide basis and ‘a hedge is transacted centrally, there is a risk that it may not be offset 
against the result of the customer transaction booked at the originating office.’166 
i i i Separate Enterprise Trading Model  
Financial institutions operating along this model maintain inventories of financial products within 
independent trading centres around the world. These centres operate either through the branch 
or subsidiary form. Each trading centre is characterised by its decisional independence from 
the head office or parent company, each normally has its own portfolio and risk management 
although a central location may provide credit risk guidelines. 
The major difficulty in applying the arm’s length principle in a model where each entity within 
the global operation is managed as a separate profit centre is that it may be difficult for a 
‘taxpayer who enters into a forward currency trade with its parent company at 11.00 a.m. on 
March 3, 1997, to show in March 2000, why it chose to trade at 11.10 a.m. rather than at 
10.50 a.m. to price the transaction.’167 This is a situation where the availability of actual third 
party transactions may be problematic. The question, it would appear, may be solved if 
comparables that would serve as a proxy for an arm’s length prices could be identified.  
It is evident that a notable degree of integration exists only with the first two categories of 
operations. Even within these two models the measure of integration differs significantly. If a 
formulary system is conceived for these two models, then such a system cannot be made to 
apply uniformly to both. Indeed, as will be discussed further below, it is doubtful whether an 
inflexible model could be successfully applied across the whole spectrum of enterprises 
operating even in each one of these models. Formulary apportionment is likely to be the most 
appropriate method of apportioning income generated by highly integrated enterprises. It 
follows that if there were to be any chance of successfully applying that method, it would have 
to be relative to the most integrated model within the global financial industry. Consequently, 
the model retained for the application of the proposed formulary method must necessarily be 
the integrated trading model. 
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B Delineating the Tax Base  
The proposed model requires the allocation of global gross accounting profits (or losses) to 
the various trading centres responsible for their generation. Gross accounting profits are to be 
calculated according to uniform international accounting standards. In order to formulate 
standards that would be acceptable throughout the global financial industry, it is important to 
determine where gross profits arise. 
i  The Global Financial Industry Sources of Income 
Global trading in financial instruments contributes to the profits (or losses) of three major 
classes of market participants: capital users, capital suppliers and financial intermediaries. 168 In 
general, financial intermediaries create wealth by servicing the needs of capital users and 
capital suppliers and, therefore, earn their profits from four major sources as set below.  
First, in their role as intermediaries between capital suppliers and capital users, they earn 
commissions and bid/ask spreads from brokering and dealing in globally traded instruments 
that evidence ownership in an underlying item. They also earn fees and spreads from trading 
risk in the form of derivative financial instruments. Again fees are earned through the provision 
of global custodian and research services for investors. 
The second source of profits is through the use of global trading by financial intermediaries to 
satisfy their own portfolio needs. Global trading facilitates the management of the assets and 
liability of a firm because its global balance sheet is under unified management. As a result, 
profits are maximised and the cost of liabilities are minimised by tapping into a variety of 
funding sources, diversifying risks and opting for the best possible deal in the given 
circumstances. 
The third source of profits for financial intermediaries arises from them trading for their own 
account. It would appear that speculation is a major source of revenue. A financial 
intermediary speculates by taking positions with respect to movements in prices, for example, 
interest and exchange rates. Therefore, the ‘operating revenues of a global trading operation 
are essentially a function of price movements and the size of positions.’169 
Finally, because financial intermediaries use sophisticated communications and data processing 
systems, they are able to generate additional profits by capitalising on arbitrage opportunities, 
including tax and regulatory arbitrage.170 
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The ‘book’ is at the base of a global firm’s trading and it is its efficient running that generates 
profits.171 The firm’s trading position as evidenced by the book is spelled out on the screens of 
the in-house computer system to which all trading centres are connected. In this context, a 
trading position is an aggregate of different information such as the firm’s market exposure, its 
profit and loss, and its inventory. The distinctive feature of global trading is the ‘passing’ of the 
book from time zone to time zone around the globe. This does not mean that the location of 
the inventory changes. Neither does this ‘passing’ result in the transfer of legal title from one 
jurisdiction to another. What passes is merely the location of trading authority. The recipient 
trading centre is not a distinct profit centre operating wholly autonomously. Thus firms really 
‘operate in one profit centre mode.’172 
The ‘one profit centre mode concept’ epitomises the integrated and centralised nature of the 
book. It reflects the whole firm’s trading position, and, obviously, the contributions of each 
trading centre to that position are known at all times. However, the sum of these contributions 
is not equal to the total trading position because of obvious synergy profits. Thus arises the 
particular problem of allocating these synergy profits to the various trading centres. 
i i  Accounting Problems Relative to Measuring the Base 
For taxation purposes, derivative instruments need to be valued properly. The choice of a 
particular accounting treatment to that effect is not simple. An appropriate method of 
accounting for derivatives needs to be ‘reasonable...and one that clearly reflects profits, is 
supported by available and reliable data, requires few adjustments, and can be properly 
administered.’173 For the following reasons it is doubtful whether the traditional methods of 
accounting are able to achieve this stated outcome.174 
a The inadequacy of historic cost 
In the historic cost model of accounting, assets and liabilities are recorded at historical rather 
than at market values. This is fundamentally at odds with the intended effect of many of the 
new financial instruments which is to ‘alter the settlement or market values of financial assets 
and liabilities’.175 In a situation where historical cost rather than market values is the norm for 
financial accounting, information relative to the effect of the instruments on the market values of 
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the assets and liabilities is difficult to interpret and therefore fails the intended purpose of a 
financial statement.  
To solve the problem the Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens proposes the use of 
the mark-to-market methodology: 
[A] theoretical answer to this problem is to value all on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
transactions at market value. The trading operations are then marked to market, this method having 
no effect on the net financial position or the net income arising from hedging transaction but 
'revaluation' of on-balance sheet positions at market value when such value is higher than historical 
costs, would be regarded in many countries as being in conflict with general accounting concepts. 
This leads to a general discussion on the validity of the historic cost concept applied to banks.176 
The Fédération then went on to argue that it is nearly impossible for banks engaging in multi-
currency business to identify a single functional currency and, therefore, a single historical cost 
basis. 
b The problem with a transaction-based system 
Accounting, Hancock argues, has traditionally been concerned with the recording of 
transactions, for example, cash sales and purchases.177 These are clear straightforward 
transactions. Conversely, the nature of the transactions associated with the new financial 
instruments is ambiguous. A swap, for example, is neither a deposit, nor a loan or a security. 
The payment and receipt of a fee under a swap are clearly transactions for the payor as well 
as for the payee. How are these transactions to be recorded in the accounting system of each 
of the parties? If income has been earned and an expenditure incurred under a swap, what 
should be the timing of their recognition? These problems led to the following conclusion  
[C]learly, any decision to recognise income in the profit and loss statement with no recognition of 
the transaction in the balance sheet will distort ratios such as return on assets. 178 
c The problem of presenting uncertainty 
Accounting has often been criticised for its inability to record transactions whose outcomes are 
subject to uncertainties. For example, the provision of a single amount for guarantees and 
letters of credit has been considered inappropriate given that, on the one hand, they are 
subject to considerable uncertainties, and that, on the other hand, information relative to these 
uncertainties is usually not provided in the accounts. 
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New financial instruments are also subject to the same uncertainty principle and are therefore 
subject to the same criticisms. A solution advocated has been the provision in accounting 
reports of ‘probability assessments of the range of possible outcomes for the instruments.’179 
d A conceptual framework 
The difficulties in developing rules for new financial instruments arise because of the absence of 
‘a clearly enunciated and readily understood complete statement of the conceptual basis for 
accounting (often referred to as a conceptual framework).’180 When this conceptual 
framework is developed, it would need to contain accepted definitions and recognition criteria 
for assets, liabilities, equity, revenue and expenses against which a transaction would be 
considered in order to determine its appropriate classification. 181 
Financial reporting is basically concerned with reflecting economic reality. It follows that the 
question to be determined when it comes to developing appropriate accounting rules 
applicable to the various financial instruments is to clearly apprehend the economic conditions 
that these instruments are seeking to exploit. 
i i i  International Accounting Standards for Financial Instruments 
In accounting for financial instruments the critical issues that need to be addressed are those of: 
· recognition, that is, the extent to which they meet the definition of assets and liabilities; 
· measurement, or, in other words, the assessment of their worth; and  
· disclosure of risks and other pertinent information that would be useful for the users of 
these financial statements. 
The need for harmonised accounting standards has already been examined in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis.182 At a more specific level, given the competitive pressures arising in the international 
capital markets, the demand for harmonised accounting standards concerning financial 
instruments as well as a single global regulator is becoming more imperative.183 In September 
1991, the International Accounting Standards Committee, in its Exposure Draft 40 (E40), 
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proposed a set of measurements concerning financial instruments.184 E40 classifies financial 
instruments in three categories: 
1. Investing and financing financial instruments 
Investing and financing instruments are those held for a long period of time or until they mature. 
E40 suggests that they be measured at historical cost given that, contrary to derivatives, they 
are not held for risk management, but are held primarily as investment vehicles. 
2. Hedging financial instruments 
The fundamental purpose of ‘hedge accounting’ is to match the recognition of changes in the 
value of the hedging instrument in the profit and loss account with the recognition of equal but 
opposite changes in the value of the particular exposed position.185 Therefore, the primary 
objective of a hedging instrument is to offset the risk of loss arising from a specifically identified 
position that is exposed to a risk of loss as a result of adverse price changes in financial 
markets.186 
To be characterised as an effective hedge, a financial instrument must eliminate or substantially 
reduce the risk of loss from the position being hedged. An effective hedge is one in which there 
is a high degree of correlation between changes in the net market value of the hedging 
instrument and opposite changes in the net market value of the position being hedged.187 
In the case of a perfect hedge the profit or loss on the hedging instrument exactly offsets the 
loss or profit on the exposed position. Conversely, if the hedge has been imperfect, then the 
extent of the imperfection is recognised in the profit and loss account in the same reporting 
period that the profit  or loss on the exposed position is recognised.188 If the hedging financial 
instrument is no longer an effective hedge, that is, if it ceases to reduce substantially the risk of 
loss from the position being hedged, then hedge accounting should be abandoned according to 
E40. The instrument is then reclassified in the two categories earlier defined. Clearly, therefore, 
the characterisation of a hedge instrument is dependent on the management’s intention in 
entering into such a transaction. Consequently, E40 requires that this information be disclosed. 
3. Operating financial instruments 
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An instrument which is neither a hedge nor an investing or financing instrument is regarded by 
the proposed standard as an operating instrument.189 These include speculative instruments 
which are bought or sold for short-term profit. E40 proposes that financial assets and liabilities 
resulting from operating instruments be marked to market at each reporting date, that is, their 
net market value be reassessed at these specific dates. Any changes in the net market value of 
a financial asset or liability should be recognised as revenues or expenses in the reporting 
periods in which the changes occur. 
The criteria proposed by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) for the  
classification of financial instruments have been criticised. Hancock argues that to focus on the 
intention of management in order to determine whether a transaction is a hedge or not is 
unrealistic ‘because of the sheer volume of transactions and the need for coordination across 
all divisions and all countries.’190 Furthermore, the distinction between hedging and 
trading/operating has also been perceived as being arbitrary. Thus Roberts argues that: 
the economic substance of currency contracts undertaken as  hedge transactions and those 
undertaken as speculative transactions is identical; there is no economic justification for defining 
gains and losses on the contracts differently.191 
The author concludes that since the distinction between hedge contracts and speculative 
contracts depends on the subjective motive underlying the transactions, it is essentially 
arbitrary. 
As a result of such adverse comments E40 was withdrawn and E48 was introduced in January 
1994. In response to E48, in March 1995, the IASC issued IAS 32, Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure and Presentation.192 IAS 32 represents the first of a two-phase process. It 
focuses on three issues relative to the disclosure and presentation of financial instruments. 
First, it aims at providing guidance as to: 
the classification of instruments between liabilities and equity, the classification of related interest, 
dividends, losses and gains, and circumstances in which financial assets and financial liabilities 
should be offset. 193 
Second, the Standard deals with: 
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information about factors that affect the amount, timing and certainty of an enterprise’s future cash 
flows relating to financial instruments and accounting policies applied to the instruments. 194 
Third the Standard encourages: 
disclosure of information about the nature and extent of an enterprise’s use of financial 
instruments, the business purpose they serve, the risks associated with them and management’s 
policies for controlling those risks. 195 
The second phase of the IASC strategy to deal with financia l instruments was launched with 
the release of a Discussion Paper in 1997 describing the IASC’s approach to the central 
problem of recognition and measurements of financial instruments and their reporting. The 
IASC Board then established an international joint Working Group with a number of national 
accounting-setters to develop an integrated and harmonised standard on financial instruments 
to be completed by the end of 2000.196 
In June 1998, E62, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurements was released. 
E62 is articulated on the principle that all financial assets and liabilities ought to be disclosed in 
the balance sheet for the sake of transparency and neutrality. Therefore, the initial 
measurement of all financial assets and liabilities, including derivatives, are to be made 
according to the fair value of consideration paid or received. Such questions are far more 
difficult to standardise on a worldwide basis as evidenced by the controversy that these 
proposals have stirred in the banking industry.197 Even the U.S. Financial Accounting 
Standards Board has ‘struggled’ with these issues without any success as yet. In fact, as 
argued by Epstein and Mirza, ‘the only new ground broken by the IASC has been to commit 
to a strict substance over form approach and to require separate presentation of disparate 
elements of compound financial instruments.’198  
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including the accounting problems relative to the reporting of future events such as provisioning and hedging; 
see Australian Accounting Standards Board, AASB Issues Policy on International Harmonisation, Media 
Release 2 May 1996. 
197 See Joint Working Group on Standards Setters, ‘Financial Instruments: Issues Relating to Banks’, (31 August 
1999), at <http://www.iasc.org.uk> & Joint Working Group of Banking Associations on Financial Instruments, 
‘Accounting for Financial Instruments for Banks’, (4 October 1999), at <http:\\www.iasc.org.uk>. 
198 B.J. Epstein & A.L. Mirza, IAS 97: Interpretation and Application of International Accounting Standards (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1997) 130. 
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After some changes decided by the IASC Board in November and December 1998, IAS 39: 
Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement was released in February 1999 to 
be effective for financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2001.199 
The major objective of Intertax is to allocate to each of its members a fair share of the profits 
of global trading institutions. To achieve this, Intertax must necessarily start from financial 
statements that are clear and unambiguous. The IASC aims at producing such standards which 
‘faithfully represent transactions and events’.200 The success of the model proposed in this 
thesis, therefore, is based to a large extent on the successful application by Intertax of the 
IASC’s standards relative to financial instruments. In this regard, consensus on the 
appropriateness of some of these standards has not yet been achieved. As mentioned earlier, 
the provisions of IAS 39 is premised on fair value measurement of financial instruments. Some 
representatives of the banking industry deny the relevance of fair value. They hold that, as far 
as the banking industry is concerned, a cost-based or mixed cost/fair value-based system for 
general external financial reporting purposes is more appropriate.201 The argument is that ‘a full 
fair value system does not provide a sound basis for predicting banking book net cash flows 
and [therefore] lack relevance.’202 It is to be noted that those objections do no t apply to short-
term transactions in a trading environment.203 
It is submitted that there should be no differentiation in the accounting treatment of activities 
whose finality is the same. Clearly, therefore, all the transactions carried out by all financial 
institutions need to be measured by a common measurement rule that is most likely to clearly 
reflect the income of global financial institutions. 
Whilst it would appear that a part of the banking industry questions the relevance of fair 
system for the banking book, that is, non-trading items, it does approve the system for trading 
activities. Thus, it would appear that there is consensus as to the appropriateness of market 
values for the global financial industry. In Walley’s opinion, this method:204 
· is a simple way of computing profitability; 
                                                             
199 For an insight into IAS 39, see IAS 39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurements , at 
<http:www.iasc.org.uk>. 
200 The Australian Research Foundation, Proposed Statement of Accounting Concepts SAC 3, at 16. 
201 Joint Working Group of Banking Associations on Financial Instruments, supra note 197, at 6.  
202 Supra note 197, at 4. 
203 Supra note 197, at 1. 
204 M. Walley, ‘Interest Rate and Currency Swap: Characteristics and Accounting Implications of New Financial 
instruments’, (OECD Symposium on New Financial Instruments, Paris 31 May-1 June 1988) 19, at 20. 
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· records accurately the profits and losses earned by a trader rather than those merely 
realised; 
· is consistent with the view that profits and losses arising in respect of marketable 
instruments should be recognised whether realised or not, merely by virtue of their 
realisability, either by disposal in the secondary market or by executing the 
appropriate hedging action; 
· avoids the distortions caused by hedge accounting; and 
· records more accurately the impact of interest-rate risk on the profits of the bank. 
Where a fully hedged portfolio exists, the mark-to-market approach effectively achieves the 
spreading of ‘locked-in’ profits over the life of the transactions within it. 
The arguments in support of this view are convincing. Indeed, it has even been claimed that 
market values need to be used for the measurement of all assets and liabilities of financial 
institutions.205 In the field of derivative financial instruments many financial institutions use the 
mark-to-market methodology to value the global book at the time of receipt and that of 
passing the book from one time zone to another in order to determine the contribution of the 
traders in each jurisdiction. 206 Having thus determined the allocable trading profit, what is left is 
to allocate expenses incurred for the derivation of such gross profits. This allocation is 
performed ‘either under the traditional realization approach or under a formula allocation.’207  
It is important to note that this practice achieves the apportionment of net profits between 
jurisdictions. Indeed, since the gross contribution of each trading centre is known pursuant to 
the practice of marking the book to market prior to passing it, what remains to be carried out 
is the allocation of expenses by way of a formula. This approach, although relatively objective, 
has certain weaknesses. It is particularly suitable for products that are traded in stable 
markets. In addition, the system allocates profits by market movements rather than on traders’ 
performance. Finally, it does not cater for cases where there are time zone overlaps or 
simultaneous trading.208 
The model proposed by this thesis requires the division of the global gross operating profits 
according to an agreed formula. If it is taken that agreement will eventually be reached as to 
                                                             
205 G.J. Benston et al., Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking: Past, Present and Future (MIT Press, 1986).  
206 Plambeck, supra note 22, at 1155. 
207 Supra note 22, at 1155. 
208 Supra note 22, at 1155. 
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the use of internationally accepted accounting standards to be released by the IASC,209 and if 
the mark-to-market approach for the measurement of the base is achieved, then what remains 
to be found is an appropriate formula or formulas for its apportionment. Although this proposal 
may seem to be radical, one must remember that even Lawrence Summers, the deputy 
secretary of the Treasury–before he came to Treasury–was of the opinion that a move to 
formulary apportionment in the international context was inevitable.210 Therefore, as Senator 
Dorgan says, ‘[T]he change will come inevitably, the question is how do we get there.’  
2 The Search for an Appropriate Formula 
An apportionment formula is composed of factors which attempt to attribute a portion of the 
business income derived from a particular jurisdiction or attributable to sources within that 
jurisdiction. A formula needs to be theoretically sound and relatively easy to administer. 
Theoretical considerations are satisfied if a formula reflects the factors that contribute to or 
measure the processes involved in the earning of business income. What then are those factors 
which, in the global financial industry, perform these functions? 
A The Wealth -Creating Factors 
The profitability of an international operation rests on many factors. Today is the era of human 
capital.211 This means that skilled and educated people are at the centre of the production 
process, whether in manufacturing or in services. In the global financial industry the traders are, 
without doubt, of major importance since the profitability of their firm is directly proportional 
to their performance. They are indeed the ‘gold-collar’ workers and are remunerated primarily 
by way of a bonus based on the profitability of the book as a whole together with a base 
salary. 
The sales persons, management and support staff are also of crucial importance to the efficient 
running of the firm. They contribute to a significant extent to the creation of wealth in the global 
financial industry by respectively finding customers, managing the firm’s business, and 
providing systems that enable decisions to be made. 
                                                             
209 On the 2 May 1996, the Chairman of the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB), Mr Ken Spencer, 
announced that while the Board intends pursuing its objective of achieving a set of harmonised global accounting 
standards applicable in the world major capital market, the interim objective of the AASB is ‘to work towards 
ensuring that financial reports prepared in accordance with Australian accounting standards comply with the 
International Accounting Standards Committee’s (IASC’s) standards.’ See Australian Accounting Standards 
Board, supra note 196. 
210 A. O’Connell Devereaux & A.M. Fernandez, ‘International Tax Developments Discussed at TEI Midyear 
Conference’ (24 March 1997) 14 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 12) 967, at 969. 
211 R. Crawford, In the Era of Human Capital (Harper Business, 1991). 
Chapter 8  Formulary Apport ionment Appl ied to the Global Financial  Industry 
 396
Clearly, the labour factor, or human capital, must be one of the major factors in any 
apportionment formula designed for the industry. However, given the different levels of staffing 
and the qualitative differences in various trading centres, the question is what weight needs to 
be accorded to each group comprising the labour force? A further question is whether the 
factor should be valued in monetary units or whether the number of personnel in each category 
should be taken into account. Even the OECD advocates in its Discussion Paper the need to 
consider the number of employees rather than their monetary compensation.212 
A second factor in the creation of wealth in this area is property. Property in this context 
consists mainly of communications and computer equipment and office space but as is argued 
further below it also reflects the level of capitalisation of the operation.  
Global trading in financial products is dependent on technology since ‘an electronic position-
keeping system is a prerequisite for 24-hour operations.’213 Computer technology and 
telecommunications constitute, therefore, another factor which needs to be prominent in an 
apportionment fraction. The standard equipment and software used are relatively easy to 
value. There remains, however, the usual problem of valuing special software that incorporates 
valuable intangible property. 
Standard software is readily available for running a system, and this is traded in the market. 
However, the design of a system specific to a firm’s needs and in line with its management 
philosophy requires the modification of standard software and the incorporation of costly 
inputs which constitute valuable intangibles. Thus, the OECD also advocates the position 
adopted in this thesis relative to intangibles. It maintains that ‘intangibles owned by the 
enterprise are recognized as belonging to a whole corporation and not to a particular location’ 
so that intangibles should not be included as an allocation factor.214 In the global financial 
industry, the proposed solution relative to intangibles is also applicable. Each trading centre of 
the international firm must be regarded as having contributed to the development of the 
intangible in question through either a real or a notional cost-sharing arrangement. 
As for office space, the usual problem of large differences in value among the various trading 
centres is ever present. Again it is suggested that floor space be taken into consideration rather 
                                                             
212 OECD (1998), supra  note 14, at 43-44 para. 175. 
213 L. Marion, ‘Creating a Global Book’, (March 1987) Institutional Investor 231, at 232. 
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than the annual rental value, although the amount of floor space used is directly related to the 
price of the property itself or its rental value.215 
Finally, the amount of revenue generated by a firm trading globally depends on the volume of 
business it conducts, the expenses it incurs, and the risks it assumes in the process. It has been 
suggested that all derivative products are valued on a mark-to-market basis. This means 
therefore that their aggregate net present value, and such value broken down for each trading 
centre, is known. 
If the expenses incurred by each trading centre is considered a relevant factor in the derivation 
of the aggregate gross income of the firm, then a ratio can be worked out between expenses 
incurred and revenue derived which be included in an apportionment factor. 
B A Suggested Formula 
It is evident that different formulas for the apportionment of income from global operations 
may be proposed. For example, the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) has, on 17 
November 1994 adopted the ‘Proposed Uniform Method for Allocation and Apportionment 
of Net Income from Financial Institutions’.216 The formula proposed therein consists of three 
factors, namely a receipts factor, a property factor, and a payroll factor. To date, uniformity in 
this area has not been achieved given that certain U.S. states still promote variations in nexus 
rules, covered financial institutions, combined factor reporting, and factor weighting. 217 
The model proposed in this thesis requires that the chosen formula apportion gross accounting 
profits derived by financial institutions operating globally. In this regard, it is appropriate, when 
devising the formula, to refer to the principles which guided the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Container Corp. of America v Franchise Tax Board.218 The Court made it clear in 
Container that an apportionment formula must not be arbitrary and that its outcome be 
reasonable. In fact, the Court held that a rough approximation rather than scientific precision is 
all that is required of an apportionment formula. These standards, together with administrative 
feasibility, are what is required of any formula applicable to TNCs. 
When the problem of designing a worldwide formula is considered, the first observation is that 
the players in the global financial industry do not operate along the same lines. Consequently, it 
                                                             
215 Even when floor space is used a problem is likely to arise in that there is a marked difference between the costs 
of maintaining certain centres. Thus in order to lessen the impact of high cost centres on the apportionment 
formula, and on equity grounds, careful consideration needs to be paid to the weighting of the property factor.  
216 P.M. Plant and R.P. Edwards, ‘MTC Financial Institutions Regulations, Summary of 1996 Actions by States’, 
74 Taxes , (November 1996) 677. 
217 Id., at 684. 
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is certain that a single relatively uncomplicated formula would never satisfy the requirements of 
the industry in general. In fact, given the general tendency for the emergence of mega-players 
in the world of global finance, it may be possible, at some stage, to contemplate an 
individualised formula for each of these players. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this thesis, a 
basic formula needs to be proposed even though modifications to suit particular circumstances 
might be required. 
In the world of global finance, labour and property are the two factors directly responsible for 
generating revenue. They should therefore constitute the only two factors in an apportionment 
formula. 
The labour factor needs to be a four-tier factor with different weights to each tier in order to 
reflect the different levels of contribution of the traders, management, sales and the support 
personnel.  
As for the property factor, it should integrate both the tangible and intangible elements. Again 
the problem of valuation arises. For the tangible element there seems to be less difficulty in 
valuing standard equipment. However, difficulties arise with the valuation of floor space used. 
It has already been suggested that surface area be used rather than monetary value. As for 
intangible property, if there is a cost-sharing agreement as between the various trading centres, 
the share of each of the latter in developing the intangible is to be regarded as forming part of 
the numerator whilst the denominator would consist of the aggregate cost of developing the 
intangible. 
Such a formula would give a certain allocation percentage which, when multiplied by the global 
gross profit, would result in the allocation of the latter to each jurisdiction. 
Thus for a given fiscal period, the gross global profit is allocated say to Trade Centre A on the 
basis of the following formula: 
Trade Centre A’s Share of Total Global Profit = [Total Global Profit] x [Allocation 
Percentage] 
Allocation Percentage = [(L) + (P)] x [100/1]  
Where: L = Labour Factor as calculated below 
  P = Property Factor as calculated below 
Labour Factor: {4 tiers, different weights to each tier} 
L = W L x {[WT x TNA / TNT] + [WM x MNA / MNT] + [WS x SNA / SNT] +  
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[WSS x SSNA / SSNT]}219 
Where: 
WL = the weighting applicable to the labour factor 
WT = the weighting applicable to the traders’ contribution to profit  
WM = the weighting applicable to the management staffs’ contribution to profit 
WS = the weighting applicable to the salespersons’ contribution to profit  
WSS = the weighting applicable to the support staffs’ contribution to profit 
TNA = the number of traders located in Centre A 
MNA = the number of management staff located in Centre A 
SNA = the number of salespersons located in Centre A 
SSNA = the number of support staff located in Centre A 
TNT = the total number of traders worldwide 
MNT = the total number of management staff worldwide 
SNT = the total number of salespersons worldwide 
SSNT = the total number of support staff worldwide 
Property Factor: 
{IP is based on the value of standard equipment in monetary terms and, therefore, needs a 
common currency: TP is based on surface area} 
P = W P x {WIP x IPA / IPT] + [WTPE x TPAE / TPTE] + [WTPS x TPAS / TPTS] 
Where:  
WP = the weighting applicable to the overall property factor220 
WIP = the weighting applicable to intangible property 
WTPE = the weighting applicable to tangible property in the form of equipment 
WTPS = the weighting applicable to tangible property in the form of office space221 
IPA = the cost of intangible property located in Centre A222 
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220 WP + WL = 1. If equal weighting is given to the labour and property factors then WP = WL = 0
.5. 
221 WIP + WTPE + WTPS = 1 
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IPT = the total cost of intangible property worldwide
223 
TPAE = the cost of tangible property, ie, equipment located in Centre A
224 
TPTE = the total cost of tangible property, ie, equipment worldwide
225 
TPAS = the floor area of tangible property, ie office space located in Centre A 
TPTS = the floor area of tangible property, ie office space worldwide. 
There is an argument that since risk is a major factor in the financial service industry, it needs 
to be accounted for and thus be a determinative factor in any apportionment formula for the 
global financial sector.  
Risk, in general, is ‘defined by the adverse impact on profitability of several distinct sources of 
uncertainty.’226 In the general corporate context, risk may be considered as the exposure to 
the possibility of economic or financial loss (or gain) as a consequence of pursuing or not 
pursuing a particular course of action. In order to control its profitability, a business needs to 
properly manage its risk exposure.227 Thus, risks must be identified and a decision made as to 
which part of the enterprise is likely to assume the risks.228  Such risk management is a crucial 
aspect of the banking business because there is a direct correlation between profitability and 
risk-taking.  
In order to assume the risk of doing business, the OECD holds that a global trading enterprise 
needs a strong capital base and credit rating, especially in the case of trading in ‘over-the-
counter’ (OTC) derivatives. Likewise, the U.S. regulations on global dealing regard capital as 
a proxy for risk-taking. The reason underlying the recognition that an adequate level of capital 
is critical to enable a global trading business to carry out its activities arises because any losses 
that may be sustained by the business is cushioned or absorbed by its capital.229 It follows that 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
222 These costs need to be denominated in the same currency, that is, currency translations will become necessary. 
223 Ibid . 
224 Ibid . 
225 Ibid . 
226  J. Bessis, Risk Management in Banking (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1998), at 5. 
227  For an overview of these functions, see Bessis, supra note 226, at 24ff. 
228  This assumes that the enterprise is a multi-entity one, or if of a single entity, is run as if it consisted of separate 
entities with specialisation of functions. If such different functional units are located in various jurisdictions, 
there arises several international tax issues whose resolution are the primary objective of the various relevant 
stakeholders. 
229  See J.F. Sinkey, Jr., ‘Risk Exposure of Banks’ in Peter Newman, Murray Milgate & John Eatwell (eds), The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Money & Finance  (London: The Macmillan Press Limited, 1992) Vol. 3 N-Z , at 
371. 
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a critical relationship exists between the adequacy of a financial institution’s capital and its 
policy towards risk. Indeed, it is the policy of monetary authorities to ensure that a financial 
institution maintains an appropriate capital cover against the risks it assumes in the ordinary 
course of its business. 
What then is capital? The word itself derives its meaning according to its context. It may have 
several meanings, such as, wealth, a factor or a means of production, the value of those means 
of production, the net worth of a business enterprise, the present value of a future sequence of 
receipts, money, or the money value of assets.230 From an accounting point of view, capital 
represents the assets held by a business. Risk is controlled by and directly referable to the 
quantum of capital. It follows, therefore, that in a formula which apportions profits, a discrete 
risk factor is otiose; it is represented in the quantum of capital, given that capital, represented 
by assets, is already accounted within the property factor. This, it is submitted, is the main 
reason for the refusal of the U.S. Treasury to include capital as an apportionment factor for the 
allocation of profits among the different branches of a global dealing institution. Indeed, as 
already shown, Proposed Regulation §1.863-3(h)(3)(ii) states: 
[S]ince the entire capital of a corporation supports all of the entity's transactions, regardless of 
where those transactions may be booked, the payment of a guarantee fee within the entity is 
inappropriate and will be disregarded. 
Consequently, to include a risk factor in the apportionment formula would be a clear case of 
double counting. Moreover, the inclusion of a capital factor in apportionment formula may be 
counterproductive according to a study of the Institute for Fiscal Studies, London (IFS) which 
argues that: 
[I]f companies can no longer minimize their tax burden by shifting profits, then the taxation of real 
activity becomes important to them and the location of real investment becomes more sensitive to 
capital taxation…Such an outcome could occur under formula apportionment. Although formula 
apport ionment generally eliminates the ability to shift profits, if the formula includes a capital based 
factor, the location of investment will be distorted as governments attempt to tax the average return, 
rather than the marginal return, on capital located in their state.231 
As was noted at the IFS conference, that result does not arise in an apportionment formula 
system such as the one used in Canada because of the absence of capital in the formula. 
The formula proposed in this thesis is tentative. There is no doubt that it requires to be tested 
in real situations in order to determine its exact value. However, arguably, it satisfies the tests 
of reasonableness and simplicity. If it were to be applied centrally through an international tax 
                                                             
230  J.H. Farrar, Company Law, (London: Butterworths, 1985) at 125. 
231  See J. Weiner, ‘News Analysis: Institute for Fiscal Studies Reports on EU Corporate Tax Harmonization’, Tax 
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organisation as proposed in this thesis, it would also satisfy the ease of administration criterion. 
Moreover, it is not premised on factors that are totally unconnected with the business of 
earning a reasonable return from dealing with financial products. In fact, it captures the essence 
of the banking business which, from time immemorial, has been to make an optimum use of 
financial capital in conjunction with human capital in order to create value. It enables the 
sharing of that value between those who have contributed to its creation, that is, the owners, 
the workers, and the jurisdictions having a nexus with that process. In short, it satisfies the test 
enunciated by Lawrence Summers in that it promotes competitiveness and prevents tax 
avoidance.232 
 
                                                             
232  See L.H . Summers (1996), in Chapter 5, Section I, n 1, at 184. 
CONCLUSION 
At the core of the emerging global system of international commerce is the principle of 
economic liberalisation and free trade. The key concept of globalisation is that the constant 
removal of existing impediments to trade leads to greater welfare and a substantial increase in 
the overall standard of living around the world. Such concepts, articulated through broad 
economic law principles, are rapidly gaining worldwide ascendancy in spite of some localised 
resistance.1 The global application of these principles in an environment of rapid technological 
innovation has already altered to a large extent the way international business operations are 
carried out. Concurrently, this emerging model is inexorably impacting on the existing system 
of international taxation causing tensions which, as demonstrated throughout this thesis, the 
existing system cannot fully absorb. If the present system of corporate income taxation is to be 
maintained in this global environment, then it is inevitable that some part of tax jurisdiction will 
pass from the national to the international level. 
The major players in this new environment are transnational corporations (TNCs). TNCs 
today engage in two major activities. First, they invest in firm specific assets such as know-
how and innovative technologies. Second, they are engaged in the production and sale of 
goods and services. For each of these two activities TNCs use different inputs. Thus, while 
their investments in research and development (R&D) or other firm specific assets is often 
highly localised for cost-effective reasons, their investments in the production of goods is often 
made in response to the availability of factors of production and adequate tax incentives. 
TNCs, each with its own technologies and know-how, compete with each other in an 
increasingly globalised market where production activities are dispersed around the world 
whilst the coordination and management of these entities are centralised.2 Increased 
competition means increase in world trade which in the end means an increase in overall 
economic welfare. In addition, since TNCs consider their tax burden as a cost which needs to 
be adequately managed, they also devise strategies to this end. These strategies, including the 
so-called dowry-chasing, if not contained, may ultimately lead to ruinous tax competition 
between nations. 
One of the ways of achieving the dual objective of promoting TNC activities while preventing 
the emergence of destructive tax competition between various nations is by removing any tax 
                                                             
1  Such resistance is based on the belief that globalisation is more destructive than advantageous for the world at 
large. It should be clearly understood that in order to stem such opposition, the globalisation process must be 
harnessed in such a way that its effects are made more equitable. One of the most appropriate ways of sharing 
the gains from globalisation is the institution of a new international tax system based on worldwide formulary 
apportionment. 
2 See S. Sassen, La ville globale (Paris: Descartes & Cie, 1996). 
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measures that inhibit international competition so that, in general, TNCs face an approximately 
equal tax burden regardless of their location. The ultimate goal, therefore, may be ‘the 
harmonization of international tax rules of countries in which significant numbers of MNCs 
[multinational corporations] are based.’3 
It is submitted that the system proposed in this thesis goes a long way to creating this 
harmonised model. Prior to arriving at this conclusion, the thesis first reviewed the origins of 
the present system of international taxation in order to place the debate in a proper historical 
perspective. Thus, the compromises wrought out in the 1930s when the system was devised 
were examined. Second, the legal base for the taxation of TNCs with its limitations was 
considered. Finally, the ongoing efforts to finetune the system were critically studied with the 
conclusion that, as a result of its inherent limitations and the emergence of the profound 
changes brought about by economic liberalisation, an overhaul of the system is necessary. 
This analysis uncovered a number of critical elements. First, clearly, in today’s global economy 
the taxation of international business operations can no longer be premised on the fiction that 
the constituents parts of TNCs carry substantial business operations as separate and 
independent entities. What is certain is that if conventional theory, which continues to treat 
separately what is in fact inseparable, is not abandoned, then ‘inevitably the result must be 
arbitrary and capricious’.4 
This fundamental issue of the inability of the separate accounting/arm’s length method to deal 
adequately with integrated business operations has already been confronted and solved by the 
U.S. states. The solution involves the recognition of the full range of economic synergies that 
arises within an economically integrated enterprise operating in a global market. It 
acknowledges the impossibility of identifying where income is earned because an integrated 
enterprise benefits from economies of scale and the ability to minimise risks. In addition, ‘the 
fact that technical expertise and information can often be obtained more cost effectively when 
it is fixed in the minds of employees than when it has to be purchased on the open market’5 
also increases the firm’s efficiency. Such efficiencies generate value for the whole enterprise 
that is greater than the sum of the parts. 
                                                             
3 See D.J. Frish, ‘The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches’, (30 April 1990) 
Tax Notes 581, at 590.  
4 See F.M. Keesling, ‘A Current Look at the Combined Report and Uniformity in Allocation Practices’, (1975) 
42 J. Tax'n 106, at 107.  
5 See D.R. Bucks & M. Mazerov, ‘The State Solution to the Federal Government’s International Transfer Pricing 
Problem, 46 National Tax Journal (3 September 1993) 385, at 388.  
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This thesis examines the mechanics of the emerging global economy. It shows the processes 
by which enterprises seek, by rationalising their operations, to achieve efficiencies and create 
value. It then analyses the weaknesses of the present separate entity/arm’s length standard and 
shows how and why it is incapable of measuring and dividing such value among the separate 
legal entities which constitute a TNC. What is found is that if applied to global trading 
operations the separate entity/arm’s length standard allows significant under-taxation and, 
therefore, substantial revenue losses, which are likely to increase as a result of further 
integration. 
The second critical element pertaining to this new economic environment is that, save a major 
catastrophe, further integration is likely to occur in spite of the market corrections which occur 
at regular intervals in the international capital markets. The incidence of these developments on 
the present system of international taxation has also been fully explored. The conclusion 
reached is that while there is an obvious growth of the bilateral treaty network, an increasing 
need is being felt for a multilateral solution to the problem of international taxation. Indeed, the 
need is evolving from one of accommodation of various national tax systems to one that would 
be more institutional in nature. In addition, in the field of tax administration, the subtle surrender 
of national sovereignty as a result of the emergence of new rules and practices, more especially 
in the field of dispute resolution and assistance in tax matters, is well evidenced. This transition, 
it has been argued, is being fostered by the increased interconnectedness and cooperation 
between such organisations as the IMF, the OECD, the EU and the WTO. Clearly, therefore, 
the emergence in the medium term of an international institution resulting from the various 
formal or informal arrangements among existing international organisations dealing with taxation 
is under way. 
This development is still rudimentary. What this thesis advocates is merely an acceleration and 
amplification of the process. It therefore proposes the creation of an international tax 
organisation, the so-called Intertax, whose mandate, powers and functions are to be defined 
by a multilateral treaty. Calls for the creation of such an organisation are not new and yet the 
objections to it have often been vehement. Such objections stem mainly from the perceived 
reluctance of nations to forgo some of their fiscal sovereignty. In addition, concerns have been 
expressed that it might degenerate into some kind of international tax police. When these 
objections are critically assessed, the advantages accruing to both taxpayers and governments 
in terms of increased equity, efficiency and simplicity are clearly demonstrated. On a more 
positive note, the argument for the creation of Intertax is premised on the fact that economic 
liberalisation, the intricacies of modern commercial methods, and the advent of new 
technologies require the institution of a new cooperative arrangement that deals with the 
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problem of international taxation in a fundamental and innovative way. The possibility of 
achieving such cooperation through existing structures is also explored. However, the general 
conclusion reached is that the creation of a specialised international organisation is a more 
convenient way to achieve this outcome.  
Central to this thesis is the submission that the interests of both TNCs and national jurisdictions 
are best served if the apportionment question, that is, the division of the international tax base 
resulting from cross-border business activities, is carried out through a formulary methodology 
in lieu of the present separate accounting/arm’s length principle. It is first demonstrated that a 
TNC is in reality a single business which, for purely legal convenience, is divided into 
separately incorporated subsidiaries. As such, inter-company transactions ‘cannot produce a 
real economic profit or loss and must therefore be eliminated from tax consideration.’6 
Therefore, real economic profits need be apportioned according to an index of the real 
economic contribution of each subsidiary to the production of these profits.7 Such a system ‘is 
economically more rational and less arbitrary than separate accounting.’8  
Moreover, rather than attempting to merely compare the merits of the separate 
accounting/arm’s length principle and formulary apportionment methodologies, this thesis 
focuses on the ways and methods of reconciling these two approaches. It shows that these 
methods are at the opposite ends of a continuum with transactional profit-based 
methodologies in the middle. In other words, the argument holds that because of economic 
liberalisation and other factors already mentioned the pendulum must necessarily swing 
towards the proposed methodology with the separate accounting/arm’s length principle 
retaining an important residual role where the correctness of its application is beyond doubt. 
On a more practical basis, the proposed system requires a minimum surrender of fiscal 
sovereignty to an international organisation whose sole objective is to shoulder the logistics of 
implementing the system. In general, Intertax would be required to: 
· measure a TNC’s global commercial profits through the use of international 
harmonised accounting standards, and 
· determine each relevant country’s share of such profits through the application of an 
appropriate formula. 
                                                             
6 Note, ‘Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation Under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code’, 
(1976) 89 Harv. L. R. 1202, at 1206.  
7 P.B. Musgrave, ‘International Tax Base Division and the Multinational Corporation’, (1972) 27  Pub. Fin. 394, 
at 398-99. 
8 P.B. Musgrave, ‘Auditing Multinational Firms: The Unitary Versus the Separate Entity Approach’, (1979) 29 
American University Law Review (No. 1) 361, at 363.  
Conclusion 
 409
Clearly, the proposed solution requires also the adoption of harmonised international 
accounting standards for measuring the international tax base. If this is achieved, then even 
compliance costs, which are often labelled as one of the major defects of global formulary 
apportionment, are likely to be reasonable. Indeed, the level of compliance costs will depend 
largely on the degree of uniformity achieved.9 There is already a more decisive move towards 
the adoption of such international standards as proposed by the IASC as evidenced, for 
example, by the renewed interest in these standards in the U.S. and in Australia. This means, 
therefore, that one of the fundamental preconditions for the successful implementation of the 
proposed system is on the verge of being independently achieved. 
It is also critical to emphasise the minimalist approach which characterises the proposed 
system. The latter does not require countries to surrender the process of calculating their own 
tax liability. Intertax’s mission is simply to calculate the share of a TNC’s commercial profits 
that is to be apportioned to a particular jurisdiction within the parameters set by the multilateral 
treaty creating it. These commercial profits are determinable by strictly following a complete 
set of international accounting standards produced by the IASC. Apportionment of these 
profits is then made by way of an apportionment formula or formulas so that each jurisdiction 
is given a share of the profits based on the contributions achieved by the factors located within 
its borders, with capital assets, payroll, and sales examined for illustrative purposes only. It 
follows that other more appropriate factors may be considered. Once this apportionment 
exercise is achieved, each country would be free, starting from its share of the commercial 
profits, to determine the taxable income, and, ultimately, the tax payable within its jurisdiction. 
In other words, each country would remain sovereign in determining its tax rate and adopting 
whatever tax accounting rules it deems fit relative to its policy objectives. This process is thus 
simple, mechanical and objective.10 
In line with the submission that the proposed system is merely at one end of a continuum rather 
than a radically new proposition, it is to be noted that it may be characterised as a formulary 
profit-split system similar to a large extent to that advocated by the OECD as a method of last 
resort. Such a system is particularly appropriate for truly global trading operations, thus the 
choice of global trading in financial products to illustrate the practical application of the 
proposed system. Therefore, far from being a completely novel solution, the proposed system 
is in reality the practical expression of the current evolution of the present system.  
                                                             
9 J.M. Weiner, ‘Using the Experience in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues in Implementing Formula 
Apportionment at the International Level’, (23 December 1996) Tax Notes Int’l 2113, at 2133. 
10 B.F. Miller, ‘None are so Blind as Those Who will not See’, (13 February 1995) Tax Notes  1023, at 1030.  
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Nevertheless, the OECD’s warning that ‘a profit split method is only acceptable if the factors 
used to allocate world-wide profits will produce a result consistent with what would have been 
realised if the parties were independent’11 has to be addressed, although it could be argued 
that if it were possible to ascertain in the first place an arm’s length division of the profits of an 
integrated financial firm, then there would no reason to resort to a profit split approach. The 
thesis demonstrates that this objection, which is really the same as maintaining that global 
formulary apportionment is arbitrary and ignores market conditions, is inapplicable in the 
proposed system. This is because the proposed system rejects the application of a single all-
purpose formula. Rather, it recognises that TNCs operating in different industries require 
different treatment and, therefore, suggests the adoption of different formulas to satisfy specific 
industry requirements. Thus, for example, the proposed formula applicable to a financial 
institution would certainly be different to that applicable to the pharmaceutical industry. 
Therefore, the system affords comparable treatment to any TNC operating within a given 
industry. 
Moreover, the common denominator for each formula is the fundamental necessity for it to 
capture the functions assets and risks assumed within that industry. Any formula that Intertax is 
called upon to apply may, if the need arises, be finetuned to fit specific situations. In this 
connection, it is pertinent to note that the OECD already accepts ‘the selected application of a 
formula developed by both tax administrations in cooperation with a specific taxpayer or 
MNE group…such as it might be used in a mutual agreement procedure, advance transfer 
pricing agreement, or other bilateral or multilateral determination.’12 The proposed system, 
whilst going beyond these overtly prudent limitations, can thus be reconciled with the separate 
accounting/arm’s length as now enunciated by the OECD. Both systems have the same 
preoccupations, although it is arguable that the proposed model is merely an institutionalised 
version of the very system advocated by the OECD. In the words of Professor Bird: 
in practice, there is much less difference between the way the arm’s length approach actually works 
and how a reasonable formulary system would work than between the two idealized conceptions 
that so often are opposed in literature.13 
The proposed approach is not a panacea for every issue arising from the limitations in the 
present system of international taxation. It has, however, ‘the great benefit...of attacking the 
international tax problems arising under the OECD Model at their root and therefore the 
                                                             
11 OECD, The Taxation of Global Trading Of Financial Instruments: A Discussion Draft (Paris: OECD, 1997) 
Document OECD/GD(97)29, at 36 para. 166. 
12 OECD, Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrators (Paris: OECD, 1995), at III-20 para. 3.60. 
13 R.M. Bird, ‘A View From the North’, (1994) 49 Tax Law Review 745, at 752. 
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ongoing tinkering and interactions that second-best solutions to tax problems usually entail 
would be reduced if not eliminated.’14 Certain difficulties may be envisaged if it were to be 
implemented. These are, however, not insurmountable. 
First, under the proposed method, TNCs may have an incentive to manipulate the rules in 
order to either fall within or without the definition of an integrated enterprise. It is a notoriously 
difficult proposition to trace corporate inter-relationships given the secrecy laws of various 
nations. However, such manipulations may be seriously undermined if de facto rather than de 
jure relationships are considered. 
Second, the question arises as to whether Intertax should act as a tax collector in addition to it 
determining the claim of each country to the international tax base arising from the cross-
border activities of TNCs. The question of tax collection may be dealt with by maintaining 
‘international business and withholding tax collection regimes.’15 Thus, for example, a 
withholding tax could still be collected by each relevant jurisdiction with Intertax acting as a 
clearinghouse administering some form of set-off mechanism between various countries. 
Third, it is most probable that a certain number of countries, unconvinced as to its advantages, 
would remain outside the system. It is therefore fundamental to the success of the proposed 
method that the major trading nations be part of the system. This will create a critical mass 
essential to enable its coherent application. If this is not achieved, then a dual system would 
coexist, that is, one group of nations would be linked to a multilateral system while the rest 
would remain within a bilateral system. The linkages in the emerging global economic system 
are such, however, that serious disruptions will arise when these two blocs interact.  
A corollary problem relates to free-riders, such as tax havens, which would deliberately opt to 
remain outside the system in order to exploit its weaknesses. However, it is unlikely that tax 
havens could seriously interfere with the integrity of the proposed system. Indeed, the method 
allocates income only to those countries which are able to demonstrate that TNCs carried out 
substantial commercial activities within their jurisdiction. Therefore, any artificial location of 
transactions within tax havens will be irrelevant for allocation purposes. In the words of 
Professor Pomp: 
A combined report, however, automatically deals with tax haven corporations in a more complete 
manner. Intercorporate transactions among corporations included in a combin ed report have no 
effect. Consequently, much of the income shifting opportunities facilitated by the use of a tax 
haven corporation would be undone. Moreover, to the extent that few activities of substance would 
                                                             
14 R.J. Vann, ‘A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region?’, (April 1991) 45 Bull Int’l Fiscal 
Documentation 151, at 159. 
15 Ibid . 
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take place in the haven country, the apportionment formula also would be unaffected. Because 
neither the preapportionment tax base nor the apportionment formula would be affected, a 
combined report would undercut the goals of using a tax haven.16 
In addition, any attempt to locate the residence of a TNC’s parent in such countries could be 
defeated by an adequate definition of corporate residence. Nevertheless, it will be necessary 
to attract non-participant countries and to do so a series of incentives may be contemplated. 
Thus Professor Vann suggests that such incentive could be: 
tax ceiling applying only among the members, unrelieved double taxation for taxes levied outside 
the members, allocation of the whole international tax base among members, or other measures 
[which] would flow quite naturally from the GATT-type structure extending most favoured nation 
status only to members of the system.  16 
The success of implementing such a system, as advocated by this thesis, depends on the level 
of international cooperation that countries are willing to achieve as pointed out by the deputy 
secretary of the Treasury, Lawrence H Summers at a conference held by the U.S. Treasury 
Department on formulary apportionment.17 Once again, in the European Union, attention is 
being given towards the seemingly insurmountable problem of harmonisation of direct taxes. 
Cooperation in tax matters, however, needs to be achieved on a worldwide basis in order to 
stem the steady erosion of the international corporate tax base and the consequential decrease 
in revenue available to governments. In an era where demand for government services is 
increasing, it is simply unacceptable that any government could sustain revenue losses to the 
magnitude of USD 10-12 billion annually.18 As Professor Bird rightly observed some years 
ago, ‘it is clearly time for a change’19 and change will not occur as long as the defects of 
formulary apportionment are exaggerated relative ‘to some perfect version of the transactional 
arm’s length approach that has never existed and cannot exist.’20 
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that it was not economic theory but concerns for the 
essential unfairness of both double taxation and zero taxation that shaped the League of Nation 
Models. These principles are still at the core of the OECD Model. However, the economic 
realities of the present are eroding the utility of the solution founded by the League. 
Consequently, a paradigm shift is required to steer international taxation into achieving its real 
                                                             
16 Ibid . 
17 A.M. Fernandez, ‘Dorgan Blasts Arm’s Length Transfer Pricing Method’, (23 December 1996) Tax Notes Int‘l 
2081, at 2082.  
18 This figure was estimated by research done by the MTC for the USA. See Bucks & Mazerov, supra note 5, at 
386.  
19 R.M. Bird, ‘Shaping a New International Tax Order’, (1988) 42  Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 
292, at 298.  
20 Bird, supra note 13, at 752. 
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purpose: the allocation to each jurisdiction of a fair share of taxes levied on the international 
profits of TNCs. 
Finally, the proposed system is essentially a corporate income tax system administered on a 
multilateral basis through the use of formulary apportionment and a form of worldwide 
combined reporting. It is, in essence, a territorial tax system. It allocates the consolidated 
profits of a TNC exclusively to various tax jurisdictions by way of an apportionment formula. 
This allocation exercise is based on the principle that a country may tax income generated by 
the factors of production with which it has become identified regardless as to where this 
income is sourced.21 Therefore, whilst each jurisdiction taxes the profits allocated to it, it must 
however give up ‘the right to tax income allocated to places outside its territorial 
boundaries.’22 This ‘form of territorial system has great appeal from the perspectives of 
fairness, efficiency, and administrative economy. As Professor McIntyre admits, ‘the problem 
with it has been and remains largely political.’ 
 
                                                             
21  A.L.Harding, Double Taxation of Property and Income (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1933), at 
24ff. 
22  Anonymous, ‘McIntyre on APA Report and More’, (17 April 2000) 20 Tax Notes Int’l (No. 16) 1775, at 
1776. 
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